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Preface 
The problems encountered in the Doha development round and the 
obstacles created by agricultural policy and trade in these negotiations 
illustrate the importance of the issues addressed in this volume. This 
volume is a result of research and exchange activities within the European 
Network of Agricultural and Rural Policy Research Institutes (ENARPRI).  
The ENARPRI network was an attempt to address an institutional 
gap in the EU. An important part of the policy planning and preparation, as 
well as the international negotiations in the field of agricultural and rural 
policy is carried out at the central EU level, i.e. by the European 
Commission. Yet most of the research capacity in the EU on these issues is 
in member states, within institutes that are the privileged conduit between 
the academic community and (national) policy-makers. This situation has 
important advantages, as these institutes assist the member state 
governments in preparing their positions on agricultural and rural policy. 
It also allows the integration of local concerns and specific structural 
conditions into the analysis. 
The absence of a central EU research institute, however, constrains 
both the policy preparation as well as the decision-making process. 
Moreover, in certain member states agricultural and rural policy research is 
dispersed and confined within a limited number of small academic units.   
The growing importance of international trade negotiations in the 
area of agricultural and rural policy reinforces the need for an EU-level 
research capacity. This point certainly holds for trade issues that are 
negotiated at the EU level.   
The purpose of the ENARPRI network was to change this by bringing 
together leading (national) institutes and research teams from 13 of the 25 
EU member states. ENARPRI institutionalised regular meetings within this 
network and between researchers and users of the policy research, both 
inside and outside the EU’s institutions. ii | PREFACE 
 
The ENARPRI network was created in 2003 with financial support 
from the European Commission under its 5th Research Framework 
Programme. The network operations lasted for four years and its activities 
included the organisation of workshops and conferences as well as the 
publication of various working papers, policy briefs and this volume.  
ENARPRI led to an improved exchange of information and policy 
research insights. It also contributed to the development of tools and 
methods, and the organisation of integrated research programmes. There 
were significant positive spillover effects and economies of scale within the 
network by avoiding overlap in the development of models for quantitative 
evaluations as well as policy scenarios, and by linking the comparative 
advantages of various institutes through network collaboration. The 
activities of the network were coordinated and managed by CEPS.  
The central theme of the network over the period 2003–06 was the 
impact of regional, bilateral, and multilateral trade agreements that the EU 
has concluded or is negotiating, including those associated with the World 
Trade Organisation, EU enlargement, the Everything but Arms initiative, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EuroMed Agreements) 
and Mercosur. Most of the agreements are complex in nature and require 
significant modelling efforts to analyse the effects in sufficient detail in 
order to make the results useful. The agreements have repercussions not 
only on efficiency and growth, but also on income and welfare distribution 
within the EU. To analyse these effects in detail, collaboration among 
various institutes with specific knowledge of local circumstances and data 
benefited the overall effort. Furthermore, several of the trade agreements 
have significant interaction effects, which accentuated the benefits arising 
from a concerted effort. Within this general theme of looking at trade 
agreements, the network paid particular and extensive attention to the 
impact of the EuroMed Agreements/trade proposals and their interrelation 
with other trade agreements.  
Another central theme of the network was the multifunctional model 
of European agriculture and the sustainable development of rural areas. 
The impact of the trade agreements on the structure of EU agriculture and 
the livelihoods of rural areas is especially important, as is the interaction of 
the trade agreements with EU policies. A significant debate is taking place 
in the EU about the need to revise some EU agricultural and rural policies 
to address existing concerns about the sustainability of EU agriculture and 
rural areas. Obvious questions emerge as to whether some of the proposed TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AND EU AGRICULTURE | iii 
 
policies, such as payments for good farming practices or for agri-
environmental purposes, are consistent with some of the trade agreements. 
Hence, the correlation between EU policies within the multifunctionality 
and sustainable development framework and trade agreements was an 
important focus of the network. 
This volume presents some of the findings of researchers involved in 
the ENARPRI network over the last four years. The chapters of this book 
were initially presented as working papers at a series of workshops 
organised by ENARPRI member institutes in their respective countries. All 
the chapters were presented at the final ENARPRI conference on “EU 
Agriculture and Trade Agreements”, organised by CEPS and held in 
Brussels on 8 June 2006.  
I hope readers find the material in this book interesting and relevant. 
As explained above, however, these written papers represent only (a 
minor) part of the ENARPRI results, as the institutional development of 
cooperation and exchange alongside the policy dialogue at the member 
state and EU level have been the major results. 
Let me end by acknowledging the support of all the participants at 
the ENARPRI workshops and conference. I would also like to thank the 
network’s advisory committee, which was composed of Professor Giovanni 
Anania (University of Calabria), Professor Jean-Christophe Bureau 
(University of Paris), Dr Elizabeth Guttenstein (World Wildlife Fund) and 
Dr Marina Mastrostefano (European Commission). 
 
 
Johan Swinnen 
ENARPRI Coordinator 
Senior Research Fellow, CEPS 
Professor, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Brussels, December 2006 
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Introduction 
Eleni Kaditi 
The EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) has a long history of 
reforming and adapting various policy instruments to protect its agri-food 
markets from competition from non-EU farmers and food processors. 
These instruments include tariffs and safeguard measures, domestic and 
export subsidies, as well as health and safety standards and other types of 
regulatory barriers. Restrictions on their use arise from the commitments of 
various multilateral trade negotiations, primarily from the EU’s 
membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Moreover, the EU 
has made a policy choice to provide support for its farmers based on the 
objective of ensuring a sustainable agricultural sector in the Community, 
including not only economic, but also social and environmental criteria. 
This objective can be summarised under the heading of 
‘multifunctionality’. In the multilateral context, rural development policies 
thus reduce the impact of EU policies on trade and make the instruments of 
the CAP less trade-distorting while being fully compatible with the WTO 
obligations.  
The present book provides a synthesis of the results of various 
analyses related to EU agricultural policies, trade agreements and the issue 
of multifunctionality. The analyses focus on the impact of regional, bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements that the EU has concluded or is 
negotiating, as well as on the interaction between EU policies and trade 
agreements within the multifunctionality and the sustainable development 
framework. The book is divided into two parts: the first part includes a 
series of preparatory and empirical papers on issues related to EU 
agriculture and trade agreements, whereas the second part examines the 
implications of trade policy for the multifunctionality of EU agriculture, 
with reference to a series of country case studies.      2 | INTRODUCTION 
 
In particular, chapter 1 by Salamon et al. provides an overview of 
multilateral trade agreements and the EU’s membership of the WTO, with 
an emphasis on the impact of resultant commitments for EU agriculture. 
The preferential trade agreements of the EU that affect its agriculture are 
also illustrated, along with the case of free trade agreements. In addition 
the analysis covers all the potential changes in the use of various EU trade 
policy instruments affected by its trade agreements, and the interactions 
between the latter and the EU’s domestic policy instruments. Finally, some 
of the specific requirements needed to model the effects of changes to trade 
policies are discussed as a precursor to the impact analyses included in the 
empirical chapters in the first part of this book.     
Chapter 2, by Kuiper, outlines a number of issues related to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The analysis starts with a brief 
presentation of the current situation in the negotiations related to the EMP, 
followed by a description of the accompanying financial support and the 
Euro-Mediterranean trade agreements. The discussion continues with the 
identification of three main factors that influence the impact of the EMP on 
the economic growth of the Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs). These 
are the amount of liberalisation achieved by the EMP and the factors 
affecting economic growth as well as trade liberalisation in this region. As 
far as agriculture is concerned, the author argues that the current 
implementation of the EMP is unlikely to have a significant result in the 
reduction of agricultural trade protection for either the EU or the MPCs. To 
promote stability and economic growth in the MPCs, the structural features 
of their economies have to be considered, together with a coherent EU 
trade and foreign policy and the promotion of South–South integration. 
In chapter 3, authors Jensen and Yu provide the first empirical 
analysis, examining the interactions of outcomes from the WTO 
negotiations with domestic policy reforms. The simulation set-up considers 
a very detailed implementation of the mid-term review of the CAP. The 
authors argue that it is feasible for the EU to undertake the largest cuts to 
its final bound aggregate measurement of support and total trade-
distorting domestic support (70 and 75%, respectively). Based on this, a 
tiered reduction formula for other WTO members is proposed. In addition, 
CAP-related modelling is discussed, with consideration given to relevant 
WTO features, especially the decoupling of its amber and blue box 
programmes. The key findings of the numerical simulations are as follows. 
First, a structural adjustment in EU agriculture and food production is 
expected, with the outputs of wheat, oilseeds, plant fibres and bovine TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 3 
 
meats dropping significantly. Second, the EU’s net export position in these 
products is forecasted to deteriorate in response to the reform. Yet, the 
overall size of the EU’s agricultural production and trade would remain 
nearly unchanged. Third, despite substantial allocative efficiency gains 
accruing to the EU from the CAP reform, the impact on its terms of trade is 
found to be quite small. Lastly, the welfare and trade expansion effects on 
the rest of world are expected to be rather limited on aggregate, as 
compared with what can be realised from reforms to market access.   
Subsequently, chapter 4 by Brockmeier et al. contains another 
empirical analysis, investigating the effects of possible WTO negotiation 
outcomes on the EU and third countries. An extended version of the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is used to first project a base run that 
includes Agenda 2000, the EU’s enlargement, the Everything but Arms 
agreement and the mid-term review of the CAP. The policy simulation also 
includes the WTO negotiations. For this latter aspect, the simulations 
differentiate among four proposals that have been submitted by the EU, the 
US, the G-10 and the G-20 in advance of the WTO’s Ministerial Conference 
in Hong Kong in October 2005. An adequate tariff-line representation is 
provided, which takes applied and bound rates into account. The authors 
conclude that highly protected sectors would experience severe negative 
changes to their trade balances as a result of all four proposals, but 
particularly under the application of the US proposal. It is also evident that 
the highly protected beef and milk sectors of the EU would be especially 
affected. 
The last chapter in this part of the book, chapter 5, includes an 
empirical analysis of the impact of the EMP on trade flows and economic 
development of the MPCs. Kuiper and van Tongeren focus their study on 
two countries in particular, Morocco and Tunisia. The authors investigate 
the effects of both the current Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
(limited to trade in manufactured goods) and a scenario involving full 
trade liberalisation, which extends to the agricultural sector. In terms of 
domestic policies, the authors consider the cases of non-replacement and 
full replacement of tariff revenues by a consumption tax. Using the GTAP 
model, their results show a strong potential for increasing earnings and 
employment in both countries. These gains depend on whether tariff 
revenues need to be redeemed through domestic taxes or otherwise. 
Moreover, it is concluded that EU member states are not significantly 
affected even when agricultural trade is fully liberalised. As a result, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements could be aligned with domestic reforms 4 | INTRODUCTION 
 
in the respective countries. This approach could reap the full potential 
benefits of the agreements for the MPCs. 
The second part of this book starts with an introductory chapter by 
Dwyer and Guyomard on issues related to multilateral trade agreements 
and multifunctionality. In chapter 6, Dwyer and Guyomard discuss all the 
practical difficulties of bringing together models that examine the economic 
impact of trade policy reforms and models that can measure environmental 
or multifunctionality indicators. A brief overview of all the country case 
studies included in the proceeding chapters is also provided, together with 
an analysis of a varying number of indicators of multifunctionality. In 
particular, the case studies cover four different EU member states, i.e. 
Finland, the Czech Republic, Ireland and Greece. As explained below, all 
the chapters develop different approaches for analysing the effects of 
alternative policy scenarios on the multifunctional role of agriculture for 
the respective countries. 
In chapter 7, by Lehtonen et al., a sector-model approach is used to 
predict and compare the multifunctionality effects of various agricultural 
policy reforms in Finland. Using the DREMFIA model, the key finding of 
their analysis is that reform of the CAP is not likely to result in any drastic 
decline of agricultural production in Finland. The cropped area is predicted 
to decline significantly as more land is put into green set-aside areas when 
agricultural support payments are decoupled from production. The 
agricultural labour force is likely to decline substantially irrespective of 
agricultural policy. This study further concludes that the credibility of the 
production economics and biological relationships of the economic model 
determine the validity of the results for the numerous indicators examined. 
Finally, it is argued that the economic logic of microeconomic simulation 
models provides a consistent assessment of the many aspects of 
multifunctionality. 
The case study in chapter 8, by Doucha and Foltýn, assesses current 
trends in the multifunctionality of Czech agriculture. The authors start their 
analysis with a brief review of the Czech agricultural sector over the last 15 
years. They then apply a non-linear optimising model (FARMA-4) to 
simulate the effects of different policy scenarios up to 2010 on the selected 
set of indicators of multifunctionality for eight farm categories. Under all 
the scenarios considered, they conclude that there is a tendency towards a 
more intensive level of production with less labour input, particularly by 
the profit-oriented farms that now prevail in the Czech Republic. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 5 
 
Chapter 9 includes an analysis of the relationship between a potential 
reform of agricultural trade policy under a WTO agreement and emissions 
from the Irish agricultural sector. Donnellan and Hanrahan focus their 
study on the impact of agricultural production levels and practices on the 
level of greenhouse gas (GHG) and ammonia emissions from this sector. A 
FAPRI-Ireland model is used to examine the issues under consideration, for 
which a brief description is given followed by a presentation of the two 
scenarios used in their projections. The authors conclude that over the next 
10 years emissions of GHG and ammonia from Irish agriculture are likely 
to decline relative to existing levels. Potential WTO trade reforms are also 
e x p e c t e d  t o  l e a d  t o  m o d e r a t e  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  e m i s s i o n s  o f  G H G  a n d  
ammonia by 2015.  
The last case study is presented in chapter 10, which models the 
relationship between trade policy reforms and the multifunctionality of 
agriculture in Greece. Psaltopoulos and Balamou use national and regional 
social accounting matrices to examine changes in the farm and non-farm 
sectors at the respective levels in response to policy changes. Having 
presented the model and methodology used in this study, the authors then 
specify alternative policy scenarios and estimate their effects. Their overall 
conclusion is that the impact of policy reforms upon multifunctionality 
indicators is rather mixed. Under a status quo scenario, a significant decline 
in agricultural employment is projected at the national and regional levels. 
In general, it is argued that increased pollution emissions are generated, 
which overcome the environmental benefits deriving from farming activity 
contraction, owing to the implementation of specific pillar II policy 
instruments. The effects of scenarios modelling full decoupling, the 
elimination of export subsidies and the reduction of decoupled income 
support under pillar I are shown to be rather worrying for most categories 
of projections. 
Finally, Alexopoulos et al. offer a synthesis of the case study findings 
in chapter 11. This last chapter in the book focuses on the relevance of key 
conclusions to both the understanding of trade and multifunctionality 
interrelations and the domestic and international policy processes. Their 
analysis closes by specifying issues that call for further consideration and 
analysis. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Part I 
 
Trade Agreements 
and EU Agriculture 
 
  
  
| 9 
 
 
1.  Key issues surrounding general 
trade agreements 
  Petra Salamon, Crescenzo dell’Aquila, Ellen Huan-Niemi, Hans Jensen, 
Marianne Kurzweil, Oliver von Ledebur and Jyrki Niemi 
Introduction 
In the current discussion on trade liberalisation, there is a focus on the 
multilateral negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) put 
forward by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Yet at the same time, the 
EU – like other major trading partners and particularly the US – has been 
concluding a wide variety of free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs),1 whose features are bound by the WTO pacts 
and, in the case of agriculture in the EU, by the common agricultural policy 
(CAP). Trade agreements, bilateral or multilateral treaties and other 
enforceable compacts committing two or more nations to specified terms of 
commerce usually involve mutually beneficial concessions. These 
agreements are meant to progressively dismantle trade protections with 
countries involved in EU enlargement or in the European integration 
process, and to maintain and deepen economic and political relations with 
the former colonies of member states. They also aim at facilitating trade 
with many developing and emerging economies that are seeking to amplify 
their integration into the world economy and improve trade relationships 
with the EU (Kurzweil et al., 2003; dell’Aquila et al., 2003). 
                                                      
1 The abbreviation ‘TAs’ is used in this chapter to refer to customs unions or free 
trade areas (which imply full tariff liberalisation among members), or other 
arrangements with limited tariff preferences. 10 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
Even though these trade agreements were often developed outside of 
the WTO framework, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the WTO as its successor provide an umbrella for all other agreements. 
In this context, specific provisions guarantee the compatibility of regional 
TAs with the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause, namely to allow for a 
subset of WTO member countries to increase mutual trade through 
discriminatory measures2 under certain conditions. Under the GATT’s Art. 
XXIV (1947), WTO members can form trading blocks discriminating against 
non-members if the agreements: i) involve free trade (i.e. the elimination of 
all tariffs) within the block for substantially all products; and ii) ensure that 
there is no increase in external trade barriers against non-member 
countries. As with the customs union formed by the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the various association agreements the EEC concludes 
with candidate and non-candidate countries and the new partnership 
agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are done 
so under the GATT’s Art. XXIV. This article is the only mechanism through 
which developed countries can also be recipients of trade preferences in 
trade agreements. To monitor the Janus-faced regional TAs, the WTO 
General Council created the Regional Trade Agreements Committee in 
1996, to assess whether or not the TAs are consistent with the WTO 
agreements. 
The next section gives a brief overview of multilateral TAs along with 
FTAs and PTAs, highlighting their political dimensions. It introduces some 
of the specific requirements for the impact analyses that are addressed in 
later sections. Specific regulations are occasionally illustrated by examples 
from the EU sugar regime to emphasise certain effects of international trade 
policies.3  
                                                      
2 The MFN principle, elaborated in Art. I of the WTO, provides for each WTO 
member to grant to all members the same advantage, privilege and favour that it 
grants to any other country. TAs, providing for lower tariffs on goods produced in 
the member countries than on goods produced outside, would violate the non-
discriminatory approach stated by Art. I. Where exemptions are allowed, these are 
regulated by Art. 24. 
3 Further details on preferential TAs and sugar trade can be found in Huan-Niemi 
& Niemi (2003). TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 11 
 
1.1  The EU and multilateral trade agreements of the WTO 
1.1.1  General overview of the WTO 
As an organisation, the WTO aims at liberalising trade. It provides a forum 
for governments to negotiate trade issues and settle trade disputes, and 
operates a system of trade rules. The WTO was established on 1 January 
1995 as the successor to the GATT (1947) agreement. The unofficial 
international organisation that provided rules and oversaw the 
international trading system from 1948 until the advent of the WTO was 
also called GATT, after the agreement itself. Over time, the GATT evolved 
through rounds of negotiations on trade liberalisation (Table 1.1). Starting 
in 1986 and ending in 1994, the last GATT round (Uruguay round) led to 
the creation of the WTO in 1995 (WTO, 2006). 
Table 1.1 Overview of the GATT Agreements 
 Place or name  Year  Main subjects  Member countries 
Geneva 1947  Tariffs  23 
Annecy 1949  Tariffs  13 
Torquay 1951  Tariffs  38 
Geneva 1956  Tariffs  26 
Geneva (Dillon round)  1960–61 Tariffs  26 
Geneva (Kennedy round)  1964–67 Tariffs and anti-dumping 
measures 
62 
Geneva (Tokyo round)  1973–79 Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, ‘framework’ 
agreements 
102 
Geneva (Uruguay round)  1986–94 Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, rules, services, 
intellectual property, 
dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, 
creation of the WTO, etc. 
123 
Source: WTO (2006). 
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Along with other trade concerns, the WTO deals with trade in goods, 
services and intellectual property. In this respect, three different basic 
agreements are relevant. While the GATT governs trade in goods, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) deals with trade in 
services. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) covers inventions, designs and creations. 
A number of fundamental principles serve as the foundation of the 
multilateral trading system: 
•  Non-discrimination based on the concepts of MFN and national 
treatment implies that countries may not discriminate among their 
trading partners;4 furthermore, imported and locally produced items 
should be treated equally once they  have entered the domestic 
market.5  
•  The  lowering of trade barriers by negotiation aims at reducing 
customs duties (or tariffs) and the abolition of import bans or quotas 
that restrict quantities selectively. In addition, non-tariff barriers are 
to be reduced. The WTO allows countries to liberalise their trade 
gradually with longer phasing-in periods for developing countries.  
•  The binding nature of countries’ commitments to market access 
provides ceilings on customs tariff rates (bound rates). Although 
countries6 may tax imports at rates that are lower than the bound 
rates (applied rates), such adjustments are only possible after 
negotiations with trading partners. The use of tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs) and other import-limiting measures is also discouraged, and 
countries’ trading rules are supposed to be publicly transparent as 
evaluated by the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  
                                                      
4 If a member grants a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of 
their products) to one country, this has to be done for all other WTO members. But 
in each agreement this principle is handled in a slightly different way. Some 
exceptions exist concerning goods: countries can set up an FTA that applies only to 
trade within the group; they can also give developing countries special access to 
their markets or raise barriers against products traded unfairly by a specific 
country. Exceptions in the trade of services also are allowed.  
5 T h e r e f o r e ,  c h a r g i n g  c u s t o m s  d u t y  o n  a n  i m p o r t  i s  n o t  a  v i o l a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  
treatment, even if locally-produced products are not charged an equivalent tax. 
6 For the most part this refers to developing countries. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 13 
 
•  Fair competition is supposed to be promoted through rules for open 
and undistorted competition (based on the principle of non-
discrimination), which govern issues such as ‘dumping’ (the export of 
products at prices that are below cost to gain market share) and the 
enactment of countermeasures for charging additional import duties 
to compensate for losses accrued.  
•  Development and economic reform prompts special assistance and 
trade concessions for developing countries.  
From the perspective of the WTO, regional TAs can actually support 
the multilateral trading system. Issues such as services, intellectual 
property, environmental standards, investments and competition policies 
originally arose in the contexts of the regional TAs and were later brought 
up as topics within the WTO. On the other hand, regional preferential TAs 
might violate the trade interests of third countries by encroaching on the 
WTO’s principle of equal treatment for all trading partners (MFN) as the 
case of sugar shows. Here the EU policy on sugar trade has deviated 
widely from the WTO’s non-discrimination principle, given that it applies 
different policies to different regions and trading blocs (Huan-Niemi & 
Niemi, 2003, p. 3). 
The two largest agreements on goods and services comprise broad 
principles, extra agreements and annexes dealing with the special 
requirements, as well as detailed and lengthy schedules of commitments 
made by individual countries providing access to their markets. For the 
GATT, these take the form of binding commitments on tariffs for goods in 
general and combinations of tariffs and quotas for some agricultural 
products. Underpinning these agreements are the procedures for dispute 
settlement and the trade policy reviews (see Table 1.2). Important 
achievements of the Uruguay round were the commitments to ‘bind’ 
customs duty rates on the imports of goods, with individual countries 
listing their legally binding commitments in schedules annexed to the 
Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT in 1994. Some particularities concerning 
agriculture and agricultural goods are discussed below. 
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Table 1.2 Areas covered by the WTO 
Umbrella  Agreement establishing the WTO  
  Goods Services  Intellectual  property 
Basic principles  GATT GATS  TRIPS 
Additional details  Other goods 
agreements and 
annexes 
Services annexes  – 
Market access  
  commitments 
Countries’ 
schedules of 
commitments 
Countries’ 
schedules of 
commitments 
(and MFN 
exemptions) 
– 
Dispute settlement  Dispute settlement 
Transparency Trade  policy  reviews 
Source: WTO (2006). 
1.1.2  Achievements in agricultural trade 
During the Uruguay round, tariffs on all agricultural products were bound. 
Although the original GATT did apply to agricultural trade, it contained 
loopholes allowing countries to use some non-tariff measures such as 
import quotas and to subsidise agriculture. The aim of the Uruguay round 
was to convert all import restrictions into tariffs, a process known as 
‘tariffication’, replacing other restrictions by tariffs giving the same level of 
protection. The new rules of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and its 
commitments applied to 
•  market access and various trade restrictions confronting imports; 
•  export subsidies and other methods used to make exports artificially 
competitive; and 
•  domestic support based on subsidies and other programmes, 
including those that raise or guarantee farm-gate prices and farmers’ 
incomes. 
Provisions concerning market access included the tariffication 
package with reduced tariffs (Table 1.3), but also aimed at guaranteeing 
some new access quantities with non-prohibitive duty rates, which was to 
be achieved by TRQs. For products ruled by tariffication, governments 
were allowed to take special emergency actions (special safeguards) in TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 15 
 
order to prevent swiftly falling prices. In the case of sugar, the special 
safeguard provisions have remained in constant operation since 1995, 
because of the low prices for sugar on the world market. The fixed standard 
tariffs and the additional import duties under the safeguard measures have 
made the import of non-preferential sugar uneconomic in comparison with 
the price of EU quota sugar in the internal market (Huan-Niemi & Niemi, 
2003, p. 4). Under the AoA, countries also used special treatment provisions 
to restrict the imports of particularly sensitive products (mainly rice) 
during the implementation period.  
Table 1.3 The reductions in agricultural subsidies and protection agreed in the 
Uruguay round (in %) 
 Developed  countries 
6 years: 1995–2000 
Developing countries 
10 years: 1995–2004 
Tariffs 
Average cut for all 
agricultural products 
–36 –24 
Minimum cut per product  –15  –10 
Domestic support 
Total aggregate measure of 
support cuts for the sector 
(base period: 1986–88) 
–20 –13 
Exports 
Value of subsidies  –36  –24 
Subsidised quantities 
(base period: 1986–90) 
–21 –14 
Source: WTO (2006). 
In principle, the AoA prohibits export subsidies unless these are 
specified in a member’s lists of commitments. Least-developed countries 
(LDCs) are exempted. When listed, the agreement requires cutting both the 
amount of money spent on export subsidies and the quantities that receive 
subsidies. Taking averages for 1986–90 as the base level, developed 
countries agreed to cut their values of export subsidies by 36% over six 
years starting in 1995 and to reduce quantities by 21%. Implementation 16 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
periods are longer and rates are lower for developing countries.7 The 
required reductions did not cause any difficulties in the case of sugar for 
the EU at the beginning of the implementation period, but towards the end 
export subsidy commitments became very binding and a ‘temporary cut’ of 
498,800 tonnes in the total A- and B-sugar quotas was needed (Huan-Niemi 
& Niemi, 2003, p. 3). 
The agreement does allow governments to support their rural 
economies, but preferably through policies that cause less trade distortion. 
Domestic policies affecting production and trade have had to be cut back. 
These domestic support measures, which are known as the total aggregate 
measurement of support (total AMS), were calculated for the agricultural 
sector and subjected to reductions (except for those operating in the LDCs). 
Three categories of domestic support were set up. One includes all 
distorting market-price support measures (with some exceptions), known 
as the ‘amber box’, which is defined in Art. 6 of the AoA as all domestic 
supports except those in the ‘blue’ and ‘green boxes’ (as discussed below). 
Up to 5% of agricultural production in developed countries (and 10% in 
developing countries) was exempted from cuts (de minimis minimal 
supports), whereas larger subsidies were subjected to cuts. The necessary 
reduction commitments are expressed in terms of total AMS, comprising all 
support for specified products as well as non-product-specific support in 
one overall figure defined in Art. 1 and Annexes 3 and 4 of the AoA.  
Other measures with only minimal impact on trade fall into the green 
box (Annex 2 of the AoA) and can be used freely. Qualified measures must 
be government funded and do not involve price support. For the most part, 
this area is where one can find programmes that are not targeted at 
products, but include decoupled direct income support and programmes 
for environmental and regional development. If these measures comply 
with the criteria set out in Annex 2, green box supports are not limited.  
Other direct payments coupled to production belong to the blue box, 
where conditions are applied to reduce distortion. Support normally found 
in the amber box is shifted to the blue box if the recipient is required to 
limit production (para. 5 of Art. 6). Currently, there are no limits on 
spending for programmes in the blue box.  
                                                      
7 For developing countries, these figures are respectively 24% and 14% over a 10-
year period. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 17 
 
Again using the example of sugar, the EU was not specifically 
required to cut its internal price support for sugar under the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), because domestic support is 
measured as the AMS, aggregated across all commodities and policy 
instruments. Subsequently, the total reduction of 20% over a period of six 
years for domestic support commitments refers to the total levels of 
support, but not to individual commodities. Overall, the sector-wide 
domestic support for sugar has been high compared with other agricultural 
commodities in the EU, because of the high intervention price for sugar 
before the reform of the EU sugar regime in 2006 (Huan-Niemi & Niemi, 
2003, p. 4). 
Creating binding tariffs and applying them equally are the general 
rule, but the WTO also allows exceptions for taking action against dumping 
(selling at an unfairly low price) and subsidies. Special ‘countervailing’ 
duties are granted to offset the subsidies and emergency measures can be 
undertaken to temporarily limit imports, designed to ‘safeguard’ domestic 
industries. A number of agreements deal with various bureaucratic or legal 
issues that could involve hindrances to trade such as import licensing, rules 
for the valuation of goods at customs, further checks on imports, rules of 
origin, investment measures and licensing procedures. 
1.1.3  The Doha Development Agenda 
In November 2001, the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha launched a 
new set of negotiations as part of its development agenda. The DDA 
involves a range of subjects, including those on agriculture and services, on 
which talks had already begun in early 2000. It also focuses on problems 
developing countries face under the current WTO agreements. During 
negotiations, the mandate was refined by work at Cancún in 2003, Geneva 
in 2004 and Hong Kong in 2005. The negotiations under the mandate of the 
Doha Declaration were originally supposed to end by 1 January 2005. 
Governments were to commit themselves to a substantial increase in 
market access, a possible phasing out of export subsidies and a cut of trade-
distorting domestic support. Special and differential treatment for 
developing countries was made an integral part of the negotiations. The 
governments also agreed to include non-trade concerns such as those on 
environmental protection, food security and rural development. At the 
time of writing, the main features of the negotiations on agriculture could 
be characterised as below (WTO, 2006). 18 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
There are to be three reduction bands in the final bound AMS and in 
the overall cut in trade-distorting domestic support, with higher linear cuts 
in the higher bands. The member with the highest level of permitted 
support will be in the top band and the two members with the second and 
third highest levels of support will be in the middle band. All others, 
including developing countries, will be in the bottom band. Overall 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support will be required even if the 
sum of the reductions in the final bound total AMS, de minimis and the blue 
box payments results in a lower figure than the overall reduction required. 
The EU is in the top band and the US and Japan are in the middle band, but 
the proposed cuts diverge in most categories. Product-specific AMS may be 
capped. The blue box will likely be modified with support capped at 2.5% 
of production value and the green box should be reviewed and clarified.  
All forms of export subsidies are to be eliminated by the end of 2013 
with front loading, so that substantial cut rates are realised in the beginning 
of the implementation period. A severe discipline on all export measures 
with equivalent effects, including export credits, state trading enterprises 
(STEs) and food aid is to be targeted. Thus far agreement has been reached 
on the disciplines for short-term export credits, but disagreements remain 
on how to deal with STEs with monopoly powers and how to ensure that 
bona fide food aid does not lead to commercial displacement. 
Regarding market access, progress has been made on the calculation 
of tariff equivalents (ad valorem equivalents), which build the basis for 
determining the cut bands. The calculation has been agreed on four tariff 
tiers, but thresholds still need to be determined. Within the bands, linear 
cut formulas whose amount is to be negotiated will be applied. Lack of 
agreement exists with respect to the ceiling on tariffs (between 75% and 
100%). Additionally, the treatment of sensitive products must be clarified – 
at present the proposed figures vary between 1% and 15% of tariff lines. 
How issues such as TRQs (volume, in-quota tariff and administration), 
preference erosion and tariff escalation are to be dealt with has yet to be 
determined. Generally, developing country members will have the 
possibility of using the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSG), in which four 
tariff bands will also be arranged. Furthermore, developing countries are to 
have the flexibility to individually designate an appropriate number of 
tariff lines as special products, guided by indicators based on the criteria of 
food security, livelihood security and rural development. In principle, two-
thirds of the industrial country members’ scheduled tariff cuts can be 
devoted to the reductions for developing country members. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 19 
 
Other issues cover subjects such as the treatment of geographical 
indications, the ‘cotton initiative’ and other sectoral initiatives, export taxes, 
tropical products, and special and differential treatment (SDT) for 
developing countries. 
Although it seems as if the disputing parties had reached an 
agreement in Hong Kong, the actual quantitative outcome of the 
negotiations, especially those concerning agriculture, remains uncertain. 
Several options under discussion are presented in the following empirical 
chapters of the first part of this book, as they form the basis of scenarios 
carried out and depict the impact of certain proposals. 
1.2  EU preferential trade agreements and agriculture 
The EU is one of the major players in the global agricultural and food 
market. European agri-food production as well as trade and trade patterns 
are governed by the CAP and related trade regimes. Within this overall 
framework of the WTO, the EU deals with numerous PTAs with third 
countries (Table 1.4).8  
In principle, these PTAs and FTAs were originally initiated by 
different sources. In the Treaty of Rome, provisions were granted for the 
ACP countries and the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) of the 
emerging European Community member states. Mutual trade preferences 
were established in a series of consecutive conventions starting with the 
Lomé Conventions, which were replaced by the Cotonou Conventions. 
Whereas previous trade relations had been primarily based on non-
reciprocal trade preferences granted by the EU to ACP exports, both sides 
have agreed to enter into economic integration agreements (new WTO-
compatible trading arrangements), progressively remove barriers and 
enhance cooperation in all areas related to trade. To this end, the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will be negotiated with the ACPs and 
applied through a process of regional economic integration. Formal 
negotiations on the EPAs started in September 2002 and the EPAs will enter 
into force by 1 January 2008 at the latest. The unilateral trade preferences 
                                                      
8 More details on these agreements can be found in ENARPRI Working Paper No. 
1 (Huan-Niemi & Niemi, 2003) and ENARPRI Working Paper No. 3 (Kurzweil, von 
Ledebur & Salamon, 2003). 20 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
will continue to be applied during the interim period 2000–07. Thus the 
PTAs will be transformed into FTAs.  
The OCTs, having had their Association Agreements accepted by the 
GATT in 1971, have to be regarded separately given that inhabitants of the 
OCTs are EU citizens. The new association arrangements9 of the OCTs are 
designed to promote the economic and social development of the OCTs, to 
develop economic relations between the OCTs and the EU, to take account 
of their specific characteristics, and finally, to improve the effectiveness of 
the financial instruments involved.  
The OCTs benefit from preferential access to the EU market. Products 
originating from the OCTs imported into the EU are not subject to import 
duties or quantitative restrictions. These arrangements are nonreciprocal; in 
other words, products originating from the EU are subject to the import 
duties established by the OCTs. 
European integration is another initiative involving the EU and 
qualifying candidate countries. This process gradually implements a 
customs union by means of a partial reduction of tariffs or by establishing 
TRQs (or both), especially in the area of agriculture. Prominent examples in 
this respect are the Europe Agreements and Association Agreements with 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), along with Malta, 
Cyprus and Turkey. Most of the countries involved in such agreements 
have since become EU member states. These kinds of agreements are now 
complemented by autonomous trade concessions/agreements with the 
Balkan countries or those in south-eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia–
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro). They were concluded in 2000 or later as in the case of 
Albania. The EU has offered the parties to these agreements the possibility 
of full integration into the EU’s structures; thus, as potential accession 
candidates these countries have been offered tailor-made Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements. The agreements, over a transitory period, render 
these trade concessions reciprocal, thereby gradually opening up the 
markets of the region to EU products. 
                                                      
9 For further details, see European Council, Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 
2001 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European 
Community, OJ L 314, 11.11.2001 and L 324, 7.12.2001. This Council Decision will 
remain in force until 2011.   
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Table 1.4 Overview of the EU’s PTAs that affect agriculture 
Trade agreement  Countries or regions covered 
Europe Agreements  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia Æ EU–CEEC forming EU–25 (1.5.2004) except Bulgaria and 
Romania 
Association Agreements  Cyprus and Malta Æ EU–CEEC 
Turkey Æ EU–RASS 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Serbia  
and Montenegro 
Euro–Mediterranean Association 
Agreements 
Israel, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia Æ EUROMED 
Cooperation Agreements  
(Euro–Mediterranean Association 
Agreements concluded but not in effect 
or under negotiation) 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria Æ EUROMED 
Other FTAs  (Denmark) Faroe Islands, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland Æ EU–EEA 
South Africa  
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Table 1.4 cont. 
Other customs unions  Andorra and San Marino Æ EU–OCU 
Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories 
Anguilla, Antarctica, Aruba, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, French Polynesia, French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories, Greenland, Mayotte,  Montserrat, Netherlands 
Antilles, New Caledonia, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Ascension Island, Tristan da Cunha, South 
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon,  Turks and Caicos 
Islands, Wallis and Fortuna Islands Æ EU–OCT 
EU–African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) Partnership 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cap Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Cook Islands, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue 
Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Æ EU–ACP  
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Table 1.4 cont. 
Autonomous Trade Measures for the 
Western Balkans 
Albania, Bosnia–Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo   
Æ EU–ATM–Western Balkans 
Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) only 
Afghanistan, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chile, People’s Republic of China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Lao People’s 
Dem. Rep., Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, the UAE, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,  American 
Samoa, Bermuda, Bouvet Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Gibraltar, Guam, Heard 
and McDonald Islands, Macao, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, US Minor 
Outlying Islands, Tokelau Islands and Virgin Islands (US) Æ EU–GSP 
Everything but Arms (EBA)  The  ACP  LDCs  are  Sudan, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Cape Verde, 
Gambia, Guinea–Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, Central African Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tomé and Principe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, 
Comoros, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Haiti, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Vanuatu and 
Samoa. The non-ACP LDCs are Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan, 
Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia Æ EU–EBA. 
Other access   New Zealand, Australia, US and Canada  
Cooperative Agreement  MERCOSUR (under negotiation), Chile and Mexico 
Note: LDCs are in italics. 
Source: Kurzweil, von Ledebur & Salamon (2003). 24 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
FTAs were also negotiated with some non-European trading partners 
to improve relations with developing, emerging and transitional countries 
as well as better integrate them into the world economy and facilitate trade 
in both directions. This group comprises the negotiations or signed 
agreements with MERCOSUR, Chile, Mexico and South Africa. 
A broader framework for different preferential regimes is provided 
by the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in conjunction with the 
Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative. These instruments were established 
with the dual purpose of facilitating trade and development. But the 
pertinence of preferential TAs as development measures is still debated. 
The EBA unilateral trade concession10 is intended to further improve 
trading opportunities for the LDCs. All agricultural products are included 
in the concession, in contrast with the original GSP concession, which 
focused on manufactured goods. Although LDCs had wide-ranging market 
access before the concession, afterwards nearly all agricultural products 
became free from ad valorem or specific duties and import quotas. 
Nevertheless, the full liberalisation of sugar, rice and bananas is being 
phased in with a transition period. During this period, raw sugar can be 
exported duty free within the limits of a tariff quota, which will increase 
each year by 15% from 74,185 tonnes (of white sugar equivalent) in 2001–02 
to 197,355 tonnes in 2008–09.) In the case of rice, full liberalisation will be 
phased in between 1 September 2006 and 1 September 2009 by gradually 
reducing the EU tariff to zero. In the meantime, a tariff quota has enabled 
the duty-free access of LDC exports within the limits of 2,517 tonnes 
(husked-rice equivalent) since 2001–02, rising to 6,696 tonnes in 2008–09. 
Concerning bananas, after a phasing-in period with gradually reduced 
tariffs, duty-free access was granted in 2006. 
As a result of these processes, the EU has TAs with numerous 
countries worldwide. The aims and the degree of preferences included in 
                                                      
10 The provisions of the EBA Regulation (European Council Regulation (EC) No. 
416/2001 of 28 February 2001) have been incorporated into the GSP Regulation 
(European Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001). The EBA regulation foresees 
that the special arrangements for LDCs should be maintained for an unlimited 
period of time and not be subject to the periodic renewal of the EU’s scheme of 
generalised preferences. Therefore, the date of expiry of European Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 does not apply to its EBA provisions. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 25 
 
the different TAs may vary a great deal. Within the listed agreements, the 
EU grants and partly receives numerous preferences that vary according to 
the date of signature, aim or regional coverage as well as to the kinds of 
goods targeted. The goal to be achieved by the EU is often more than a 
provision of economic gains, so targets such as European integration, 
stabilisation and improved conditions for developing or transitional 
countries are mentioned. Moreover, while following these political aims, 
the adherence to European superordinated preferences for domestic goods, 
especially in the agri-food sector, is apparent for example by the 
introduction of safeguard provisions and the definition of sensitive 
products including sugar, beef, dairy products, bananas and other fruits 
and vegetables. Key features of these agreements are 
•  They are negotiated bilaterally, thus allowing better adjustment 
during the convergence process, but at the same time implying a 
greater bargaining power for the EU.11  
•  Nearly all agreements cover general trade, whose arrangements are 
implemented step-wise combined with a gradual removal of tariffs 
and duties, quantitative import restrictions, export restrictions and 
export subsidies. To some extent these concessions are then converted 
into custom unions or ‘real’ free trade areas, and can be deepened 
into arrangements for qualifying states to join the EU by applying the 
aquis communautaire.  
•  Comparably swift adjustments are characteristics of most non-
agricultural sectors, but the importance of the CAP implies a much 
slower implementation in the agri-food sectors. Here, tariff 
reductions are not always assigned in a reciprocal way. Sensitive 
products of one preference partner are often subjected to lower 
concessions, as is the case with CAP products such as sugar, beef and 
veal, dairy products and certain fruits and vegetables.  
•  Quite often the concessions are granted as TRQs, with a fixed import 
quantity for which a zero tariff or reduced tariff is applied, whereas 
over-quota import quantities are charged out-of-quota tariffs 
(normally MFN rates). These quotas can be established for all 
                                                      
11 Exceptions in this respect are the Cotonou Convention and the GSP and EBA 
protocols. 26 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
countries under a certain scheme (e.g. wheat), but are often allocated 
to individual countries so that unfilled quotas cannot be used by 
other preferential suppliers (e.g. dairy products). Both systems may 
be applied to certain goods at the same time (e.g. beef and bananas).  
•  Tariff reductions and TRQs are always fixed for specific tariff lines, 
and are mostly based on a HS 8-digit level or higher. Some of the 
tariff preferences are actually temporarily limited to some seasons 
when production is low in the EU, especially for fruit and vegetables. 
With regard to the EBA concession, additional access to the EU is 
provided for 919 agricultural tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level. 
•  EU duties are often defined as an absolute value in euros per tonne or 
per 100 kg (specific tariffs). Therefore, the exporter is subject to the 
effects of varying exchange rates.  
•  The  import licenses providing the preferences are distributed in 
various ways, e.g. on a ‘first come, first served’ basis or given to 
historical suppliers with quotas for newcomers or implemented 
through tenders. Different allocation systems may imply different 
economic outcomes depending on who receives the quota rent.  
•  From the very beginning, the EU agreements have been equipped 
with  safeguard clauses and measures, aimed at protecting the 
internal market from sudden surges of imports that will affect 
domestic market prices. In cases where these were not included, they 
have often been added later on. An example is provided by the new 
regulation of trade with the OCTs, which now has a safeguard clause. 
When in 1999 the OCTs tried to circumvent the import quotas 
imposed, the European Commission applied safeguard measures to 
prevent the import of sugar and cocoa mixtures from the OCTs. 
•  A second qualitative restriction is the rule of origin, which ensures 
that a preference is only granted if the product originates in the 
country to which the preference is provided. The origin of sugar 
coming from the LDCs could be a concern in the EU.  
•  Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures may be set up in the 
context of the TAs to the extent they protect human, animal and plant 
health and follow the WTO rules.  
•  Among other aspects, the agreements refer to property rights, 
institutional frameworks, acceptance of common standards and 
settings for foreign investments. Regulations and measurements can TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 27 
 
prove necessary to generate stable economic growth and income. But 
under certain circumstances they can turn into obstacles when, for 
example, common standards prevent some or all imports.  
1.3  Policy dimensions 
1.3.1  The policy measures affected 
Looking at the issues and policies covered by the PTAs and FTAs, there is a 
similar range of measures as those covered by the WTO. All TAs are aimed 
at lowering trade barriers among their member governments or at least 
governments try to overcome the most important hindrances to improved 
trade flows. The main differences in comparison with the WTO are to be 
seen in the extent to which they affect both trade and domestic support 
measures. 
The multilateral framework of the WTO is better suited for the 
treatment of domestic policies than PTAs and FTAs. Domestic policies are 
tested as to whether they are consistent with the WTO’s rules or hinder the 
increase in fair trade, and, based upon that, are also included in the 
multilateral bindings. Because of EU enlargement, the CAP has been forced 
to undergo reform for better concordance with WTO rules, through the 
mid-term review of the CAP. So the impact on the domestic policies of any 
member state and especially on larger member states is much more 
pronounced under a multilateral than under a bilateral system.  
Although domestic policies are not directly affected by TAs, two 
important issues for possible policy re-definition remain. First, many 
existing domestic policies are likely to be challenged owing to their 
inconsistency with trade regulations, which might be the real core of the 
negotiations for agricultural liberalisation. Second, lower border protection 
has an impact on domestic markets and welfare; thus changes in the 
economic situation of different economic agents can induce adjustments in 
domestic policies. Naturally, it is to be expected that the effects will 
increase disproportionally with the economic importance of a trading 
partner and the negotiated size of the tariff reductions compared with 
domestic protection. A further question concerns the interaction between 
domestic policies and trade policies.  
Table 1.5 presents an overview of trade policy measures affected by 
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include import tariffs, TRQs, export subsidies and the EU entry-price 
system as well as voluntary export restrictions (VERs).  
Table 1.5 Changes in EU trade policy measures owing to EU TAs  
   EU–
CEECs 
EU-
RASS 
Euro-
Med 
  EU-
EEA 
EU-
ACP 
EU-
GSP 
EU-
EBA 
EU-
Chile/ 
South 
Africa 
WTO 
Tariffs  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
TRQs  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
SSG or 
sensitive  
products 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Import 
licenses* 
Yes  No No No No No  No No  No 
Entry 
prices 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Export 
subsidies 
Yes  Yes No Yes No No  Yes No  Yes 
VERs/ 
non-tariff 
barriers 
No  Yes Yes No No No  No No  Yes 
* Import licenses are required in general. Trade with the CEECs will eventually become internal 
trade; therefore no further import licenses will be required. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Import licences are required in all cases, whose distribution can vary 
by product. Normally, the implementation of a TA does not change this 
requirement (with the notable exception of EU enlargement). The 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures established by the WTO 
requires import licensing to be simple, transparent and predictable. Export 
subsidies are granted to promote exports when world market prices are 
lower than domestic prices. Not being fixed, export subsidies are evaluated 
at regular intervals and often adjusted to reflect changes in world market 
prices, exchange rates, domestic and foreign availabilities, demand, 
domestic price fluctuations and other changes. Under the WTO agreement, 
export subsidies were bound multilaterally for the first time and 
characterised by upper limits to budgetary expenses for export subsidies as 
well as to subsidised export quantities, both of which were to be reduced. 
The DDA talks foresee a complete abolition of export subsidies by 
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the implementation of the WTO, some members obtained similar results by 
negotiating VERs without technically imposing quotas. Clearly, foreign 
companies were persuaded to voluntarily restrict the quantities of goods 
they export to a particular country. The foreign companies agreed because 
their governments threatened to impose tariffs if the companies did not 
agree to the VERs. Thus the VERs do not represent a common trade 
measure,12 but they are often regarded as a non-tariff barrier to trade. 
Within the WTO, the technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are regulated by a 
separate agreement and they will be subject to further discussion in the 
WTO talks. 
Table 1.6 presents the policy linkages between the CAP and the TAs. 
In general, the policies embedded in the CAP and bilateral TAs are only 
indirectly related. The CAP measures include 
•  production quotas (e.g. for sugar, raw milk and starch) and 
maximum guaranteed quantities (e.g. olive oil, cotton and dried 
fodder);  
•  intervention price systems or equivalent regulations (e.g. basic price 
and target price) in different sectors (e.g. cereals, beef, dairy products, 
sugar and pork);  
•  set-aside regulations (e.g. cereals and oilseeds); and  
•  consumption/processing aids (e.g. butter, skimmed milk powder and 
cotton).  
Usually, these measures are only lightly affected by bilateral TAs, 
with exceptions for some special cases – e.g. the EBA and the EU sugar 
sector – in which effects of preferential TAs are considered as very 
significant as the above-mentioned domestic policy instruments are mostly 
associated with the amber or blue box of domestic support subject to cuts. 
These WTO bindings (and anticipated future cuts) along with the 
budget issues surrounding the EU’s enlargement have induced policy 
reforms. More specifically, in principle domestic support elements have 
been shifted from the amber box (market support measures) to the blue box 
(direct payments) or the green box (income transfers) by the mid-term 
review of the CAP.  
                                                      
12 Theoretically derived effects of VERs can be found in Bouet (2001) and Wauthy 
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Table 1.6 Interactions between the EU’s domestic policy measures and EU TAs 
  EU-CEECs 
enlargmt. 
EU-
RASS 
Euro-
Med 
EU- 
EEA 
EU- 
ACP 
EU- 
GSP 
EU- 
EBA 
EU-Chile/ 
South 
Africa 
WTO 
Production 
quotas 
Yes (Yes)  (Yes)  (Yes)  (Yes) (Yes) (Yes)  No  Yes 
Intervention
/basic price 
Yes (Yes)  (Yes)  (Yes)  (Yes) (Yes) (Yes)  (No)  Yes 
Set-aside Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No  (No)  (Yes) 
Consumptio
n or 
processing 
subsidies 
(Yes) No  No  No  No  No  No No (Yes) 
Premiums/ 
single farm 
payments 
Yes No  No  No  No  No  No No Yes 
Budget Yes  (Yes)  (Yes)  (Yes)  (Yes) (Yes) (Yes)  (Yes)  Yes 
Note: Information in parentheses indicates a very small effect. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
As part of the CAP, decoupled support payments represent a further 
group of policy instruments that may be affected by TAs and vice versa. 
Whereas the impact of a bilateral TA on the amount of payments and the 
formal design of direct payments is probably negligible, the effect of 
payments in the light of a multilateral agreement could be much more 
significant and distinct. Granting payments enables the EU to lower tariffs 
and other trade barriers with a limited impact on production. When 
transfers have been decoupled as scheduled by the mid-term review, the 
direct support of certain sectors might be lower than would be the case 
with partly-coupled direct payments; however, production costs will also 
be reduced by a single farm payment allowing presumably higher 
production than in a situation where no payments are granted. Thus the 
EU has greater potential to lower its tariffs when TAs are established. Yet 
the process of decoupling has actually been prompted by the DDA 
negotiations, which in all circumstances will require the EU to reduce its 
protection with respect to import tariffs, export subsidies and domestic 
support. Under the present system, the shift towards decoupled domestic 
support would be regarded as the least devastating compared with other 
protection measures.  
All of the instruments discussed above have repercussions on the EU 
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refunds as well as adjustments in the domestic policy instruments, directly 
affect the EU budget. On the other hand, changes in the EU budget lead to 
the necessity of policy adjustments, concerning primarily domestic but also 
indirect trade-policy measures. 
1.3.2  Policy representation in models 
As stated above, an adequate representation of policy measures in models 
for trade analysis is needed, covering trade policies as well as domestic 
agricultural policies. Owing to the wide range of policy instruments carried 
out by the EU, standard approaches are often used for a stylised 
representation of policy measures such as the so-called ‘tariff equivalents’ 
or ‘price wedges’. A tariff equivalent of a policy measure is calculated as 
the difference between the world market price and the comparable 
domestic price. A disadvantage of this simple concept is the fact that most 
of the goods are not homogenous (non-comparable) and undistorted world 
market prices are seldom obtainable. A common method for deriving tariff 
equivalents is to use producer support estimates, comprising price 
distortions, market price supports (transfers from consumers to producers) 
and transfers from governments to producers. A similar concept exists for 
consumer subsidy equivalents. The drawbacks are the relevant fluctuations 
of producer support estimates and consumer support estimates, owing to 
changes in world market prices, exchange rates and the values of domestic 
production (van Tongeren & van Meijl, 1999).  
Also, the representation of quantitative restrictions by tariff 
equivalents is often an inadequate approach. Quantitative restrictions are 
as frequently used in agricultural markets and trade policies as price 
support instruments. They range from production quotas (e.g. sugar and 
milk), bounds on intervention buying (e.g. beef and milk), restrictions on 
livestock production per area, limitations on emissions and overly limited 
premiums (for most agricultural products), to import quotas, TRQs and 
limitations on export subsidies. The depiction of these measures is more 
complicated whenever they pose no real restriction on production or 
demand. Quotas are then ‘non-binding’ and the tariff equivalent would be 
zero or less. Yet policy changes may cause adjustments, leading to a 
situation in which quotas are restrictive (binding), but the tariff equivalents 
are still zero or fixed. Model results, in this case, would not detect such a 
development. Such policy measures can be directly introduced into models, 
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In all cases, databases are needed that provide information on the 
policy measures in the regions under observation, as well as data about 
these instruments. With trade policy measures such as import tariffs, 
import quotas, TRQs, entry price systems, seasonal import restrictions, 
export subsidies, restrictions on subsidised exports, export subsidy 
commitments and non-tariff barriers, a more direct approach is often 
required. 
Table 1.7 gives a brief overview of the approaches to explicitly 
introducing policy changes in models.  
Table 1.7 Requirements for explicit policy representation in modelling TAs 
Policy measure  Changing 
profile or 
effectiveness 
owing to PTAs 
Modelling of policy 
instruments 
Additional 
information 
Border measures 
Tariffs Reduced  or 
abolished 
Tax rates  Aggregation of tariff 
lines 
TRQs 
quantities 
in/out of quota 
rates 
Either newly 
introduced or 
increased  
or abolished (free 
access) 
Complementarity Aggregation  of  tariff 
lines establishing 
binding and non-
binding quotas, fill 
rates, estimation of 
rents 
Import licenses  Generate or 
change the 
distribution of 
rents among 
groups 
Implementation of 
rents as income of 
groups, e.g. 
importers 
Distribution of rents 
Export subsidies, 
limitation on 
subsidised 
export quantities 
Reduced or 
abolished 
Complementarity Aggregation  of  tariff 
lines establishing 
binding and non-
binding quotas, fill 
rates, estimation of 
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Table 1.7 cont. 
Entry prices 
(variable levies) 
Reduced or 
abolished 
Closure swap  Aggregation of 
variable levies 
VERs Introduced  or 
abolished 
Complementarity   Aggregation of tariff 
lines establishing 
binding and non-
binding quotas, fill 
rates, estimation of 
rents 
 
Domestic policy measures  
Production 
quotas 
Reduce rents  Complementarity  
or upper bounds 
Establishing binding 
and non-binding 
quotas, fill rates, 
estimation of rents, 
distribution of rents 
Intervention/  
basic price 
Changes price 
wedge 
Introduction of 
additional 
equations, 
intervention price 
and price 
transmission 
Price transmission 
between the 
intervention price 
and market price 
Set-aside Becomes  less 
effective 
(probably small) 
Adjustment of rates  – 
Consumption/ 
processing 
subsidies 
Become less 
effective 
(probably small) 
Adjustment of rate 
or closure swap 
– 
Premiums 
(animal & 
hectare), 
payments (single 
farm payments) 
Affect 
production levels 
Equal or unequal 
distribution to land 
or other factors, 
lump sum 
Coupled to factors, 
full or partial 
decoupling from 
factors 
Budget Changes 
expenditures  
Introduction of  EU 
budget 
SAM and additional 
equations, data 
adjustments to net 
transfer 
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As trade policy instruments often comprise quantitative restrictions, 
the modelling process requires a complementarity approach or, depending 
on the model used, a fixation of upper bounds. A complementarity 
approach allows a more detailed representation.  
The implementation of these different approaches in models draws 
upon quantitative country-level information for 
•  actual, bilateral, applied tariff rates as well as bound rates; 
•  bilateral TRQs, in-quota tariff rates, actual imports or fill rates, 
seasonal restrictions and actual imports, price differentiations 
between in-season and off-season demand, estimations of actual 
quota rents and distribution of quota rents; 
•  (bilateral) export subsidies, quantitative value restrictions of export 
subsidies, restrictions on subsidised exports and fill rates or actual 
subsidised exports, VERs, estimation of actual quota rents and 
distribution of quota rents; 
•  entry prices, ‘undistorted world market prices’ or variable levies; and 
•  non-tariff barriers, product standards, rules of origin and SPS 
measures.  
Some data are already available in the new Agricultural Market 
Access Database (AMAD) established by a joint initiative of the US 
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service, Agriculture and 
Agrifood Canada, the European Commission, the United Nations’ 
Conference on Trade and Development and the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (UNCTAD). When this database is completed, it should 
contain most of the information on market access commitments on a tariff 
line basis and their use as needed to model TRQs. 
Also, domestic policies are widely displayed in the price-wedge 
approach. Yet the direct implementation of policy instruments that are 
subject to limitations may provide better insights, as previously discussed 
in the case of trade instruments. Intervention price systems need a different 
approach based on equations on price transmission, while the 
implementation of the EU budget requires a social accounting matrix and 
the introduction of additional equations (Brockmeier, 2003). 
Again, databases are required providing general information on the 
domestic policy instruments adopted as well as quantitative data on the 
policy measures. Particularly, on a country and product basis, data are 
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•  production quotas, actual production or fill rates, the estimation of 
actual quota rents and distribution of quota rents;  
•  subsidies for exports, imports, inputs, factors, outputs and income 
along with their associated net transfers, restrictions and distribution; 
•  payments linked to land, animals, quotas and ceilings, decoupled 
payments as well as their related implementation mechanisms, the 
degree of decoupling and distribution of transfers among factors;  
•  limitations on production density, actual production density, 
distribution of land use and estimations of efficiency changes; 
•  other transfers; 
•  set-aside; and 
•  administered prices, transmission-to-market prices and additional 
influencing factors (e.g. net exports).  
For OECD countries, the components of these data have already been 
introduced in the OECD’s database of producer support estimates and are 
updated on a yearly basis. The database notably covers data on market 
price support and the amounts of government transfers to agricultural 
sectors. 
In addition to agri-food and trade policies, other policy measures 
(particularly those affecting production factors) may have an impact on 
trade flows. Such policies – not listed in the table, although they can play a 
non-negligible role – comprise the allocation of land and water rights, the 
distribution of emission permits, labour policies (minimum wages, union 
rights and collective labour agreements), migration policies, money supply 
and interest rates, investment policies, fair trade laws, competition laws, 
tax policies, monetary policies and so forth. These kinds of instruments can 
rarely be found implemented in quantitative (trade) models (Brockmeier & 
Kurzweil, 2003). Nevertheless, their importance increases as the integration 
process deepens. A further obstacle in quantitative modelling is the fact 
that such policies have not been established on a long-term basis and policy 
adjustments occur very regularly.  
1.3.3 Further  analytical  requirements for models posed by EU TAs  
The overview in section 1.2 identifies the features of existing EU TAs. Some 
insights can be derived from these features on additional core elements to 
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Table 1.8 Requirements for analysing key elements of EU TAs 
Requirement Analytical  needs  Modelling 
Economy wide  General approach  AGE model 
Bilateral preferences  Bilateral trade flows  Multi-region AGE model 
Phasing in  Dynamic approach 
(projections) 
Dynamic AGE model, 
model with projections 
Other trading 
partners 
Global approach  Multi-region AGE model 
Tariff line 
representation 
Tariff line aggregation  Satellite database of 
detailed tariff lines 
Deep integration 
process 
Adjust for Armington in 
full enlargement 
Introduction of new nests 
Product quality 
(standards) 
Armington Multi-region  AGE  model 
Imperfect 
competition  
Scale economies from 
fixed costs 
Introduce product 
differentiation on the 
supply side (need for 
firm-level data) 
Migration Model  structure  adjustment  Adjustment of standard 
equations, introduction of 
new nest in labour 
Unemployment Model  structure  adjustment  Adjustment of standard 
equations 
FDI flows  Introduce FDI flows  – 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
•  The EU’s bilateral and multilateral agreements cover general trade. 
This implies a general approach to representing non-agricultural 
sectors as well, which can greatly affect the market situation and 
price formation in factor and input markets. A dynamic model 
approach allowing for gradual implementation would be helpful. 
Some endogenous and exogenous factor adjustments along the time 
line may be necessary. The interaction between non-preferential third 
countries, preferential third countries and the EU (with trade-creating 
and trade-diverting effects) reveals the need for a global approach. 
•  Because of their discriminatory nature, TAs should be studied by 
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involve more than one of the EU’s trading partners. This requirement 
has rarely been implemented in computable, general equilibrium 
modelling.  
•  Trade flows are often treated with the assumption of homogeneous 
products. Homogenous goods do not have distinct features and thus 
the prices of such goods can be pooled. The so-called ‘pooled 
approach’ aggregates imports and exports, so all that is needed is a 
mechanism to balance imports and exports on a market-wide basis 
and a mechanism to distribute trade shares to the different suppliers 
as well as to the different demanding agents. The models only 
explain inter-industry trade and not intra-industry trade. With such 
an approach modelling can be easier, although it does not address the 
need to track bilateral trade flows (only a single flow for each actor is 
mapped, for either imports or exports). A bilateral approach would 
require a complete set of interactions between each buyer and seller 
of each commodity and, therefore, substantially more data and 
parameters.  
•  Heterogeneous products can be differentiated and there is no need 
for equalising prices among suppliers. If goods are heterogeneous, 
then different buyers are willing to pay different prices to obtain the 
same quantity of a good. Each actor may be both a buyer and a seller 
at the same time. Product differentiation can be introduced 
exogenously by assuming that products are differentiated by country 
of origin. This method was introduced by Armington (1969) by 
simply assuming that imports of a certain good and domestically 
produced goods are imperfect substitutes in demand. Combined with 
a preference function that is separable in domestic and foreign 
products, it results in (manageable) import functions. This implies an 
exogenously introduced product differentiation on the demand side. 
Furthermore, the Armington approach would also allow the 
implementation of qualitative issues such as product quality and 
consumer preferences (as represented in, for example, SPS and 
common standards). In this context, products would not only be 
distinguished by origin, but also by product quality. In addition, 
some constraints including small or zero-level trade flows may 
hinder the impact analysis of any trade liberalisation in the 
Armington approach. If prohibitively high tariffs induce negligible 
trade flows, trade liberalisation will only lead to limited changes 38 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
because of its trade share. Yet there are possibilities to overcome the 
problem by an exogenous gravity estimation of possible trade share 
(Kuiper & van Tongeren, 2006).  
•  Preferences are granted for distinct tariff lines and not for product 
groups. They are often defined as source-specific and are nearly 
always limited in quantity. An analysis of these measures would 
require an implementation of tariff lines or the establishment of a 
sound method of aggregation. 
•  Several other aspects that are not directly related to the preferential 
TAs need to be addressed in modelling work, such as the free 
movement of labour. Also, institutional frameworks and settings for 
improving foreign investments require an approach reflecting 
migration, capital accumulation and factor diversity. Furthermore, 
changes need to be addressed in factor availability (as a result of 
changes in land use, irrigation, increased mobility of labour owing to 
better education, changes in unemployment rates, regulations 
concerning the influx of labour and adjusted rates of population).  
•  Different topics within the context of competition also deserve a more 
detailed analysis. A major item might be the integration of imperfect 
competition, in cases in which huge international firms or quasi-state 
trade firms dominate trade and special trade flows.13 One approach 
would be to introduce product differentiation endogenously at the 
firm level on the supply side. Krugman (1991 and 1993), Ethier (1996) 
and Ethier & Horn (1984) introduced the concept of monopolistic 
competition to international trade theory. Traditional gains from 
trade are supplemented by ‘non-comparative advantage’ gains from 
trade in the presence of scale economies and imperfect competition. 
The increase of firms’ output leads to positive scale effects and gains 
from trade in the form of increased variety. Scale economies normally 
imply that only the support of a limited number of firms is possible. 
These are consequently imperfectly competitive. Therefore, trade 
creation supports a larger number of firms, but also a greater level of 
competition. An advantage of this concept is that it locates product 
differentiation on the supply side. A disadvantage is the need for firm 
data to derive elasticities. 
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Summary and issues for further work 
The EU is implementing various TAs, which are of a bilateral, regional or 
multilateral nature within the framework of the WTO. Most of the 
agreements have a complex set-up and differ across commodities, sectors, 
tools and measures, and also with respect to the timeframe and the regional 
coverage. Because of this complexity, impact analysis requires significant 
analytical efforts, moreover because interactions between the different 
arrangements make it very difficult to overlook the overall economic effects 
in the countries involved. In order to obtain better insight into the possible 
effects of these trade arrangements on prices, quantities, incomes and 
economic welfare, quantitative models are regarded as necessary tools. 
Also apparent is the need to analyse issues such as the economy-wide 
effects of general trade, reflecting bilateral preferences and phasing-in 
periods as well as trade creation and trade diversion. Owing to the nature 
of the TAs a more detailed tariff-line representation than that realised by 
most quantitative models is required to represent most tariff measures, 
such as tariff cuts, bound and applied tariffs, specific tariffs, sensitive 
products and entry prices. To a certain extent, this also applies to the 
implementation of export subsidies. To capture the interaction between 
trade and domestic policies, detailed domestic measures have to be 
mapped within the quantitative models. As the focus here is on trade, the 
three different boxes of domestic support as well as decoupled policy 
measures such as the introduction of the single farm payment in the EU 
form a hub for further investigations.  
Thus far, only a limited number of additional features have been 
addressed in ENARPRI’s work. Because of actual developments the focus 
has shifted from regional FTAs and PTAs to multilateral WTO issues, given 
that (as previously noted) this institution provides the general regulatory 
framework to which all TAs are subject. With respect to trade policies 
almost the same requirements and features apply. Still, in the case of WTO 
regulations the corresponding interactions and the need to adjust domestic 
policies according to WTO requirements are much stronger. Against this 
background the impact analysis in the following empirical chapters 
concentrates particularly on WTO issues. 
As many of the above-mentioned requirements have already been 
captured by the comparative-static, multi-regional, computable general 
equilibrium model GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) it serves as a 
starting point for further improvement. The standard version provides a 40 | KEY ISSUES SURROUNDING GENERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
representation of the economy including the linkages between farming, 
agribusiness, industrial and service sectors within a global context. The use 
of the non-homothetic constant difference of elasticity functional form to 
handle private household preferences, the explicit treatment of 
international trade and transport margins and a global banking sector that 
links global savings and consumption is innovative in the GTAP. 
Additional features represent perfect competition in all markets as well as 
profit- and utility-maximising behaviour on the part of producers and 
consumers. Trade is represented by bilateral trade matrices based on the 
Armington (1969) assumption. Policy interventions are usually represented 
through price wedges but can be extended with more elaborate features, 
especially when it comes to domestic policies. The framework of the 
standard GTAP model is well documented in the GTAP book.14 Thus the 
standard version already covers such needs as the bilateral, global trade 
flows of general trade, with most PTAs and FTAs already represented in 
the applied tariffs of GTAP’s database version 6. Furthermore, projections 
for capturing phasing-in can be easily applied.  
Special attention is given to the depiction of tariff line representation 
(at the HS 6-digit level), the transformation of specific tariffs into ad-valorem 
tariff equivalents and the improved modelling of domestic policies, 
especially single farm payments. As effects may vary according to factor 
allocation, resource availability and country-specific demands, results are 
partly displayed by EU member states. In the following empirical chapters, 
experiments on the effects of WTO regulations on the EU and other 
countries are presented. In chapter 3, the interactions of WTO negotiation 
outcomes with domestic policy reforms are investigated. The simulation 
set-up considers a very detailed implementation of the mid-term review of 
the CAP. In addition to this CAP-related modelling, relevant WTO features 
are well represented and considered such as measures in the amber, green 
and blue boxes. In chapter 4, the effects of possible WTO negotiation 
outcomes on the EU and third countries are analysed. The effects are 
projected using an extended GTAP model, which takes into account 
various additional aspects. With respect to tariffs, the experiment provides 
an adequate tariff line representation and also considers specific tariffs, 
accounting for the existence of bound and applied tariffs in both cases. The 
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extended GTAP structure further allows for consideration of the EU’s 
common budget and the mid-term review of the CAP.  
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2.  The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
and the issues at stake  
 Marijke  Kuiper1 
Introduction 
Following a ministerial meeting in Barcelona in 1995, the EU and its 
Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs) engaged in an ambitious venture 
of increased economic, political and social cooperation through the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements (EuroMed Agreements) and a 
programme for financial cooperation. Ambitions in terms of economic 
cooperation were especially high, aiming at a free trade area (FTA) by 2010. 
This arrangement should create an area of shared prosperity, fostering 
peace and stability at the southern borders of the EU. The Barcelona 
process implied a broadening and deepening of trade agreements dating 
from the 1970s. A meeting marking the 10th anniversary of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in November 2005 sought to revive 
efforts to meet the objectives of the Barcelona process.  
The current international security situation is one of the driving 
forces behind the renewed EU interest in the EMP. In this spirit, the 
guidelines for a common European security strategy call for the promotion 
of a ring of well-governed countries around the EU, making explicit 
references to the Mediterranean countries (European Council, 2003, p. 8): 
                                                      
1 This chapter is based on a joint ENARPRI working paper with C. dell’Aquila 
(2003). The author would like to thank Henk Kelholt for his able statistical 
assistance. Financial support through the EU-sponsored ENARPRI-TRADE project 
is gratefully acknowledged, as is financial support from the Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 45 
 
The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with 
Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security 
and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona process.  
In a similar vein the United States has also intensified its activities in 
the Mediterranean, as part of a set of presidential initiatives to promote 
security interests through economic development. Given this interest in 
enhancing development in the Mediterranean countries, it seems an 
appropriate time to take stock of the achievements of the EMP.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general assessment of the 
impact of the EMP. We start with a short overview of the current state of 
the negotiations and a description of the two components of the EMP 
(EuroMed Agreements and financial support). Based on this discussion we 
identify three main factors influencing the impact of the EMP on economic 
growth in the MPCs: the amount of liberalisation achieved by the EMP, the 
factors affecting economic growth in MPCs and those affecting trade 
liberalisation by the MPCs. We conclude this discussion with an initial 
assessment of the EMP and by identifying key policy and research issues. 
2.1  The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
At the Barcelona Conference in 1995 the EU deepened its involvement in 
the Mediterranean area by launching the EMP with 12 MPCs: Algeria, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian 
Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya has the status of observer in 
the EMP; there are no negotiations on a EuroMed Agreement with Libya 
nor does Libya qualify for financial support. Among the MPCs, Cyprus and 
Malta have since become fully fledged members of the EU (in 2004), and 
Turkey has become an EU candidate country. Given Turkey’s desire to 
progress its candidacy towards full EU membership, the EuroMed 
Agreements between the EU and Turkey extend far beyond the agreements 
with other MPCs. This chapter focuses on the MPCs that are not seeking 
EU membership, thus excluding Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. 
The EMP is divided into two components: EuroMed Agreements 
aimed at liberalisation and cooperation in different areas, and financial 
support provided through the MEDA instrument and the European 
Investment Bank. 46 | THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
2.1.1  Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
The first part of Table 2.1 summarises the current state of the EuroMed 
Agreements. EuroMed Agreements have been signed with all the countries 
previously noted except for Syria, with which negotiations are ongoing. 
Any trade preferences that may be granted may be bound by rules for 
members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (although in practice the 
WTO does not appear to restrict regional agreements). Thus Table 2.1 also 
indicates the WTO membership status of the MPCs. 
The establishment of an FTA implies South–South integration as well. 
The EuroMed Agreements, however, are bilateral agreements between the 
MPCs and the EU, and do not cover South–South liberalisation. Two 
possible avenues to such liberalisation are the (revived) Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAFTA) and the Agadir Agreements, which promote regional 
integration. Participation in these agreements is indicated in the last two 
columns of Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 MPC participation in EuroMed, GAFTA and Agadir Agreements as well 
as WTO membership 
  EuroMed 
Agreement 
WTO 
member 
GAFTA Agadir 
  Signed Effective       
Tunisia 1995  1998  1995  1998  2003 
Israel 1995  2000  1995  –  – 
Morocco 1996  2000  1995  1998  2003 
Palestinian Territories  1997  1997a)  – –  – 
Jordan 1997  2002  2000  1998  2003 
Egypt 2001  2004  1995  1998  2003 
Algeria 2002  –b)  Observer 1998  – 
Lebanon 2002  2006  Observer 1998  – 
Syria 2004  –c)  – 1998  – 
a) Agreements with the Palestinian Territories are interim agreements.  
b) Ratification of the agreement with Algeria is pending.  
c) The EU’s ratification of the agreement with Syria is pending Syria’s response to UN 
Security Council resolutions.  
Sources: European Commission website data (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm), European Commission (2003) 
and WTO website data (retrieved from http://www.wto.org). TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 47 
 
Although details of the agreements differ across MPCs, the EuroMed 
Agreements share a number of common themes:  
•  political dialogue; 
•  respect for human rights and democracy;  
•  the establishment of WTO-compatible free trade over a transitional 
period of up to 12 years;  
•  provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public 
procurement, competition rules, state aid and monopolies (‘deep 
integration’); 
•  economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors;  
•  coordination with regard to social affairs and migration (including re-
admission of illegal immigrants); and 
•  cultural exchange. 
This wide coverage of the agreements implies that full 
implementation would have a considerable impact on the (economic) 
relations between the EU and MPCs. 
Despite an ambitious goal of creating a Mediterranean FTA by 2010,2 
the agreed speed of trade liberalisation varies greatly among 
manufacturing, agriculture and services. Concessions on manufacturing 
goods provide for a well-defined, progressive tariff dismantling over a time 
span of 12 to 16 years. The EuroMed Agreements stipulate the gradual 
liberalisation of agricultural trade on the basis of traditional trade flows, 
through periodical revisions of agricultural protocols. The process must be 
consistent with national agricultural policies and the results of WTO 
negotiations. For services, the commitment is to abide by the results of 
multilateral negotiations (on the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
GATS), i.e. there are no additional steps taken within the context of the 
EuroMed Agreements. 
The EuroMed Agreements replace the trade agreements from the 
1970s. A major difference compared with these earlier agreements is the 
                                                      
2 The reference to the deadline of 2010 might be better understood as an expression 
of political will that should provide a common discipline to the contracting parties. 
Actual trade protocols attached to the EuroMed Agreements provide schedules for 
tariff cuts that are not consistent with such a time target, which is in part owing to 
the usually very long process of negotiation and ratification of the agreements. 48 | THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
element of reciprocity in the EuroMed Agreements, which (apart from the 
case of Israel) provides for unilateral concessions by the EU. As a result, a 
good share of MPC manufacturing exports has had unrestricted access to 
EU markets since the 1970s. The trade preferences for industrial goods in 
the EuroMed Agreements are thus in practice quasi-unilateral, favouring 
the EU.  
Reciprocity is not restricted to manufacturing, but also applies to 
agricultural products. This aspect implies a new commitment by MPCs to 
introduce preferential measures favouring EU agro-food exporters. 
Establishing an FTA would thus grant European exporters preferential 
access to MPC markets, giving them an edge over other competitors. In 
practice this seems unlikely to materialise. The US is the EU’s main 
competitor in the Mediterranean region. The US already has free trade 
arrangements with Israel (since 1985) and Jordan (since 2000), and has 
recently signed one with Morocco. Furthermore, in line with security 
policies after September 11th, the US launched a Middle East Trade 
Initiative in May 2003. This initiative mirrors the EMP, seeking to establish 
bilateral trade arrangements and general support for more outwardly-
oriented policies in the Middle East and North Africa. The overall aim is to 
establish a US–Middle East FTA within a decade, i.e. before 2013. Given the 
pace at which the US is moving, the establishment of a European FTA with 
the MPCs would not give European producers an edge, but would only 
keep them at par with their US competitors.  
2.1.2  Financial support through MEDA and the European Investment 
Bank 
The second pillar of the EMP is a new modality for managing financial 
cooperation, based on an autonomous financial regime with a single 
budget for the whole Mediterranean area (MEDA).3 The first MEDA 
programme replaced the previous five-year bilateral protocols, entailing a 
three-fold increase in the financial support provided by the EU (€4.6 billion 
from 1995–99) and a notable enlargement of issues to be tackled.  
                                                      
3 For further details, see Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial 
and technical measures to accompany MEDA, OJ L 189, 30.07.1996 and Regulation 
(EC) No. 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000 amending Regulation 1488/96 (MEDA 
II), OJ L 311/1, 12.12.2000. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 49 
 
MEDA I was succeeded by MEDA II, which has made €5.35 billion 
available over the period 2000–06, while the programme has been 
incorporated in a larger process of restructuring EU cooperation towards 
development (European Commission, 2001). 
MEDA is closely linked to the aim of creating a Mediterranean FTA. 
Funds are disbursed for improving economic and social policy-making, as 
well as for direct budgetary support to facilitate structural adjustment 
programmes (European Commission, 2003). A limited amount of MEDA 
interventions are meant to support rural development (technical assistance, 
training, product diversification, environmental and social protection 
measures). 
During the time span covered by MEDA I (1995–99), about 86% of the 
funds were committed to bilateral cooperation on structural adjustment 
(15%), economic transition support (30%), socio-economic balance support 
(29%), the environment (7%), and rural development (5%). Actual MEDA 
payments, however, were much lower than the commitments, owing to the 
length of the implementation period for some projects and negotiation 
issues as well as cumbersome procedures for project approval and 
management. 
In addition to the MEDA funds the European Investment Bank 
launched a Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility in October 2002, 
encompassing all of its lending to the Mediterranean. The funds disbursed 
by the European Investment Bank promote private sector development. 
The lending portfolio of €9 billion was supplemented by an additional   
€8-10 billion (up to 2006) when the Facility was launched.  
2.1.3  Summarising the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Despite the wide scope of the EuroMed Agreements, the driving force of 
the EMP is the establishment of a Mediterranean FTA with trade 
liberalisation taking centre stage. The implicit assumption seems to be that 
increased trade fosters growth of the MPC economies. The objectives of the 
EU seem to be both broad and long-term (promoting political stability at its 
southern borders through increased welfare) as well as more narrow and 
short-term (unrestricted access for EU manufacturing exports to MPC 
markets). The absence of well-defined schedules for abolishing protection 
in agricultural trade also reflects the narrow short-term interests of the EU. 
The short-term interests of the MPCs are primarily the additional 
funds provided through MEDA and the European Investment Bank. Full 50 | THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
implementation of the trade agreements implies a major, possibly socially 
disruptive, restructuring of their economies. This feature of the EuroMed 
Agreements is clearly acknowledged by the specific allocation of MEDA 
funds to facilitate the transition. Since the MPCs already have unrestricted 
access for their manufacturing exports to the EU, their short- and long-term 
interests are improved access to EU agricultural markets.  
The main goal of the EMP, serving the interests of both the EU and 
the MPCs, is to promote economic growth. The key instrument for 
achieving this is a Mediterranean FTA. Whether the goal of economic 
growth will be reached depends first on the amount of liberalisation 
achieved by the agreements, i.e. the effectiveness of the agreements in 
liberalising trade. A second determinant of the effectiveness of the EMP is 
the importance of increased trade relative to other factors limiting 
economic growth in the MPCs. If current levels of protection play only a 
minor role, little can be expected from the EMP in terms of promoting 
economic growth. The remainder of this chapter therefore looks at three 
sets of issues affecting the impact of the EMP on economic growth in the 
MPCs: the amount of liberalisation achieved by the EMP, the major factors 
limiting economic growth in the MPCs and the scope for liberalisation by 
the MPCs.  
2.2  Liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Three elements play a role when assessing the achievements of the EMP in 
liberalising trade: current patterns in protection, current Mediterranean 
trade flows and the amount of liberalisation achieved by the EMP. 
2.2.1  An initial look at current protection patterns 
In order to establish the need and scope for liberalisation, an idea of the 
recent protection levels affecting Mediterranean trade is necessary. Figure 
2.1 summarises the trade restrictiveness of MPCs and the EU. 
With the exception of Israel, all the MPCs implement repressive trade 
policies that are also reflected in high mean tariffs. The MPCs do not seem 
to follow the global trend of reducing trade protection, making it one of the 
most protective areas in the world (European Commission, 2003). TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 51 
 
The numbers in Figure 2.1 refer to trade policies in general, obscuring 
the considerable protection of the EU on agricultural products. Agricultural 
trade policies towards the MPCs are governed by a complex system of 
seasonal preferences for ‘sensitive products’,4 with higher tariffs and entry 
prices for the majority of fresh fruit and vegetables during EU harvesting 
periods. The MPCs mirror this by protecting ‘strategic products’.5  
Figure 2.1 Trade restrictiveness and mean tariffs 
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Note: Restrictiveness index: less than 2 = free trade policy, between 4 and 5 is repressed trade 
policy. 
Sources: Heritage Foundation (Gwartney  et al., 2003) and World Bank Development 
Indicators (2002). 
 
                                                      
4 According to the Commission, ‘sensitive’ Mediterranean products are tomatoes, 
olive oil, almonds, oranges, mandarins, lemons, grapes, melons, strawberries, 
flowers, potatoes, rice and wine (European Commission, 1997). 
5 The definition of ‘strategic’ products varies among the MPCs, but most of these 
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In summary, there is ample scope for liberalisation through the EMP. 
The MPCs could strive for broad trade liberalisation, since their protection 
levels are well beyond global averages. For the EU, there is plenty of room 
for simplifying and reducing protection on specific Mediterranean 
agricultural products.  
2.2.2  Current trade flows  
Apart from current protection the impact of trade liberalisation in the 
Mediterranean region depends on the levels of trade. The EU is much 
larger than the MPCs combined, in terms of both population and the size of 
the economy. The MPCs are only a minor trading partner for the EU, while 
the EU is a major trading partner for the MPCs (about 50% of MPC trade is 
with the EU). The discussion of trade patterns is therefore from the 
perspective of the MPCs. Since the objective of the EMP is to intensify trade 
relations in the Mediterranean region, trade data in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are 
broken down by region.  
Table 2.2 Exports from the MPCs (totals and shares by destination)  
  2003–04 Shares  (%)  1995  Shares (%) 
  (106  US  $) EU MPC US ROW  (106 US $) EU  MPC  US ROW 
MPC  98,260 45 3  22  30  44,116 48 3  18 31
Algeria 28,347 56 3  22  19  9,357 65 2  17 16
Egypt  7,037  33  9  8 50  3,444 46 11 15  28
Israel  35,201 26 0  37  36  19,047 32 0  30 38
Jordan 3,486  3  12  24  61  1,432 6  8  1  85
Lebanon a)  1,524  9 14  4 73  642 23 13  6  58
Morocco 9,350 75 2 3  20  4,719 62 3 3 32
Syria  5,557  55  10  4  31  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a.
Tunisia  8,520 82 3 1  15  5,475 79 5 1 15
a) For Lebanon data from 2003 and 1997 were used. 
Source: International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) data. 
 
The dominant position of exports to the EU is immediately obvious, 
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of the) EMP has not led to an increasing share of exports to the EU; instead 
there was a slight drop in the overall level of exports to the EU. The 
aggregate numbers, however, do obscure differences among the MPCs. 
Both Morocco (13%) and Tunisia (3%) increased their exports to the EU 
more than to other regions; notably these two MPCs have gone farthest in 
implementing the EMP. For all other MPCs we find a reduced level of 
exports to the EU, especially for Lebanon (dropping from 23 to 9%).  
Trade among the MPCs does not seem affected by the EMP, 
remaining stable at 3% for all MPCs. Again, there are differences among the 
MPCs with both Morocco and Tunisia decreasing their exports to other 
MPCs, which suggests trade diversion to the EU following the 
implementation of the EMP. The US is a major player in the region, 
increasing its export shares in all the MPCs (most strongly in Jordan, 
jumping from 1 to 24% of its exports). Again Morocco and Tunisia are the 
exceptions with a low and stable share of exports to the US (the recent FTA 
between Morocco and the US may change this). The aggregate data in 
Table 2.2 show that overall exports from the MPCs have increased strongly 
for all MPCs, and while the relative shares of trade with the EU have 
declined, trade among the MPCs has remained stable and trade with the 
US has increased. Data for the two MPCs that have gone farthest with 
implementing the EMP (Morocco and Tunisia) indicate trade diversion 
from other MPCs and (mostly) the rest of the world to the EU with a 
constant share of trade with the US. 
Exports only present one side of the trade story; Table 2.3 therefore 
looks at the pattern in imports. Comparing total imports with total exports 
reveals a continuing (albeit decreasing) trade deficit for all MPCs. The only 
exception is Algeria, whose trade surplus in 2003–04 can be attributed to 
high oil prices. Comparing import shares between the periods 2003–04 and 
1995 we find that imports from the EU and US are less significant and there 
is a small (1%) increase in imports from other MPCs. This situation implies 
that imports have diversified from the EU and US to other regions. As with 
exports, Morocco and Tunisia show a different pattern: imports from the 
EU remain stable while imports from other MPCs are less significant. This 
outcome again suggests that the EMP promotes trade with the EU. 
Based on these aggregated data we can conclude that (anticipation of) 
the EMP has not led to an increased trade flow in the Mediterranean. 
Instead, the EU’s shares in imports and exports are declining. Meanwhile, 
the relative share of exports to the US does show an increase. Exceptions to 54 | THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
this general trend are Morocco and Tunisia, which have gone farthest in 
implementing the EMP. This finding suggests that future implementation 
of the EMP in the other MPCs may intensify trade with the EU, possibly at 
the expense of trade among the MPCs. Despite a downward trend, the EU’s 
share of imports and exports remains around 50%. This fact implies that 
liberalisation of trade with the EU would have a considerable impact on 
MPC economies. 
Table 2.3 Imports from the MPCs (totals and shares by destination)  
  2003–04 Shares  (%)  1995  Shares (%) 
  (106  US  $) EU MPC US ROW  (106 US $) EU  MPC  US ROW 
MPC 109,653 44  3  9  44  78,443 51  2 18  29
Algeria 15,920  55  3  6 36  10,782 59  3 17  21 
Egypt 12,112  25 5  11  59  11,739 39 1  15  45 
Israel 37,590 40  0  15  44  28,344 52 0  30  18 
Jordan 6,898 24  9  7  61  3,696 33 5  1  61 
Lebanona)  7,167 43  7  6  44  7,438 37 6  6  51 
Morocco 16,028  56  2  4  37  8,540 56  3  3  38 
Syria 6,080  17  6  5  73  n.a.   n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tunisia 11,441  70  2  3 25  7,903 71  4  1  24 
a) For Lebanon data from 2003 and 1997 were used. 
Source: International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) data. 
 
The data above do not disaggregate trade in agricultural products. 
With this being the area in which liberalisation by the EU can be expected 
to have the most impact, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present disaggregated 
agricultural trade data for the MPCs as a whole. Fruit and vegetables are 
the main agricultural export commodities from the MPCs (33% of total 
agricultural exports), of which 56% is destined for the EU. This group of 
commodities is also that for which EU protection is strongest. Cereals are 
the main agricultural import commodity (29% of agricultural imports), of 
which 23% originates in the EU and 30% in the US. Across all agricultural 
commodities, both imported and exported, the EU is the most important TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 55 
 
trading partner. The liberalisation of agricultural trade in both directions 
thus has a potentially large impact on trade flows in the Mediterranean. 
Table 2.4 Value and destination of agricultural exports by MPCs (2003–04) 
  Export composition  Destination (% by category) 
(106 US $) (%) EU MPC US ROW
Agricultural products 6,776 100 47 10 5 39
Vegetables and fruit  2,257 33 56 9 5 30
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs  1,020 15 72 3 2 23
Cereals, cereal preprtns  521 8 8 39 3 49
Fixed veg. fats and oils  492 7 73 4 7 16
Crude animal, veg. matl.  480 7 70 2 9 19
Animal, veg. fats, oils, nes  399 6 18 1 1 79
Live animals  285 4 2 14 0 83
Misc. edible products  272 4 29 4 6 60
Sugar,  sgr  preprtns, honey  172 3 50 15 4 31
Beverages 170 3 26 13 5 55
Dairy products, bird eggs  161 2 4 17 4 75
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices  144 2 21 19 11 49
Tobacco, tobacco mnfct.  114 2 17 1 16 67
Animal feedstuffs  102 1 11 16 0 73
Meat, meat preprtns  71 1 48 5 7 40
Oil seed, oleaginous fruit  49 1 71 9 3 17
Cork and wood  33 0 61 9 0 30
Hides, skins, fur skins, raw  19 0 13 21 0 66
Animal oils and fats  15 0 21 0 0 79
Note: For Lebanon data from 2003 are used. 
Source: International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) data. 
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Table 2.5 Value and origin of agricultural imports by MPCs (2003-04) 
 Import  composition  Origin (% by category) 
 (106 US$) (%) EU MPC US ROW
Agricultural products  16,643 100 29 5 15 51
Cereals, cereal preprtns  4,817 29 23 5 30 42
Cork and wood  1,323 8 46 0 1 53
Dairy products, bird eggs  1,287 8 56 3 1 40
Vegetables and fruit  1,251 8 29 15 7 48
Fixed veg. fats and oils  1,223 7 18 2 9 71
Sugar, sug. preprtns, honey  1,003 6 37 2 1 61
Animal feedstuffs  952 6 14 3 19 64
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices  745 4 20 4 1 75
Tobacco, tobacco mnfct  704 4 16 1 32 51
Oil seed, oleaginous fruit  630 4 4 1 30 65
Meat, meat preprtns  623 4 11 1 4 85
Misc. edible products  571 3 55 10 18 18
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs  422 3 29 7 36 1
Live animals  393 2 52 16 2 30
Crude animal, veg. matl.  295 2 60 5 8 27
Beverages 198 1 71 11 2 15
Animal, veg. fats, oils, nes  166 1 38 3 12 47
Hides, skins, fur skins, raw  31 0 65 9 2 24
Animal oils and fats  10 0 19 0 42 38
Note: For Lebanon data from 2003 are used. 
Source: International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) data. 
 
2.2.3  Liberalisation achieved by the EMP 
As far as establishing an FTA is concerned, the absence of a defined 
prospect for the liberalisation of agriculture must be stressed (Barcelona 
Declaration, European Commission, 1995, emphasis added):  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 57 
 
[T]aking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the 
various agricultural policies allow and with due respect to the results 
achieved within the GATT negotiations, trade in agricultural products 
will be progressively liberalized through reciprocal preferential access 
among the parties. 
A rather sceptical interpretation of the Barcelona Declaration is that 
there will be no liberalisation of agriculture, apart from the commitments 
made within the negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which cannot be withheld from most MPCs by the most-
favoured nation principle. This interpretation seems to fit observed 
behaviour: there have been no significant new concessions by the EU for 
agricultural products in the EuroMed Agreements, nor are these expected 
to come about in the near future (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002, p. 402). 
For the MPCs, a preferential treatment of imports originating in the 
EU is a brand new feature. Compared with EU concessions, MPC 
preferences are even more limited, in terms of the share of preferential over 
total trade flows and in terms of tariff reductions. The products concerned 
are largely staple foodstuffs or ‘continental’ products. 
In contrast to agricultural products, explicit time frames for phasing 
out protection for manufacturing products are part of the EuroMed 
Agreements. Whether these will be followed remains an open question, 
with most MPCs not yet being required to cut back protection. Tunisia, 
being the first MPC to sign a EuroMed Agreement, is ahead of the other 
MPCs in reforming its economy. The expectation for Tunis was that an 
overnight liberalisation of manufactured goods would result in the 
bankruptcy of one-third of its industrial firms. An adjustment programme 
has therefore been implemented to prepare firms for increased competition 
(Riess et al., 2001). In spite of pressure to push back the deadline of 2008 for 
full liberalisation, Tunisia has been reducing its barriers to European 
manufactured goods. The expected demise of manufacturing has not 
materialised and Tunisia has been able to maintain a GDP growth rate of 
around 5%.  
2.2.4  Summarising the liberalisation achieved by the EMP 
The above analysis indicates ample scope for liberalisation to have an 
impact on Mediterranean trade flows. Currently, significant protection 
exists across all sectors in the MPCs and mainly for agriculture on the EU 
side. Regardless of the current levels of protection the EU is already a major 58 | THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
destination for MPC exports and a major origin for MPC imports. A 
reduction of trade barriers can thus be expected to have a significant impact 
on trade flows. The liberalisation achieved through the EMP is, however, 
limited. Some concessions have been made, but the consensus is that not 
much can be expected in terms of agricultural concessions from the EU. 
A new element of the EMP relative to earlier agreements is the 
reciprocal character of the preferences, requiring a reduction in the high 
current protection levels of the MPCs. Sizeable reductions in protection will 
require a major restructuring of their economies, which is reflected in the 
availability of MEDA funds to facilitate restructuring. 
Before turning in more detail to the patterns of protection on the 
MPC side, we first review the structural features of the MPC economies. 
These features affect the impact of trade liberalisation on economic growth 
and the scope for liberalisation on the MPC side.  
2.3  MPC economies 
The MPC economies cover a broad spectrum. Where Israel has relatively 
high per-capita income levels (comparable to EU incomes), the other MPCs 
included in this study are found in the middle to low income brackets. 
Correspondingly, diverse models of economic development are found, 
varying from countries increasingly participating in the world economy to 
countries with marked protectionist tendencies. In spite of this diversity it 
is still possible to identify certain common elements across the MPCs, 
especially those classified as developing countries: high population growth, 
lagging economic growth, the importance of agriculture and high trade-
protection levels. 
This section discusses the structure of MPC economies in order to 
assess the extent to which liberalisation through the EMP may contribute to 
economic growth. We start with the main characteristics of the MPC 
economies and their development over time. We then discuss the causes of 
sluggish economic growth in the MPCs, assessing in general terms the 
possible impact of the EMP on enhancing growth. We conclude the 
discussion of the MPC economies by taking a closer look at the agricultural 
sector and agricultural policies pursued by MPCs. 
2.3.1  Key characteristics of MPC economies 
Table 2.6 presents key economic indicators of the MPCs. The MPCs are 
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combined is about the same as the GDP of Spain and some 15% less than 
the total GDP of the EU accession countries (European Commission, 2003). 
In general the MPC economies can be characterised by high levels of debt, 
relatively high population growth and high inflation rates. 
Table 2.6 Economic indicators of MPCs (2003) 
 GDP 
level 
GDP 
growth  
1990–2000 
GDP/ 
capita 
 
Debt  
 
Population 
growth 
  ($ billion)  (%)  (1,000 $)  (% of 
exports) 
(%) 
Algeria  61.0 2.3 1.9  n.a. 1.6 
Egypt  109.6 4.1 1.6  152.3 1.8 
Israel  115.7 4.2  17.3  n.a. 1.8 
Jordan  9.6 4.9 1.8  164.5 2.6 
Lebanon 17.7 6.0 3.9  603.4 1.3 
Morocco 38.5 2.8 1.3  136.0 1.6 
Syria    19.7 4.7 1.1  270.7 2.3 
Tunisia  21.9 4.6 2.2  155.3 1.2 
Palestinian 
  Territories  2.9  n.a.  0.8  n.a.  4.1 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005).  
 
High population growth requires strong economic growth to 
maintain employment. Lack of employment has repercussions for social 
stability and the scope for structural changes in the economy. Table 2.7 
presents demographic data for the MPCs. A comparison of population 
growth in 2003 in Table 2.6 with annual population growth over the period 
1990-2003 in Table 2.7 suggests that population growth is slowing down in 
most countries. Yet because of previous growth levels, the labour force is 
continuing to swell rapidly in most MPCs, while unemployment levels are 
already high (up to a third of the labour force in Algeria).  
From these aggregate data a picture emerges of economies that have 
not been able to expand quickly enough to absorb a fast-growing labour 
force. At the same time, most of the countries face serious debt problems, 
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economic terms is Israel, faring much better than the surrounding 
countries. The next sub-section considers the reasons for the lagging 
economic growth in the majority of the MPCs. 
Table 2.7 Demographic characteristics of the MPCs (2004)
 
  Population Labour  force   
Rural 
population
Unemploy-
ment 
Total Growtha) Total Growtha)
(mn) (%) (mn) (%) (%) (%)
Algeria 31.8 1.9 11.7 4.0 41.2 29.8
Egypt 67.6 2.0 26.7 3.0 57.2 11.2
Israel 6.7 2.8 2.9 3.6 7.9 9.1
Jordan 4.5 4.0 1.7 6.2 20.9 25.0
Lebanon 30.1 1.7 1.7 3.1 9.4 20.0
Morocco 17.4 1.7 12.2 2.4 42.6 18.2
Syria 9.9 2.8 5.8 4.2 47.5 20.0
Tunisia 3.4 1.5 4.2 2.9 32.6 14.3
Palestinian 
  Territories  5.3 4.2 0.7 5.1 n.a. >30
a) Annual growth 1990-2003. 
Sources: World Bank (2005); unemployment data from the European Commission (retrieved 
from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed). 
2.3.2  Causes of lagging economic growth  
High population growth and extensive unemployment make economic 
growth a prime issue for the MPCs. But the actual track record of the MPCs 
is rather disappointing, lagging behind the growth rates attained by 
comparable countries in other parts of the world. Figure 2.2 sketches 
different, interconnected causes of the sluggish economic growth in the 
MPCs, generalising over the different countries. The three main forces 
hampering growth are non-trade income, high levels of trade protection 
and extensive state interference in the economy.  
A first factor slowing economic growth is the presence of non-trade 
income. Oil exports and remittances are important sources of foreign 
exchange for a number of countries. This inflow of foreign exchange 
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demand. The resulting appreciation of the exchange rate promotes 
investments in non-traded sectors of the economy, while reducing 
investments in the traded sectors. Such a distorting role of oil income is 
relevant in Egypt, Algeria and Syria (Riess et al., 2001), while the ratio of 
remittances to the value of exports approaches this scenario in Egypt and 
Jordan, underscoring the element of (temporary) migration in the MPC 
economies (Nassar & Ghoneim, 2002).  
Figure 2.2 Outline of the causes of slow economic growth in the MPCs 
 
 
A second factor undermining economic growth is the high level of 
trade protection through an inward-looking development strategy. Such 
protection shelters domestic firms from international competition. This in 
turn reduces incentives for efficiency improvements and investments in 
innovations. Combined with the focus on non-traded sectors induced by 
inflows of non-trade foreign exchange, this approach has resulted in a 
production structure that is not internationally competitive. 
High levels of trade 
protection 
Extensive state 
interference in economy 
Non-trade income 
(oil, remittances) 
Limited domestic 
competition and 
innovation 
Unprofitable, slow-growing 
state enterprises that depend on 
subsidies and soft bank loans 
Investment in 
non-traded 
sectors 
Production not 
internationally 
competitive 
Macroeconomic 
instability (high 
inflation, fiscal 
deficits) 
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A third factor hampering economic growth is the extended influence 
of the state on the economy. Such influence takes the shape of an over-
staffed public sector and a dominant presence of state enterprises. The 
bloated character of public sector employment is apparent from the fact 
that its share in (non-military) employment is twice the global average, 
accounting for close to one-fifth of employment in the MPCs. On the 
production side the state also plays a significant role, for example 
accounting for 30% of GDP in Egypt and Tunisia, and close to 60% in 
Algeria. Public investments were close to 40% of total investment, which is 
double the middle-income country average. Booming oil revenues in the 
1970s and 1980s provided a further stimulus to increasing public sector 
expenditures in oil-exporting countries (Bulmer, 2000; Riess et al., 2001).  
High levels protection and extensive government involvement in the 
economy has led to unprofitable state enterprises maintained with 
subsidies and soft loans. This policy puts heavy pressure on state budgets, 
causing severe macroeconomic instability. Thus reforms are about as 
necessary as they are difficult. Tariff revenues form an important part of 
the government budgets. Countries with high import ratios from the EU 
will be faced with significant losses in income if they grant the EU 
preferential access to their markets, necessitating a restructuring of their 
economy. 
2.3.3  The structure of the agricultural sector and MPC agricultural 
policies 
Although agriculture is an important sector across the board, its role in the 
overall economy differs by MPC (see Table 2.8). The classification of most 
MPCs as developing countries is reflected by the large share of the labour 
force employed in agriculture (between 12 and 36% of the total labour 
force). In high-income countries this proportion is less than 10%, as 
reflected by the 2% figure for Israel.  
In terms of GDP, agriculture is a major sector, again mostly for 
developing MPCs, contributing as much as 23% to GDP in Syria. Jordan 
seems to have a more particular economic structure, although agriculture 
contributes significantly to employment (accounting for 12% of 
employment); its contribution in terms of the GDP share is limited to 3%. 
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Table 2.8 Contribution of agriculture to GDP and employment in the MPCs
 
  Share of GDP (%)  Agricultural  
labour force  
(% total labour force) 
 Agriculture  Industry  Services    1990  1999 
Algeria 21  13  66  26  24 
Egypt 19  23  58  40  33 
Israel 2  32  66  4  3 
Jordan 3  19  79  15  12 
Lebanon 14  12  74  7  4 
Morocco 22  19  59  45  36 
Syria   23  26  51  32  28 
Tunisia 13  20  67  29  25 
Palestinian 
  Territories  13  14  73  n.a. n.a.
Notes: GDP data are for 2003 (2002 in the case of Egypt); an exception is the GDP by sector 
for Israel (2003 estimates from the CIA World Factbook). 
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2005), FAOSTAT and the CIA World 
Factbook (retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ 
is.html). 
 
Production composition varies considerably from country to country, 
but it centres on cereals, fruit and vegetables, followed by other staple 
foodstuffs or typically Mediterranean products. The importance of 
agricultural raw materials, such as tobacco, cotton and sugar beet is more 
limited. Egypt is a main producer, especially for staple foodstuffs, although 
other countries – Israel, Syria and those in the Maghreb6 – are often 
important players in particular markets.  
In addition to the fundamental climatic and geographical features of 
the Mediterranean area, the composition of production is affected by long-
term trends in world prices and relatively lower levels of protection for 
some target markets for Mediterranean products (fruit and vegetables, 
olive oil). Products that are not strictly Mediterranean (cereals, meat and 
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milk) maintain an important role in the agricultural system, by providing 
subsistence to peasant farmers and in some cases, because of policy support 
and trade protection aimed at reducing dependence on imported food 
(INEA, 2002; De Rosa, 1997). 
The main issues in MPC agriculture can be summarised under three 
headings: a polarised production structure, production limitations and 
food security. There is a marked and growing polarisation between large-
scale, capitalist company farming and small family holdings. Institutional 
factors, insufficient public intervention in the reform of land ownership 
and, for some MPCs, strong government support for agricultural exports 
have accentuated this duality. Large farms complain above all about the 
lack of adequate services, while small farmers find it difficult to make a 
living from traditional farming practices. These issues stem from natural 
and technical restraints, obstacles to mechanisation and other structural 
limitations, but also from price dynamics and conditions of the marketing 
channels (INEA, 2002). 
Environmental, climatic and technological limitations restrict the 
expansion of arable land and create problems for the sustainability of 
traditional agricultural methods and ecosystems. The lack of fertile land 
and water is an evident hindrance to agricultural development, while the 
goal of increasing yields creates further problems, owing to chemical inputs 
already being used on a massive scale. Desertification, soil erosion and 
infertile soils are serious problems brought about by overgrazing, intensive 
crop rotation and the abandonment of traditional agricultural practices. 
Inefficient and insufficient consideration of soil characteristics are often a 
feature of the management of water resources and can lead to the soil 
becoming too saline or alkaline, as happens in Syria and Egypt, or to soil 
erosion, as is widespread in Syria, Lebanon and the Maghreb (Makhlouf et 
al. 1998; Lacirignola & Hamdy, 1995). 
The orientations and tools of agricultural policy differ from country 
to country.7 In the case of Israel, agricultural policy has been influenced by 
a need to combine agricultural development with national security and 
self-sufficiency in food production, given its hostile geopolitical 
environment. As regards the other MPCs, the major priorities in 
agricultural policy are to improve the performance of the sector and the 
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level of food security. Minor objectives – but by no means negligible – 
relate to improving linkages between vertical stages of agro-food systems 
(competitiveness, marketing, etc.), as well as environmental protection, 
food quality and food safety. 
Measures of producer support and market regulation evolve slowly 
within the context defined by adjustment programmes, WTO commitments 
and preferential deals with the EU. All imply, for developing 
Mediterranean countries, a fundamental change in price policies, with the 
aim of restoring the market mechanism and improving its operation. 
Liberalisation and structural adjustment have important implications for 
agriculture. Agricultural policy reform seeks to open domestic markets, 
reducing the protection differentials among agriculture and other sectors, 
along with scaling back government support for production prices or 
cutting consumer subsidies (or both) and slashing input subsidies.  
Some countries have made considerable strides in this direction. 
Egypt as well as the Maghreb countries modified their policies appreciably 
in order to reduce protection in the industrial sector and re-launch 
agriculture by improving market efficiency. The effects of the reforms vary 
depending on the starting point of the country concerned and the level of 
social consensus, but the overall picture is still characterised by hefty 
government regulation of agricultural markets, through intervention on 
prices (consumer and producer subsidies), quantities (quotas) and tariffs. In 
fact, the reform process has been rather selective: government support and 
trade protection are still considered indispensable for certain products, 
while policy interventions aspiring to either control food prices or extract 
surpluses from the agricultural sector are still in place. Moreover, there are 
still cases in which agriculture suffers from an overvaluation of real 
exchange rates and trade protection in the manufacturing sector. 
2.3.4  EuroMed Agreements and migration 
Since remittances are a key feature of the MPCs, one can wonder about the 
impact of the EuroMed Agreements on migration from the MPCs to the 
EU. This question is largely absent from existing studies of the EuroMed 
Agreements, although reducing the flow of North African migrants is an 
important policy issue for the EU. The EuroMed Agreements could reduce 
migration if they were to stimulate labour-intensive production in the 
MPCs, thus increasing wages and reducing the incentives for migration. 
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Preliminary analyses of the impact of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement on migration flows between Mexico and the US, however, 
suggest that the establishment of an FTA can increase migration flows. 
Different theoretical explanations can be provided for such an outcome. 
One is that a rise in wages following the FTA has enabled low-skilled 
labourers to accumulate the cash needed for migration. In this line of 
thought, trade and migration are complements, not substitutes. New trade 
theory, allowing for a concentration of economic activity, provides an 
alternative explanation. Reducing trade barriers opens the way for 
industries to become more concentrated. Given the hub-and-spoke 
structure of the EuroMed Agreements this concentration is likely to occur 
in the EU. The establishment of an FTA could thus increase migration.  
2.3.5  Summarising the main features of MPC economies 
The still rapidly-growing labour force in the MPCs necessitates the 
acceleration of economic growth. The track record of the MPCs is not 
promising and growth rates have been lagging compared with other 
regions, owing to inflows of foreign exchange from oil and remittances, 
high trade-protection levels and prolific state interference. State 
intervention in the agricultural sector has also been substantial, through 
price interventions, quotas and tariffs. The next section takes a closer look 
at the different forms of protection in the MPCs. 
2.4  Scope for liberalisation by the MPCs 
A key element of the EMP is the reciprocal nature of the trade 
liberalisation. The scope for liberalisation by the MPCs depends on the 
current level of protection and political possibilities for liberalisation. Most 
studies of the EMP focus on the (lack of) liberalisation on the EU side. In 
terms of the impact on the MPCs, the lagging liberalisation of agricultural 
trade by the EU is most important since barriers to manufactured exports to 
the EU were lifted in the 1970s. The position of the EU with respect to the 
liberalisation of agricultural trade is well-documented and there is no 
reason to expect a major change to this position. Thus trade protection by 
the EU will not be further discussed here. 
This section examines the trade barriers erected by the MPCs. 
Although protection is only one of a multitude of hindrances to economic 
growth in the MPCs, it is the aspect most easily influenced through the 
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context of the EMP is its reciprocal nature, requiring the MPCs to remove 
their trade barriers as well. This feature of the EMP also warrants a closer 
look at the protection in the MPCs. 
First, trade protection by the MPCs is compared with other regions 
and its development over time is assessed. Second, non-trade polices 
affecting production and trade patterns are discussed. The third sub-section 
addresses some of the reasons for the high levels of trade protection and 
other interventions in the MPCs.  
2.4.1  Comparing trade protection in the MPCs with other regions in 
the world 
Detailed studies of protection by the MPCs are few and far between. 
Srinivasan (2002) provides a rare summary of different studies, of which 
the main points are summarised here. Table 2.9 reproduces protection 
indicators for a selected number of MPCs, for which data are available in 
the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database. Table 2.10 
reproduces the scores of the MPCs on three aggregated protection 
measures. 
All indicators confirm the observation previously made about high 
trade-protection levels in the MPCs. The weighted average tariff rate 
provides an illustration of the protection rates. Egypt has the lowest score 
of the MPCs with a weighted tariff of 13.7%. This rate still exceeds the 
highest score by income group (12.6% for low-income countries). This 
result reflects the lack of trade liberalisation in Egypt while the rest of the 
world has been lowering trade barriers. The MPCs started from historically 
high protection levels and have not been reducing (sometimes even 
increasing) them.  
Among the MPCs, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have gone farthest in 
reforming their economies. This reform, however, has not extended to trade 
protection. This situation is illustrated by the weighted tariff of Tunisia 
being more than double the tariff of the low-income countries.  
In terms of aggregate protection measures the MPCs score even 
worse. The aggregate measures build on the simple average tariff rate and 
the standard deviation, both of which are exceptionally high in the MPCs. 
In terms of the Andrew and Neary measure of trade protection, only South 
Asia comes near the protection levels of the MPCs. Within the group of 
MPCs included in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, Jordan has the lowest level of 
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Table 2.9 Trade protection indicators for selected Middle East and North African 
countries 
 Simple 
avg. 
Weighted 
avg. 
Standard 
deviation 
NTB 
coverage 
Escalation 
index 
  (%) (%) (%) (%)  (Ratio) 
Selected MPCs        
Algeria  24.2 17.3 16.7 15.8  1.6 
Egypt  28.1 13.7  130.6 28.8  2.1 
Jordan  21.6 18.9 15.8  0.0  1.1 
Morocco  35.7 25.8 31.2  5.5  1.1 
Tunisia  29.9 28.8 12.8 32.8  1.1 
Comparators by income 
group 
      
Low-income 
countries 
15.5 12.6 10.9  5.5  1.5 
Lower middle-income  
   countries 
15.3 12.5 15.0 13.4  1.7 
Upper middle-income 
   countries 
13.8 11.6 12.3 14.7  1.6 
High-income 
countries 
4.3 3.4 7.0  15.6  1.7 
Comparators by region        
Europe and Central 
   Asia 
9.8  6.7 11.0 10.9  2.0 
East  Asia  13.1 8.7  16.8 9.9  1.8 
Latin  America  13.1 11.9  8.5 17.1  1.6 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  17.7 14.2 13.3  4.5  1.5 
South  Asia  19.7 18.8 11.7  8.2  1.2 
Note: Most-favoured nation tariff rates are used; NTB coverage refers to the percentage of 
tariff lines having at least one non-tariff barrier; the escalation index is the ratio of the 
simple average tariff on final goods to the tariff on intermediate goods. 
Source: Table 1 in Srinivasan (2002, p. 9) based on the TRAINS database. 
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Table 2.10 Aggregated trade protection indicators for selected Middle East and 
North African countries 
  Sharer index  Oliva index  Anderson & 
Neary index 
Selected MPCs     
Algeria 7.0  20.0  25.0 
Egypt 8.0  55.8  23.5 
Jordan 4.0  14.4  n.a. 
Morocco 7.0  26.6  35.0 
Tunisia 8.0  26.1  23.8 
Comparators by income 
group 
   
Low-income countries  3.5  11.7  21.2 
Lower middle-income  
   countries 
4.1 14.7 15.1 
Upper middle-income 
   countries 
4.1 13.6 11.8 
High-income countries  3.1  8.0  10.9 
Comparators by region     
Europe and Central 
   Asia 
3.5 10.4 11.6 
East Asia  3.9  13.2  11.3 
Latin America  3.6  12.9  14.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.8  13.1  18.9 
South Asia  4.2  14.6  27.7 
Note: The Sharer index is an arbitrary scoring system combining most-favoured nation tariff 
rates and standard deviations; the Oliva index combines tariff rates, standard 
deviations and non-tariff barrier coverage; the Anderson and Neary index is the 
uniform tariff rate applied to a free trade regime to return welfare to the most recent 
year of observation.  
Source: Table 1 in Srinivasan (2002, p. 9) based on the TRAINS database. 
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The EMP could be expected to lead towards a more open orientation 
of the MPC economies. Table 2.11 shows the development over time of the 
trade restrictiveness indicator. In 2003 all the MPCs, except Israel, can be 
classified as having restrictive trade policies. More interesting is the 
development over time. One could have expected more outward-looking 
trade policies as time went by. According to Table 2.11, only Egypt and 
Syria seem to fit this pattern, moving to a more open trade policy in 2003. 
The patterns of the other countries, however, suggest that this may only be 
a temporary change. Jordan, for example, increased its protection in 2003. 
Morocco and especially Lebanon alternate between open and restrictive 
trade policies. Overall, there is no indication that the MPCs are following 
the global trend towards more open policies. 
Table 2.11 Trade restrictiveness over time by country 
  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Algeria  5  5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 
Egypt 5  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Israel 2  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Jordan  4  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Lebanon  n.a.  2 2 5 2 5 3 4 5 
Morocco  5  4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 
Syria  n.a.  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Tunisia  5  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Note:  Restrictiveness index: less than 2 = free trade policy, between 4 and 5 is repressed 
trade policy. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (Gwartney et al., 2003). 
 
2.4.2  Government intervention in agriculture 
Apart from restrictive trade policies consisting of tariffs, licensing, import 
bans, state trade monopolies, multiple exchange rates and restrictive 
foreign-exchange allocations, other MPC policies may affect domestic 
production and the scope for foreign competitors (ERF, 2002).  
Agriculture is important for the MPCs, in terms of employment, 
contribution to GDP and income-distribution effects (poverty tends to be 
concentrated in the rural regions). Historically, the MPC governments 
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(cereals, vegetable oil and sugar), output support for both farmers and 
agro-food processors, subsidies of inputs (water, fertilisers, seed and 
machinery) and consumer subsidies. The amount of intervention varied 
with the commodities, from directly controlling prices and markets for 
strategic commodities (such as wheat and sugar beet) to allowing 
competitive markets for fruit and vegetables. The policy interventions 
require huge outlays of public funds and are hard to maintain when 
economic circumstances take a change for the worse. Some countries 
reformed their agricultural interventions in the course of implementing 
structural adjustment programmes (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia); 
others (notably Syria) have maintained the prime role of the state (Chaherli, 
2002). 
Despite reforms, distorting policies remain. On the production side 
these mainly affect ‘strategic products’: wheat in most MPCs; milk and 
olive oil in Tunisia; cotton, sugar beet and tobacco in Syria; and sugar beet 
and tobacco in Lebanon (Chaherli, 2002). On the input side a wide array of 
subsidies are used to stimulate cereal and livestock production. Subsidies 
of feed area is a common feature, representing the most important (and 
constant) item of the agricultural budget in MPCs. Analyses of the 
competitiveness of MPC production indicate that in the absence of 
government intervention in output and input prices, MPC producers could 
not compete with foreign imports.  
High tariffs to ward off cereal imports and to promote domestic 
production lead to high domestic prices. Most of the MPC governments 
subsidised consumer prices to reduce the burden for consumers, but found 
that intervening on both sides of the market poses a heavy burden on 
government budgets. Therefore, most countries have since reduced food 
subsidies, generally in a gradual fashion to avoid political instability.  
Apart from tariffs and quotas there seem to be other restrictions to 
trade since quota fill rates are (well) below 100%. It seems likely that the 
administration of the quotas is hampering foreign imports. In the case of 
Egypt, for example, product standards are applied to imports that do not 
apply to domestic products, such as the requirement that imported beef has 
less than 7% fat content while no restrictions apply to domestic beef (USTR, 
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2.4.3  Factors affecting the slow pace of reform in the MPCs 
The above comparison of MPC protection with that in other regions begs 
the question of why the MPCs are not following the global trend towards 
freeing trade. The implication of diverging from the global pattern is that 
the MPCs will be losing in terms of international competitiveness relative 
to other regions in the world. Thus there seems to be a clear case for at least 
keeping protection levels in line with the rest of the world.  
Analysis of the relative strength of import-substitution industries and 
export-oriented industries in Morocco and Egypt suggests a strong lobby 
for maintaining protection rates (Srinivasan, 2002). This leaves the question 
of why there is such a strong import-substitution industry. Trade policies 
unfavourable to exports and generally unsupportive domestic policies 
seem to play a role in the development of import-substitution industries 
demanding continuous protection. 
Policies oriented towards import substitution were made possible by 
the inflows of foreign exchange (from natural resources and remittances) 
and by the preferential agreements in which the MPCs engaged. Income 
from fuel and remittances allowed the financing of an expansive public 
sector and of the interventions on the producer and consumer sides. At the 
same time a number of MPCs enjoyed preferential access to EU markets for 
textiles and clothing. The resulting investments in these sectors may have 
been at the expense of investments in medium technology industries (such 
as industrial chemicals, standardised machinery and simple electrical and 
electronic products). Latin American countries (with similar endowments) 
did make these investments, gaining market share. Given the learning-by-
doing that plays an important role in manufacturing, the inward-looking 
strategy of the MPCs in the past could prove costly in the future.  
2.4.4  Summarising the scope for liberalisation by the MPCs 
Historically MPCs have had high levels of protection and diverged from 
the global trend towards more open policies. In addition to restrictive trade 
policies there is still a hefty degree of government intervention in the MPC 
economies. Two major factors that hamper MPC trade liberalisation are a 
bloated public sector and the lack of international competitiveness of MPC 
producers. Liberalising trade would reduce government income and may 
wipe out a large part of MPC production, both of which may result in 
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in the MPCs, the reciprocal trade liberalisation implied by establishing a 
free trade agreement seems hard to achieve. 
The impact of preferential access for textiles and clothing on 
industrial developments raises a question about the impact of preferential 
access granted by the EU for specific agricultural products. Similar to the 
distortion in manufacturing, these preferences may have distorted the 
agricultural production structure of the MPCs.  
Conclusions 
The current implementation of the EMP can be summarised as a trade-
focused agreement in which no significant results have been attained in the 
reduction of agricultural trade protection, either by the EU or by the MPCs. 
Although a reduction of protection on manufactured goods by the MPCs is 
specified by time schedules, previous trends give no reason to expect that 
these schedules will be met. Rising trade with the US suggests that 
American trade agreements and financial support are more effective than 
the present European initiative. 
The lack of progress in liberalising agricultural trade indicates that 
the economic interests of a limited set of (Mediterranean) EU member 
states has so far prevailed over the overall interests of the EU in economic 
growth at its southern borders. Thus, EU foreign and trade policies towards 
the MPCs are currently incoherent. The explicit consideration of these 
conflicting objectives could support the development of alternative policies 
more in line with the multiple objectives of the EU. In this light the recently 
drafted road map for liberalising agricultural trade based on a negative-list 
approach (IPTS, 2006) appears to be a promising sign for a realignment of 
the EU’s trade policies with the EU’s overall interests. 
The liberalisation of trade addresses only one of the features of MPC 
economies that hamper their growth. Liberalising trade not only reduces 
high trade-protection levels in the MPCs, but also has strong implications 
for employment and government tariff revenues. Taking account of the 
structural aspects of the MPC economies could facilitate the design of 
agreements such that they promote growth and support a gradual move 
towards more open economies, while acknowledging the constraints faced 
by the MPC governments. 
Finally, the EMP is designed as a set of bilateral agreements between 
the EU and each of the MPCs. The Mediterranean FTA sought by the EMP, 
with the view that linking the MPC economies could play an important 74 | THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
stabilising role in the region, requires the liberalisation of trade among the 
MPCs as well. The current set of agreements, however, results in a hub-
and-spoke structure – which does not promote South–South integration.  
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3.  Reforming the EU’s domestic 
support in the Doha round 
Measurement, feasibility and consequences 
  Hans Jensen and Wusheng Yu 
Introduction 
The agricultural trade negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
were put back on track with the agreement to the July package in 2004. The 
domestic subsidies allocated by a few member countries to their 
agricultural sectors formed part of the negotiations. Many developing 
countries had been pressuring these members to reduce their domestic 
support measures. In responding to these pressures, the July package 
outlines a framework for such reductions. In this framework, the guidelines 
for reforming domestic support measures through a tiered formula have 
been set out but the numerical targets of the formula have not been 
specified and are still to be negotiated. 
Exploring the possible outcomes of the negotiations under this 
framework and evaluating their impact is no easy task. Among other 
things, it requires detailed knowledge of the WTO measurements of 
domestic support programmes and of the actual policy instruments used 
by individual member countries. These and other specific challenges that 
analysts face are discussed below. 
Unlike the cases of reducing market access barriers and export 
subsidies, reforming domestic support measures involves a complex 
package of policy instruments that are placed in different WTO ‘boxes’ (see 
Figure 3.1, reproduced from Baffes & de Gorter, 2005).  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 77 
 
Figure 3.1 Domestic support measures and the WTO 
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Notes: The 5% above de minimis applies for the sum of taxpayer- and consumer-financed 
support. The de minimis exemption can include consumer-financed support. 
Source: Baffes & de Gorter (2005). 
 
Any reductions will be applied to the measures in these boxes and to 
the overall levels of trade-distorting domestic support derived from the 
different boxes. To complicate matters, the current levels of domestic 
support for each member country allowed under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) are tied to historical references, such as 
average production values, land areas, intervention prices and average 
world market prices. Some of these measures have since lost their relevance 
because of changing market conditions and (changing) trade policies. For 
example, the market price support included in the amber box for the EU is 
largely no longer relevant. Yet the EU is still obliged to include some 
‘fictional’ numbers in its notification of the aggregate measure of support 
(AMS) to the WTO. What this implies for the talks about reductions is that 
it becomes quite difficult to figure out the actual level of support using the 78 | REFORMING THE EU’S DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE DOHA ROUND 
 
WTO classification scheme (i.e. the boxes) and it is even more difficult to 
come up with a numerical reduction target, given the current levels of 
permitted support and the actual levels of support. These issues lead to the 
research question of how to correctly measure domestic support 
programmes in policy analysis. 
Furthermore, a numerical analysis of the effects of any reduction 
proposal needs to match the support given to individual instruments in 
each of the boxes with the actual policy variable in an economic model. 
Researchers typically encounter two possible issues. First, one may have 
knowledge of the aggregate level of support in each box but not the details 
associated with individual policy instruments within the boxes. Second, 
different countries usually have very different policy instruments within 
the same box. Therefore, a sensible model-based evaluation of a reduction 
proposal needs to translate the reduction proposal into changes to the 
actual policy instruments in the model and the implementation of the 
reduction proposal needs to be conducted on a country-by-country basis. 
Lastly, unlike the reductions of tariffs and quotas, reforms of 
d o m e s t i c  s u p p o r t  t e n d  t o  i m p l y  c u t s  t o  f i s c a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o n  t h e s e  
programmes rather than reductions of the price wedges. In fact, if the fiscal 
spending needs to be set at a certain level, the relevant price wedge then 
needs to be adjusted endogenously in response to a reduction of the 
support in dollar terms. In many cases, reforms to domestic support 
programmes may also involve turning a trade-distorting measure into a 
‘decoupled’ instrument. There, analysts need to make sure that the new 
instrument is indeed decoupled from production decisions about the 
affected products. 
The EU maintains the largest domestic-support programme in the 
world, which is likely to be subjected to new WTO disciplines and 
reduction commitments at the conclusion of the Doha negotiations. The 
above-discussed measurement and modelling challenges are perhaps most 
evident in analysing the possibility, feasibility and consequences of 
reforming domestic support in the EU. The EU’s efforts to meet its potential 
WTO domestic-support commitments are in essence the reform of the 
common agricultural policy (CAP). Recent and ongoing efforts to reform 
the CAP include Agenda 2000, the mid-term review, reforms to the EU’s 
sugar regime and proposed sectoral initiatives in areas such wine, fruit and 
vegetables. In addition, the enlargement of the EU also has important 
implications on domestic support negotiations. Therefore, speculation TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 79 
 
about the possible stance of the EU in the WTO talks and evaluations of the 
impact of the EU’s position need to be conducted in the context of these 
CAP reform programmes, taking into account external pressures facing the 
EU. 
The purpose of this chapter is to sketch out a reduction proposal for 
reducing the EU’s domestic support measures in the spirit of the July 
package framework. The possibility and feasibility of the proposal is 
analysed by carefully reviewing the allowed level of support for the EU 
(section 3.1) and the existing and ongoing reform initiatives of the CAP 
(section 3.2). Based on this, we also project a tiered reduction formula for 
other WTO members (section 3.3). We then proceed to discuss the 
modelling of existing EU domestic-support programmes and their reforms 
as per the reduction proposal in a computable, general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. There, we show how we have mapped out the instruments in the 
model according to the WTO boxes and how we have modelled the CAP 
reform, which in the context of meeting the WTO’s reduction proposal 
largely implies a decoupling of the amber and blue box programmes 
(section 3.4). After that, the numerically simulated results from 
implementing the proposal are presented and compared with those 
obtained by reforms to market access and export competition (section 3.5). 
This section is followed by a discussion and concluding remarks. 
3.1  Domestic support in the WTO negotiations and implications 
for the EU 
In the 1994 URAA, disciplines were introduced to limit agricultural 
support programmes that encourage agricultural production. Member 
countries made commitments to bind their levels of domestic support using 
an AMS framework, which provides a measurement for domestic support 
classified as amber box policies. Domestic support measures that are not 
classified in the amber box were exempted from reduction commitments. 
These measures include trade-distorting domestic support policies falling 
under the de minimis level of support (which is set at less than 5% of the 
value of production in developed countries), support measures contained 
in the blue box (where payments are linked to historical production levels) 
and green box measures that are considered to have minimal trade-
distorting effects. An overview of these domestic support measures is 
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In the current round of agricultural trade negotiations, disciplined 
domestic support has been extended to cover blue box policies and a new 
overall limit on all trade-distorting domestic support has been proposed. 
More precisely, the Doha Work Programme (WTO, 2004) – also known as 
the July package – stipulates a framework to reduce the possible use of 
amber (AMS) and blue box payments, plus payments falling under the de 
minimis rule. Overall, the framework calls for substantial reductions in 
trade-distorting domestic support and specifies that special and differential 
treatment will be an integrated part of domestic support. Furthermore, 
there is to be a strong element of harmonisation in the reductions made by 
developed countries. 
To secure substantial reductions, the framework proposes to cap both 
the de minimis support and the allowed amount of blue box support. More 
specifically: 
•  The overall trade-distorting domestic support (as measured by the 
final bound total AMS plus the permitted de minimis level plus the 
highest level of blue box payments during a recent representative 
period) will be reduced according to a tiered formula. In the first year 
of implementation countries have to reduce support by 20% relative 
to this overall base. 
•  The final bound AMS will be reduced substantially, using a tiered 
approach, with those members having higher total AMS making 
greater reductions. 
•  Reductions in the de minimis support are also to be negotiated. 
•  Blue box support in the future will not exceed 5% of a WTO 
member’s average total value of production during a historical period 
to be agreed. 
•  Direct payments that do not require production under certain 
conditions can be placed in the blue box. 
The EU is the world’s largest provider of domestic agricultural 
support in dollar terms. The total possible trade-distorting domestic 
support of the EU specified as the final bound AMS commitment in the 
URAA exceeds €67 bn, with no limit on blue box payments. Of course, not 
all this allowed amount has actually been spent by the EU in the years 
following the Uruguay round. In fact, the notified total AMS of the EU in 
the year 2001 was €43.6 bn, with an additional €22.2 bn in the blue box. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 81 
 
The framework for reducing domestic support proposed in the July 
package calls for the EU to make larger cuts to its trade-distorting domestic 
support measures. In fact, many speculate that the EU will be put into the 
top tier in a tiered reduction formula. For example, Canada has asked the 
EU to make the largest proportional cuts in its domestic support ceiling as 
part of a WTO Doha round agreement and proposed to position the EU 
alone in the first tier of reduction commitments (Agra Europe, 2005). 
Canada suggests that the US and Japan should be placed in the second tier, 
with other developed countries in the third tier and developing countries in 
the fourth tier.  
Facing the pressures from other WTO members to make the largest 
cuts in its domestic agricultural support, the natural question to ask is 
whether the EU is willing and in the position to agree to a first-tier cut. In 
this chapter we argue that the CAP reforms in the past decade have given 
the EU a wide margin for accommodating a large cut to its domestic 
support measures. If indeed the EU agrees to a first-tier cut, the pressure 
would be on other countries with substantial domestic-support 
programmes to follow suit. 
3.2  The CAP reform and possible EU stances in domestic support 
negotiations 
Following the guidelines laid out by the Doha Work Programme, Table 3.1 
reveals how large a reduction in total trade-distorting domestic support the 
EU-15 can take from its overall base-level commitment, taking into account 
the recent Agenda 2000, the mid-term review (MTR) and the sugar and 
olive oil sector reforms to the CAP.  
In the EU-15 the overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic 
support is assumed to be €112,874 mn, which has been calculated by 
adding the URAA final bound AMS levels together with the permitted de 
minimis payments in a given reference period plus the highest of existing 
blue box payments during the 1995-2002 period.1 Comparing the overall 
base level of trade-distorting domestic support with the notification to the 
WTO for the year 2000–01, the EU-15 was already well below this base 
                                                      
1 The permitted de minimis level is simply calculated as 5% of the average value of 
total agricultural production during the period 1999-2002 using values found in the 
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commitment of €112,874 mn for that year: the reported AMS plus de 
minimis and blue box payments only amounted to €66,455 mn. Moreover, 
the recent CAP reforms will further reduce the actual amount of trade-
distorting support in the future, implying that large cuts from not only the 
total base level but also from the actual notification level are possible. Next, 
we go through the possibilities of reducing the EU support measures 
contained in the AMS, the de minimis support and the blue box. 
Table 3.1 The EU’s base commitments in trade-distorting domestic support and 
possible reductions (mn €) 
   De minimis     
  AMS
Non-product
specific
Product-
specific
Blue
box
Total trade-
distorting 
domestic 
support 
Base commitment  67,159 12,097 12,097 21,521 112,874 
Notif. 2000–01  43,654 538 40 22,223 66,455 
 Of which MPS a)  30,684 0 0 0 n.a. 
Reductions          
MPS reductions to            
Rice -376 0 0 0 0 
Rye -238 0 0 0 0 
Other cereals  -1,701 0 0 0 0 
Milk -1,893 0 0 0 0 
Beef -11,190 0 0 0 0 
Sugar -6,090 0 0 0 0 
Olive oil  -2,070 0 0 0 0 
Total MPS reductions  -23,558 0 0 0 -23,558 
Non-MPS reductions  17 0 -17 -18,223 -18,223 
New domestic 
   support b)  20,113 538 23 4,000 24,674 
New commitment b)  20,148 6,049 6,049 12,097 28,219 
a)  MPS refers to market price support. 
b)  This is a conservative estimate of the EU’s possible reduction in notified trade-distorting 
support given that reforms of the cotton, tobacco and hops sectors have not been taken into 
account in this calculation. These three commodities account for €1,769 mn of the EU’s notified 
AMS in 2000–01. Also, future reforms of the EU wine, fruit and vegetable sectors are not taken 
into account when calculating the EU’s possible reductions of trade-distorting domestic support. 
These three commodities accounted for €9,603 mn of the EU’s notified AMS in 2000–01. 
Sources: WTO (2004) and authors’ calculations. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 83 
 
3.2.1  Aggregate measure of support 
In the case of the AMS, the EU-15 reported that it used €43,654 mn in 
support of farmers in the WTO amber box, of which the market price 
support (MPS) accounted for €30,684 mn. For each relevant commodity, the 
MPS included in the AMS is calculated as the price gap between a fixed 
world price (average for the period 1986-88) and an administered market 
price for the concerned commodity, multiplied by the amount produced.2 
In the case of the EU, the administered prices of some commodities that 
were used in the calculation of the MPS in the 2001 notification by the EU 
will be or already have been reduced as a result of Agenda 2000, the MTR, 
and the sugar and olive oil reforms to the CAP. In fact, Agenda 2000 and 
the sugar reforms abolish the intervention prices for beef and sugar. Until 
now, these prices have been used in the calculation of the MPS in the EU’s 
notification to the WTO. Under the reforms, the EU introduces a basic price 
of €2,224 per metric tonne (t) of beef, which will trigger public intervention 
only when the average market price in a member state or region falls below 
a safety net level of €1,560/t for two consecutive weeks. This means that 
the current safety net level in the EU is 70% of the basic price. In the case of 
sugar the intervention price is replaced by a reference price for sugar that is 
set at €404.4/t. The new basic and reference prices act as a trigger level for 
private storage as well as set the level of border protection in the EU. In the 
case of the olive oil reform, the notified administered price is abolished and 
replaced by a new trigger price for private storage, which ranges from 
€1,779/t to €1,524/t for different types of olive oil. It is assumed that these 
new prices will not be notified as new administered prices given that both 
the new trigger price for olive oil and the public intervention price for beef 
are below the fixed world price (the EU’s external reference price in its 
WTO notifications). 
These reductions and the abolition of the administered prices, as 
shown in Table 3.2, will lead to a lowering of the EU’s MPS (and hence the 
                                                      
2 Some countries do not use the total amount produced but only the total amount 
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AMS) by €23,558 mn, given the production level reported in the 2001 
notification.3 
Table 3.2 Agenda 2000 and MTR intervention price reductions 
 
Notification 2000–01 
administered 
New 
administered 
External 
reference 
  price (€/t)  price (€/t)  price (€/t) 
Olive oil  3,837.70    n.a.    2,851.80 
Rice   298.40    150.0    143.30 
Rye   110.25    n.a.    67.30 
Other cereals    110.25   101.3    n.a 
Skimmed milk powder   2,055.20  1,747.0    684.70 
Butter   3,282.00  2,464.0    943.30 
Beef   3,242.00    n.a.    1,729.80 
Sugar   631.90    n.a.    193.80 
Sources: EU (2003a, 2003b and 2003c) and EU (2006). 
Abolishing the administered market prices for beef, sugar and olive 
oil, combined with reductions in administered prices for cereals and milk, 
would reduce the notified AMS in 2000–01 to €20,113 mn. This implies that 
the EU could agree to a reduction of roughly 70% in its final bound AMS 
commitment (i.e. from €67,159 mn to €20,148 mn).4 
3.2.2 De  minimis 
In the case of de minimis support, any change in the exempt level would not 
have any substantial effect on the EU, owing to the fact that the EU’s 
notified de minimis support remains quite small. In its 2001 notification to 
the WTO, the EU’s exempt non-product specific and product-specific 
domestic support amounted to only €538 mn and €40 mn, respectively. 
                                                      
3 This assumes that the EU will use the new basic and reference prices respectively 
for beef and sugar as the new administered prices in the calculation of MPS in the 
AMS. 
4 Future reforms to the common market for fruit and vegetables could possibly 
enable the EU to undertake a larger reduction commitment of the AMS than the 
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According to the text of the July package, it is more likely that a 
reduction rather than a removal of the exempt de minimis support will come 
out of the Doha negotiations. As such, we conjecture a 50% reduction of the 
de minimis rule.5 This implies that the de minimis rule would be reduced 
from 5% to 2.5%. In the case of the EU, non-product specific domestic 
support would then be capped at 2.5% of the total value of agricultural 
production, which was roughly €6,046 mn in 2001 and was well over the 
notified number of €538 mn in 2001 (see Table 3.1). As for the product-
specific de minimis support, the rule of 2.5% implies that the EU would have 
to reduce the 2001 notification of €40 mn to €23 mn.6 Therefore, a total of 
€17 mn would have to be moved back into the calculation of the AMS, 
which would be the only action the EU needs to take under this conjectured 
new de minimis rule. 
3.2.3 Blue  box 
In the year 2000–01, the EU provided its farmers exempt direct payments 
under production-limiting programmes in the blue box that amounted to 
€22,223 mn. These payments were given in the form of land and livestock 
premiums. Under the MTR reform of the CAP, the majority of these 
payments will become decoupled from production. Therefore, they can be 
moved into the undisciplined green box.  
Specifically, the implementation of the MTR’s single farm payment 
gives each member state the option to maintain a small part of its direct 
payments coupled to production. For the EU as a whole, it is expected that 
88% of the budgetary transfers in the form of direct payments (i.e. land and 
livestock premiums, among others) will become part of the single payment. 
The aggregate ceiling for the single payment in the EU-15 is €33,218 mn for 
the year 2013, of which around €21 bn was notified as blue box payments in 
2001. The MTR will shift a large portion of the blue box payments to the 
green box, leading to roughly only €4 bn left in the blue box. This amount is  
 
                                                      
5 In its 2001 WTO notification, the US had over $7 bn in exempt non-product 
specific and product-specific domestic support. Therefore, a total abolition of the de 
minimis rule does not seem to be a plausible outcome of the Doha round. 
6 This reduction is necessary because the support granted to some commodities in 
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well below the new commitment for the blue box payments (which must 
not exceed 5% of the total value of agricultural production in the EU, a 
figure that is in the region of €12,097 mn). 
3.2.4  Total trade-distorting domestic support 
Given the assumptions about possible reductions in the AMS (amber box), 
the 50% reduction in the de minimis rule and the move of a large share of 
the blue box payments into the green box, under existing and planned CAP 
reform programmes the EU should be able to cut its total trade-distorting 
domestic support from the 2001 notification level of €66,455 mn to a new 
level of €24,674 mn (see Table 3.1). The overall base commitment of all 
trade-distorting domestic support of €112,874 mn – from which reductions 
are to be made – can then be at least reduced by 75%, resulting in a new 
base commitment level of €28,219 mn. Such a reduction in the total 
commitment level would leave room for the EU to increase either de 
minimis  payments or blue box payments but without the possibility to 
increase its AMS payments. 
3.3  Towards a tiered formula for reducing domestic support in the 
Doha round 
The above analysis has demonstrated that the EU is in a position to 
institute large cuts to its base commitment level of trade-distorting support 
within the current reform programmes of the CAP. If indeed the EU adopts 
such a position, it would have ripple effects on other countries, obliging 
them to reform their own domestic support programmes.  
3.3.1  Proposal on the tiered formula 
It can be assumed that the above-proposed cuts (i.e. a 70% cut to the final 
bound AMS and a 75% cut to the overall base commitments of all trade-
distorting domestic support) would put the EU in the first tier of the 
suggested reform formula. Other countries can then be placed in several 
different tiers in the conjectured formula according to their current levels of 
domestic support and their base commitments. Table 3.3 presents this 
proposal.    
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Table 3.3a Domestic support base commitments, new commitments and latest WTO notifications – Developed countries 
    Currency AMS  De 
minimis 
Blue 
box 
Total Production 
value 
Total as a 
percentage 
of prod. 
value 
Reduction 
total/AMS 
(%) 
         (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)=(1+2+3)  (5)  (6)=(4/5)  (7) 
Iceland Base  commitmenta)  Mn ISK  130  11  15  156  114  137  75/70 
 New  commitmentb)  39 2.5%  6  39  –  –  – 
 Notif.  2000  c)     117  0  0  117  –  –  – 
Norway  Base commitment  Mn NOK  11,449  1,768  7,880  21,097  17,682  119  75/70 
 New  commitment  3,435  2.5%  884  5,274  –  –  – 
  Notif. 2001     10,700  0  7,240  17,940  –  –  – 
Switzerland– Base  commitment Mn  CHF  4,257  730  365  5,353  7,304  73  75/70 
Liechtenstein New  commitment  1,277  2.5%  365  1,338  –  –  – 
  Notif. 1998     3,273  0  0  3,273  –  –  – 
Japan  Base commitment  Bn JPY  3,973  905  452  5,330  9,047  59  75/70 
 New  commitment  1,192  2.5%  452  1,333  –  –  – 
  Notif. 2000     709  32  93  833  –  –  – 
EU-15  Base commitment  Mn EUR  67,159  24,194  21,521  112,874  241,943  47  75/70 
 New  commitment  20,148  2.5%  12,097  28,219  –  –  – 
   Notif. 2000     43,654  561  22,223  66,438  –  –  –  
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Table 3.3a cont. 
Canada  Base commitment  Mn CAD  4,301  3,074  1,537  8,912  30,737  29  65/60 
 New  commitment 1,720  2.5%  1,537  3,119  –  –  – 
  Notif. 1999     939  1,102  0  2,041  –  –  – 
US  Base commitment  Mn USD  19,103  19,313  9,656  48,072  193,129  25  65/60 
 New  commitment 7,641  2.5%  9,656  16,825  –  –  – 
  Notif. 2001     14,413  7,045  0  21,458  –  –  – 
New   Base commitment  Mn NZD  288  1,338  669  2,296  13,385  17  55/50 
Zealand New  commitment  144  2.5%  669  1,033  –  –  – 
  Notif. 2001     0  0  0  0  –  –  – 
Australia  Base commitment  Mn AUD  472  3,493  1,747  5,712  34,934  16  55/50 
 New  commitment  236  2.5%  1,747  2,570  –  –  – 
   Notif. 2002–03     213       20  0  233  –  –  – 
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Table 3.3b Domestic support base commitments, new commitments and latest WTO notifications – Developing countries 
    Currency AMS  De 
 minimis 
Blue 
box 
Total Production 
value 
Reduction 
total/AMS (%) 
         (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)=(1+2+3)  (5)  (7) 
Argentina  Base  commitment  USD  75,021,296  – –  – –  40/40 
  New  commitment  45,012,778  5% –  – –  – 
  Notif. 2000–01     79,599,922  0  0  79,599,922  –  – 
Brazil  Base commitment  Thsnd USD  912,105  – –  – –  40/40 
  New  commitment  547,263  5% –  – –  – 
  Notif. 1997–98     82,820  408,714  0  491,534  –  – 
Bulgaria  Base commitment  Mn EUR  520  719  180  1,419  3,594  40/40 
  New commitment  312  5%  180  851      –  – 
  Notif. 2001     26  9  0  35  –  – 
Colombia  Base commitment  Thsnd USD  344,733  – –  – –  40/40 
  New  commitment  206,840  5% –  – –  – 
  Notif. 1999     6,805  0  0  6,805  –  – 
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Table 3.3b cont. 
Costa Rica  Base  Thsnd USD  15,945  –  – – –  40/40 
  New  commitment  9,567  5%  – – –  – 
  Notif. 1999     1,595  0  0  1,595  –  – 
Israel  Base commitment  Thsnd USD  568,980  632,816 163,620 1,360,001 3,272,391  40/40 
 New  commitment    341,388  5.0%  163,620  816,000  –  – 
  Notif. 2002     248,155  27,131  0  275,286  –  – 
Jordan  Base  commitment  JOD  1,333,973  111,066,667  27,766,667 140,167,306 555,333,333  40/40 
  New commitment  800,384  5.0%  27,766,667  84,100,384      –  – 
  Notif. 2002     743,298  10,775,176  –  11,518,474  –  – 
Korea  Base commitment  Bn KRW  1,490  6,427  1,607  9,524  32,137  40/40 
  New commitment  894  5.0%  1,607  5,715      –  – 
  Notif. 2000     1,691  526  0  2,217  –  – 
Mexico Base  commitment  Mn  MXP ‘91  25,161  59,164  14,791  99,116  295,821  40/40 
  New commitment  15,097  5.0%  14,791  59,470      –  – 
  Notif. 1998     3,799  0  0  3799  –  – 
Morocco  Base commitment  Mn MAD  685  –  –  –  –  40/40 
  New  commitment  411  5%  – – –  – 
  Notif. 2001     300  0  0  300  –  –   
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Table 3.3b cont. 
Papua New   Base commitment  Mn USD  33  0  –  33  –  40/40 
Guinea  New commitment  20  5%  –  –      –  – 
  Notif. -     –  –  –  –  –  – 
South Africa  Base commitment  Mn ZAR  2,015  9,331  2,333  13,679  46,655  40/40 
  New commitment  1,209  5%  2,333  8,207      –  – 
  Notif. 2002     0  0  0  0  –  – 
Taipei China  Base commitment    Mn TWD  14,165  –  –  –  –  40/40 
 New  commitment  8,499  5%  –  –  –  – 
  Notif. -     –  –  –  –  –  – 
Thailand  Base commitment    Mn THB  19,028  –  –  –  –  40/40 
 New  commitment  11,417  5%  –  –  –  – 
  Notif. 1998     16,402  0  0  16,402  –  – 
Tunisia  Base commitment    Mn TND  59  748  187  994  3,738  40/40 
  New commitment  35  5%  187  596     –  – 
  Notif. 2000     0  26  0  26  –  – 
Venezuela  Base commitment   Thsnd USD  1,130,667  –  –  –  –  40/40 
 New  commitment  678,400  5%  –  –  –  – 
   Notif. 1998     210,578  0  0  210,578  –  – 
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a)  Base commitments on trade-distorting domestic support: 
•  The AMS (column 1) base level values are taken from the final bound AMS levels agreed in the Uruguay round. 
•  The permitted de minimis (column 2) payments included in the overall base level of trade-distorting domestic support are calculated 
as a five-tenths percentage of the total value of agricultural production as defined by an average production value in a given 
reference period (column 5) multiplied by two (total value of non-product- and product-specific de minimis). 
•  Blue box payments (column 3) included in the total base level of all trade-distorting support is the higher of existing blue box 
payments during the 1995–2000 period or 5% of the value of agricultural production (column 5). 
•  The total (column 4) value of the overall base level of support is columns (1) + (2) + (3). 
•  The reference value of agricultural production (column 5) in OECD countries is calculated as the average production value in the 
period 1999–2002 using values found in the PSE tables. For other countries an average of the reported total value of agricultural 
production found in the WTO notifications has been used where available. 
•  In column (6) the total value of the overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic support is calculated as a percentage of the 
value of agricultural production, with Iceland having the largest percentage value and Australia the lowest among developed 
countries. 
•  In column (7) the assumed reduction commitments for the overall base level of trade-distorting domestic support and the AMS is 
specified, where those developing countries with the highest level of possible trade-distorting domestic support as defined in 
column (6) make the largest reductions. 
b)  New commitments: 
•  The AMS is reduced by 10% less than the overall base level of trade-distorting domestic support. 
•  The permitted de minimis value of domestic support is reduced from a five-tenths percentage of agricultural production value, to 
2.5–5%.  
•  Blue box payments are limited to 5% of the agricultural production value found in column (5). 
•  The total overall base level of domestic support is reduced by the percentage found in column (7). 
c) Notif. refers to the latest notification to the WTO. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 93 
 
In the first tier, four developed countries (Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland and Japan) and the EU-15 are grouped together, where a 75% 
reduction in total trade-distorting domestic support and a 70% cut in the 
AMS (both of which are from the base commitments) are imposed. These 
countries have the highest base commitments before any reductions are 
undertaken, relative to the values of their agricultural production (see 
Table 3.3). In the next tier are Canada and the US, with the respective 
proposed reductions of 65% and 60%. The third tier includes New Zealand 
and Australia, with 55% reductions for both categories. Lastly, it is 
proposed that developing countries with domestic support commitments 
reduce both categories by 40%. 
The above proposal on reducing the base total commitments and the 
AMS, along with the new rules on the de minimis (the conjectured 2.5% rule 
for both product and non-product specific support) and the 5% cap on the 
blue box payments (as in the July package framework), constitutes our best 
guess as to the possible outcome of the Doha negotiations on domestic 
support.  
3.3.2  How binding are the new commitments? 
Using the above proposal and the placement of individual countries in the 
different tiers, eight countries would have to make reductions to the 
reported domestic support contained in their latest WTO notifications (see 
Table 3.3). These of course include those countries in the EU-15 that have 
not yet fully implemented the MTR reform of the CAP or abolished the 
intervention price for beef. The other seven countries are Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, the US, Argentina, Korea and Thailand. In this section, we 
offer a preliminary assessment for the US and discuss very briefly how the 
other six countries would be able to comply with the proposed cuts.  
Total trade-distorting domestic support in the US amounted to 
$21,458 mn in 2001 (Table 3.4). This figure would have to be reduced to 
$16,825 mn, given the total base level of $48,701 mn and the proposed 65% 
reduction commitment. Moreover, both the AMS and the de-minimis 
payments would have to be reduced as these exceeded the proposed new 
commitment levels. As for the blue box, the US would have no need to take 
action, since the US did not report anything under the blue box in its 2001 
notification to the WTO. 
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Table 3.4 Proposed domestic support reductions in the US (mn US$) 
  De minimis 
  AMS 
Non-product 
specific 
Product- 
specific 
Blue 
box 
Total trade-
distorting 
domestic 
support 
Base commitment  19,103  9,656   9,656  9,656  48,072 
Notif. 2001  14,413  6,828  217  0  21,458 
 Of which MPS  5,826  0  0   0  n.a.  
Reductions          
MPS reductions          
 Milk   -4,483  0  0  0  -4,483 
Non-MPS reductions  206  -4,640  -206  4,640  0 
New domestic support  10,136 2,188  11  4,640  16,975 
New commitment  7,641  4,828  4,828  9,656  16,825 
Source: WTO (2004) and authors’ calculations.  
Can the US get under the proposed new levels of domestic support? 
To answer this question, we need to review the recent 2002 US Farm Act. 
The Farm Act maintains the fixed-direct payment (green box) and loan-
deficiency payment (amber box) systems but also introduces counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs). These new CCPs provide additional payments to 
producers when market prices fall below a certain level, which is known as 
the target price. They are expected to be included in the blue box, owing to 
the fact that these payments are calculated using historical base areas and 
yields. The CCPs have replaced earlier, ad hoc, crop market-loss assistance 
payments, which accounted f o r  $ 4 , 6 4 0  m n  o f  t h e  de minimis payments 
notified by the US in 2001. Therefore, this amount should be moved from 
the de minimis to the blue box, thereby relieving the US of the pressure to 
drastically reduce its de minimis payments. Another area where the US can 
cut down from the final bound AMS relatively easily and hence the total 
base commitment is the MPS payments related to the dairy policy. Sumner 
(2003) noted that the administered prices for the dairy sector could be 
abolished without hurting US farmers. If this step were taken, it would 
reduce the AMS reported in 2001 by $4,483 mn (Table 3.4). 
After making these changes to the 2001 notification (moving 
payments into the blue box and abolishing the MPS for milk products), the TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 95 
 
US would still not be able to meet the proposed new 65% and 60% 
reductions. Yet recent USDA long-term baseline projections show that this 
needs not be the case. These projections are conducted each year in order to 
forecast the costs of farm programmes for the president’s budget. In their 
latest agricultural baseline projections to 2014 (USDA, 2005), direct 
government payments to farmers are projected to fall from over $24 bn in 
2005 to about $11 bn per year for the period of 2010–14. Towards the end of 
the projections, direct government payments will largely consist of fixed 
direct payments under the 2002 Farm Act and conservation payments, 
which are green box payments. This projection builds on the assumption 
that government payments fall as rising market prices for programme 
commodities reduce loan benefits and CCPs to farmers. If these projections 
are found to be accurate (i.e. if marketing loan gains and loan-deficiency 
payments are reduced to zero and future blue box payments are drastically 
reduced), the AMS level notified in 2001 would be reduced by roughly 
$6,202 mn, thereby enabling the US to comply with the proposed new 
commitments (Table 3.3). 
With regard to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, their notified AMS 
levels are mainly comprised of MPS. Therefore, a large reduction in 
administered prices would be needed to meet their new domestic support 
commitments as compiled in Table 3.3. In Norway, there would also be a 
need to reduce blue box payments by reforming its agricultural policy, 
insofar as to move some of these payments into the green box.  
In the cases of Argentina and Korea, domestic support is given to 
respectively tobacco and rice farmers, in the form of MPS. In Thailand, the 
majority of domestic support is also given to rice farmers in the form of a 
paddy-pledging scheme and a soft loan measure. Argentina and Korea 
would have to reduce their administered prices for tobacco and rice, while 
Thailand would have to reduce its taxpayer-financed rice support scheme 
or convert these measures into blue box payments if the proposed 
reduction scheme was implemented.  
3.4  Modelling trade-distorting and non-trade distorting domestic 
support of the EU 
One of the reasons why negotiating domestic support reductions is an 
integrated part of the Doha agenda is the argument that domestic support 
programmes – especially amber box measures – encourage over-production 
of agricultural commodities in developed countries and depress world 96 | REFORMING THE EU’S DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE DOHA ROUND 
 
market prices. In the case of the EU, the budgetary outlays on the CAP 
programmes also exert great pressure on the EU’s common financial 
scheme. Therefore, one of the ways to create momentum for reducing the 
spending on these programmes is to reveal the true cost associated with 
them – an issue that can be analysed with numerical economic models. The 
modelling issues involved here, however, are far more complicated as 
compared with the modelling of market access barriers or export subsidies. 
This is because the functioning of the latter two are more or less uniform 
across countries, whereas domestic support programmes can vary widely 
from one country to another. 
Recent numerical studies on multilateral reforms of domestic support 
programmes are largely based on CGE models, among which the GTAP 
model (accompanied by the global GTAP database) is the most widely 
used. In the GTAP framework, domestic support measures are modelled as 
intermediate input subsidies, land and capital-based subsidies, and output 
subsidies. A sensible modelling approach requires improvements on 
existing studies in the following areas:  
•  First, one needs to carefully match the individual domestic-support 
measures contained in the amber, blue and green boxes with the 
instruments in the model and relate the various payments to the right 
instruments.  
•  Second, reforming domestic measures in many cases calls for 
changing the association of certain payments from one type of 
instrument to another type in the model. 
•  Third, making reductions to domestic support payments often 
requires maintaining the integrity of the fiscal spending, which 
usually means that shocking the price wedges is misleading.  
•  Lastly, the applied shocks in model simulations need to be generated 
using the differences between the current and the targeted support 
levels, as opposed to those between the WTO base commitment and 
the targeted level. This is because there are large differences between 
the actual spending and the base commitment levels. 
For these reasons, modelling the domestic support measures of the 
EU and their reforms is not a trivial undertaking. Here, we present our 
modelling of the EU’s domestic support programmes in a modified version 
of the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), which we have used for many of our TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 97 
 
studies on CAP reform.
7 The GTAP version 6 database (Dimaranan & 
McDougall, 2005) is used to carry out the policy simulations.  
The domestic support included in the GTAP database originates from 
the OECD’s producer support estimates (PSEs), which have been 
incorporated into the GTAP database as output subsidies, intermediate 
input subsidies, land subsidies and capital subsidies. The total value of the 
PSE included in the GTAP database version 6 (the base year of which is 
2001) amounts to €44,785 mn, which includes green, blue and amber box 
payments but excludes MPS. It is slightly less than the corresponding 
amount of €47,667 mn notified to the WTO by the EU in 2000–01. The latter 
includes €22,223 mn in the blue box, €21,845 mn in the green box and 
€3,600 mn of taxpayer-financed non-exempt direct payments and non-
product specific payments in the amber box. The discrepancy is owing to 
the fact that some payments included in the WTO domestic support 
notification are not included in the PSE calculation but are found under the 
OECD’s general services support estimates. 
3.4.1  Modelling blue box payments of the EU 
Blue box payments in the GTAP version 6 database amount to €23,429 mn 
for the EU-15, €18,031 mn of which are compensatory payments given to 
farmers based on fixed area and yields (i.e. a hectare premium) and the 
remaining €5,398 mn of which are compensatory livestock payments based 
on a fixed number of heads (i.e. a livestock premium). A breakdown of the 
payments is shown in Table 3.5.  
The full implementation of the Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP will 
increase the blue box payments to €25,358 mn, while the enlargement of EU 
further increases these payments to €30,587 mn.  
 
 
 
                                                      
7 For a more detailed discussion of the many changes to the standard GTAP model, 
see the series of working papers published by the Food and Resource Economics 
Institute on reforms of the CAP and trade liberalisations under the WTO. These 
papers can be downloaded from www.foi.dk or can be obtained from the authors 
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Table 3.5 Nominal domestic support moved into the green box (mn €) 
   2001  2015  Doha  2015  Doha
 EU-15  EU–10 
 Blue box       
Fixed hectare premiums  18,031 17,504 1,961 4,063 0
Fixed livestock premiums  5,398 7,855 2,086 952 0
Total 23,429 25,358 4,047 5,229 0
Amber box       
non-exempt direct payments 
Milk premiumsa) 0 2,936 0 476 0
(Olive oil) b) 2,469 2,446 622 0 0
Tobacco 964 952 467 0 0
PBF 88 216 0 0 0
 Green box        
Extensification premium  914 1,013 0 213 0
Single farm payment  0 0 28,026 0 5,814
a) New Agenda 2000 compensatory payments given to dairy farmers. 
b) Direct aid given to olive oil farmers, which only seems to be included under the MPS in 
the amber box. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Those blue box payments based on fixed areas and yields (the hectare 
premium) are implemented in the model as input subsidies to agricultural 
land where reform-related crops are grown. In responding to any 
exogenous shocks to the model, the payments per hectare are fixed but 
land is allowed to adjust endogenously between reform-related crops as 
long as the fixed base area is not exceeded. Failing to do so would result in 
either larger or smaller spending on these programmes than the actual 
payments. The MTR reform implies that the majority of these payments 
will become part of the decoupled single farm income payment linked to 
the utilised agricultural area in each member country. 
Similarly, compensatory payments given to livestock (suckler cows 
and breeding ewes) are modelled as subsidies to agricultural capital, while 
male animal/steer premiums are modelled as output subsidies to slaughter TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 99 
 
animals.
8 The implementation of these compensatory payments are 
modelled by fixing the total EU budgetary expenditure on premiums paid 
while allowing premiums per cow/ewe and per male animal/steer to 
adjust endogenously during the projection of the database from 2001 to 
2015.  
The MTR reform of the CAP converts a large proportion of the 
livestock premiums into a simple farm income payment in the form of a 
uniform land-based payment. Therefore, a large proportion of the above-
mentioned capital subsidies and output subsidies should be converted to 
the land-based payment. The decision by the EU  to grant each mem ber 
state the option to keep a small portion of blue box payments coupled to 
the number of male animals and steers implies that a reduced premium per 
head needs to be kept as output subsidies, in addition to the uniform land-
based payment in some member countries.
9 In these member states, the 
reduced premium per head is fixed to allow for the budgetary expenditure 
to adjust to changes in production. 
3.4.2  Modelling the green box payments of the EU 
Green box payments consist of many different types of support 
programmes that are supposed to have no or minimal trade-distorting 
effects. In other words, these payments should be fully decoupled. There 
are ongoing debates, however, about whether some of them are truly non-
distorting. In the GTAP database, all green box domestic-support 
payments, which are included in the PSE calculations from the OECD, are 
incorporated into the database as either input or output subsidies. This of 
course means that green box payments included in the GTAP database are 
coupled to production to some extent. As modellers and researchers have 
not reached a consensus on the correct treatment of green box payments in 
the GTAP, we take the GTAP database as given in this study and focus our 
 
                                                      
8 These different treatments reflect the fact that suckler cows and breeding ewes 
are part of the capital used to produce slaughter animals, while male animals and 
steers are final products sold directly to slaughter houses. 
9 Some member states are also allowed to retain a portion of the hectare premiums 
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attention on modelling the decoupling initiatives of the CAP programmes 
that will result in moving some previous blue and amber box payments 
into the green box. 
Specifically, the MTR reform of the CAP will move a large share of 
the blue and some amber box payments to the green box. Of the €30,587 mn 
in the blue box, only €4,047 mn will remain there owing to the MTR (Table 
3.5). In addition, direct payments originally classified as amber box 
payments given to milk, olive oil, tobacco, plant fibres and the 
extensification premiums in the green box are now all included in the new 
single farm income payment in the green box. 
These decoupled, single farm income payments are incorporated in 
the model by converting those affected blue and amber box payments in 
each member country into a uniform hectare payment given to all utilised 
agricultural area. Therefore, the results found in this chapter represent a 
decoupling of direct aid from production where no restrictions on the use 
of land are imposed.
10 
3.4.3  The amber box and the MPS  
As discussed earlier, non-exempt domestic support that is classified in the 
amber box contains both direct payments and the MPS. Direct payments 
are modelled as various subsidies in the GTAP database and are taken as 
given as the starting point of our analysis. The decoupling of these 
payments involves eliminating the coupled payments and increasing the 
single farm income payments in the form of the uniform hectare payment. 
In the case of the EU, another complication is related to the MPS, 
which comprises a large part of the EU’s amber box support and stems 
from consumer-financed MPS. This is calculated from historical world 
market prices and administered institutional prices. Because of the 
historical nature of this measure, it can be quite inaccurate as actual 
domestic and world market prices may be quite different from their 
historical references. The inclusion of the MPS in the amber box also hinges 
                                                      
10 The aggregate PSE for the EU is disaggregated by GTAP commodity and EU 
member state in the version 6 database, whereby the implementation of the 
proposed movement of amber/blue box payments into the green box shown in 
Table 3.5 is modelled at the individual EU member state level. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 101 
 
on the existence of an administered price, which might have already been 
abolished or reduced such that the administered price has no relevance to 
reality and nor is it used as an active regulatory instrument. If this is the 
case, modelling the reduction in the MPS means no actual shocks to the 
model. On the other hand, if reductions in the administered intervention 
prices are linked to increased compensatory payments, the reductions in 
the MPS are achieved by reducing the level of border protection (i.e. 
increased market access and the elimination of export competition – the 
other two pillars of the Doha agricultural negotiations). In this sense, the 
MPS reduction is not a pure measure of domestic support but also includes 
support derived from border measures.  
3.5  Simulating the effects of reducing the EU’s domestic support 
Having outlined how and to what extent the EU could cut its domestic 
support to accommodate a proposed WTO reform outcome within the 
reform of the CAP and then described how these reductions are modelled 
in a CGE model, we are now able to discuss the implications of this reform 
proposal on the EU and the rest of the world. The impact analysis can be 
drawn from the differences between a business-as-usual baseline and a 
Doha reform scenario. So, in this section, we first describe the baseline and 
the Doha scenario before presenting the numerical results.  
3.5.1  The baseline 
Like previous rounds of reforms to global trade policy, any multilateral 
liberalisation following the conclusion of the Doha round will likely take a 
few years to be implemented. A meaningful evaluation of the anticipated 
policy changes can be obtained by comparing the liberalisation scenario 
with a non-liberalisation scenario. Such a non-liberalisation scenario 
contains projections of the macroeconomy and incorporates the effects of 
important policy changes other than the exogenous shocks to be analysed. 
To be consistent with the focus of the study, we construct a non-
liberalisation baseline scenario, which features a number of important 
policy initiatives by the EU, including the Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP, 
the Everything but Arms initiative and EU enlargement. In addition, the 
URAA is assumed to be completed in this baseline. Lastly, we apply shocks 
to GDP, population and total factor productivities to project the world 102 | REFORMING THE EU’S DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE DOHA ROUND 
 
economy to the baseline year of 2015 – a year when we expect the new 
agricultural agreement to be fully implemented.11  
3.5.2  The Doha scenario 
In the Doha scenario we implement a domestic-support reform programme 
of the EU (which is largely the MTR reform of the CAP) as discussed in 
detail in section 3.3, while domestic support programmes in other countries 
are assumed to be unchanged.12  
In addition, a stylised interpretation of the July package framework 
for modalities in reducing market access barriers and export competition 
measures is also simulated. Specifically, all trade-distorting export 
competition measures are removed and market access barriers are reduced 
using the proposed Harbinson multiple-tiered formula on applied tariff 
equivalents found in the GTAP version 6 database. Unlike the shocks to 
domestic support reform (which is limited to the EU), the market access 
and export competition reforms are conducted multilaterally in this 
scenario. In the analysis of the results, we use the effects of the market 
access and export competition reforms as a benchmark to gauge the relative 
magnitude of the impact of the domestic support reform. 
3.5.3  Results 
Three main results are reported here, including changes in the EU’s 
agricultural production and trade, changes in factor income in agriculture 
(which we use as a proxy to investigate the effect of the reforms on farmers) 
and changes in economic welfare. These results are reported in Tables 3.6-
3.10. The individual contributions from the EU’s domestic support reform 
and the multilateral market access and export competition reforms to these 
changes are also provided in the tables. 
                                                      
11 A more detailed discussion of a similar baseline can be found in Jensen & 
Frandsen (2003b). 
12 We also plan to analyse the reform of domestic support in the US. In the present 
analysis, agricultural domestic support in the US is fixed exogenously at its 
nominal value of $32,268 mn as found in the GTAP version 6 database. In the 
baseline projection, these payments are deflated by 2% a year.   
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Table 3.6 Change in primary and secondary agricultural production, internal and external trade of the EU, by commodity 
(%) 
   Change in production     Change in intra-trade    Change in extra-trade 
  Total  Contributions from   Total    Contributions from   Total  Contributions from  Total  Contributions from 
 
Prod. 
  
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
access 
 Trade 
 
 Mn 
$  
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
access 
Import 
 
Mn 
$ 
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
access 
Exp. 
 
Mn 
$ 
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
access 
Paddy rice  -14.7  7.1  -1.4  -20.3   -32.5  -127  6.1  1.1  -39.7   81.4  74  -22.1  -5.7  109.2  83.2  75  39.0  7.5  36.7 
Wheat -3.2  -5.8  -0.6  3.2   0.4  115  -0.9  2.3  -1.0   18.1  76  30.0  -21.5  9.6  -10.8  -132  -20.0  -5.0  14.2 
Other grains  -6.4  -2.3  -3.6  -0.5   -3.7  33  -1.6  1.1  -3.1   18.6  105  13.8  -7.0  11.8  -42.4  -317  -13.0  -29.3  0.0 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts  1.3  2.4  0.0  -1.1   -3.2 -1,071  1.7  0.5  -5.4   2.7  236  -7.6  -1.7  11.9  19.9  864  8.3  -3.1  14.7 
Oilseeds -14.6  -13.7  0.6  -1.4   -8.3  -38  -11.1  1.2  1.7   12.2  522  16.0  -0.3  -3.5  -26.2  -122  -17.2  1.8  -10.7 
Sugar cane and beet  0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.0   0.2  0  0.0  0.1  0.1   -0.2  0  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.6  0  0.1  0.2  -0.8 
Plant-based fibres  -22.7  -25.0  1.8  0.5   -35.0  -173  -35.1  1.7  -1.6   9.3  118  10.2  -1.6  0.7  -22.1  -204  -26.1  2.3  1.8 
Other crops  3.4  3.0  0.4  0.0   -0.5  -260  1.6  0.5  -2.6   -6.2  -425  -9.2  -1.4  4.3  18.0  1,157  11.1  2.1  4.8 
Bovine animals  -12  -8.1  -0.6  -3.2   -15.4  -67  -12.1  0.5  -3.8   51.4  166  54.6  -5.4  2.2  -39.0  -363  -46.8  4.0  3.9 
Other animals  2.7  1.1  0.4  1.1   1.4  -21  0.6  0.6  0.2   -1.9  -29  -2.8  -1.8  2.6  4.1  93  2.8  0.4  0.9 
Raw milk  -0.1  0.2  -0.2  -0.1   2.2  -2  0.6  0.9  0.7   2.2  2  0.6  0.9  0.7  0.0  -5  -0.1  0.1  -0.1 
Wool 42.3  33.8  6.4  2.0   43.9  192  36.0  6.3  1.7   -17.5  -134  -13.6  -2.9  -1.1  50.7  484  40.1  8.1  2.6 
Bovine meat products  -10.6  -2.9  -3.3  -4.5   -30.1 -1,740  -9.8  0.9  -21.1   56.6 2,216  19.4  -3.1  40.4  -86.1 -1,250  -5.3  -88.6  7.8 
Other meat products  2.6  0.4  0.4  1.8   -1.0  -267  2.7  0.4  -4.0   85.6  703  -2.6  -8.3  96.5  49.0  3,063  4.8  4.6  39.7 
Vegetable oils and fats  -2.4  -1.3  0.3  -1.4   -13.1  -380  -4.2  0.8  -9.8   39.6  617  9.7  -3.4  33.3  -2.9  -19  -12.9  2.7  7.2 
Dairy products  -0.8  0.5  -1.0  -0.4   0.7  -672  0.4  6.6  -6.3   17.3  419  -4.2  -58.2  79.7  -32.7 -1,049  3.2  -57.4  21.6 
Processed rice  -24.6  0.5  -4.7  -20.4   -55.9  -314  1.2  1.0  -58.2   80.7  244  -1.5  -1.6  83.8  -64.6  -91  1.7  -68.5  2.2 
Sugar 0.3  0.0  0.1  0.1   -4.8  -90  -0.3  5.9  -10.4   -13.9  -362  -0.1  -8.9  -4.8  -54.8  -226  -0.6  -70.3  16.1 
Other processed foods  -0.3  -0.1  0.0  -0.2   -2.0 -1,001  -0.1  0.8  -2.7   7.2 1,282  -0.1  -3.2  10.5  3.0  786  -0.1  -3.8  6.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 104 | REFORMING THE EU’S DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE DOHA ROUND 
 
Agricultural production in the EU 
The assumed domestic support reform of the EU has a fundamental 
redistribution effect on primary agricultural production in the EU, by 
shifting resources (especially land) from those commodities under the MTR 
reform to those previously receiving less support. Indeed, outputs of those 
products that will experience a net drop of domestic support will decrease, 
including wheat (-5.8%), oilseeds (-13.7%) and bovine animals (-8.1%). On 
the other hand, the redistribution of support through the uniform land-
based payment will boost outputs of those products that previously 
received less support, such as vegetables and fruit, other crops and other 
animals, as can be seen in Table 3.6. On aggregate, this reform appears to 
have little impact on overall agricultural production in the EU, with a mere 
two-tenths of a percentage decrease from the base production level. 
Although the more interesting adjustment lies in the commodity 
dimension, changes in outputs are also unequal across the EU member 
states. The total agricultural production of Belgium, Greece, Ireland and the 
UK is expected to drop and that of other member states (including most of 
the new ones) is expected to increase. This outcome can largely be 
explained by the initial production patterns of individual member states, 
relative to the commodities affected by the domestic reform programme 
under the MTR.  
How large are these output effects, as compared with the impact of 
multilateral market access and export competition reforms? It appears that 
the domestic support reform contributes a substantial share of the total 
decline of outputs of a number of primary agricultural products, including 
wheat, oilseeds, plant fibres and bovine animals. The redistribution effect 
of the single farm income payment also leads to output increases of several 
products such as other crops, other animals, and vegetables and fruit. 
These output expansions from the domestic support reform contribute 
significantly to the total output increases found under the scenario. In 
contrast, the output effects of eliminating export subsidies are generally 
negative but small, whereas reducing market access barriers has largely 
negative effects on EU production levels, reflecting the fact that the EU 
maintains higher average import barriers than many other countries. 
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Table 3.7 Change in primary and secondary agricultural production, internal and external trade of the EU, by member state (in %) 
.  Change in production    Change in intra-trade    Change in extra-trade 
    Total    Contributions from   Total    Contributions from    Total Contributions  from    Total Contributions  from    Total Contributions  from
 
Prod. 
  
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
access 
Import 
 
Mn 
$  
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
access 
Export 
 
Mn 
 $ 
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt 
 access 
Import 
 
Mn $ 
 
Dom. 
supp. 
Exp. 
comp. 
Mkt
 access
Export Mn
 $
Dom
supp.
Exp.
comp.
Mkt
access
Belgium/Lux. -2.3  -1.4  0.0  -0.9  -4.5  -521  -0.3  1.6  -5.8  -5.0  -654  -2.1  1.5  -4.4  9.7  355  -0.2  -4.3 14.2 0.1 90 -3.9 -7.3 11.3
Denmark 1.9  1.1  -0.1  0.9  -2.2  -91  1.3  1.2  -4.6  -2.0  -223  0.6  3.5  -6.1  9.0  120  -0.5  -4.6 14.1 8.7 485 2.9 -6.0 11.8
Germany -0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.4  -2.0  -811  0.2  1.7  -3.9  -2.6  -694  0.7  1.7  -5.1  7.5  560 -2.4 -6.9 16.8 3.3 451 0.6 -9.9 12.7
Greece -3.0  -2.0  -0.2  -0.8  -2.0  -73  0.5  1.7  -4.2  -13.6  -202  -6.9  1.0  -7.7  12.6  158  5.9  -3.4  10.1 -2.4 -13 -3.8 -3.3 4.7
Spain -1.9  -0.6  0.0  -1.3  -3.9  -301  -0.3  1.7  -5.4  -4.6  -794  0.4  0.7  -5.6  14.2  759  6.7  -3.0  10.4 3.0 191 0.6 -5.3 7.8
France -0.3  0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -2.5  -533  -0.9  1.2  -2.9  -2.1  -451  0.6  1.7  -4.5  6.1  345  -0.8  -6.1  12.9 -2.6 94 -1.8 -9.5 8.8
Ireland -10.3  -8.5  -0.2  -1.6  -8.6  -226  -3.2  0.0  -5.4  -14.2  -650  -13.0  3.7  -4.9  21.5  157  9.2  -4.3  16.6 -2.1 7 1.6 -9.2 5.5
Italy -1.5  -0.1  -0.5  -0.9  -4.5  -602  -0.9  2.7  -6.3  -6.9  -715  1.2  -1.2  -6.9  18.8  994  3.5  -6.8  22.1 7.4 483 1.4 -8.2 14.3
Netherlands -1.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.9  -12.9 -1,115  -0.3  1.1  -13.7  -1.7  -703  -0.8  2.5  -3.4  13.7  981  -0.2  -2.9  16.8 4.1 534 0.4 -8.5 12.2
Austria 0.1  0.1  -0.3  0.2  -1.4  -107  0.5  2.1  -4.0  -4.2  -94  0.2  -0.2  -4.1  9.4  65  -3.2  -13.5  26.0 14.0 113 2.1 -9.4 21.3
Portugal -0.9  0.0  -0.1  -0.8  -4.0  -142  -1.3  1.0  -3.7  -6.8  -65  -2.2  0.3  -4.9  8.2  127  0.4  -2.2  10.0 2.7 18 2.4 -5.2 5.5
Finland 0.0  0.2  -0.3  0.0  -4.7  -71  -0.2  0.9  -5.4  -0.4  -14  0.0  4.5  -4.8  5.8  36  -2.4  -4.0  12.2 -7.3 -10 -0.2 -16.5 9.4
Sweden 3.6  -0.2  -0.3  4.2  -0.4  -49  1.3  1.3  -3.1  -1.7  -34  1.9  1.0  -4.6  11.5  78  -2.8  -7.4  21.7 40.0 447 1.1 -10.2 49.0
UK -1.6  -0.9  0.0  -0.6  -3.2  -658  0.4  1.9  -5.5  -7.5  -434  -2.2  -0.1  -5.2  8.8  798  2.4  -4.3  10.7 -7.0 -123 -6.3 -7.7 7.0
Cyprus/Malta -13.4  -0.2  -12.1  -1.1  -9.8  -36  -0.8  0.6  -9.6  0.9  -7  -0.6  7.5  -6.0  7.6  30  0.4  -7.9  15.1 -25.0 -94 0.0 -30.9 6.0
Czech Republic  -1.6  0.9  -2.2  -0.3  -4.0  -113  -1.7  -0.2  -2.1  -2.8  -38  0.1  2.6  -5.5  -0.5  -1  -7.9  -5.5  12.9 -40.2 -149 0.4 -48.3 7.7
Estonia -3.7  2.0  -4.9  -0.7  -4.3  -21  -1.2  -0.1  -3.1  0.0  -6  3.6  2.5  -6.1  8.6  16  1.8  -5.0  11.9 -7.0 -10 4.1 -17.0 5.9
Hungary 8.9  6.6  -0.6  2.9  -0.7  -24  -0.5  0.3  -0.5  0.7  10  11.0  2.9  -13.2  15.0  57  1.7  -6.8  20.1 27.0 455 1.8 -11.5 36.7
Latvia -0.4  1.1  -0.3  -1.2  -9.7  -54  -0.9  2.0  -10.7  8.6  7  8.0  -0.3  0.9  24.8  66  -0.1  -3.8  28.7 -1.5 3 -3.4 -5.9 7.8
Lithuania -1.2  1.4  -2.3  -0.4  -3.8  -29  -3.1  2.7  -3.3  -6.1  -28  -0.3  1.3  -7.1  6.7  17  -3.7  -3.4  13.8 -11.6 -17 -1.2 -21.2 10.8
Poland -0.1  1.1  -0.9  -0.3  -4.1  -269  -1.5  1.0  -3.7  -1.7  -66  3.6  1.4  -6.6  9.4  109  -4.8  -5.2  19.4 -9.6 -90 1.5 -21.1 10.1
Slovakia 0.3  1.0  -0.5  -0.2  -0.3  -15  -0.8  2.0  -1.5  -0.8  -5  1.6  -0.4  -2.0  -5.5  -7  -10.1  -5.6  10.2 -19.3 -15 -0.2 -23.2 4.0
Slovenia -6.5  1.8  -9.4  1.1  -3.2  -24  1.0  -1.8  -2.5  -6.7  -26  14.9  4.1  -25.7  6.0  11  -2.4  -9.0  17.5 -26.7 -107 0.7 -46.3 19.0
EU-25 -1.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -3.9 -5,884  -0.3  1.6  -5.1  -3.9 -5,884  -0.3  1.6  -5.1    10.8 5,830   1.0  -4.9  14.8   1.6 2,745  -0.3  -9.8  11.7
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International trade of the EU 
Reducing and decoupling domestic support measures will generate uneven 
effects on the trade patterns and trade volumes of different products. Those 
commodities subject to the MTR reform programmes will be less 
competitive in the world market and their exports to external markets will 
decline. At the same time, imports of these products from the EU’s external 
trading partners will expand. Moreover, increasing external imports, 
decreasing external exports and shrinking outputs imply that imports 
within the internal market of the EU will have to be adjusted downwardly, 
given the normal assumption about consumer behaviour in the EU. For 
commodities that previously received no or little trade-distorting domestic 
support, the decoupled support will likely generate opposite effects. A 
more specific discussion of the results on intra-EU trade and extra-EU trade 
is presented below (see also Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
•  External imports into the EU 
As expected, volumes of external imports into the EU would rise 
quite significantly for wheat (30%), other grains (13.8%), oilseeds 
(16%), plant fibres (10.2%) and bovine meats (19.4%) as a result of the 
EU’s domestic support reform. These are the products whose outputs 
are predicted to decline. In contrast, imports of vegetables and fruit, 
other crops and other meats would actually decrease. Again, earlier 
discussion shows that these are the products whose outputs are 
expected to rise under the MTR reform. On balance, these declines in 
external imports are more than cancelled out by the increases in the 
imports of the other products, leading to a 1% gain in total external 
imports into the EU.  
This redistribution effect along the commodity dimension of the 
domestic support reform is more evident when compared with the 
effects of the assumed multilateral market access and export 
competition reforms contained in the scenario. Specifically, market 
access reform at the multilateral level increases imports into the EU 
with very few exceptions and total external imports into the EU rise 
by nearly 15%, revealing the fact that such reform is more effective in 
expanding imports into the EU market. Conversely, multilateral 
reform to export competition almost entirely reduces imports into the 
EU, with total imports falling by almost 5%. This is because such TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 107 
 
action turns much of the original exports from the EU into domestic 
consumption and at the same time pushes up world market prices 
slightly, making imports more expensive in the EU market, thereby 
’crowding out’ external imports into the EU. Overall, total external 
imports into the EU will increase by $5.8 bn owing to the assumed 
reforms in the three negotiation areas combined.  
•  External exports from the EU 
Changes in external exports from the EU (through its domestic 
support reform) tend to mirror the corresponding changes in its 
output and external import patterns. Here, exports of wheat, oilseeds, 
plant fibres and bovine meats to the external markets of the EU 
decrease, whereas exports of a few other products actually increase. 
Total external agricultural exports from the EU will almost remain 
unchanged. In contrast, greater multilateral market access will mostly 
create more export opportunities for EU products, resulting in some 
increases in exports for several products from the EU, which in some 
cases cancels out the negative effects of the assumed domestic 
support reform in the EU. For example, the domestic support reform 
would reduce exports of wheat from the EU by 20%, of which 14.2% 
would be cancelled out by multilateral market access reform. The 
impact of eliminated export subsidies would significantly reduce 
exports of the subsidised products, which reinforces the negative 
effects caused by the domestic support reform on exports for several 
products, such as wheat and bovine meats. 
Despite drops in exports induced by reducing/decoupling 
domestic support measures and export subsidies by the EU, increases 
in the exports of previously unprotected or little-protected products 
and the opening up of markets elsewhere (caused by the multilateral 
market access reform assumed in the scenario) will lead to net 
increases in the EU’s external exports by over $2.7 bn. This gain, 
however, is smaller than the increase in external imports into the EU, 
thereby leading to a slightly worsened external trade balance in 
agriculture for the EU. 
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•  Intra-EU trade 
The negative external trade balance implies a reduction of intra-EU 
trade to some extent. Domestic support reform is quite effective in 
this regard for commodities under the reform programme. Among 
primary agricultural products, such reform will reduce the internal 
trade of oilseeds, plant fibres and bovine animals in the EU, all by 
over 10%. For processed food products, the internal trade of bovine 
meats will be reduced by almost 10%. Overall, it is expected that a 
reduction of three-tenths of a percentage in intra-EU agricultural 
trade will occur.  
Multilateral market access reforms also generate strong adverse 
effects on the internal trading of a number of products, especially 
bovine meats (reduced by 21%). Eliminating export subsidies, 
however, appears to lead to marginal increases in internal trade, 
stemming from the redirection of some exports from the external 
market to the internal EU market. On balance, the three types of 
reforms will lead to reduced internal trade among the EU member 
states and the combined drop in intra-EU trade will amount to almost 
$5.9 bn, most of which represents a displacement by imports from 
outside the EU. 
Changes in factor income in agriculture 
The nature of the EU’s domestic support reform under the MTR can be 
further elicited by looking at the total factor payments in primary 
agriculture. Despite the significant changes in the CAP, the total actual 
domestic-support spending by the EU will mostly remain unchanged 
following the MTR reform. As can be seen from Table 3.8, total factor 
payments in primary agriculture are indeed quite stable for both the 
original and new member states.  
For the original EU-15, these payments only increase by half a 
percentage point, whereas in the case of the new member states, there is a 
very small decrease. So, it appears that on aggregate farmers in the EU are 
almost fully compensated. This point can be made even clearer when 
comparisons are made against the impact of export competition and market 
access reforms. In the latter cases, farmers are assumed to receive no 
compensation. Consequently, total factor payments drop noticeably. 
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Table 3.8 Change in primary agricultural factor income (in %) 
   Contributions  from 
Total  
change 
Domestic  
support 
Export 
comp. 
Market 
access 
Belgium/Lux. -5.6  -0.9  -2.2  -2.5 
Denmark -2.5  -0.5  -4.3  2.3 
Germany -3.3  1.4  -2.7  -1.9 
Greece -4.1  -2.0  -1.0  -1.1 
Spain -2.7  0.1  -1.2  -1.7 
France -3.7  0.2  -2.6  -1.3 
Ireland -7.1  -0.5  -2.9  -3.7 
Italy -1.1  0.0  -0.6  -0.5 
Netherlands -4.3  -0.8  -2.7  -0.8 
Austria -1.9  0.7  -1.4  -1.1 
Portugal -2.2  0.5  -1.5  -1.2 
Finland -4.7  0.2  -4.2  -0.8 
Sweden -1.4  2.1  -3.6  0.1 
UK -0.9  3.6  -2.3  -2.2 
EU-15 -2.9  0.5  -2.0  -1.3 
Cyprus/Malta -3.9  -0.2  -4.4  0.7 
Czech Republic  -2.7  0.3  -2.3  -0.6 
Estonia 2.2  2.6  -2.0  1.6 
Hungary 0.5  0.1  -2.7  3.1 
Latvia -6.3  0.0  -0.3  -6.0 
Lithuania -2.0  0.0  -3.0  1.0 
Poland -2.3  -0.8  -0.9  -0.6 
Slovakia -1.2  0.2  -0.7  -0.7 
Slovenia -4.7  -0.3  -5.3  0.9 
EU–10 -1.9  -0.3  -1.6  0.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Welfare effects 
The EU’s domestic-support reform programme will no doubt improve the 
allocation of economic resources among different agricultural sectors and 
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this reform are expected. And the gains are larger, the larger the size of the 
member state and their previously subsidised agricultural sector. Table 3.9 
reports these results. For instance, the efficiency gains to Germany, the UK 
and Spain are all over $400 mn. Overall, the EU-25 will gain in excess of $4 
bn from the efficiency improvements arising from its domestic-support 
reform programmes. When added to the efficiency gains from the 
multilateral market access and export competition reforms assumed in the 
scenario, these lead to a total efficiency gain of almost $10 bn. 
Table 3.9 Changes in welfare (equivalent variation) (mn US$) 
      Contribution from    Contribution from   
Total 
 EV 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Dom. 
supp. 
Export 
comp. 
Mkt. 
access 
Terms 
of trade 
Dom. 
supp. 
Export 
comp. 
Mkt. 
access  Others 
Belgium/Lux. 461  381 149 48 184 203  -33  291 -55  -123
Denmark 519  236 51 134 52 306  -18  246 78  -23
Germany 2,589  1,216 410 376 431 966  230  814 -78  407
Greece 342  340 250 22 67 62  -55  122 -5  -60
Spain 941  857 483 68 307 39  -342  528 -148  46
France 1,951  1,039 355 427 257 795  146  676 -27  117
Ireland 226  464 346 26 92 -238  -45  -114 -78  0
Italy 1,931  1,114 309 161 644 499  -265  784 -21  318
Netherlands 980  877 70 214 595 178  -104  390 -108  -75
Austria 357  163 47 35 80 172  20  136 16  22
Portugal 215  193 91 14 88 26  -8  34 1  -4
Finland 265  113 26 53 33 134  9  124 1  18
Sweden 378  185 46 85 53 147  17  48 82  46
UK 2,601  1,597 761 80 756 920  36  824 59  84
Cyprus/ 
Malta -18  56 8 35 14 -24  -4  -28 7  -50
Czech 
Republic 124  145 80 55 9 22  44  -17 -5  -43
Estonia 33  30 16 12 2 15  -2  10 7  -12
Hungary 353  183 124 41 18 216  46  88 82  -46
Latvia 70  36 17 -2 20 31  4  27 0  3
Lithuania 239  83 64 15 5 151  13  132 6  5
Poland 779  539 391 105 44 289  117  172 -1  -50
Slovakia 175  44 32 9 3 127  10  119 -2  4
Slovenia 9  74 23 60 -9 9  2  -3 9  -73
EU-25 15,519  9,965 4,149 2,073 3,745 5,044  -180  5,403 -179  510
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On the other hand, the terms of trade effects of reforming the EU’s 
domestic support programmes are not as uniform, as these are positive for 
some member states such as Germany, France, the UK and Poland, and 
negative for Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. These mixed results reflect 
the fact that reforming domestic support mostly changes the allocation of 
economic resources among different sectors and its ramifications on the 
world market prices varies from one product to another. Therefore, 
member states that experience increases in their net exports (imports) in 
those products of higher (lower) world market prices will gain from 
improved terms of trade, while those that suffer losses in their net exports 
(imports) with lower (higher) world market prices will experience 
deteriorated terms of trade. The exact effect for individual member states of 
course depends on their trade structure and the nature of changes to world 
market prices relative to their trade structure.  
The overall terms of trade loss to the EU is about $180 mn, mostly 
resulting from losses in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. Combined with 
the large terms of trade gains from eliminating export subsidies at the 
multilateral level (and a small loss from market access reform), total terms 
of trade gains for the EU-25 are expected to be over $5 bn.  
These results show that reforms to domestic support in the EU have 
only minimal influence on the terms of trade of the EU and of its trading 
partners on the whole. But it does improve the EU’s own economic 
efficiency. The aggregate welfare impact of this reform amounts to just 
under $4 bn for the EU, which is about one-fourth of the total welfare gains 
of $15.5 bn to the EU from both the domestic support reform and the 
assumed multilateral reforms in export competition and market access.    
Summary and concluding remarks 
Starting with the July package of the WTO agricultural negotiations in 
2004, this chapter analyses the implications of a proposal for reforming and 
reducing domestic support in the EU. Despite the pressure for the EU to 
undertake large cuts to the final bound AMS agreed in the Uruguay round 
and to its total trade-distorting support, we find that these cuts can be 
accommodated within the existing reform programmes of the CAP.  Most 
notably the cuts can be taken under the mid-term review, which decouples 
a large portion of the EU’s blue box payments and some of the amber box 
payments and makes them eligible for inclusion in the green box. 
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currently classified and notified as amber box payments has already lost its 
relevance, such that it can be simply eliminated without any real 
implications. As such, the 2001 notification of total trade-distorting 
domestic support of over €66 bn can be reduced to a new level of around 
€25 bn, implying the feasibility of cutting the EU’s overall base 
commitment of around €113 bn by 75%. In addition, the EU’s final bound 
AMS commitment can be cut by 70%. This proposal of 75% and 70% cuts 
would effectively restrict the EU from increasing its AMS payments but 
would leave room for increased de minimis and blue box payments. 
If the EU takes the lead in implementing this proposal, there would 
be pressure on other countries to follow suit. We conjecture a reduction 
formula for all the WTO members, taking into consideration their Uruguay 
round base commitments and their recent notifications. It is expected that 
most of these members, including the US, would be able to comply with the 
reduction formula. 
Analysing the effects of such a reduction proposal, however, is not an 
easy task, owing to several classification, measurement and modelling 
issues. These issues have more or less been ignored or simplified in many 
previous, modelling-based studies of reforming/reducing domestic 
support. As such, this study argues that modelling the reform and 
reduction of domestic support needs to be conducted in the context of the 
specific domestic-support programmes of the member countries. Failing to 
do so would lead to results of little policy relevance. To illustrate these 
points in the context of reforming the EU’s CAP for fulfilling the assumed 
reduction targets, this study carefully matches the notified domestic 
support of the EU to the different WTO boxes with the policy variables in a 
CGE model and database. We then examine how the reform of the CAP 
changes the nature and size of these payments. Lastly, we re-assign these 
payments to the right policy variables according to the reform programmes 
and adjust the fiscal expenditure on the various policy variables as 
necessary. 
Having sorted out the measurement and modelling issues, this study 
uses the model and database to simulate the likely impact of reforming 
domestic support in the EU on a unilateral basis. The effect of doing so is 
benchmarked against a baseline in which no domestic support reform is 
conducted. In addition, for the purpose of gauging the relative importance 
of reforming domestic support measures in the Doha negotiations, we also TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 113 
 
compare the impact of reforms to domestic support with reforms to market 
access and export competition at the multilateral level.  
Several interesting observations from the simulation results are 
summarised here. First, following the reform of domestic support in the 
EU, a structural adjustment in EU agriculture and food production is to be 
expected, with the outputs of wheat, oilseeds, plant fibres and bovine 
meats dropping significantly. Second, the EU’s net export position in the 
above products is forecasted to deteriorate in response to the reform, while 
that in other products is expected to improve. The overall size of the EU’s 
agricultural production and trade remain nearly unchanged. These results, 
which further underscore the redistributive nature of the EU’s domestic-
support reform programmes, are in great contrast to what can be 
anticipated from multilateral reforms to market access and export 
competition. Third, despite substantial allocative efficiency gains accruing 
to the EU from its domestic support reform, the effect on terms of trade is 
not that significant. This result stems from the limited and offsetting price 
effects across different products. Lastly, although gains may be had by 
other countries that have distinct comparative advantages in those 
commodities targeted by the EU’s domestic-support reforms, overall the 
welfare effects for other countries are not substantial, as the EU’s reforms 
would have little impact on aggregate trade volume or world market 
prices. 
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4.  WTO agricultural negotiations  
A comparison of recent proposals 
for market access 
  Martina Brockmeier, Rainer Klepper and Janine Pelikan 
Introduction 
A great deal of attention is currently being paid to discussions about the 
reform of global agricultural trade. In 2000, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) initiated a new round of trade negotiations on agriculture and 
services. According to the Doha mandate adopted on 14 November 2001, 
the WTO members committed themselves to substantially improving 
market access, to reducing (with a view to phasing out) all forms of export 
subsidies and to significantly reducing trade-distorting domestic support 
(WTO, 2001).  
Several proposals have been delivered by negotiation partners and 
chairpersons of the agricultural committee on how this Doha mandate can 
best be achieved. Among them are the revised Harbinson proposal (WTO, 
2003a), the US–EU joint text (WTO, 2003b), the Castillo text (WTO, 2003c) 
and the Derbez text (WTO, 2003d), as well as the Grosser proposal (WTO, 
2004a). None of these submitted proposals has lived up to the expectations 
of a compromise to which all WTO member countries have been able to 
agree. Only a revised version of the Grosser text (WTO, 2004b), the so-
called ‘Oshima text’, was adopted in July 2004 as part of the Doha Work 
Programme (WTO, 2004c). Yet the adopted Doha Work Programme is very 
vague. It contains almost exclusively qualitative information about tariff 
cuts and the abolition of export subsidies, but does not make any concrete 
statements regarding the time horizon or magnitude of the tariff 
reductions. The latest attempt to bridge the gap between the diverging 
interests of the WTO members involves new proposals by the EU, the US, 116 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
the G-20,1 the G-102 and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries,3 which were delivered in October 2005. But the perspectives of 
the WTO member countries remained too diverse; it was evident before the 
last Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005 that the 
newest proposals would meet the same fate as their predecessors. 
One of the most difficult points to agree upon in the WTO 
agricultural negotiations is certainly the expansion of market access. Here, 
the suggestions already made range from a repetition of the Uruguay 
round formula to an ambitious cut of 90% for tariffs above 60% in the initial 
situation. Given these widespread proposals, it is not surprising that WTO 
member countries have only made marginal progress in the pillar of 
market access. Until now, WTO members could only agree to a 
standardised conversion of specific tariffs in ad valorem tariff equivalents 
(AVEs). Additionally, the use of a tiered harmonisation formula with four 
bands was accepted by all WTO member countries (WTO, 2004c). Yet most 
other questions dealing with market access remain unresolved. The level of 
tariff reductions and type of tiered harmonised formulas, the coverage of 
tariff bands as well as the tariff band flexibility are probably the most 
prominent issues. But the handling of sensitive products and tariff quotas 
also impair the already-hardened trade positions of WTO member 
countries.  
Against this background, it is interesting to analyse whether the 
outcomes of the most recent proposals for market access are so different 
that they justify the halt of the WTO negotiations. For this reason, section 
4.1 briefly illuminates the market access aspects of the latest proposals 
submitted by the EU, the US, the G-20 and the G-10. In section 4.2, the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) framework is introduced together  
 
                                                      
1 At the time of the proposal, the G-20 included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
2 The G-10 includes Bulgaria, Iceland, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei. 
3 The ACP countries also submitted a proposal. It does not include quantitative 
suggestions for tariff cuts and thus it is not considered here.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 117 
 
with the theoretical extensions. Thereafter, model design and experiments 
are discussed in section 4.3, followed by results (in section 4.4) and 
conclusions. 
4.1  Overview of the most recent proposals for market access 
Numerous proposals concerning market access were made by different 
negotiation groups in advance of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong in December 2005. The proposals of the EU, the US, the G-20 and the 
G-10 deliver quantitative information on the tariff cuts by taking the four 
bands and the use of a tiered harmonisation formula into account (see 
Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Proposals for market access by the EU, the US, the G-20 and the G-10  
G-20 proposal G-10 proposal
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff cut 
(%)
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff cut 
(%)
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff cut 
(%)
initial final
> 90 60 > 60 85 90 >75 75 > 70 45
> 60 ≤ 90 50 > 40 ≤ 60 75 85 >50 ≤ 75 65 > 50 ≤ 70 37
> 30 ≤ 60 45 > 20 ≤ 40 65 75 >20 ≤ 50 55 > 20 ≤ 50 31
0 ≤ 30 35 0 ≤ 20 55 65 0 ≤ 20 45 0 ≤ 20 27
-
> 130 40 > 60 n.a. n.a. >130 40 > 100 n.a.
> 80 ≤ 130 35 > 40 ≤ 60 n.a. n.a. >80 ≤ 130 35 > 70 ≤ 100 n.a.
> 30 ≤ 80 30 > 20 ≤ 40 n.a. n.a. >30 ≤ 80 30 > 30 ≤ 70 n.a.
0 ≤ 30 25 0 ≤ 20 n.a. n.a. 0 ≤ 30 25 0 ≤ 30 n.a.
- Cap: 150%
Cap: 100%
Developed countries
Developing countries
EU proposal US proposal
Tariff cut 
(%)
Cap:  100% Cap: 75%
Cap: 150% n.a.  
Sources: USTR (2005), G-10 (2005), G-20 (2005) and FAPRI (2005). 
Table 4.1 reveals that expectations about the impact of tariff 
reductions on opening markets in the WTO member countries are very 
widespread. They range from tariff cuts as high as 90% for tariff rates 
above 60% in the US proposal, to the far lower tariff cuts of 45% for tariff 
rates above 70% in the G-10 proposal. It can also be seen that the EU 
proposal asks for more moderate tariff cuts, while the G-20 suggest tariff 
cuts that are between those in the EU and US proposals. The cap on tariffs 
in the US proposal asks for an ambitious reduction of all tariffs below 75% 
in developed countries. By contrast, the EU and the G-20 would be satisfied 
if the final tariff rates of developed countries do not exceed 100%. 118 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Meanwhile, the G-10 does not want to apply a cap at all. Table 4.1 also 
reveals that the proposals do not always offer complete information on 
tariff cuts in developing countries (i.e. the US and G-10 proposals). 
Although the use of a tiered formula with four bands has already 
been decided, Table 4.1 shows the leeway that exists in implementing this 
formula. The imposition of a tiered formula with linear cuts between the 
bands, however, implies the problem of discontinuity, which results in a 
change of the ordering of tariffs. From the political–economy perspective, 
such discontinuities would create political resistance from agents in sectors 
that are just above the transition points (Anderson & Martin, 2005, p. 16). 
Also, developing countries (such as the Dominican Republic) with fixed 
bound tariffs at one specific level can be strongly affected by the problem of 
discontinuities. One possibility for avoiding this problem is the 
implementation of a progressive tiered formula as proposed by Canada in 
May 2005.4 Instead of applying a single cut to the entire tariff line, different 
cuts are applied to different portions of the same tariff. Because of smaller 
cuts in the lower portions of the tariff, this formula cuts high tariffs by less 
than a linear tiered formula in absolute terms. Yet this potential tariff-
cutting option is not discussed in the recent proposals on how to open 
market access. The G-10 proposal avoids the problem of discontinuity by 
adjusting a limited range of tariffs surrounding the thresholds (see also 
section 4.3). 
4.2  GTAP framework 
4.2.1  Extension of the GTAP model 
The analyses in this chapter are based on the comparative static, multi-
regional general equilibrium GTAP model. This model provides an 
elaborate representation of the economy, including the linkages between 
the farming, agribusiness, industry and service sectors of the economy. The 
use of the non-homothetic, constant difference of elasticity functional form 
to handle private household preferences, the explicit treatment of 
international trade and transport margins and a global banking sector that 
links global savings and consumption are innovative in the GTAP. Trade is 
                                                      
4 For further details, see the website link (http://www.tradeobservatory.org/ 
library.cfm?refid=72991). TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 119 
 
represented by bilateral trade matrices based on the Armington 
assumption. Further features of the standard model are perfect competition 
in all markets as well as a profit- and utility-maximising behaviour on the 
part of producers and consumers. All policy interventions are represented 
by price wedges. The framework of the standard GTAP model is well 
documented in the GTAP book (Hertel, 1997) and is available on the 
Internet.5 
Agricultural policy instruments are represented through price 
wedges in the standard GTAP model. Therefore, the standard GTAP model 
is extended with an explicit modelling of the instruments related to the 
EU’s mid-term review (MTR). Following the approach of Frandsen, 
Gersfeld & Jensen (2002), we introduce an additional land subsidy rate into 
the model that is equalised across all sectors entitled to direct payments.6 
With the implementation of the MTR, the existing domestic support 
measures are converted into a region-specific, fully decoupled, land-area 
payment, while budgetary outlays for total domestic support are held 
constant. We deliberately did not model the EU sugar policy, as this would 
require resources that go far beyond the scope of this study (see 
Brockmeier, Sommer & Thomsen, 2005). 
The EU budget is introduced in the GTAP model using a social 
accounting matrix (SAM). This SAM not only covers the expenditures and 
revenues of existing agents (producers, government, private households, 
etc.), but also of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF). This EU budget receives 75% of the import duties for agricultural 
and non-agricultural products from producers, private households, the 
government and the capital account. Additional revenues result from an 
endogenously calculated GDP-related tax that flows from regional 
households to the EU budget. Here, all EU member countries face an equal 
GDP tax rate. The revenues of the EU budget are used to cover agricultural 
output and export subsidies as well as direct payments. In contrast to these 
product-specific instruments, expenditures on structural policies are not 
covered by the EU budget module. Because of their characteristics and 
                                                      
5 For further details, see the GTAP website (http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
products/gtap_book/default.asp). 
6 We are grateful to Hans Jensen for his support in implementing the element of 
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specific aims, structural funds cannot be allocated to certain commodities – 
strongly hampering their implementation in a product-specific model such 
as the GTAP. 
Obviously, the revenues of the EU budget from one member state are 
not identical to the expenditures of the EU budget on the same member 
state. A comparison of the revenues and expenditures of each member state 
therefore shows the net transfer that takes place within the EU financial 
system. Analogous to capital transfer, the net transfer within the EU is part 
of the current account balance that makes up the difference between the 
exports and imports of goods and services. Yet the sum of net transfers of 
all member states equals zero, since the EU budget is balanced through the 
endogenous GDP tax rate.  
In the standard GTAP model, EAGGF revenues and expenditures are 
organised through the regional household. All components of the EU 
budget are therefore introduced wit h  t h e  h e l p  o f  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e s  
allowing an easy shift from regional households to the EU budget and vice 
versa. Consequently, a preliminary simulation is employed to move the 
GTAP database from the initial situation without the EU budget to a new 
equilibrium, wherein the EU budget is in charge of the EAGGF 
(Brockmeier, 2003, pp. 100-12). 
Alongside changes in the political environment of an economy, 
macroeconomic developments such as technical progress are of great 
importance to economic growth. In order to take these changes into 
account, corresponding trends are incorporated into the analyses at hand. 
For this purpose, we include in the extended GTAP model exogenous 
projections for regional GDP and factor endowment based on data from 
Walmsley et al. (2000). In the simulations, technical progress is generated 
endogenously by the model, enabling the projected growth pattern. 
4.2.2  Extension of the GTAP database 
The most recent GTAP database (version 6.04) includes applied tariffs, 
which are based on the Market Access Map (MAcMap). The source files of 
MAcMap come from the UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information 
System (TRAINS), the WTO and the Agricultural Market Access (AMAD) 
database. The applied rates of the newest GTAP database therefore take 
preferences, AVEs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) into account. Information 
on preferences in MAcMap is taken from the TRAINS database and is 
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basis of the median unit value of worldwide exporters, using an average 
flow of the years 2000–03. Finally, TRQs are taken into account by utilising 
the filled rate from the AMAD database. If the filled rate is less than 90%, 
the in-quota tariff is used. The out-of-quota rate is employed if the filled 
rate is higher than 100%. If the filled rate is higher than 90%, but lower than 
100%, a simple average of the in-quota and out-of-quota rate is applied 
(Bouët et al., 2004). 
WTO negotiations take place at a much higher, disaggregated level of 
tariff lines. To be as close as possible to this negotiation process we 
implement all tariff cuts at the HS 6 tariff-line level (see 4.3.2). For this 
purpose, we supplement the GTAP database with a tariff module that 
includes bound and applied rates at the HS 6 tariff-line level. The applied 
and bound rates at the HS 6 tariff-line level are taken from the MAcMap 
database. 
4.3  Empirical analysis 
The simulations are based on the GTAP database version 6.04, with 2001 as 
the base year. The database consists of bilateral trade, transport and 
protection matrices that link 57 sectors in 87 countries or regions. In order 
to keep the calculation effort within a reasonable scope, the database is 
aggregated into 23 regions and 19 sectors (see Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the 
appendix). The regional sets are put together with regard to geographical 
nearness, developmental status, or membership in a certain regional 
agreement. With regard to the sectoral aggregation, it was important to 
distinguish between primary and processed agricultural-production 
sectors. 
4.3.1  Simulations 
Before the actual simulations are carrie d  o u t ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n d u c t  
some pre-simulations to implement the extended model structure and to 
update the protection rates (see Figure 4.1 and Table A4.3 in the appendix).  
This pre-simulation includes instruments used by the common 
agricultural policy (CAP) and the common budget of the EU. Based on the 
results of the pre-simulation, a base run is conducted that represents a 
projection of the exogenous variables of population, GDP and factor 
endowment up to the year 2014. Additionally, Agenda 2000, EU 
enlargement and the Everything but Arms (EBA) agreement as well as the  
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MTR are implemented in 2004, 2010 and 2014, respectively (for details see 
Table A4.3 in the appendix). The base run only considers political 
intervention in the EU-15 and in the candidate countries. Developments in 
other regions, such as the Farm Bill in the US or China’s WTO accession, 
are not yet taken into account. Parallel to the base run, a scenario is 
implemented as well. It takes account of the same projections and policy 
shocks (Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, the EBA agreement and the MTR). 
Additionally, it implements the negotiations of the WTO round in the 
period from 2010 to 2014. Here, tariff cuts to open market access as 
proposed by the EU, the US, the G-20 and the G-10 are employed as shown 
in Table 4.2. The US and the G-10 proposals do not provide information 
about the magnitude of tariff cuts or the cap for developing countries. 
Analogous to a study by FAPRI (2005), these cuts are assumed to be two-
thirds of the cuts for developed countries. The effects of the WTO round are 
obtained by comparing the results of the base run with those for the 
scenario for 2014.  
 
Figure 4.1 Base run and simulations 
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Table 4.2 Proposed tariff cuts by the EU, the US, the G-20 and the G-10 used in 
the simulations 
G-20 proposal G-10 proposal
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff cut 
(%)
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff cut 
(%)
Tariff rate 
(%)
Tariff cut 
(%)
initial final
> 90 60 > 60 85 90 >75 75 > 70 45
> 60 ≤ 90 50 > 40 ≤ 60 75 85 >50 ≤ 75 65 > 50 ≤ 70 37
> 30 ≤ 60 45 > 20 ≤ 40 65 75 >20 ≤ 50 55 > 20 ≤ 50 31
0 ≤ 30 35 0 ≤ 20 55 65 0 ≤ 20 45 0 ≤ 20 27
-
> 130 40 > 60 56.7 60 >130 40 > 100 30
> 80 ≤ 130 35 > 40 ≤ 60 50 56.7 >80 ≤ 130 35 > 70 ≤ 100 24.7
> 30 ≤ 80 30 > 20 ≤ 40 43.3 50 >30 ≤ 80 30 > 30 ≤ 70 20.7
0 ≤ 30 25 0 ≤ 20 36.7 43.3 0 ≤ 30 25 0 ≤ 30 18
-
EU proposal US proposal
Tariff cut 
(%)
Developed countries
Cap:  100% Cap: 75% Cap: 100%
Developing countries
a
Cap: 150% Cap: 112.5% Cap: 150%  
a) The US and the G-10 proposals give no information about the magnitude of tariff cuts or 
the cap for developing countries. Analogous to a study by FAPRI (2005) these cuts are 
assumed to be two-thirds of the cuts for developed countries. 
Sources: USTR (2005), G-10 (2005), G-20 (2005) and FAPRI (2005). 
4.3.2  Calculations of tariff cuts 
The negotiations of the WTO are based on bound rates, while the economic 
effect of a tariff cut clearly depends on the applied rate. Therefore, our 
calculations of tariff cuts take both kinds of tariff rates into account. The 
difference between bound and applied duties is called ‘water in the tariffs’.7 
A reduction of the bound rate does not result in a trade effect if the reduced 
bound rate is above the applied rate (see Figure 4.2, parts 1.1 and 1.2), e.g.  
 
                                                      
7 There is disagreement over the definition of the term ‘water in the tariffs’ in the 
literature. For example, Martin & Wang (2004) define water in the tariffs as any gap 
between the applied rate and the actual rate of protection, where the actual rate is 
lower. Additionally, the term water in the tariffs is not equivalent to the term 
‘binding overhang’, which defines the difference between the bound and the most-
favoured nation rate (Francois & Martin, 2003). 124 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
water in the tariff still exists after the tariff cut, so that imports are 
unchanged. But there will be a trade effect if tariff cuts exceed the water in 
the tariffs (Figure 4.2, part 1.3).8 
Figure 4.2 Bound rates, applied rates and water in the tariffs 
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Notes: T = tariffs, br = bound rates, ar = applied rates, pw = world market price 
Accordingly, tariff cuts in the proposals of the EU, the US, the G-20 
and the G-10 are calculated at the HS 6 tariff-line level based on the 
following equations: 
  )
100
y
1 ( T T
br 0
br
1
br − ⋅ =  (1) 
 where: 
  T = tariff rate 
  y = tariff cut in % 
  subscript br/ar = bound/applied rate 
  superscript 0/1 = initial/final situation. 
                                                      
8 Because of the lack of available information we do not take into account the 
effective protection. It should be stressed, however, that an implemented tariff cut 
will not result in a trade effect if it leaves the applied rate above the effective 
protection. The effective protection is defined as the amount by which the 
prevailing internal price exceeds the world market price before tariffs (Podbury & 
Roberts, 2003, p. 5). TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 125 
 
If  1
br T  is higher than or equal to  0
ar T , no tariff cuts will be 
implemented. If  1
br T  is smaller than  0
ar T , the tariff cut to achieve  1
br T = 1
ar T  will 
be implemented according to equation (2): 
  ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+ ⋅ = =
0
ar
0
ar
1
br 0
ar
1
ar
1
br T
T T
1 T T T  (2) 
Water in the tariffs will lead to country-specific reduction 
commitments. Owing to the option to bind the ceiling, developing 
countries were allowed to implement the tariff binding without reference to 
former protection levels. As a result, the bound tariffs in developing 
countries are much higher than in developed countries (Anderson & 
Martin, 2005, p. 14). Therefore, developing countries may experience an 
implicit preferential treatment that may be additional to the already 
granted special and differential treatment.  
The new applied rate ( 1
ar T ) is aggregated to the GTAP level using 
import trade weights. This is done with the help of source generic world-
import values from the UN’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE) from the year 2001, excluding intra-EU trade. Import 
weighting is the most commonly used aggregation scheme, which is also 
utilised to aggregate the applied rates included in the GTAP database 
version 6.04. Advantageously, trade weights take the relative importance of 
trade flows into account. Furthermore, the welfare implications are better 
addressed with this method. By contrast, the import-weighted aggregation 
scheme leads to an endogenous bias, as the weight for each individual tariff 
decreases with an increase in the tariff. Accordingly, prohibitive tariffs that 
impede market access and thereby reduce the trade volumes to zero are not 
taken into account by import weighting. Trade barriers are thus 
underestimated with this method.9 
Finally, we calculate the shocks at the GTAP level that are necessary 
to reduce the initial applied rate of the GTAP database ( 0
ar T ) to the new 
                                                      
9 In contrast to this study, Walkenhorst & Dihel (2003) used simple averages for the 
tariff aggregation to avoid biases from the interdependence of tariff levels and 
trade flows. The simple non-weighted average, however, does not take the relative 
importance of particular tariffs into account. 126 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
applied rates calculated with the help of the tariff module, for all the WTO 
proposals on market access under consideration (see Table 4.2). 
4.4  Results 
This section discusses the results of four experiments analysing the 
implementation of the tariff cuts proposed by the EU, the US, the G-20 and 
the G-10 in advance of the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005. 
The results are presented in millions of US dollars for the year 2001 of the 
GTAP database and are obtained using version 9 of the software 
GEMPACK (Harrison, Horridge & Pearson, 1996). As a macroeconomic 
closure we adopt a fixed trade balance. 
In this section, we mainly focus on the EU trade balance. The 
appendix provides detailed results for production output (in Table A4.5) on 
a disaggregated country level. Changes in production output are primarily 
induced by changes in the trade regime. The output results therefore show 
a pattern that is similar to the changes in trade balances and is only 
discussed in a rudimentary way. 
4.4.1  Impact on the EU trade balance 
Table 4.3 reports the changes in the regional trade balance10 by commodity 
resulting from the implementation of each of the four proposals. 
Examination of the entries in Table 4.3 shows that the changes in the EU-27 
are negative in almost every important sector in all four simulations. These 
negative changes are particularly pronounced in the highly protected beef 
and milk sectors, where imports rise relative to exports under the EU 
proposal by more than $-8.05 bn and $-8.23 bn respectively. Table 4.3 also 
reveals that the change in the EU trade balance for milk does not 
significantly vary between the simulations. Notably, the EU trade balance 
for beef differs by around $7.48 bn when the US proposal ($-14.46 bn) is 
implemented instead of the G-10 proposal ($-6.98 bn). 
 
                                                      
10 The change in the trade balance represents the change in the value of fob exports 
minus the value of cif imports.    
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Table 4.3 Changes in trade balances owing to the implementation of proposals by the EU, the US, the G-20 
and the G-10 (mn US$) 
EU27 USA Japan Oceania WTO IC Brazil India ACP LDC WTO DC ROW
cereals -388 3284 37 3 290 743 -59 -51 83 -4307 -58
oilseeds 181 1363 137 -133 -785 2461 21 -86 24 -3368 -150
paddy rice -4624 -92 -4588 46 -81 -195 357 -41 -1126 9288 -128
vegetables and fruits -214 -939 -102 -102 229 -129 -172 -130 -117 1466 -117
cattle 176 -632 27 -323 205 -12 1 -36 -18 730 -37
other animal -130 -1098 26 -200 33 -55 28 -41 -46 1674 -137
beef -8053 1857 -1189 648 117 3756 -1172 197 72 1554 2246
other meat -2168 1352 -3351 -142 -907 -2078 10 -61 183 7182 -70
milk -8232 992 -406 2162 630 24 364 416 588 2838 1037
sugar -1708 -185 -383 353 -8 106 -14 887 -955 1947 43
other food -7127 -4448 -6146 181 -592 -1393 -1191 -123 -608 21116 -888
other primary 3397 1619 595 -43 473 -221 -890 307 -1474 -5321 -826
manufactures 6542 -15515 15765 -2243 -2251 -1390 3176 -1283 4707 -23519 1944
services 22305 12449 -421 -203 2674 -1612 -540 59 -1304 -11307 -2750
cereals -39 3505 -28 39 724 848 -133 -296 138 -5596 140
oilseeds 289 1786 155 -155 -752 1894 52 -159 105 -3429 -131
paddy rice -5797 115 -4003 77 -99 -259 617 -74 -1346 9530 -130
vegetables and fruits -401 -960 -213 -103 572 -276 -994 -120 -96 1828 -55
cattle 332 -901 49 -437 362 -50 3 -51 -14 880 -38
other animal -81 -957 95 -196 110 -142 75 -46 -48 1342 -117
beef -14466 2987 -2882 1291 781 12455 -4830 297 86 1639 2255
other meat 2985 3783 -6901 -303 -679 -3435 -187 -211 266 4235 -82
milk -7863 1833 -1646 4571 -1922 -70 324 183 643 2189 1793
sugar -4499 -934 -1439 1044 3 429 -5 3341 -2337 3977 102
other food -7234 -4139 -7044 411 -490 -1416 -1746 -402 -445 21160 -737
other primary 3876 1148 1290 -590 613 -1433 -143 -30 -1140 -4924 -859
manufactures 8461 -19493 21773 -4665 -2277 -5948 6817 -2290 5314 -22441 637
services 24417 12220 794 -976 3071 -2590 27 -108 -1132 -10353 -2665
1) For the composition of regions and sectors see Table A1 and A2 in the appendix. 2) WTO IC: other developing WTO member countries, ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; 
LDC: Least Developed countries; WTO DC: other developing WTO member countries; ROW: Rest of the world
Source: Own calculations.
EU proposal
US proposal 
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Table 4.3 cont. 
 
EU27 USA Japan Oceania WTO IC Brazil India ACP LDC WTO DC ROW
cereals -308 2369 53 163 640 -23 0 64 130 -3224 16
oilseeds 90 78 113 -129 -829 2948 11 -78 -49 -2300 -167
paddy rice -883 -478 -7444 -63 -20 -173 -60 -46 -1043 9198 -132
vegetables and fruits -260 -363 -6 -68 -1 -91 -26 -108 -107 968 -129
cattle 145 -386 8 -268 62 -6 0 - 3 0- 1 65 9 7- 3 5
other animal -107 -861 5 -173 -59 -33 18 -37 -43 1467 -127
beef -6976 1825 -844 523 84 1797 -75 125 69 1313 2249
other meat -3385 1446 -2530 -88 -399 -1604 302 -32 166 6225 -65
milk -8330 884 -17 1878 887 44 388 428 574 2767 975
sugar -1302 -5 -114 190 -15 85 38 423 -548 1360 29
other food -6614 -4652 -3860 -319 -601 -1264 -857 -11 -572 18541 -639
other primary 2796 2435 195 73 296 69 -1096 365 -1605 -5106 -843
manufactures 4319 -14607 15024 -1692 -2424 -340 2040 -1122 4433 -21462 1809
services 20763 12319 -581 -26 2418 -1407 -763 70 -1378 -10377 -2838
cereals -321 3233 54 11 429 602 -57 -124 95 -4320 -42
oilseeds 219 1463 152 -138 -773 2258 29 -107 40 -3330 -145
paddy rice -4651 -94 -4580 45 -79 -223 376 -57 -1206 9419 -130
vegetables and fruits -402 -1056 -138 -148 230 -175 -117 -142 -104 1770 -113
cattle 238 -700 31 -324 256 -23 2 -45 -15 707 -37
other animal -118 -1085 41 -207 57 -86 41 -45 -43 1632 -136
beef -10301 2129 -1578 687 183 7153 -2841 282 78 1910 2245
other meat -968 2848 -5583 -177 -827 -2560 -89 -110 213 7127 -55
milk -8264 1072 -820 2735 -106 8 376 399 606 3126 1198
sugar -2607 -407 -556 469 -7 205 -18 1725 -1549 2662 66
other food -7317 -4222 -6737 332 -633 -1499 -1114 -177 -533 21445 -894
other primary 3595 1546 873 -155 535 -656 -688 171 -1344 -5370 -825
manufactures 8003 -16928 18800 -2753 -2039 -3030 4351 -1731 5006 -25455 1716
services 22854 12208 41 -371 2792 -1968 -338 -19 -1238 -11328 -2740
1) For the composition of regions and sectors see Table A1 and A2 in the appendix. 2) WTO IC: other developing WTO member countries, ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; 
LDC: Least Developed countries; WTO DC: other developing WTO member countries; ROW: Rest of the world
Source: Own calculations.
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What causes these different results? In the following discussion, the 
results are decomposed and examined more closely. Here, the total changes 
are disaggregated into parts, the so-called ‘subtotals’, which are 
attributable to changes in individual exogenous variables, e.g. policy 
instruments. The decomposition of the total effect into subtotals thereby 
allows the identification of changes that govern the results. The 
decomposition is based on the changes in policy instruments (e.g. import 
tariffs or export subsidies) that are applied to bilateral trade flows. Thus, 
the policy instrument, as well as the source and the destination of the trade 
flow subject to the policy instrument, can be identified (Harrison, Horridge 
& Pearson, 1999).  
Such a decomposition of the EU trade balances for selected products 
is presented in Table 4.4. It shows that in the case of beef, the results are 
clearly driven by two main effects. The first effect involves a deterioration 
of the EU trade balance between $-0.96 bn (G-10 proposal) and $-8.41 bn 
(US proposal), which is induced by the cuts of EU tariffs on agricultural 
products that are imported from third countries. 
The second effect stems from the increase in EU beef imports relative 
to beef exports by $-4.54 bn (G-10 proposal) and $-4.77 bn (G-20 proposal), 
owing to the abolition of export subsidies. While the latter remains more or 
less unchanged between the simulations, i t  c a n  o b v i o u s l y  b e  s e e n  f r o m  
Table 4.4 that the EU beef sector reacts very sensitively to EU agricultural 
tariff cuts. Additionally, Table 4.4 reveals the minor importance of the 
opening of third countries’ beef markets to the exports of highly-protected 
EU beef. 
In contrast, the results for the EU trade balance in processed milk 
trade are almost completely dominated by the abolition of EU export 
subsidies (see Table 4.4). This effect varies only slightly between the 
simulations and comprises a relative increase of EU milk imports from 
around $-10.16 bn (G-10 proposal) to $-11.73 bn (US proposal). Milk exports 
are also subsidised by third countries. In this regard, the abolition of export 
subsidies results in an expected positive effect for the EU trade balance for 
milk. The effect, however, at $0.31 bn, is negligibly small compared with 
that from dismantling EU export subsidies. Also, all other repercussions, 
particularly those arising from the cut to EU import tariffs, are 
insignificant. Even the high cuts to agricultural tariffs in the US proposal 
evoke only smaller changes in the EU trade balance for milk. Here, the 
better access to third countries’ milk markets (to the extent of $6.98 bn) is 130 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
almost offset by the effect of EU agricultural tariff cuts ($-2.16 bn) and of 
diverting EU milk exports, which results from better market access among 
third countries ($-1.62 bn). 
Table 4.4 Decomposition of the changes in the EU trade balances for selected 
products under proposals from the EU, the US, the G-20 and the G-10 
(mn US$) a), b)  
Tariffs of non- Sum
TC EU TC agricultural EU TC
Commodity Proposal to EU to TC to TC products to TC to all
EU 134 586 -346 53 -802 -13 -388
US 101 1137 -506 53 -806 -17 -39
G-10 87 456 -66 53 -824 -13 -308
G-20 171 589 -319 52 -800 -14 -321
EU -655 -33 -35 85 -1068 -1 -1708
US -3433 -12 -23 73 -1103 -2 -4499
G-10 -257 -25 -33 88 -1073 -1 -1302
G-20 -1547 -25 -31 79 -1082 -2 -2606
EU -657 3220 -817 153 -10476 345 -8232
US -2158 6979 -1619 164 -11729 502 -7862
G-10 -366 2409 -672 149 -10162 312 -8330
G-20 -1096 4014 -926 154 -10797 387 -8264
EU -2094 -112 3 -1288 -4585 13 -8062
US -8408 -173 4 -1125 -4772 12 -14464
G-10 -957 -83 -78 -1334 -4544 13 -6982
G-20 -4391 -135 33 -1219 -4620 13 -10318
EU -38 4802 -3671 231 -3505 14 -2166
US 3 14636 -7974 235 -3929 14 2986
G-10 -16 2648 -2861 233 -3404 15 -3385
G-20 -58 7709 -5237 228 -3622 14 -966
Tariffs of agricultural product from Export subsidies from
Cereals
Other meat
Milk
Beef
Sugar
 
a) For the composition of sectors see Table A4.2 in the appendix.  
b) TC = third countries 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 4.4 also decomposes the change in the EU trade balance for the 
other meat (pork and poultry) sector, which reveals a large degree of 
variation between the simulations. The implementation of the G-10 
proposal results in a deterioration of the EU trade balance of $-3.39 bn in 
total, while the EU achieves a relative increase in EU other meat exports of 
$2.99 bn with the implementation of the US proposal. The decomposition of 
these results shows that this variation is related to the sensitivity of the 
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countries. The higher agricultural tariff cuts of the US proposal open up the 
market in third countries, which have to accommodate additional EU 
exports of $14.64 bn. Yet, only EU exports of $-7.97 bn are displaced by the 
high cuts to agricultural tariffs in the US proposal and its resulting 
increased trade opportunities among third countries. An additional relative 
decrease of EU imports of other meat stems from the abolition of EU export 
subsidies ($-3.93 bn), but does not compensate this positive effect. On the 
contrary, the application of the G-10 proposal only implies an increase of 
exports to third countries of $2.65 bn, while it is just offset by the increase 
of trade among third countries ($-2.86 bn). The additional negative effect of 
the elimination of EU export subsidies for other meat rises to $-3.40 bn and 
leads to an overall deterioration of the EU trade balance for this sector. All 
other effects are negligible for the EU trade balance of other meat.  
The EU sugar sector is another area in which a negative change in the 
trade balance develops, which lies between $-1.30 bn (G-10 proposal) and 
$-4.50 bn (US proposal). Analogous to the beef sector, the EU sugar sector 
reacts very sensitively if the higher agricultural tariff cuts are applied 
under the US proposal. The EU’s relative sugar imports only decrease by a 
moderate amount $-0.26 bn under the application of the market access 
options included in the G-10 proposal, while the proposed US tariff cuts 
lead to a negative change in the EU sugar trade balance of $-3.43 bn. A 
clearly negative effect also results from the abolition of the EU export 
subsidy, which, however, is more or less constant among the four 
simulations and amounts to $-1.07 bn (EU proposal) or $-1.10 bn (US 
proposal). All proposals result in better access to third countries’ sugar 
markets, but the relative increase in EU sugar exports is only marginal and 
does not compensate for the other negative effects. 
Finally, Table 4.4 also reveals the negative change in the EU trade 
balance for cereals, rising to $-0.04 bn and $-0.39 bn in the US and the EU 
proposals respectively. The decomposition of these results shows that there 
are two reasons for this negative development. First, the EU trade balance 
for cereals declines owing to the opening of markets for agricultural trade 
among third countries and its resulting diverting effect for EU cereal 
exports. This effect involves a negative development in the EU trade 
balance for cereals of $-0.07 bn under the G-10 proposal, which even 
increases under the implementation of the US proposal to $-0.51 bn. 
Second, the EU trade balance for cereals is also hurt by the abolition of EU 
export subsidies. Here, the trade balance deteriorates by around $-0.8 bn in 132 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
all four simulations. These negative developments are partly offset by 
positive developments that result from better EU export opportunities to 
the markets of third countries by $1.14 bn under the application of the US 
proposal. Nevertheless, this positive figure falls slightly to $0.46 bn when 
the agricultural tariff cuts of the G-10 proposal are employed. Table 4.4 
shows another positive influence on the EU trade balance for cereals, which 
stems from the cut of EU agricultural tariffs and lies between $0.09 bn (G-10 
proposal) and $0.17 bn (G-20 proposal).  
The latter result in particular is somewhat puzzling, and certainly 
deserves a closer look. Why do the cuts to EU agricultural tariffs have a 
positive impact on the EU trade balance for cereals? Table 4.5 presents an 
extended decomposition of this outcome under the US and the G-10 
proposals to answer this question.  
Table 4.5 Decomposed effects of cuts to EU agricultural import tariffs on the trade 
balance of cereals (mn US$) 
Impact of the trade balance of cereals
US proposal G-10 proposal
Cut of EU tariffs of
cereals -303 -10
oilseeds 1 1
paddy rice 12 4
vegetables & fruits 58 18
cattle 0 0
other animal 5 4
beef 149 25
other meat 38 6
milk 33 6
sugar 30 4
other food 78 29
Sum 101 87  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As the table shows, the total effect of the cuts to all agricultural tariffs 
i s  f u r t h e r  b r o k e n  d o w n  i n t o  e a c h  agricultural commodity. From a first 
glance it can clearly be seen that the cut to EU import tariffs for cereals 
undoubtedly has the expected negative effect on the EU trade balance for 
cereals, under the proposals of the US ($-0.30 bn) and the G-10 ($-0.01 bn). 
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and $0.03 bn respectively), has a positive effect on the EU trade balance for 
cereals. The reason for this is a reduction of, for example, high EU tariffs on 
beef imports, which constitute an implicit tax for the EU cereals sector. In 
summary, these positive effects outweigh the negative effect of the cut in 
the relatively low EU tariff for cereals. A very similar outcome can be 
observed when third countries cut their tariffs for EU imports of sugar and 
beef (see Table A4.4 in the appendix). 
4.4.2  Impact on third countries’ trade balances  
Who is taking advantage of the expanded access to EU agricultural 
markets? To elaborate this question we divide the countries and regions of 
Table 4.3 into developed, developing and least-developed countries 
(LDCs)11 as well as the rest of the world, which includes non-WTO member 
countries. Table 4.6 accordingly represents the change in the trade balance 
for these regions for all the considered commodities. In the following we 
concentrate the discussion on the highest and lowest figures resulting from 
each of the four simulations. 
An examination of Table 4.6 shows that the previously noted negative 
changes to the EU trade balance for beef ($-6.98 bn in the G-10 proposal) 
are mainly accommodated by developing countries ($3.16 bn), while 
developed countries and the rest of the world share almost all of the 
remaining surplus of $1.59 and $2.25 bn respectively. Yet only the 
developed and developing countries are able to increase their beef exports 
to the EU if the much higher cuts to agricultural tariffs are applied under 
the US proposal. It is interesting to note that the trade balance of developed 
countries increases disproportionately here. By contrast, the trade balances 
of the LDCs change and those of the rest of the world stay relatively 
constant in the simulations. 
The large negative changes of around $-8 bn to the EU trade balance 
for milk in all the simulations are also distributed among all other groups 
of countries. Nevertheless, the developing and developed countries can 
obviously be identified as the main milk-surplus producers, which are able 
to increase their relative milk exports by $3.6 bn in each case with the help 
                                                      
11 Developed, developing and least-developed countries are grouped according to 
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of the tariff cuts proposed by the G-10. Developed and developing 
countries show, however, a slightly smaller increase in their trade balances 
if the higher cuts to agricultural tariffs are implemented under the US 
proposal (about $2.7 bn). The rest of the world is able to almost double an 
increase in relative exports. Again, the LDCs are only minor players in the 
world milk market. 
Table 4.6 Changes in trade balances owing to the implementation proposals by the 
EU, the US, the G-10 and the G-20 for aggregated regions (mn US$) a) 
EU27 IC DC LDC ROW EU27 IC DC LDC ROW
cereals -388 3615 -3674 83 -58 -39 4239 -5176 138 140
oilseeds 181 582 -972 24 -150 289 1033 -1642 105 -131
paddy rice -4624 -4715 9409 -1126 -128 -5797 -3910 9815 -1346 -130
vegetables & fruits -214 -914 1035 -117 -117 -401 -705 438 -96 -55
cattle 176 -722 683 -18 -37 332 -928 782 -14 -38
other animal -130 -1240 1606 -46 -137 -81 -949 1228 -48 -117
beef -8053 1433 4335 72 2246 -14466 2178 9560 86 2255
other meat -2168 -3047 5053 183 -70 2985 -4101 401 266 -82
milk -8232 3377 3643 588 1037 -7863 2836 2627 643 1793
sugar -1708 -223 2926 -955 43 -4499 -1326 7742 -2337 102
other food -7127 -11005 18409 -608 -888 -7234 -11262 17596 -445 -737
other primary 3397 2643 -6125 -1474 -826 3876 2461 -6530 -1140 -859
manufactures 6542 -4244 -23016 4707 1944 8461 -4662 -23862 5314 637
services 22305 14499 -13400 -1304 -2750 24417 15109 -13025 -1132 -2665
cereals -308 3225 -3184 130 16 -321 3727 -3900 95 -42
oilseeds 90 -767 581 -49 -167 219 705 -1151 40 -145
paddy rice -883 -8006 8919 -1043 -132 -4651 -4708 9514 -1206 -130
vegetables & fruits -260 -438 743 -107 -129 -402 -1112 1336 -104 -113
cattle 145 -584 561 -16 -35 238 -737 640 -15 -37
other animal -107 -1088 1415 -43 -127 -118 -1194 1542 -43 -136
beef -6976 1588 3161 69 2249 -10301 1420 6504 78 2245
other meat -3385 -1572 4891 166 -65 -968 -3738 4368 213 -55
milk -8330 3632 3626 574 975 -8264 2881 3909 606 1198
sugar -1302 57 1907 -548 29 -2607 -500 4575 -1549 66
other food -6614 -9432 16409 -572 -639 -7317 -11260 18655 -533 -894
other primary 2796 2998 -5768 -1605 -843 3595 2798 -6543 -1344 -825
manufactures 4319 -3699 -20884 4433 1809 8003 -2921 -25865 5006 1716
services 20763 14130 -12476 -1378 -2838 22854 14669 -13653 -1238 -2740
EU proposal US proposal
G-10 proposal G-20 proposal
 
a)  For the composition of regions and sectors see Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the appendix.  
Note: IC = industrial countries; DC = developing countries; LDC = least-developed 
countries; ROW = rest of the world 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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With regard to the other meat sector, Table 4.6 also reveals that large 
changes in the trade balances of the EU ($-3.34 bn in the G-10 proposal) and 
other developed countries ($-1.57 bn) are almost entirely offset by 
developed countries, which experience a significant positive development 
in their trade balances ($4.89 bn). Conversely, it is interesting to note that 
the higher tariff cuts of the US proposal almost exclusively benefit the EU 
($2.99 bn), while the other developed countries have to accept a further 
deterioration of their trade balances for the other meat sector ($-4.1 bn).  
The reaction of the sugar sector to the implementation of the Doha 
round is somewhat different. In this context, the relative increase of EU 
sugar imports ($-1.30 bn under the G-10 proposal) is accompanied by a 
trade balance change in the LDCs ($-0.55 bn), which clearly comes from 
preference erosion. The negative changes to the trade balances of the EU 
and the LDCs more than double under the application of the US proposal, 
while the slightly positive change to the sugar trade balances of the 
developed countries transforms into a relative increase in imports under 
the US proposal. The main increase of relative exports in the world sugar 
market is given, however, to developing countries and to a far lesser extent 
to the rest of the world. Thus, the trade balance change for developing 
countries ($1.9 bn) under the G-10 proposal is more than doubled when 
tariff cuts are more ambitiously applied with the implementation of the US 
proposal ($7.7 bn). The rest of the world is only a casual bystander in the 
world sugar market. 
Finally, Table 4.6 reveals the relative increase of cereal imports into 
the EU as previously indicated. In this respect, the application of the EU 
proposal leads to a change in the trade balance for the EU and the 
developed countries of $-0.39 bn and $-3.67 bn, respectively. These changes 
are almost completely accommodated by developed countries ($3.62 bn). 
Owing to better access to developing countries’ markets, the change to the 
EU trade balance is slightly less when the higher cuts to agricultural tariffs 
are applied as proposed by the US.  
Conclusions 
The WTO negotiations of the Doha round are a key issue in the public 
debate. This chapter analyses the effects of different market access options 
on the basis of a general equilibrium model. An extended version of the 
GTAP model is used to first project a base run that includes Agenda 2000, 
the EU’s enlargement, the EBA agreement and the MTR. The policy 136 | WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
simulation run also includes the WTO negotiations. For this latter aspect, a 
distinction is made among the four different simulations examining the 
approaches to open agricultural markets as proposed by the EU, the US, the 
G-20 and the G-10 in advance of the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong in October 2005. All tariff cuts are calculated in the tariff database (at 
the HS 6-digit tariff level), taking applied and bound rates into account and 
added up to the GTAP-model level using import weights. In our 
examination, we concentrate on the impact of the WTO negotiations on the 
EU’s trade flows. In this respect, the results of the simulations reveal the 
following points: 
•  Results from different options for market access in the WTO 
negotiations of the Doha round show parallel developments. Thus, 
for example, the increase or decrease of the trade balance is more or 
less pronounced, while a change of direction is merely an exception 
that applies to the other meat sector. 
•  Implementation of all the proposals results in negative changes to the 
EU’s trade balances for most agricultural products, but particularly 
for the highly protected EU beef and milk sectors. The trade balances 
of sugar, cereals, vegetables and fruit, other food products and to 
some extent those for other meat products deteriorate as well, and 
consequently show a relative increase in imports. These 
developments are only reversed for other meat products, if higher 
agricultural tariffs (e.g. as proposed by the US) are implemented. 
•  With the help of a decomposition of the trade effects for selected 
products it can be shown that the negative developments in the EU 
trade balances for beef and sugar are dominated by the cuts in EU 
agricultural tariffs and the abolition of EU export subsidies. For the 
milk trade balance, however, the largest negative trade impact for the 
EU stems solely from the abolition of EU export subsidies, while tariff 
cuts by the EU and third countries are not so important. The EU 
cereals and other meat sectors particularly react to tariff cuts among 
third countries, which displace EU exports to them. The elimination 
of export subsidies is also of significant importance for the EU cereals 
and other meat sectors. 
•  Who is taking advantage of improved EU market access? From the 
perspectives of the non-participating LDCs and non-WTO member 
countries, it does not make much difference whether tariff cuts are 
higher (as in the US proposal) or not (as in the G-10 proposal). These TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 137 
 
proposals only realise minor changes in trade balances. Additionally, 
the LDCs suffer from preference erosion in the sugar sector, which 
increases with higher tariff cuts. By contrast, developing countries are 
able to disproportionately increase their relative beef and sugar 
exports to the EU. This development even occurs when the tariff cuts 
are higher. Other developed countries are able to increase their 
relative cereal exports, but only gain slightly better access to other EU 
agricultural markets. 
•  From the EU’s point of view, it really matters which of the four 
proposals are implemented in the beef, other meat and sugar sectors, 
as these sectors are particularly sensitive to tariff cuts by the EU and 
third countries. For the EU milk sector, however, it hardly makes a 
difference, as better market access to third countries is almost entirely 
offset by the effect of tariff cuts by the EU and among third countries. 
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Appendix 
Table A4.1 Aggregation of countries and regions 
Countries and regions  Abbr.  
1.  European Union – 27 countries 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland,  Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
EU-27 
 
 
2. United  States    USA 
3. Japan  JPN 
4. Oceania 
Australia, New Zealand  
OCEA 
5.  Other WTO members (industrialised countries) 
Canada, Switzerland, Rest of EFTA, Albania, Croatia 
WTO 
IC 
6. Brazil  BRA 
7. India  IND 
8.  Rest of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries  
Rest of Oceania, Rest of FTAA, Rest of Caribbean, Botswana, 
South Africa 
ACPs 
9.  Least-developed countries  
Bangladesh, Rest of Southeast Asia, Rest of South Asia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania,  Other Southern Africa, Madagascar, 
Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia 
LDCs 
 
10.  Other WTO members (developed countries) 
China, Hong Kong, Korea, Rest of East Asia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South America, Central America, 
Turkey, Rest of Middle East, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North 
Africa, Rest of South African CU, Zimbabwe 
WTO 
DC 
 
11.  Rest of the world 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Rest of North America, Rest of Europe, 
Russian Federation, Rest of FSU 
ROW 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Table A4.2 Aggregation of sectors 
Sectors 
1.  Wheat, cereal grain nec 
2. Oil  seeds 
3.  Sugar cane, sugar beet 
4. Paddy  rice 
5. Vegetables,  fruit,  nuts 
6.  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 
7.  Animal products nec 
8. Raw  milk 
9.  Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses 
10.  Meat products nec 
11. Dairy  products 
12. Sugar 
13.  Food products nec, vegetable oils and fats, processed rice 
14.  Other primary sectors  
       Plant-based fibres, crops nec, wool, silk-worms, cocoons, forestry, fishing 
coal, oil, gas, minerals nec, wood products, petroleum, coal products 
15. Industry 
  Beverages and tobacco products, textiles, wearing apparel, leather 
products, wood products, paper products, publishing, chemical, rubber, 
plastic products, mineral products nec, ferrous metals, metals nec, metal 
products, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment, electronic 
equipment, machinery and equipment, manufactures nec 
16. Services 
  Electricity, gas manufactures, distribution, water, construction, trade, 
transport nec, sea transport, air transport, communication, financial 
services nec, insurance, business services nec, recreation and other 
services, public administration/defence/health/education, dwellings 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Table A4.3 Pre-simulations, Agenda 2000 and EU enlargement 
Pre-simulations 
  CAP instruments 
    Complementarity approach for milk and sugar (assumption: 
quantity in the database represents production quotas) 
    Land subsidy equalised across sectors to implement a 
homogeneous area payment 
  Common EU budget  
    75% of tariff revenues as well as a share of GDP is accrued to 
the EU budget; determination of a uniform endogenous GDP 
rate 
    Expenses of the EAGGF paid for by the common EU budget 
    Net transfers among EU member states 
Agenda 2000 
  Cereals 
    Reduction of intervention prices by –15% 
    Unification of direct payments for cereals, oilseeds and 
protein plants 
    Reduction of set-aside rate from 15% to 10% 
  Beef 
    Reduction of intervention prices by –18% 
    No change in direct payments (assumption: increase in direct 
payments is compensated by lower output) 
  Milk 
    Reduction of intervention prices by –15% 
    Retention of quota regulation 
    Increase of quota by 2.4% 
EU enlargement (EU-27) 
  Creation of customs union 
    EU-15 and CEECs abolish all bilateral trade barriers 
    The CEECs establish the trade protection measures of the EU-
15  
    Production quotas for milk and sugar are fixed at the current 
production levels of the CEECs 
    No set-aside in the new member states TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 143 
 
Table A4.3 Continued 
    Direct payments in the EU-15 remain unchanged 
    100% of the current land and animal premiums in the EU-15 
are transferred to the new member states (standard 
procedure) 
    Fixation of ceilings for direct payments with an endogenous 
adjustment of the premium rate for land and animals in the 
EU-15 
  Common EU budget 
    Complete integration of the CEECs in the EU’s common 
budget: 90% of tariff revenues as well as a share of GDP to the 
EU budget 
    Payments in the framework of the EAGGF in the CEECs 
through the common budget 
    Implementation of net transfers between the EU-15 and the 
CEECs 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Table A4.4 Decomposed effects of third countries’ tariff cuts for EU agricultural 
imports on the trade balance of sugar and beef (mn US$) 
US proposal G-10 proposal US proposal G-10 proposal
Cut of third countries tariffs
for EU imports of
cereals -8.2 -2.0 -111.0 -39.0
oilseeds -0.4 0.0 -7.0 -2.0
paddy rice 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
vegetables & fruits -9.2 -2.0 -95.0 -19.0
cattle -0.4 0.0 -11.0 -5.0
other animal -1.9 -0.7 -8.0 -3.0
beef -2.0 0.0 560.0 100.0
other meat -53.7 -10.0 -316.0 -54.0
milk -37.3 -11.0 -118.0 -40.0
sugar 145.0 14.0 -1.0 0.0
other food -44.2 -13.0 -66.0 -21.0
Sum -12.3 -24.7 -173.0 -83.0
Impact of the trade balance 
of sugar
Impact of the trade balance 
of beef
 
Note: For the composition of the sectors see Table A4.2 above.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table A4.5 Changes in output owing to the implementation of proposals for market access by the EU, the US, the G-20 and 
the G-10 (in %) 
 
EU27 USA Japan Oceania WTO IC Brazil India ACP LDC WTO DC ROW
cereals - 46 - 3 9 - 12 1 5001 - 91
oilseeds 0 4 5 -17 -21 18 -1 -5 0 -24 -4
sugar beet & cane - 1 4 - 1 - 1 84200 1 7 - 361
paddy rice - 3 5- 6 - 8 7 7 - 2 8 - 1 5- 1- 7- 8 - 4 6- 2
vegetables and fruits - 1 - 4 - 1 - 14 - 6 - 1 - 2030
cattle - 1 30 - 1 5 - 14 1 4 - 11053
other animal - 2 - 2 - 1 2 - 6 - 1 1 - 90 - 1251
raw milk - 61 - 3 1 74116471
beef - 2 82 - 1 881 2 8 - 3135 4 4
other meat -3 1 -42 -4 -20 -23 18 -2 6 12 4
milk -10 1 -3 20 7 0 6 14 75 13 16
sugar - 2 1 - 1 - 1 8 1 4210 2 9 - 882
other food - 3- 2- 4 1- 2- 4- 6- 1- 11 0- 1
other primary 10000 - 1 - 10 - 10 - 1
manufactures 0 0 1 -2 -1 -1 1 -1 2 -1 0
services 00000000000
cereals -3 7 -75 -1 3 18 0 -3 1 -12 1
oilseeds 2 5 8 -22 -21 10 -1 -7 2 -23 -3
sugar beet & cane - 2 8 - 4 - 3 6 1 2 - 510 5 8 - 791
paddy rice -46 -1 -87 9 -35 -18 0 2 -9 -40 -2
vegetables and fruits - 2 - 4 - 1 - 29 - 1 2 - 3 - 2030
cattle - 2 11 - 3 006 5 0 - 60053
other animal 00 - 2 3 - 7 - 1 1 - 90 - 1252
raw milk - 71 - 9 3 5 - 1 5 - 113462
beef - 4 14 - 3 6 1 5 - 1 8 7 - 2 2035 4 4
other meat 24 - 7 6 - 8 - 2 2 - 3 8 - 3 0 - 9884
milk -10 2 -11 41 -22 -1 5 8 79 12 25
sugar - 4 0 - 5 - 3 7 4 1260 1 0 4 - 2 0 1 43
other food - 3- 2- 4 3- 1- 4- 8- 3- 11 0- 1
other primary 100 - 20 - 50000 - 1
manufactures 0 -1 2 -4 -1 -4 2 -1 2 -1 0
services 00000000000
1) For the composition of regions and sectors see Table A1 and A2 in the appendix. 2) WTO IC: other developing WTO member countries, ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; 
LDC: Least Developed countries; WTO DC: other developing WTO member countri
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Table A4.5 Continued 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
EU27 USA Japan Oceania WTO IC Brazil India ACP LDC WTO DC ROW
cereals - 45325 - 4031 - 11
oilseeds -1 -1 2 -16 -22 23 0 -5 -1 -20 -4
sugar beet & cane - 1 10 - 1 111008 - 151
paddy rice -7 -17 -82 -13 -8 -13 -2 -15 -7 -46 -2
vegetables and fruits - 1 - 20 - 10 - 40 - 2020
cattle - 1 01 - 1 2 - 13501143
other animal -3 -1 -9 -5 -4 -8 1 -1 1 5 2
raw milk - 61 - 1 1 56116461
beef - 2 42 - 1 463 1 32134 4 4
other meat -4 2 -32 -2 -5 -17 87 -1 6 10 4
milk - 1 010 1 8 1 116 1 5 7 4 1 3 1 6
sugar - 1 60 - 1 18111 1 5 - 471
other food -3 -2 -3 -2 -2 -3 -4 -1 -1 9 -1
other primary 100000 - 20 - 10 - 1
manufactures 001 - 2 - 101 - 1200
services 000000000 00
cereals - 46 - 4 6 - 12 1 2001 - 81
oilseeds 1 4 6 -18 -21 15 -1 -5 1 -24 -3
sugar beet & cane - 2 0 - 2 - 2 26200 3 1 - 571
paddy rice -35 -6 -87 6 -27 -16 0 -5 -8 -46 -2
vegetables and fruits -2 -4 -1 -2 4 -8 -1 -2 0 3 0
cattle - 1 61 - 2 1 - 15 2 9 - 31053
other animal -2 -1 -17 -6 -11 -8 0 -1 2 5 1
raw milk - 71 - 5 2 2 - 2016471
beef - 3 33 - 2 581 5 2 - 1 2136 4 4
other meat -2 3 -65 -4 -21 -28 -5 -5 7 12 4
milk - 1 01 - 6 2 6 - 206 1 4 7 6 1 4 1 8
sugar - 2 9 - 2 - 2 2 1 9130 5 6 - 1 3 1 02
other food - 3- 2- 4 2- 2- 4- 5- 2- 11 0- 1
other primary 100 - 10 - 2 - 10 - 10 - 1
manufactures 0 0 1 -3 -1 -2 1 -1 2 -1 0
services 00000000000
1) For the composition of regions and sectors see Table A1 and A2 in the appendix. 2) WTO IC: other developing WTO member countries, ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; 
LDC: Least Developed countries; WTO DC: other developing WTO member countri
G-20 proposal
G-10 proposal 
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5.  An economy-wide perspective  
on Euro-Mediterranean trade 
agreements with a focus  
on Morocco and Tunisia 
  Marijke Kuiper and Frank van Tongeren1 
5.1  The issues at stake 
The economic interests of the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries 
(MPCs) in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EuroMed 
Agreements) are far apart. The MPCs are of limited economic interest to the 
E U .  I m p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  M P C s  a c c o u n t  f o r  o n l y  2 %  o f  E U  i m p o r t s ,  w h i l e  
exports to the MPCs account for only 3% of total EU exports. The majority 
of EU imports from the MPCs consist of oil, followed at a distance by 
Mediterranean agricultural products. Given the limited size of the agrarian 
trade flows, the European Commission does not consider the MPCs a threat 
to European farmers (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002). 
The very limited economic interests of the EU contrast with the clear 
economic interests of the MPCs: 50% of their imports and exports are with 
the EU, which is their largest trade partner. The MPCs have a comparative 
advantage in typical Mediterranean products such as fresh fruit and 
vegetables, citrus, tomatoes and olive oil. Improved access to European 
                                                      
1 This chapter benefited greatly from detailed comments by Mohamed Lahouel 
during the ENARPRI final conference “Trade Agreements and EU Agriculture” 
held in Brussels on 8 June 2006. Financial support through the EU-sponsored 
ENARPRI-TRADE project is gratefully acknowledged, as is financial support from 
the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 147 
 
agricultural markets could provide a positive stimulus to their economies. 
Such a positive stimulus is badly needed. Economic growth in the MPCs is 
lagging behind the growth rates attained in the rest of the world, while the 
MPCs combine a young population with unemployment rates of between 
15 and 30%. 
Given the limited economic interests in the MPCs, the EuroMed 
Agreements de facto mainly serve the EU’s political interests in stability at 
its southern borders. This political interest can also be inferred from explicit 
references to the Barcelona process in the European security strategy 
launched by High Representative Javier Solana (European Council, 2003). 
A further indication of the EU’s political interests in the Mediterranean is a 
speech on the link between the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Wallström, 2005). Looking at the 
EuroMed Agreements in terms of promoting political interest in stability 
and prosperity at the EU’s southern borders, there appears a contradiction 
between the political interests of the EU as a whole and the sectoral or 
regional economic interests of specific EU member states. 
The EU unilaterally removed its protection on manufactured goods in 
the 1970s, but has since maintained its high levels of protection in 
agriculture. The EuroMed Agreements thus boil down to an opening of 
MPC markets to industrial imports from the EU. Since the MPCs’ industrial 
producers are not generally considered internationally competitive, 
implementation of the agreements is expected to decimate industry in the 
MPCs. The resulting reduction in already limited employment will not 
contribute to stability in the MPCs.  
Next to an expected loss of employment in the industrial sector, 
implementation of the agreements will decrease tariff revenues. 
Government expenditures in the MPCs are high owing to a bloated public 
sector: the share of non-military public employment in total employment is 
twice the world average (Bulmer, 2000). In addition, producers of grain, 
meat and milk are subsidised to reduce dependence on imports, while 
consumer prices are kept low through subsidies on staple foods. A 
reduction of government revenues through trade liberalisation would have 
a direct impact on employment and consumer prices, with all its 
consequences in terms of social unrest. 
The current agreements thus conflict with the political interests of the 
EU in attaining stability at its southern borders, by having detailed schemes 
for abolishing protection on manufactured goods, but so far not on 148 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
agricultural products. From the perspective of stability at the southern 
perimeters, and given the comparative advantage of the MPCs in 
Mediterranean agriculture, the trade agreements should aim at relaxing the 
complex EU trade barriers for Mediterranean agricultural products. 
Current EU concessions in this area are marginal, since MPC producers 
compete directly with producers from Mediterranean EU member states. 
Although concessions would have only a marginal impact on the EU as a 
whole, relaxing restrictions on Mediterranean agricultural products would 
be noticeable in Mediterranean EU member states. The current trade 
agreements reflect these regional interests. 
European trade barriers, however, are only one of the factors limiting 
economic growth in the MPCs. Next to a bloated public sector and market 
interventions, the region belongs to the most protected in the world and the 
competitiveness of the private sector is limited by the high level of trade 
protection. In addition, there is an inflow of foreign exchange in the MPCs 
through oil revenues and remittances. This inflow of foreign exchange 
stimulates domestic demand for services and causes an appreciation of the 
exchange rate by increasing demand for imports, thus hampering exports. 
As a result, MPC economies are oriented towards non-trade sectors. 
Trade protection distorts the structure of the economy while creating 
interests in maintaining the protection that hampers reform. An example is 
the industrial sector in the MPCs. Access to European markets has not led 
to a competitive sector, because continuing high trade barriers have not 
provided an incentive to restructure industries. A comparable scenario 
would be possible with unconditional and unilateral reduction of European 
trade barriers for agricultural products. The complexity of the current 
protection implies that producers have invested in information and 
contacts to be able to export to the EU and thus they have an interest in 
maintaining the current protection structure. If the MPCs retain their 
barriers to imports from the EU, there are no incentives for restructuring 
agricultural production. 
Given the limited economic interest o f  t h e  M P C s  f o r  t h e  E U  a s  a  
whole, there is room to support domestic reforms in the MPCs through 
alignment of trade agreements with domestic policies. Consequently, the 
aim of this chapter is to 1) analyse the impact of the EuroMed Agreements 
on northern and Mediterranean EU member states and 2) assess the 
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This study is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the model 
and data used in the study. We use a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model that allows us to analyse changes in trade flows and the 
resulting economy-wide effects in Morocco and Tunisia (as case studies of 
the MPCs) and in northern and Mediterranean EU member states. Section 
5.3 describes the scenarios analysed in this study, as well as initial tariff 
profiles and trade flows. To gauge the impact of assumptions on model 
outcomes we focus on extreme assumptions, providing upper and lower 
bounds of possible outcomes. In terms of the scope of liberalisation we 
analyse the current EuroMed Agreements (limited to an opening of MPC 
economies to EU manufacturers) and a full liberalisation of all trade 
(including agriculture). In terms of domestic policies we analyse a case in 
which tariff revenues are not replaced (government expenditures are 
assumed to adjust) and a case with full replacement of tariff revenues by a 
consumption tax. Together this yields four scenarios, varying in terms of 
the scope of liberalisation and tariff replacement. Section 5.4 analyses the 
impact of the current EuroMed Agreements, with and without tariff 
replacement. Section 5.5 assesses whether the inclusion of agriculture in the 
agreements would lead to different results. The final section concludes. 
5.2  Model and data 
The issue at stake in this study is to analyse the economy-wide effects of the 
EuroMed Agreements, taking the diverging interests of EU member states 
into account. This effort poses a set of requirements on the applied 
methodology. Kuiper (2004) provides a review of existing general 
equilibrium analyses of the EuroMed Agreements in light of these 
requirements. Here we focus on the main implications of this review for the 
modelling exercise in this study. 
In order to address the diverging economic interests of EU member 
states a multi-regional model is required. Similarly, in order to address the 
prospects of South–South integration to balance the hub-and-spoke nature 
of the bilateral agreements between the EU and the MPCs such a model is 
needed.  
In this study we employ a multi-regional general equilibrium model 
with the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (version 6). While 
being somewhat restricted in terms of sectoral detail, an economy-wide 
analysis does allow an examination of the trade-offs between agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors and the employment effects of the agreements. 150 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
The current EuroMed Agreements are most detailed in terms of lowering 
restrictions on trade in manufactured goods by the MPCs, and we therefore 
feel that a more aggregated but economy-wide perspective on the EuroMed 
Agreements in the context of a multi-regional model is warranted. 
5.2.1  Main model features 
As noted above, to gauge the economy-wide effects of the EuroMed 
Agreements we use a CGE model. The GTAP model we employ for this 
purpose provides a complete representation of each national economy as 
well as their interactions through trade. In terms of production it covers the 
agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors, allowing an analysis of 
resource reallocation following policy changes. In terms of incomes and 
consumption it covers the use of factor income, tariff revenues and taxes for 
private and government expenditures. The key strength of the GTAP 
model is the detailed modelling of international trade, including all 
bilateral trade flows among regions. By distinguishing bilateral trade flows 
we can analyse the impact of preferential trade agreements, of which the 
EuroMed Agreements are an example. For a detailed discussion of the 
algebraic structure of the GTAP, see chapter 2 in Hertel (1997). 
Whereas the GTAP has much to offer in terms of coverage of 
production and trade, consumption is modelled in less detail. 
Consumption decisions are modelled using a single household to represent 
all consumption decisions in a region. Consequently, the results do not 
provide much in terms of the distribution of income across households, nor 
can we analyse changes in poverty. In terms of changes in the distribution 
of income we can analyse the returns to land, labour (skilled and unskilled) 
and capital, which provide a limited indication of changes in income across 
different household groups. 
To capture the importance of unemployment in the MPCs we use an 
unemployment closure, replacing the standard assumption of perfect 
labour markets. The standard assumption implies that full employment is 
attained by adjusting the wage rate until demand and supply are balanced. 
In contrast, the unemployment closure specifies that real wages are fixed at 
base levels and the (perfectly elastic) supply follows demand. This is a 
rather stylised representation of unemployment, which does not take actual 
levels of unemployment into account. That being said, it does provide a 
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changes in policy, thus allowing us to assess whether employment will 
increase or decrease in different sectors of the economy.  
Tariff revenues are an important source of MPC governments’ 
budgets. The elimination of tariffs implies a reduction in revenues, which 
either requires an adjustment in government expenditures or a tax increase 
to replace tariff revenues. We analyse the impact of different choices 
regarding the loss of tariff revenues by varying assumptions on tariff 
replacement across scenarios. Specifically, we analyse the impact of a tax 
replacement scenario whereby the consumption taxes are endogenously 
adjusted such that total taxes are kept at a constant share of national 
income.  
5.2.2  Data, aggregation and baseline construction 
Our model employs version 6 (public release) of the GTAP database, 
representing the economy of 87 regions in 2001 (Dimaranan & McDougall, 
2005). Our aggregation of regions for this study is driven by the diverging 
interests between northern and Mediterranean EU member states, which 
are specified as two separate regions in the model. We furthermore 
distinguish EU accession countries in order to account for the recent 
accession of the new EU member states as well as the imminent accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania. MPCs are represented by Morocco, Tunisia and 
the rest of North Africa aggregate, which comprises Algeria, Egypt and 
Libya. We also distinguish among the rest of the Middle East, which 
includes some of the MPCs, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian 
Authority and Syria, as well as other countries in the Middle East. This 
distinction allows us to analyse the impact of the EuroMed Agreements on 
South–South trade. Finally, to allow future analyses of the impact of trade 
agreements between the MPCs and the US we keep the US separate from 
the rest of the world. 
The sector aggregation is based on an analysis of the scope of the 
current EuroMed Agreements and the expected employment 
repercussions. We combined detailed trade data on EuroMed Agreements 
at the HS-6 level to factor shares from the GTAP to determine an 
appropriate grouping of sectors. Vegetables and fruit are kept as a separate 
sector because of the comparative advantage of the MPCs in these 
products; spices and other crops are kept separate because of different 
patterns in the proposed elimination of protection. Tariff reductions in 
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different types of equipment sectors, which are thus kept as a separate 
sector. The remaining sectors are grouped according to the share in 
production to be able to capture differences in employment across sectors. 
After aggregating regions and sectors we arrive at a model with 9 regions 
and 17 sectors (see the chapter appendix for the aggregation schemes).  
The GTAP data represent the state of the world economy in 2001. 
Meanwhile, other policy changes affect the results that could be attained by 
the EuroMed Agreements. To account for these policy changes we 
construct a baseline, updating the 2001 data with the following policy 
changes in the period 2001–07: 
•  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) agreements – implementation of the remaining 
Uruguay round commitments (with an end date of 2005 for 
developing countries) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(phasing out restrictions on textile trade from 2005 onwards); 
•  China’s WTO accession – the accession of China to the WTO is 
incorporated by equalling all import tariffs according to the most-
favoured nation clause; 
•  enlargement of the EU in 2004 – expansion of the EU is simulated as full 
trade liberalisation between the EU-15 and EU-25 and adoption of EU 
border tariffs in the Central and Eastern European countries; and 
•  mid-term review of the common agricultural policy (CAP) – the GTAP 
data do not include the reform of the CAP under the Luxembourg 
Agreement of 2003. The crucial point of this mid-term review is the 
decoupling of payments from output levels. This reform is 
approximated by equalising subsidy payments to land and capital 
across crops. There is thus no gain in terms of subsidies to switch 
from one crop to another. 
The model results after implementing the above set of reforms are 
used as the reference point for the simulations in this study. This allows us 
to assess the impact of the EuroMed Agreements in the context of ongoing 
policy reforms. This study distinguishes rather aggregate sectors, which 
ignores some of the complexities of the protection structure for agricultural 
products. The results should thus be interpreted as an indication of the 
scale and direction of the anticipated effects of the EuroMed Agreements, 
aimed at providing input for deciding among different proposals for 
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5.3  Tariff structures, model scenarios and initial trade flows  
The tariff reductions agreed upon in the current EuroMed Agreements 
focus on manufactured goods. There are a limited number of concessions 
for agricultural products, consisting of enlargements of quota and the 
reduction of some tariffs. Most of these imply changes to the complex 
protection for specific agricultural products, which we cannot adequately 
capture with the aggregated representation of these crops in the GTAP 
database. Our discussion of the current EuroMed Agreements thus focuses 
on changes in the protection of manufactured goods, ignoring the (limited) 
changes in the protection of agricultural goods.  
The EuroMed Agreements contain detailed schemes for lowering 
import tariffs on manufactured goods by Morocco and Tunisia over a 
period of up to 12 years. Schemes for the elimination of trade barriers vary 
from immediate elimination of tariffs, stepwise elimination over a short 
period (three to five years), stepwise elimination over a long period (up to 
12 years or during part of a 12-year period), elimination of tariffs after 12 
years and products that are exempted from tariff reductions. The 
specifications for reductions to be applied by the EU are much simpler: 
immediate elimination of all protection on manufactured goods except for 
the protection on the agricultural component of imported goods. This 
approach reflects the lowering of trade barriers on manufactured imports 
from MPCs in the past, implying that a very limited number of barriers for 
manufactured goods from the MPCs remain. 
The impact of the EuroMed Agreements depends on the change in 
prices of EU imports compared with imports from other regions not 
benefiting from the tariff reduction. Figures 5.1a and 5.1b therefore present 
t a r i f f s  l e v i e d  b y  s o u r c e  o f  i m p o r t s for Morocco and Tunisia, which are 
calculated from trade and tariff data at the HS-6 level of detail. 2  
                                                      
2 The computation of tariff reductions foreseen in the EuroMed Agreements is 
done by combining 6-digit level data on tariff lines to be removed from Annexes 3 
through 6 in the EuroMed Agreements of Morocco and Tunisia with tariff and 
trade data from MAcMAP. We first compute the trade-weighted import tariff on 
imports originating in northern Mediterranean EU countries at the 6-digit level 
using the MAcMap database (these data are from 2001 and thus cover the period 
before EU enlargement). We then compute the trade-weighted tariff for each of the 
sectors in our model. The next step involves removing tariffs in accordance with 
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For the EU we include the tariffs before the EuroMed Agreements as well 
as after them, in order to assess changes to the relative trade barriers.  
Morocco and Tunisia both have significant protection levels across 
the board. The two countries also tend to levy relatively high tariffs on 
imports from other trade partners in the region. For agricultural sectors, 
when comparing the pattern of protection we find generally stronger 
p r o t e c t i o n  i n  T u n i s i a ,  w h i l e  M o r o c c o  l e v i e s  h i g h e r  t a r i f f s  o n  n o n -
agricultural sectors. Given that the EuroMed Agreements mostly affect the 
non-agricultural sectors we would thus expect a stronger impact of the 
current agreements on Morocco. The inclusion of agriculture in the full 
liberalisation scenario, on the other hand, would affect Tunisia more 
strongly.  
Analysing the reduction in tariff barriers on European imports in 
relation to tariffs levied on imports from other regions, we predictably find 
only minor changes in the agricultural sectors. In the non-agricultural 
sectors, however, there is a change in the relative barriers of the EU 
compared with imports originating in Tunisia or in the rest of North Africa. 
Whereas the EU encounters higher barriers before the EuroMed 
Agreements, after the agreements it faces no tariffs (except for a small 
remaining import tariff on European equipment in Morocco and on 
European motor vehicles in Tunisia). The relative competitiveness of EU 
imports compared with imports from other North African countries 
improves, reflecting the hub-and-spoke structure of the EuroMed 
Agreements. This structure may redirect trade flows to the EU, weakening 
economic integration within North Africa. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the EuroMed Agreements at the 6-digit level and re-computing the average trade-
weighted tariff for imports originating in the EU for the sectors in our model. 
Afterwards, we compute the percentage change in tariffs for each of the sectors in 
our model, which renders the shocks to be applied to simulate the EuroMed 
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Figure 5.1a Import tariffs by source of imports levied by Morocco (%) 
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Note: Tariffs are weighted by import flows in the baseline.  
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Figure 5.1b Import tariffs by source of imports levied by Tunisia (%) 
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Note: Tariffs are weighted by import flows in the baseline.  
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These findings for the manufacturing sectors are not unexpected, 
given the structure of the agreements. More notable is the outcome for the 
food processing sector – after the EuroMed Agreements the EU also 
benefits from lower tariffs than those levied on other North African 
countries, with its tariffs reduced by more than 50% in both Morocco and 
Tunisia.  
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b are based on our computation of the changes in 
tariffs as foreseen by the EuroMed Agreements. Apart from a clause on 
maintaining the protection on the agricultural components of 
manufactured goods, the EuroMed Agreements stipulate an immediate 
elimination of EU barriers on imports from Morocco and Tunisia. Since we 
lack information on the agricultural component of manufactured goods we 
implement this requirement as a straightforward elimination of the 
remaining (low) barriers on the EU’s imports of manufactured goods from 
Morocco and Tunisia. By ignoring the agricultural component there is the 
implication that we will slightly overstate the effect of EU liberalisation, but 
given the low initial tariffs we do not expect this to significantly affect the 
results.  
Computing the tariff reductions by Morocco and Tunisia is more 
complicated, as for these detailed schemes different time paths are 
foreseen. In the current analysis, we ignore differences in the speed of 
liberalisation undertaken by the two countries. We thus develop a scenario 
that removes all trade barriers on imports from the EU for all industrial 
tariff lines (at the 6-digit level) that are mentioned in Annexes 3 through 6 
of the EuroMed Agreements. Table 5.1 presents the tariff reductions as 
computed from the EuroMed Agreements. 
The EuroMed Agreements foresee an elimination of almost all tariffs 
on manufactured imports originating in the EU. This is reflected at the level 
of GTAP sectors in Table 5.1 by the (almost) complete elimination of tariffs 
on the manufacturing sectors. The EuroMed Agreements are very generic 
in character, subjecting more or less the same tariff lines to reductions in 
Morocco and Tunisia. Despite this generic character, Table 5.1 indicates 
rather different tariff reductions for several sectors (compare columns 1 and 
2). The largest differences are found in the non-manufacturing sectors and 
are related to the manner in which tariffs at the 6-digit level are aggregated 
to the GTAP sector level. Several manufacturing tariff lines are linked to 
non-manufacturing GTAP sectors. For these sectors only a limited number 
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applied in the GTAP model, we compute the tariff reduction at tariff-line 
level after which we aggregate again to the GTAP sector level using trade 
flows as weights. Having different trade flows, the resulting aggregate 
reductions at the GTAP sector level differ for Morocco and Tunisia. Basing 
tariff reductions on the detailed information available with version 6 of the 
GTAP database therefore results in differential tariff reductions, despite the 
reference to rather generic EuroMed Agreements. 
Table 5.1 EuroMed Agreement scenario by sector and region (% reduction in 
tariffs) 
 
Sector  MPC tariffs on 
imports originating 
in the EU 
EU tariffs on imports 
originating in the 
MPCs 
   Morocco Tunisia Morocco  Tunisia 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
1 Cereals  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2  Oils seeds & vegetable oils  -11.6 -2.4 0.0 -0.2
3  Vegetables, fruit & nuts  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4  Spices and other crops  -3.0 -11.5 -0.4 -17.7
5 Plant-based  fibres  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6  Sugar cane, sugar beet,  sugar  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7  Animal products and wool  -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0
8  Milk & dairy products  -1.9 -0.9 -0.1 0.0
9  Natural resource extraction  -22.6 -81.8 0.0 0.0
10  Food & beverages  -65.5 -58.8 -60.6 -77.2
11  Textiles & leather  -100.0 -99.7 0.0 0.0
12 Petro-chemicals  -100.0 -99.9 0.0 0.0
13  Wood, paper & mineral products  -100.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0
14  Metals and metal products  -100.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0
15  Various types of equipment  -95.1 -100.0 0.0 0.0
16  Motor vehicles & manufactures  -100.0 -84.4 0.0 0.0
Sources: Annexes 3 through 6 of the EuroMed Agreements, MAcMap and authors’ 
computations. 
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The large number of zeros in columns 3 and 4 reflects the earlier 
removal of trade barriers that was implemented unilaterally in the 1970s by 
the EU. We computed the effects of a removal of tariffs on industrial goods 
(HS chapters 18 through 97) and on fishery products (chapter 3 and some 
additional 6-digit lines mentioned in protocol 2 of the EuroMed 
Agreements). As Table 5.1 shows, there are few tariffs remaining on trade 
in industrial goods. The only significant reduction in percentage terms is in 
food (61 and 77%). These remaining tariff barriers are probably owing to 
protection on the agricultural components of industrial goods as specified 
in Annex 1 of the EuroMed Agreements, which we cannot isolate because 
of lack of data. Regardless of the strong reduction in percentage terms, the 
reduction applies to an initial tariff of only 1.5% for Morocco and 1.6% for 
Tunisia, thus not granting much in terms of additional market access.  
Overall the current agreements can be described as a significant 
lowering of trade barriers by Morocco and Tunisia (the percentages in 
Table 5.1 apply the levels depicted in Figures 5.1a and 5.1b), while their 
access to the EU market does not improve significantly. 
The tariff reductions in Table 5.1 are used as input data for the 
scenario analysing the impact of the current EuroMed Agreements. Table 
5.2 presents a summary description of the model scenarios employed in 
this study. The first set of scenarios refers to the current EuroMed 
Agreements (coded as EA). Given the restricted focus of the current 
EuroMed Agreements on industrial trade, the question arises as to what the 
impact would be if the agreements were to encompass agricultural trade as 
well. Such a full liberalisation (FL) of EU–Moroccan and EU–Tunisian trade 
is analysed with the second set of scenarios. Both contain two scenarios, 
differing in whether or not tariffs are replaced by a (consumption) tax. As 
we see when analysing the results, assumptions about the way in which 
MPC governments deal with the change in tariff revenues greatly affects 
the outcomes of the simulations.  
The impact of the policy changes simulated in each of the scenarios is 
compared with a base run of the model that incorporates ongoing policy 
changes described in section 5.2. Tables 5.3a and 5.3b present the main 
indicators of the international trade relations of Morocco and Tunisia 
derived from the base run that serves as a reference point in our study. This 
provides a background for understanding the effects induced by the 
different policy changes.  
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Table 5.2 Description of model scenarios 
Code Description  Tariffs  Employment  Tariff 
replacement 
EA_n Current  EuroMed 
Agreements with 
unemployment, no 
tariff replacement 
See Table 5.1 
for reduction 
percentages 
Unemployment 
of skilled and 
unskilled 
labour 
No 
replacement 
EA_r Current  EuroMed 
Agreements with 
unemployment, 
with tariff 
replacement 
See Table 5.1 
for reduction 
percentages 
Unemployment 
of skilled and 
unskilled 
labour 
Tariffs 
replaced with 
consumption 
tax 
FL_n  Full elimination of 
tariffs on EU–
Moroccan and EU–
Tunisian trade, no 
tariff replacement 
All tariffs 
eliminated on 
EU–Moroccan 
and EU–
Tunisian 
trade 
Unemployment 
of skilled and 
unskilled 
labour 
No 
replacement 
FL_r  Full elimination of 
tariffs on EU–
Moroccan and EU–
Tunisian trade, with 
tariff replacement 
All tariffs 
eliminated on 
EU–Moroccan 
and EU-
Tunisian 
trade 
Unemployment 
of skilled and 
unskilled 
labour 
Tariffs 
replaced with 
consumption 
tax 
Source: Authors’ data. 
 
Starting with the structure of the economies we find the services 
sector to dominate total GDP with a 57.6% share in Morocco and a 66.8% 
share in Tunisia. Note that in these cases services include the government 
(see the appendix to this chapter for the activities captured in each of the 
sectors). Agriculture plays an important role in both countries, accounting 
for 25.5% and 20.4% of GDP in Morocco and Tunisia, respectively. The role 
of agriculture in exports is less pronounced, and manufacturing plays an 
important part in earning foreign exchange, especially in textiles and 
leather (26.3% of Moroccan exports and 32.8% of Tunisian exports). Note 
also that the baseline construction includes the accession of China to the  
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WTO as well as the phasing-out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
both of which lead to a contraction of the textiles and leather sector. The 
effects are most noticeable in Tunisia with a reduction of the textiles sector 
by 12.1% and a 1.9% loss of employment. In Morocco there is a much 
smaller contraction (0.7%) and the reallocation of production factors to 
other sectors increases employment by 0.2%. In spite of the changes in the 
global economy, textiles remain an important source of export earnings, 
even for Tunisia. Non-agricultural sectors dominate imports even more 
strongly, with the role of agricultural products limited to 22.4% in Morocco 
and 9.8% in Tunisia. Agricultural imports are clearly more important in 
Morocco than in Tunisia.  
With regard to the trade balance the two countries have a striking 
similarity in qualitative terms. Both have a negative trade balance, with the 
value of imports exceeding exports by $415 million in Morocco and $715 
million in Tunisia. The importance of the textiles sector in exports is 
reflected by its positive trade balance in both countries, being the only 
manufacturing sector with a positive contribution to net exports. Among 
the agricultural sectors only food and beverages, animal products and 
vegetables have a positive trade balance in both countries, while for Tunisia 
vegetable oils (olive oil) also shows positive net exports. The negative trade 
balances are further reflected in the limited number of sectors in which 
domestic production exceeds the total use of sector output (self-
sufficiency). 
The EuroMed Agreements are limited to liberalising trade with the 
EU. Their impact thus depends on the importance of the EU as a trading 
partner. The right panes of Tables 5.3a and 5.3b depict the share of exports 
or imports by sector traded with northern3 and Mediterranean EU member 
states and Tunisia or Morocco.  
 
                                                      
3 We added trade with the new EU member states from Eastern Europe to the 
northern EU member states. Given the very limited trade with the accession 
countries this does not influence the analysis.   
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Table 5.3a Basic international trade indicators for Morocco  
  General indicators  Importance of EuroMed destinations 
           Northern  EU 
member states 
Mediterranean 
EU member states 
Tunisia 
 Share 
of GDP 
Share of 
exports 
Share of 
imports 
Trade 
balance 
Self- 
sufficiencya) 
Share 
exports 
Share 
imports 
Share 
exports 
Share 
imports 
Share 
exports 
Share 
imports 
 (%)  (%)  (%)  ($  mn)  (%)  (%) (%) (%) (%)  (%)  (%) 
Agricultural and mining sectors                    
Cereals 5.6  0.2  5.3  -599  74  60.2  36.9  10.4  1.2  0.0  0.0 
Oil seeds & vegetable oils  0.3  0.0  1.5  -179  54  30.7  7.7  25.2  8.6  0.0  0.7 
Vegetables, fruit & nuts  4.6  4.2  0.4  428  127  73.2  21.2  4.0  15.9  0.0  17.1 
Spices and other crops  0.3  0.6  1.3  -90  47  47.8  12.9  12.2  16.6  0.6  0.0 
Plant-based  fibres  0.6  0.1  0.4  -38  89  37.8  1.2 9.4  6.4 0.1  0.0 
Sugar cane, sugar beet, sugar  0.8  0.1  0.5  -47  93  42.6  4.0  4.8  0.2  16.3  0.0 
Animal products and wool  5.6  0.7  0.5  19  99  37.6  71.1  8.2  2.8  0.0  0.4 
Milk & dairy products  1.5  0.2  1.0  -98  84  2.6  87.2  0.2  4.5  0.0  0.1 
Natural resource extraction  4.0  5.4  9.6  -519  69  19.4  1.9  37.7  2.0  0.4  0.0 
Food & beverages  2.1  8.0  1.8  697  119  20.9  32.3  35.4  16.1  0.5  0.5 
Non-agricultural sectors                     
Textiles & leather  5.8  26.3  16.6  1,035  102  70.2  59.2  19.8  27.6  0.3  0.1 
Petro-chemicals 3.2  10.2  11.2  -153  90  27.7  40.0  11.8  23.4  1.1  1.2 
Wood, paper & 
mineral products 
3.7 3.0  6.5  -425  85  38.9  38.4  30.6  30.8  3.3  0.4 
Metals and metal products  1.3  0.7  4.7  -480  72  23.6  35.6  38.0  35.5  5.0  0.5 
Various types of equipment  1.8  10.8  22.8  -1,457  59  42.5  55.4  12.9  25.4  0.2  0.2 
Motor vehicles & manufactures  1.0  1.2  4.8  -426  71  45.9  50.6  8.2  28.7  0.8  0.3 
Services and activities nec  57.6  28.3  11.0  1,916  107  34.5  27.7  6.4  12.3  0.1  0.2 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0  -415  –  44.1 41.0  16.1 20.5  0.4  0.4 
a) Self-sufficiency is measured as the domestic share in total use. 
Source: Authors’ calculations – model simulation, base run.  
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Table 5.3b Basic international trade indicators for Tunisia  
  General indicators  Importance of EuroMed destinations 
           Northern  EU 
member states 
Mediterranean 
EU member states 
Morocco 
  Share of 
GDP 
Share of 
exports 
Share of 
imports 
Trade 
balance 
Self-
sufficiencya) 
Share 
exports 
Share 
imports 
Share 
exports 
Share 
imports 
Share 
exports 
Share 
imports 
  (%) (%)  (%)  ($  mn)  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Agricultural and mining sectors                    
Cereals  0.7  0.3  3.6  -322  55  33.9  33.8 6.4  0.8 0.0  0.0 
Oil seeds & vegetable oils  0.2  1.7  0.7  78  144  0.4  15.0  82.1  20.1  0.8  0.0 
Vegetables, fruit & nuts  7.8  1.1  0.3  73  102  55.0  34.4  17.6  22.1  8.1  0.5 
Spices and other crops  0.2  0.1  0.8  -66  30  56.0  8.0  11.6  28.0  0.3  0.5 
Plant-based  fibres  0.0  0.1  0.4  -36  21  32.2  1.5 7.1  34.4 0.2  0.0 
Sugar cane, sugar beet, sugar  0.3  0.0  0.2  -22  88  7.6  9.1  0.8  2.3  0.0  9.4 
Animal products and wool  2.9  0.6  0.3  24  99  31.1  67.3  40.0  9.4  0.5  0.0 
Milk & dairy products  0.1  0.1  0.2  -14  89  5.5  65.5  0.4  5.4  1.8  0.0 
Natural resource extraction  6.3  4.2  1.5  230  109  26.8  6.0  57.6  17.2  0.0  1.6 
Food & beverages  1.9  2.1  1.7  28  93  19.0  20.3  33.1  9.6  0.5  3.0 
Non-agricultural sectors                     
Textiles & leather  5.3  32.8  21.0  906  110  68.7  52.7  25.9  39.3  0.1  0.4 
Petro-chemicals 2.5  8.9  14.0  -559  77  20.6  46.9  16.7  31.8  2.1  1.0 
Wood, paper & mineral products  2.9 3.1  7.1  -411  75 35.6  48.7  19.1  26.0  1.0  1.6 
Metals and metal products  0.3  1.8  4.9  -315  53  40.1  42.5  28.6  29.3  1.8  0.8 
Various types of equipment  1.2  13.7  26.2  -1,305  50  72.5  58.9  14.2  22.1  0.4  0.1 
Motor vehicles & manufactures  0.7  2.7  7.6  -488  52  58.0  60.7  17.0  26.0  0.6  0.2 
Services and activities nec  66.8  26.8  9.4  1,486  111  36.0  30.8  6.6  9.2  0.1  0.2 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0  -715  –  39.1  39.6 15.9  21.0  0.4 0.4 
a) Self-sufficiency is measured as the domestic share in total use. 
Source: Authors’ calculations – model simulation, base run. 164 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
Analysing the differential importance of trade flows by trading 
partner provides some initial insight into the political economy of the 
EuroMed Agreements. Taken together, the EU accounts for 60.2% (44.1 and 
16.1%) of Morocco’s exports and 55.0% (39.1 and 15.9%) of Tunisia’s 
exports. Comparable large percentages are found for EU imports to 
Morocco (60.2%) and Tunisia (60.6%). The EU is thus the major trading 
partner of both Morocco and Tunisia.4  
We argue that the lack of progress in liberalising agricultural trade 
flows can be traced to the varying interests of northern and Mediterranean 
EU member states. Some indications of these interests can be found in 
Tables 5.3a and 5.3b. Although the Mediterranean EU member states are 
much smaller (their combined GDP is about a third of the GDP of the 
northern EU region), for some sectors they account for a very large share of 
exports. Most notable is the trade of vegetable oil, with 25.2% of Moroccan 
exports and no less than 82.1% of Tunisian exports being destined for 
Mediterranean EU countries. The picture in terms of vegetables is less clear, 
probably owing to the aggregated representation in the model. The exports 
to the northern EU are about three times as large as to the Mediterranean 
EU region, which corresponds to the difference in their GDPs. On the 
import side, a clear diverging interest is found for the animal products and 
dairy sectors, with 71.1 and 87.2% of Moroccan imports and 67.3 and 65.5% 
of Tunisian imports originating in the northern EU. For cereals we find a 
similar dominance of northern EU countries (although less pronounced 
because of imports from the US). Imports from the Mediterranean EU 
countries are limited for these ‘temperate’ agricultural products.  
Despite its aggregated character the model does capture the main 
diverging interests of northern and Mediterranean EU member states: 
northern EU countries would benefit from improved access to North 
African markets for animal products, dairy and cereals, whereas 
Mediterranean EU countries would face a further increase in imports of 
vegetable oils. We do not find a similar pattern for vegetables, because of 
the aggregated nature of the vegetable sectors in the GTAP, which 
unfortunately combines Mediterranean products with more temperate 
                                                      
4 These numbers reflect projected trade flows given the ongoing policy changes 
and therefore differ from the numbers based on past trade flows in the previous 
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vegetables and fruit. The data also reflect the importance of the EU as a 
trading partner of both Morocco and Tunisia. The EuroMed Agreements 
can thus be expected to have a significant impact on both economies. 
5.4  Results of the current EuroMed Agreements 
This section analyses the results of the current EuroMed Agreements. We 
focus on the current agreements in the first instance since these are already 
signed. The next sub-section compares the impact of expanding trade 
liberalisation to include agriculture, which could be achieved if the recently 
proposed negative-list approach to liberalising agricultural trade in the 
Mediterranean were to be adopted. 
5.4.1  Income effects of the EuroMed Agreements without and with 
tariff replacement 
Our analysis of the income effects of policy changes focuses on the 
equivalent variation (EV), a concise measure of the macroeconomic 
consequences of a (policy) change. The EV measures the change in income 
equivalent to the proposed policy change. More specifically, it measures 
the amount of income that should be given to (or taken away from) a 
household to attain a welfare equivalent to the welfare occurring after a 
(policy) change comes into effect. If a policy change results in a positive EV, 
this number represents the additional income that could be generated if the 
policy were implemented. If total EV is positive the winners could 
potentially compensate the losers. Apart from this general conclusion on 
the potential for compensation the EV does not consider distributive issues. 
We start by analysing the effect of implementing the EuroMed 
Agreements without tax replacement (left pane of Table 5.4). The 
elimination of tariffs on trade with the EU has two major effects: i) reducing 
distortions in the economies of mainly Morocco and Tunisia; and ii) 
diverting trade from the rest of the world (ROW) to the EU. The first effect 
is strongest for Morocco, which initially levies higher tariffs on European 
manufactured goods than Tunisia (see the discussion of tariff profiles with 
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b). In absolute terms the gains for Morocco are highest 
(an annually recurring $2,692 million or 7.92% of GDP in the base run). 
Since northern EU member states account for a larger share of trade (in 
b o t h  M o r o c c o  a n d  T u n i s i a ) ,  t h e y  g a i n  m o r e  f r o m  t h e  l o w e r i n g  o f  t a r i f f  
barriers ($823 million). Because of the limited economic importance of 
Morocco and Tunisia in the total trade of the European Union, the impact 166 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
assessed in terms of base GDP remains an insignificant 0.01% for northern 
EU countries and 0.02% for those in the Mediterranean EU. 
Table 5.4 Income effects of the current EuroMed Agreements (million US$, 2001) 
  No tax replacement (EA_n)  With tax replacement (EA_r) 
  Total Share  of 
base 
GDP 
Share of 
total 
gains 
Total Share  of 
base 
GDP 
Share of 
total 
gains 
   (%)  (%)   (%)  (%) 
Morocco 2,692  7.92  65.76 -1,455  -4.28  82.19 
Tunisia 907  4.67  22.15  -520  -2.68  29.37 
Northern EU  823  0.01  2.10  619  0.01  -34.94 
Mediterranean 
EU 371  0.02  9.07  282  0.01  -15.92 
ROW -699  0.00  -17.07  -696  0.00  39.30 
Total  4,094 0.01  100.00  -1,771  -0.01  100.00 
Note: Computed from EV.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations. 
The lowering of barriers on trade with the EU gives European 
producers an edge on producers in the rest of the world. The EU already 
has lower tariffs on manufactured goods (see Figures 5.1a and 5.1b) and the 
EuroMed Agreements further increase this advantage. This results in a 
decrease of trade with the ROW, shown in Table 5.4 as a welfare loss for the 
ROW of $699 million. 
If we then turn to the right pane in Table 5.4 we find that the results 
for a scenario with tax replacement (EA_r) give a radically different picture 
of the income effects of the EuroMed Agreements. Although the effects for 
the EU are comparable to the first scenario we now find welfare declining 
in both Morocco ($-1,455 million or -4.28% of base GDP) and Tunisia ($-520 
million or -2.68% of base GDP). This radical change in the assessment of the 
agreements is driven by a different assumption on the need for replacing 
the tariff revenues. The second scenario assumes that the government fully 
replaces tariff revenues by a consumption tax to sustain its expenditures. 
This assumption implies that the distortions of an import tax are replaced 
by a distorting consumption tax. As indicated by the total income loss of 
$1,771 million, the distortions of the consumption tax exceed the reduced 
distortions of the import tax. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 167 
 
The strong impact of tax replacement, turning significant gains into 
significant welfare losses, comes rather unexpectedly. Both countries are 
small, which implies that changes in domestic demand would not affect 
international prices. Consequently, import taxes only raise domestic prices, 
not international prices.5 The tax replacement then only shifts the manner 
in which taxes are collected from an import to a consumption tax, and one 
would not expect such dramatic shifts in welfare.  
The strong impact is the result of three interrelated features of our 
modelling exercise: a uniform shift in taxes, the Armington assumption and 
the unemployment closure. We use a change in closure to model tax 
replacement – we fix the ratio of tax revenues to national income and use 
an endogenous tax rate on private consumption to compensate for the 
shortfall of import tariff revenues. The tax shift leads to a significant rate of 
taxation on consumption of 9.5% in Morocco and 8.5% in Tunisia, which 
exacerbates existing distortions. This effect is visible in the different 
repercussions on Morocco and Tunisia. Tunisia has little variation in 
consumption taxes, while in Morocco the existing and possibly inefficient 
dispersion of tax rates (with much higher tariffs on manufactured goods) is 
aggravated by the shift in taxes. Making domestic taxes more uniform may 
increase the benefits from trade liberalisation, but the coverage of tax data 
in our database is not sufficient to allow a satisfactory analysis of this fiscal 
issue.  
Given the uniform tax rates in Tunisia the puzzle remains as to how 
the change in taxes has such a strong effect on welfare. In a recent paper, 
Taylor & von Arnim (2006, pp. 23-26) show that when modelling bilateral 
trade flows using the Armington assumption (as in virtually all applied 
CGE models, including the GTAP), reducing tariffs reduces demand and 
welfare gains if government expenditures are fixed and tariff revenues are 
replaced by a consumption tax. The intuition of this result is that 
consumption is reduced by the rise in tax rates. The size of this reduction 
depends on the share of imports in the Armington aggregate, which will 
always be less than one (since some domestic goods are consumed as well). 
By replacing tariff revenues with consumption taxes consumers bear the 
                                                      
5 Using the Armington assumptions, all goods are region-specific, which gives 
even small countries a limited amount of market power. For all practical purposes 
we can maintain the small-country assumption when analysing results. 168 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
full burden of the increased taxes: the incidence of the tax falls on a much 
broader base. The net effect on consumption is therefore always negative. 
Morocco has initially higher tariffs on manufactured goods and thus the 
negative effect on consumption will be larger for Morocco, contributing to 
its higher welfare losses. 
In our model the welfare losses through the consumption side are 
multiplied by the assumption of unemployment. A reduction in 
consumption will result in a contraction of production, which will increase 
unemployment and further reduce consumption. This multiplier effect is 
considerable. A simulation of the implementation of the agreements with 
tax replacement but assuming full employment results in much smaller 
welfare losses ($107 million for Morocco and $58 million for Tunisia). The 
unemployment closure thus strongly interacts with the Armington fiscal 
effect, but negative welfare effects remain even with full employment.  
The combination of distorting initial consumption taxes, imperfect 
substitution of domestic and foreign goods in consumption (Armington) 
and the multiplier effect of unemployment generate large negative welfare 
effects of tariff reductions with revenue replacement. These findings 
underscore the need to carefully address the budgetary implications of a 
tariff reduction while accounting for the overall economic setting 
(especially unemployment). Such an assessment requires detailed 
modelling of the tax system and its effects on the economy, for which the 
GTAP with its rather limited data on government revenues and taxes is less 
suited.  
Next to overall income effects employment is a major concern in both 
Morocco and Tunisia. The changes in employment are closely linked to the 
overall income effects, with employment increasing in the first scenario and 
decreasing in the case of tariff replacement (Table 5.5). With a single 
representative household we cannot address issues of income distribution 
across households. Changes in factor prices, however, do provide some 
initial insight into the distributive effects of the agreements. Poor 
households tend to have only unskilled labour and possibly some land (if 
located in rural areas).  
The current EuroMed Agreements only entail changes in import 
tariffs on manufactured goods, which do not use land. The changes in 
returns to land in Table 5.5 indicate that the agricultural sectors are 
indirectly affected by the tariff reductions. Without tax replacement the 
improved allocative efficiency raises incomes, stimulating demand for TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 169 
 
(agricultural) consumption goods. Increasing the consumption tax to 
replace tariffs reduces demand, which translates into a reduced return to 
land. With real wages fixed the price of labour cannot accommodate and all 
the adjustment has to occur in the amount of labour employed. In contrast, 
there is limited scope for quantity adjustments for the immobile production 
factor of land and most adjustments occur through changes in its rental 
rate. Capital also witnesses drops in returns, for many of the same reasons. 
Although capital is assumed to be inter-sectorally mobile, the overall 
contraction of the economy provides only limited opportunities for the 
reallocation of capital across sectors.     
Table 5.5 Employment and factor prices with the EuroMed Agreements (% change 
to base) 
  No tax replacement (EA_n)  With tax replacement (EA_r) 
  Morocco Tunisia  Morocco Tunisia 
Employment       
Unskilled labour  14.9 11.1  -6.8  -5.1 
Skilled labour  15.6  11.7  -8.3  -5.9 
Factor prices       
Land 24.5  11.8  -14.2  -19.2 
Unskilled labour  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Skilled labour  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Capital 12.0  9.6  -7.0  -4.2 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on model simulations. 
 
In terms of income distribution this implies that not only are poor 
households in urban areas affected by the agreements, poor households in 
rural areas are as well. General equilibrium effects transmit the policy 
changes in the manufacturing sector to rural areas by changing the demand 
for agricultural goods. Rural wage labourers and small farmers thus benefit 
from the reduced import tariffs while being harmed by the consumption 
tax. 
5.4.2  Drivers of the aggregate income effects 
We found considerable differences in the income effects of the EuroMed 
Agreements, depending on whether or not tariffs are replaced by a 170 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
consumption tax. Some general explanations of the underlying mechanisms 
have been discussed. We now examine in more detail the adjustments 
induced by the agreements. 
The EV on which Table 5.4 is based provides a summary of statistics 
concerning the total effect of different drivers of welfare changes. Table 5.6 
presents the contribution of four main drivers to the total income gains 
expressed in terms of base GDP: allocative efficiency, employment and 
terms of trade. 
The  allocative efficiency effects relate to distortions induced by 
taxes. The removal of import tariffs reduces distortions, allowing factors of 
production (land, labour and capital) to move to their most efficient use. 
Increased efficiency translates into lower prices, promoting the expansion 
of supply and demand. Increasing the consumer tax to replace tariff 
revenues aggravates distortions working in the opposite direction of the 
import tariff reductions. 
Focusing on the top part of Table 5.6 we find large allocative 
efficiency effects for Morocco (30% of net gains) and Tunisia (44% of net 
gains). Contributions to the EU regions are minimal, reflecting the low 
initial tariffs and limited importance of imports from Morocco and Tunisia. 
With Morocco and Tunisia having the highest initial tariffs and the EU 
being a major trading partner, they are also benefiting most from removal 
of the tariffs. The flip side is that they are also affected most by the 
distortions induced by an increased consumption tax replacing tariff 
revenues (see the lower half of Table 5.6). With tax replacement there are 
two opposing forces: the removal of import tariffs improves efficiency 
while the increase in consumption taxes reduces efficiency. A net efficiency 
loss remains for both countries. The net loss is more important in Tunisia 
(24% of total loss) than in Morocco (4%). This difference stems from 
efficiency gains in Morocco’s manufacturing sectors, which are related to 
higher initial tariffs on manufactured imports in Morocco (see the 
discussions with Figures 5.1a and 5.1b) and which create more scope for 
improving efficiency by reducing tariffs than in Tunisia. 
The employment effect is the most important factor determining the 
net income effects, both in terms of gains with only tariff removal (88% for 
Morocco and 77% for Tunisia) and in terms of losses (76% for Morocco and 
64% for Tunisia). The large role of changes in employment is a direct result 
of the modelling of the labour market. In the unemployment closure we fix 
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match demand. This implies that sectors can expand production without 
facing an increase in production costs, thus increasing their 
competitiveness. The additional labour market entrants in turn increase 
consumption demand, stimulating production further. A contraction of the 
economy has a similarly strong but opposite effect: shrinking employment 
reduces demand, further contracting production. 
Table 5.6 Income effects of the EuroMed Agreements by source  
  Share of 
base GDP 
  Source (% of gain or loss) 
  (%)   Allocative 
efficiency 
Employ-
ment 
Terms of 
trade* 
Total 
No tax replacement (EA_n)         
Morocco 7.92    30 88  -18  100 
Tunisia 4.67    44 77  -21  100 
Northern EU  0.01    3 0  98  100 
Mediterranean 
EU 0.02    3 0  97  100 
ROW 0.00    19 9  72  100 
With tax replacement (EA_r)        
Morocco -4.28    4 79  17  100 
Tunisia -2.68    24 64  12  100 
Northern EU  0.01    5 0  95  100 
Mediterranean 
EU 0.01    2 0  98  100 
ROW 0.00    12 10  78  100 
* This column includes small terms-of-trade effects on the balance of payments account 
through changes in the prices of investment and savings.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations. 
 
The changes in tariffs and in consumption tax affect sectors 
differently. Table 5.7 presents the changes in demand for labour by sector. 
The general equilibrium effects of the reduction in import tariffs on 
manufactured goods are clearly indicated by the changes in demand for 
labour in agricultural sectors when only tariffs on manufactured goods are 
removed (see the left pane of Table 5.7). Increased employment in the 172 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
manufacturing sectors is transmitted to agricultural sectors by an increased 
demand for consumption goods. The agricultural sectors are thus not 
shielded from the current EuroMed Agreements, despite their focus on 
manufactured goods. 
Table 5.7 Demand for labour by sector with the EuroMed Agreements (% change) 
  No tax replacement 
(EA_n) 
With tax replacement 
(EA_r) 
  Morocco Tunisia Morocco Tunisia 
Agricultural sectors      
Cereals 5  1  -9  -10 
Oil seeds & vegetable oils  8  -7  -11  -18 
Vegetables, fruit & nuts  3  3  -7  -6 
Spices and other crops  -4  -7  -14  -18 
Plant-based  fibres  9 7  -7 0 
Sugar cane, sugar beet, sugar  11  8  -9  -8 
Animal products and wool  22  8  0  -6 
Milk & dairy products  9  9  -12  -8 
Natural resource extraction  -3  -1  -8  -5 
Food & beverages  11  7  -7  -10 
Non-agricultural sectors      
Textiles & leather  53  46  23  24 
Petro-chemicals 4  9  -18  -9 
Wood, paper & mineral  
    products  -2  2  -24  -17 
Metals and metal products  0  7  -23  -8 
Various types of equipment  18  9  -7  -11 
Motor vehicles & manufactures  -2  7  -23  -13 
Services 15  11  -9  -6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations. 
 
The textiles sector exhibits the largest increase in demand for labour. 
Note that there is no change in tariffs faced by textile exports to the EU 
since these were eliminated in the 1970s (see the changes in tariffs in Table 
5.1). Also note that the increases reported in Table 5.7 are relative to the TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 173 
 
base data, which included a contraction of textiles following China’s WTO 
accession and abolition of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. Textiles 
benefit from a rationalisation of the manufacturing sectors when the 
protection from European imports is removed. As a result factors of 
production, including labour, move to their most efficient use. This increase 
is strong enough to undo the contraction of textiles captured in the 
baseline.  
Overall the impact of the EuroMed Agreements on employment in 
manufacturing is not as devastating as one might have expected given their 
relatively high initial protection, especially in Morocco. There are two 
major explanations for this outcome. First, tariffs on imported intermediate 
inputs are removed as well, which reduces production costs in sectors 
using European imports in their production. Second, by accounting for 
unemployment we fixed the real wage rate. This implies that labour 
becomes relatively more attractive compared with other factors of 
production for which prices rise (see Table 5.5). Sectors thus adjust their 
input mix and employ more labour, which contributes to increased 
employment.  
As discussed above, the presence of unemployment may also lead to 
a stronger contraction of the economy. This is reflected in the large 
reductions in employment in the right pane of Table 5.7, presenting results 
for the scenario in which tariffs are replaced. The only major exception is 
the textiles sector, which keeps its increased demand for labour. Our 
reference point is a base run that includes the phasing-out of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as well as the WTO accession of 
China, a major competitor in the textiles market. Despite these ongoing 
changes serious distortions in the global textiles market persist, implying 
that the preferential access to the European textiles market remains 
important for Morocco and Tunisia. A side effect of the remaining 
protection on agricultural production is that in Morocco employment 
increases in the animal products sector, even when consumption taxes are 
increased. This sector, however, is the most protected in Morocco (see 
Figure 5.1a). This shift of labour to such a highly protected sector may 
increase the costs of a future agreement liberalising agricultural trade. 
Returning to Table 5.6 we find that the third major driver of changes 
in income is the terms-of-trade effect. The terms of trade are a summary 
measure indicating the ratio of prices received for exports to prices paid for 
imports. We find declining terms of trade for Morocco and Tunisia in both 174 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
scenarios, accounting for 12 to 19% of the income changes. The terms-of-
trade effect is a macroeconomic phenomenon related to the balance of 
payments. The balance of payments measures the inflow of money from 
exports and investments and the outflow of money through imports and 
savings. Although some adjustments occur in savings and investments, the 
major adjustments occur in imports and exports.  
By removing import tariffs the EuroMed Agreements increase 
imports in Morocco and Tunisia. In order to maintain the balance of 
payments, exports need to rise to generate the foreign exchange needed for 
the increased imports. Growth in exports requires the exports of Morocco 
and Tunisia to become cheaper than their competitors’ products. The main 
mechanism to achieve this adjustment is normally a reduction in the costs 
of production factors in order to reduce the prices of exports. If we look at 
Table 5.5, however, we find that in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia factor 
prices increase when tariffs are not replaced. The origin of their relatively 
cheaper exports thus lies not in lower factor prices, but in the lower costs of 
imported intermediate inputs. The drop in prices of intermediate inputs 
allows an expansion of exports by reducing relative prices despite a rise in 
factor prices. This is an illustration of the so-called ‘Lerner symmetry’: 
shielding the economy from imports ultimately reduces exports. Reducing 
import protection boosts exports while allowing incomes to rise.  
5.4.3  A summary of the impact of the current EuroMed Agreements 
Summarising we find that the current EuroMed Agreements have the 
potential to benefit Morocco and Tunisia. The direction of the impact, 
however, strongly depends on domestic policies. If tariff revenues are 
replaced by a consumption tax the income effects are negative, 
unemployment increases and returns to land decrease. For poor 
households relying on labour and possibly land (in the case of the rural 
poor) changes in domestic policies following trade liberalisation are thus 
essential. 
When delving a bit deeper into the drivers of the income changes we 
find that accounting for unemployment plays a central role in the overall 
assessment of the agreements. Unemployment strongly enhances both the 
positive and negative consequences of policy changes. Analysing the 
allocative efficiency effects we find the textiles sector to be expanding in 
both scenarios. This result appears to be related to the remaining 
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preferential access to European markets remains valuable for Morocco and 
Tunisia. Analysing the terms-of-trade effects we find that the removal of 
import barriers allows Morocco and Tunisia to increase the competitiveness 
of their exports through reduced costs of imported intermediate inputs. 
This development in turn allows factors of production and thus households 
to benefit from increased factor prices. 
In this section we have focused on the current EuroMed Agreements, 
which are limited to manufacturing. A natural question then arises as to the 
impact of including agricultural sectors in the trade agreements, especially 
given the recent proposal for a negative-list approach to liberalising 
agricultural trade. There appear to be two key issues related to the political 
economy of further reforms: i) contradictory EU interests and ii) the future 
costs of liberalisation. Opposite gains by the northern and Mediterranean 
EU member states seem to be a main factor in the current virtual absence of 
agricultural reform in the agreements. The above analysis furthermore 
indicates an expansion of the heavily-protected animal products sector in 
Morocco. This expansion suggests that the current one-sided agreements 
may increase the future costs of liberalising agricultural trade. 
5.5  Results when agriculture is incorporated 
The opposite interests of the northern and Mediterranean EU regions will 
come into play when agricultural trade is liberalised. Lowering tariff 
barriers on agricultural trade is also expected to affect the most strongly 
protected sectors of Morocco, which would expand its employment with 
the implementation of the current EuroMed Agreements. Again we analyse 
full liberalisation scenarios without tariff replacement (FL_n) and with 
tariff replacement by a consumption tax (FL_r). In the scenarios we assume 
all tariffs are removed, i.e. we analyse a full liberalisation of trade with the 
EU for Morocco and Tunisia. 
The additional gains from liberalising agricultural trade differ for 
Morocco and Tunisia (Figure 5.2). In the absence of tariff replacement, 
Morocco gains an additional 2.2 percentage points to its base GDP whereas 
Tunisia gains an additional 6.9 percentage points. In terms of the share of 
base GDP the gains for Tunisia are larger here than for Morocco, which 
gained more from the liberalisation of manufactured trade. 
In the case of tariff replacement the inclusion of agricultural trade 
does not yield much difference in the overall impact for Morocco; its 
income loss becomes slightly deeper by an additional 0.1 percentage points. 176 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
For Tunisia the inclusion of agriculture yields much more, even reversing 
the loss of income and producing an income gain of 1.0% of base GDP. 
Figure 5.2 Income effects for Morocco and Tunisia by scenario (% of base GDP)  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations. 
 
The differential impact of including agriculture in the agreements can 
in part be explained by differences in initial tariffs (see Figures 5.1a and 
5.1b). Tunisia has higher initial agricultural tariffs and therefore stands to 
gain more from a liberalisation of its agricultural trade in terms of 
improved allocative efficiency. The second important factor is a spectacular 
increase in vegetable oil production when access to EU agricultural markets 
improves. In the base run the majority of these exports (82.1%) are to the 
Mediterranean EU regions (see Table 5.3b). This outcome implies that the 
Mediterranean regions are also affected most by the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade. 
The changes in production in the two full liberalisation scenarios 
clearly indicate that the growth in vegetable oil production in Tunisia 
drives the aggregated effects (Table 5.8).  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 177 
 
Table 5.8 Output by sector and region with full liberalisation (% change) 
  No tax replacement (FL_n)  With tax replacement (FL_r) 
  Morocco Tunisia  EU 
North 
EU 
Med. 
Morocco Tunisia  EU 
North 
EU 
Med. 
Agriculture 7  16  0  0  -6 6  0  0 
Cereals -6  -44  3  1  -18  -51  2  1 
Vegetable  oils  10 856  0 -7 -7 795  0 -6 
Vegetables & 
   fruit  11  15  0 0 2  5  0 0 
Spices &  
   other crops  -5  -20  0  1  -13  -29  0  0 
Plant-based  
   fibres  10  0  -1  0  -6  -8  0  0 
Sugar   11  11  0  0  -6  -3  0  0 
Animal  
   products  21  1  0  0  2  -12  0  0 
Dairy -18  -18  0  0  -31  -30  0  0 
Food &  
   beverages  11 0  0  0  -3  -10  0  0 
Natural  
   resources  -2  -3  0  0  -6  -6  0  0 
Manufacturing 15  8  0  0  -2  -4  0  0 
Textiles &  
   leather  54  26  0  0  31  15  0  0 
Petro- 
   chemicals  -1  -2  0  0  -13  -11  0  0 
Wood, paper  -6  -6  0  0  -20  -18  0  0 
Metal  
   products  -3  1  0  0  -19  -13  0  0 
Equipment 17 -3  0 0  -3  -20 0  0 
Motor  
   vehicles  -5  -3  0  0  -20  -15  0  0 
Services 11  11  0  0  -5  -2  0  0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on model simulations. 
 
Whether or not tariffs are replaced, vegetable oil production shows 
an extraordinary eight-fold increase. This increase negatively affects the 
Mediterranean EU regions, although compared with the remarkable 178 | AN ECONOMY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROMED AGREEMENTS 
 
changes in Tunisia the effects are rather modest (-7% and -6% with tariff 
replacement). In both scenarios Morocco and Tunisia reduce the 
production of cereals, benefiting both the northern and Mediterranean EU 
regions. Apart from a 1% decline in plant-based fibres in the northern EU 
there are no noticeable effects on European agriculture. This result 
illustrates the limited economic importance of Morocco and Tunisia for the 
EU as a whole. 
Based on the high initial protection on animal products in Morocco 
we expected a decline following trade liberalisation. Apparently animal 
production is more competitive than expected, expanding in both scenarios 
(21% and 2% with tariff replacement). The labour that moved from 
manufacturing to animal production with the implementation of the 
current EuroMed Agreements (Table 5.7) thus does not have to move again 
when agricultural trade is liberalised. Textiles and leather also maintain the 
expansion found with only liberalising manufacturing trade. The major 
contraction of cereals and dairy, however, does entail a loss of 
unemployment. In the case of Morocco this results in a slightly higher loss 
of employment when liberalisation is expanded to include the agricultural 
sector and tariffs are replaced (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3 Employment for Morocco and Tunisia by scenario (% change) 
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Conclusions 
This study analyses the economic effects of the EuroMed Agreements using 
a multi-sectoral, multi-regional model. Our numerical analysis, which 
focuses on Morocco and Tunisia, is built from a detailed commodity profile 
(6-digit level) of the provisions of the EuroMed Agreements. These current 
agreements turn out to be very asymmetrical: the EU essentially does not 
give any new concessions (maintaining its protection of agricultural 
sectors), while the MPCs will have to open their manufacturing markets to 
European competitors. 
Because of the small size of the Moroccan and Tunisian economies, 
improved access to their markets for manufactured goods yields 
insignificant benefits for the EU – a mere 0.01% of base GDP for the 
northern EU region and 0.02% for the Mediterranean EU. Being located 
closer to Morocco and Tunisia, the Mediterranean EU countries trade more 
with them and therefore gain more from the current agreements. 
The impact of the current EuroMed Agreements on Morocco and 
Tunisia is found to depend on their need to replace reduced tariff revenues 
with an increased consumption tax. If such replacement is not needed, both 
economies benefit from an improved allocation of factors of production 
with the removal of distorting import tariffs. Their economies expand, 
increasing both employment and factor earnings. A rather different picture 
emerges when tariff revenues are replaced by a consumption tax. This 
consumption tax aggravates distortions in the economy, and for some 
commodities implies a shift from subsidising to taxing consumption. Apart 
from the political issues related to the implementation of such a tax 
increase, we find a decline in income and a loss of employment. This 
unexpected and strongly negative impact of tariff replacement (reversing 
the outcomes of the agreements) can be attributed to a combination of the 
tax instrument chosen (a uniform shift in consumption taxes), the fiscal 
effects of the Armington assumption used to model bilateral trade and the 
assumption of unemployment. From an analytical perspective, this 
highlights the need to model in detail how taxes affect the economy in 
order to design the change in tax policy to avoid negative consequences on 
incomes and employment. 
The virtual absence of agricultural liberalisation in the current 
agreements can be put down to the diverging interests of northern and 
Mediterranean EU member states. Analysing a full liberalisation of all trade 
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interests reflected in the changes in output. The northern EU region 
benefits from an increase in cereal exports (as does, to a lesser extent, the 
Mediterranean EU region). The Mediterranean EU region faces a 7% 
reduction in its vegetable oil production owing to an eight-fold production 
increase in Tunisia. Despite this reduction the overall impact on the two EU 
regions remains insignificant, because of the limited size of the Moroccan 
and Tunisian economies. 
Because of its initially higher level of agricultural protection Tunisia 
benefits more from an expansion of the current agreements to include 
agriculture. In the case of Morocco, the additional benefits (and costs, if 
tariffs are replaced) are limited. Driven by the increase in vegetable oil 
production Tunisia maintains its income gain even when tariffs are 
replaced. In terms of employment, however, both countries face a reduction 
in employment when tariffs need to be replaced, even when agriculture is 
included.  
In conclusion we find that a liberalisation of EU agricultural 
production only has a significant impact on cereals (positive) and vegetable 
oil (negative for the Mediterranean EU countries). This latter finding is 
driven by an unrealistic eight-fold increase in Tunisian production. Given 
biophysical limitations on the expansion of olive oil (the main vegetable oil 
produced in Tunisia) the large competitive advantage identified in the 
model simulations are not likely to materialise when trade barriers are 
removed. This view implies that the negative impact on the Mediterranean 
EU region will be less than suggested by the model simulations, which are 
already found to be insignificant when related to GDP. More importantly, 
the sizable positive impact driving an overall positive income effect for 
Tunisia when agricultural trade is liberalised will not materialise. 
We find the impact of the EuroMed Agreements on incomes and 
employment to hinge upon the domestic policies of Morocco and Tunisia in 
response to a loss of tariff revenues. If government expenditures can be 
reduced such that a replacement of tariffs is not required, both countries 
will benefit from increased factor incomes and employment. If tariff 
replacement is needed a careful consideration of the economy-wide impact 
is necessary to reduce the income and employment losses we find when 
uniformly increasing consumption taxes. This observation highlights the 
importance of embarking on domestic tax reforms in parallel with trade 
reforms.   TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 181 
 
The results in this study underscore that (apart from specific sector 
interests) the EuroMed Agreements are not of economic significance to 
northern or Mediterranean EU member states. Thus there is room to focus 
on an implementation of the agreements in sync with domestic policy 
reforms in the MPCs, to reap the potential benefits of the agreements to 
enhance growth and social stability at the southern borders of the EU. It 
further affords the possibility to avoid the potential negative implications 
when reduced tariff revenues need to be recovered elsewhere in the MPC 
economies. 
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Appendix: Aggregation schemes 
Table A5.1 Aggregation of regions 
Aggregate region  Code  GTAP V6 regions 
1)  Morocco MOR  Morocco 
2)  Tunisia TUN  Tunisia 
3)  Rest of North Africa  RNA  Rest of North Africa 
4)  Middle East  MEAST  Rest of Middle East 
5)  Northern EU members  EU_N  Austria 
   Belgium 
   Denmark 
   Finland 
   France 
   Germany 
   United  Kingdom 
   Ireland 
   Luxembourg 
   Netherlands 
   Sweden 
6)  Mediterranean EU members  EU_M  Greece 
   Italy 
   Portugal 
   Spain 
7)  EU accession countries  EU_A  Bulgaria 
   Cyprus 
   Czech  Republic 
   Hungary 
   Malta 
   Poland 
   Romania 
   Slovakia 
   Slovenia 
   Estonia 
   Latvia 
   Lithuania 
8)  US USA  United  States 
9)  All other regions  ROW  The remaining 55 GTAP regions 
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Table A5.2 Aggregation of sectors 
Sector Code  Sector  Code 
1)  Cereals cereal  Wearing apparel (wap)   
Wheat (wht)    Leather products (lea)   
Cereal grains nec (gro)    12) Petro-chemicals  petchem 
Processed rice (pcr)    Petroleum, coal products (p_c)   
2)  Oil seeds & vegetable oils  oilcrp  Chemical, rubber, plastic prods (crp)   
Oil seeds (osd)    13) Wood, paper & mineral products  wd_min 
Vegetable oils and fats (vol)    Wood products (lum)   
3)  Vegetables, fruit & nuts  veg_frt  Paper products, publishing (ppp)   
Vegetables, fruit, nuts (v_f)    Mineral products nec (nmm)   
4)  Spices and other crops  spices  Metals nec (nfm)   
Crops nec (ocr)    14) Metals and metal products  metal 
5)  Plant-based fibres  fibercrp  Ferrous metals (i_s)   
Plant-based fibres (pfb)    Metal products (fmp)   
6)  Sugar cane, sugar beet, sugar  sugar  15) Various types of equipment  equip 
Sugar cane, sugar beet (c_b)    Transport equipment nec (otn)   
Sugar (sgr)    Electronic equipment (ele)   
7)  Animal products and wool  anim  Machinery and equipment nec (ome)   
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses (ctl)    16) Motor vehicles & manufactures  veh_man 
Animal products nec (oap)    Motor vehicles and parts (mvh)   
Wool, silk-worm cocoons (wol)    Manufactures nec (omf)   
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse (cmt)    17) Services  servs 
Meat products nec (omt)    Electricity (ely)   
8)  Milk & dairy products  dairy  Gas manufacture, distribution (gdt)   
Raw milk (rmk)    Water (wtr)   
Dairy products (mil)    Construction (cns)   
9)  Natural resource extraction  extract  Trade (trd)   
Forestry (frs)    Transport nec (otp)   
Fishing (fsh)    Sea transport (wtp)   
Coal (coa)    Air transport (atp)   
Oil (oil)    Communication (cmn)   
Gas (gas)    Financial services nec (ofi)   
Minerals nec (omn)    Insurance (isr)   
10) Food & beverages  food  Business services nec (obs)   
Food products nec (ofd)    Recreation and other services (ros)   
Beverages and tobacco products (b_t)   PubAdmin/defence/health/educat(osg)  
11) Textiles & leather  tex_lea  Dwellings (dwe)   
Textiles (tex)        
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6.  International trade, agricultural 
policy reform and the 
multifunctionality of EU agriculture 
A framework for analysis 
  Janet Dwyer and Hervé Guyomard 
Introduction 
The main objective of this strand of ENARPRI’s work is to clarify how far it 
is possible for agricultural economists to develop robust analyses to reflect 
the perceived importance of supporting a multifunctional model of 
agriculture within the enlarged EU in the context of the ongoing round of 
multilateral agricultural negotiations. Towards that end, it is necessary to 
revisit issues of multifunctionality and its meaning in a trade perspective, 
drawing upon theory and political rhetoric (section 6.1). From this 
overarching analysis, we move on to consider how agricultural trade 
agreements, and the Doha talks in particular, are likely to affect the 
multifunctionality of EU agriculture (section 6.2). This question is 
addressed principally through examining the likely effects of trade 
agreements on the policy instruments of the common agricultural policy 
(CAP), including changes to export refunds, import tariffs and guaranteed 
prices, as well as the scale and nature of domestic support. Analyses are 
performed for various EU member states, essentially because the available 
models to date have been developed at this geographical scale (country 
case studies). The analyses also cover a varying number and range of 
indicators of multifunctionality. 
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6.1  Agricultural policies and multifunctionality: A trade 
perspective 
6.1.1  What is multifunctionality? 
In a nutshell, the multifunctional character of farming can be defined as 
follows. Agriculture is an activity that provides a mix of conventional 
marketable goods such as food and fibre along with a bundle of non-food 
and non-fibre outputs that are not marketable in conventional terms. These 
non-food and non-fibre outputs can be either benefits/goods (e.g. 
biodiversity preservation) or costs/bads (e.g. biodiversity loss). Most of 
these non-food and non-fibre outputs have positive/negative externalities 
or public good/bad characteristics. An externality arises when the action of 
one economic agent influences either the well being of another consumer or 
the production possibilities of another producer in an indirect way, i.e. in a 
manner that is not transmitted by market prices. Pure public goods/bads 
are defined by two features: they are non-rival (consumption of the 
good/bad by one person does not reduce the consumption available to 
another person) and non-excludable (once the good/bad has been provided 
to one consumer, it is not possible to prevent others from consuming it). All 
pure public goods/bads are externalities, but not all externalities are public 
goods/bads. As agricultural producers do not reap all the benefits of the 
positive spillovers they provide nor support all the costs associated with 
the negative spillovers they generate, any market-led situation is likely to 
be characterised by an under-production of positive externalities/public 
goods and an over-production of negative externalities/public bads, with 
respect to the socially optimal level of provision. These are the classic cases 
of ‘market failure’ that may provide the legitimacy for public intervention 
to correct them. 
The choice of policy instruments that can be used to correct market 
failures in respect of multifunctional goods and bads needs to consider at 
least three important factors. First is the efficiency criterion, i.e. how 
failures can be corrected in the most efficient way with regard to the use 
and allocation of resources, including administrative resources. Second are 
the redistribution effects, i.e. how the policy will alter the distribution of 
resources and incomes among actors and whether this redistribution 
matches social perceptions of equity. Third are the trade distortion effects, 
i.e. which policy instruments will have the least impact in terms of 
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A strict application of welfare economic theory would lead one to 
address externalities and public goods/bads following the targeting 
principle, that is, one policy instrument per market failure. This would 
consist of letting market forces freely determine the levels of trade, 
consumption and production of private (marketable) goods while 
simultaneously addressing externalities and public goods/bads provision 
through targeted policy instruments, decoupled from production of 
commodity outputs and coupled only to the provision of non-commodity 
outputs.1 This simple and intuitive recommendation immediately raises the 
very difficult and to date only very partially resolved questions of 
identifying, measuring and valuing the externalities and public 
goods/bads associated with agricultural production. Because of this, and 
also because of jointness in production2 and transaction costs, this 
recommendation may be, in practice, neither possible nor desirable 
(optimal). 
Identifying multifunctionality: An impossible mission? 
Political rhetoric has adopted a number of implicit meanings for the term 
‘multifunctionality’. In almost all situations, use of this word embraces the 
full range of environmental spillovers associated with agricultural activity. 
In some cases, notably for multifunctionality proponents within the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), it also includes food security and the viability 
of rural areas, as well as some elements of social concern in relation to the 
c u l t u r e ,  c u s t o m s  a n d  n e t w o r k s  o f  t r aditional, agriculturally-based rural 
areas (see, for example, Burrell, 2002). Multifunctionality opponents 
recognise that there are external effects or public goods (or both) stemming 
from food security and rural area viability. They do not accept, however, 
that these factors are external effects associated with agricultural 
                                                      
1 In passing, one may note that the targeting principle leads one to decouple 
agricultural income support instruments from production choices and levels – in 
this case not to correct an exogenous market failure but to achieve an endogenous 
policy objective aimed at modifying the redistribution of national income in favour 
of agricultural producers.   
2 Jointness in production arises when commodity and non-commodity outputs are 
simultaneously (jointly) supplied – as is often the case with by-products of 
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production. In the case of food security, the externality-generating 
mechanism would lie on the consumption side and agricultural production 
would only be a substitute for other sources of supply such as imports or 
stocks. In the same way, although the viability of rural areas can be related 
to farming, it is not an externality associated with agricultural production, 
as the externality-generating mechanism is employment (Rude, 2000). What 
is clear from the previous analysis is that there cannot be an unambiguous 
resolution to the problem of identification (Bredhal, Lee & Paarlberg, 2003). 
In any case, both multifunctionality proponents and opponents agree that 
agriculture generates negative and positive environmental externalities 
(OECD, 2001). Unfortunately, they generally disagree on the way these 
environmental externalities should be addressed. 
Environmental externalities: From welfare theory to good practice  
In this subsection, let us temporarily assume that multifunctionality is 
limited to the environment and that the environmental externalities 
associated with agricultural production can be properly and 
unambiguously identified, measured and valued (clearly, a very heroic 
assumption). Under these assumptions, what lessons can be drawn from 
economic theory, more precisely economic welfare theory?3 
The first-best results are well known. If there is perfect information 
and competition in markets, free trade is socially optimal provided that 
corrective policies properly internalise the positive and negative 
externalities associated with farming. The second-best results are more 
interesting. If externalities are not adequately addressed, free trade may not 
produce the most favourable outcome. Moreover, even in this case, trade 
policies (export subsidies, import tariffs, import quotas, etc.) are unlikely to 
be optimal instruments to deal with externalities (Paarlberg et al., 2002; 
Glebe & Latacz-Lohmann, 2003). According to economic welfare theory, 
these externalities should be addressed through specific policies following 
the targeting principle. Yet such specific and targeted policies may be very 
difficult to define and implement in practice. 
Because the instruments that could be used to deal with externalities 
and achieve a given outcome are not unique, additional criteria need to be 
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used to select the most appropriate instrument (or set of instruments) in 
any particular case (Fullerton, 2001). These additional criteria include 
administrative efficiency, the ease of monitoring and enforcement, 
information needs and uncertainty, political feasibility, equity and 
distributional effects. Also included is the presence of other distortions 
(imperfections in other markets) and flexibility and dynamic adjustments 
(i.e. the flexibility of governments to adjust policy rules as information, 
measurement and valuation improve along with the flexibility of the 
economy to adjust the production of commodity and non-commodity 
outputs). Sensitivity to transaction costs is also very important in 
influencing these considerations. 
In the real world, we should perhaps be willing to accept that the 
targeting principle as a goal is very rarely either appropriate or achievable. 
A growing body of contemporary evaluation suggests that policy packages 
are often the most-effective and efficient approach to dealing with 
production externalities. These seek to achieve a balanced combination of 
basic ‘sticks’ (regulations) to set minimum standards and ‘carrots’ 
(incentives) to reward provision beyond the baseline, accompanied by 
promotion/awareness-raising/training, education and extension activities 
(i.e. information, to minimise transaction costs). Often, as society grows to 
understand the relationship between production and externalities over 
time, the level of the baseline shifts. 
A broad definition of multifunctionality 
In the framework of ENARPRI, we have retained a broad definition of 
multifunctionality essentially because our main objective was not to define 
optimal policies for a multifunctional EU agriculture but to analyse to the 
extent to which agricultural trade agreements and domestic policy reforms 
induced by these trade agreements could affect all non-commodity outputs 
provided by agricultural activity.4 As a result, potential negative side 
effects of agricultural change upon multifunctionality include not only 
negative environmental effects but also effects upon employment and 
                                                      
4 It is also because our purpose is essentially positive that we do not discuss in this 
chapter the two issues of non-commodity output measurement and valuation (on 
this point, see, for example, Bohman et al., 1999; Rude, 2000; Randall, 2002; 
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social cohesion, particularly in the context of marginal or depressed rural 
areas where farming still represents a significant percentage of economic 
activity and employment. If agriculture intensifies and capitalises in these 
areas, this can have a negative impact upon employment and community 
identity. This pattern is common in several EU regions (in the Spanish 
steppe agriculture, mountain agriculture, etc.): agricultural jobs contract, 
people move away or join the unemployed and fragile communities 
disintegrate. Economists and national policy-makers frequently do not see 
these consequences as negative, but simply as issues of adjustment. By 
contrast, local policy-makers often perceive such consequences as 
significant, negative social side effects of policy changes. Of course, the 
outcome can be the same when agriculture extensifies and decapitalises, 
leading to land abandonment and decreased agricultural production. In the 
same way, the positive side effects of agricultural change upon 
multifunctionality can include positive environmental spillovers along with 
the increased viability of rural communities and food security. They may 
further include social elements such as the support of traditional rural 
customs, strong social capital or unique cultural heritage. 
6.1.2  Multifunctionality and multilateral agricultural negotiations 
When the Doha round of multilateral negotiations was launched in 
November 2001, non-trade concerns were specifically recognised and 
integrated into the agricultural agenda, albeit to a limited extent.5 
Multifunctionality was at the heart of the talks in the very beginning. But as 
time goes by, a question arises: Is multifunctionality still a relevant 
question of the day?  
Multifunctionality in the Uruguay round 
The WTO makes no judgements about countries’ domestic agricultural 
policy objectives on condition that the instruments used to achieve these 
objectives have no, or at least minimal, trade-distorting effects. From the 
                                                      
5 Non-trade concerns and multifunctionality can be considered as synonymous. 
The URAA used the term ‘non-trade concerns’ instead of multifunctionality, but 
did not provide a clear definition of the concept. This lacuna largely explains why 
there is still considerable confusion among WTO countries about what is really 
meant by the terms non-trade concerns and multifunctionality.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 193 
 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of 1994, there is in 
effect an explicit recognition that domestic policies do link with 
international trade. In practice, the URAA classified domestic policies into 
three coloured boxes according to their perceived distortion effects on 
production and trade. The green box included domestic farm programmes 
that were deemed to be minimally trade-distorting and as a result were 
exempted from reduction commitments and expenditure limits. It was 
agreed that non-trade concerns should be addressed using green box 
instruments.6  
Multifunctionality in the Doha round 
The current round of multilateral negotiations was launched in 2001 at the 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. As far as agriculture is concerned, it 
has adopted a similar negotiation framework (export competition, market 
access and domestic support) as was adopted under the Uruguay round. 
From the very beginning of the round, multifunctionality had its 
proponents and opponents. Proponents argued that production-linked 
payments are necessary to ensure the sufficient provision of positive 
externalities and public goods to the extent that these externalities and 
public goods are joint products of agricultural production. They also 
desired an extension of the green box, i.e. more flexibility to classify new 
kinds of aid as green box programmes. By contrast, opponents argued that 
                                                      
6 The URAA distinguished 11 categories of green box policies: 1) general services, 
2) public stockholding for food security purposes, 3) domestic food aid, 4) 
decoupled income support, 5) government financial participation in income 
insurance and income safety-net programmes, 6) disaster payments, 7) producer 
retirement schemes, 8) resource retirement schemes, 9) investment aids, 10) 
environmental payments and 11) regional assistance. Several categories of policies 
were designed to address non-trade concerns: food security for programmes 
(category 2 and possibly category 3), environmental externalities (category 10) and 
the development of agriculture-based rural area programmes (category 11). 
Category 4 was specifically defined to address the endogenous policy objective of 
agricultural income support. Programmes under categories 5 and 6 may be 
interpreted as aimed at addressing market failures associated with risk and 
uncertainty, more precisely the incompleteness of risk and uncertainty markets. 
Finally, programmes under categories 7, 8 and 9 were explicitly designed to ease 
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there is an insufficient basis for continuing to offer production-linked 
payments. They invoked the policy-targeting principle and claimed that 
there is enough flexibility within the URAA green box definition for green 
box measures to be used to address all legitimate, non-trade agricultural 
concerns. 
Multifunctionality in agricultural trade talks: Still a relevant question? 
The EU was the most important WTO member seeking more flexibility in 
the design of domestic policy relative to what was provided by the 
provisions of the URAA green box definition.7 Japan, Norway, South Korea 
and Switzerland also took this view. But the reform of the CAP in June 2003 
led to widespread decoupling with cross-compliance requirements on 
income support payments. Modulation is also to be applied in order to 
achieve a (modest to date) switching of f u n d s  f r o m  p i l l a r  I  t o  p i l l a r  I I  
measures. As a result, a large part of CAP domestic support may now be 
viewed as meeting the criteria for eligibility under the URAA green box 
definition. If this view is accepted in the context of the current round, the 
question may be posed as to whether the issue of multifunctionality is still 
relevant to trade discussions and considerations. 
Following the Geneva agreement in August 2005, the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference in December 2005 resulted in a framework 
agreement for Doha. Detailed commitments have yet to be negotiated, 
however. The agreement covers the three areas of export competition (with 
a commitment to eliminate export subsidies by 2013), market access and 
domestic support. In relation to these three areas, given that export 
competition is now agreed as an important ingredient and EU agricultural 
domestic support could be viewed as largely in the green box, then market 
access may appear as the Achilles’ heel of the June 2003–April 2004 CAP 
reforms. In spite of the successive reforms of the CAP in 1992, 1999 and 
                                                      
7 The positions of the various EU member states on the multifunctionality dossier 
were, and still are, very heterogeneous. France was clearly the best friend of 
multifunctionality, essentially because such an attitude allowed French agricultural 
policy-makers and the main farmers’ organisation to claim the maintenance of 
coupled area and animal payments and hence, to reject any further reform of the 
CAP in the framework of the so-called ‘mid-term review’ of the Agenda 2000 CAP. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 195 
 
2003, the world prices of many agricultural products remain much lower 
than domestic prices in the European Union.  
Although it is not possible to define precisely what will be included 
in the final agreement on agriculture from the Doha round, one can 
reasonably assume that it will have an impact on EU agriculture, essentially 
through two transmission channels. Third-country imports should increase, 
owing to their improved access to the EU market and EU exports should 
decrease because of the suppression of export subsidies. These changes 
should have a negative impact on EU market prices and the domestic 
supply of agricultural commodities. But the Doha round agreement could 
also affect EU agriculture by inducing (speeding up) further reforms of the 
CAP (for which domestic pressure is also very likely, notably from 
enlargement and budgetary discipline). At the very least, the phased 
elimination of export subsidies would appear to make further reforms to 
the dairy sector inevitable. 
These potential outcomes mean that for those who are genuinely 
interested in maintaining or indeed enhancing the multifunctionality of EU 
agriculture, the focus of interest in the trade negotiations and their result is 
in how the agreement is likely to affect the balance of non-food benefits and costs 
generated by the farm sector across the EU. This analysis needs to be made in 
the context of recent, significant policy changes at the EU level as 
represented by the 2003–04 CAP reforms. 
6.2  Assessing the effects of agricultural policy reforms on the 
multifunctionality of EU agriculture 
In order to analyse the effects of the 2003–04 CAP reforms and possible 
Doha outcomes on the multifunctionality of EU agriculture, we need to 
identify indicators and experiments. More specifically, 
•  For multifunctionality indicators, what range and types of indicators 
can be used to measure multifunctionality, in all its different 
interpretations? 
•  With regard to policy experiments, what scenarios for future 
domestic policies and prices can simulate the likely outcomes of the 
Doha talks within the EU? 
On this basis it should then be possible to undertake some impact 
assessment from which we hope to draw a concluding synthesis and 
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6.2.1  Multifunctionality indicators 
From a literature review, in particular OECD (2001), we have identified six 
classes of potential indicators that are to a large extent already incorporated 
in domestic policy impact assessments and thus can be used to examine the 
implications of change upon multifunctionality (see Dwyer et al., 2005, for 
more details). These six classes correspond to 
1)  economic indicators (prices, supplies, exports and imports, farm or 
household incomes, etc.); 
2)  primary factor use (capital, land and labour); 
3)  environmental indicators (greenhouse gas, pollution by nitrates or 
fertilisers as a whole, pollution by pesticides, soil conservation, water 
management, biodiversity preservation, landscape preservation, etc.); 
4)  agricultural structure indicators (number of farmers and farm 
workers, farm sizes and types, etc.); 
5)  farm management indicators (set-aside areas, land abandonment, 
livestock density, etc.); and 
6)  cultural and social indicators (agriculturally linked customs and 
events, percentage of rural population connected with farming and 
the proportion of locally sourced food sold in rural areas). 
There are significant measurement problems for many of these 
indicators, as well as potentially ambiguous interpretations for some of 
them depending upon how one values certain issues (such declining farm 
employment, which can be seen as a positive efficiency adjustment or a 
negative issue, notably in depressed rural areas). There is also unequal 
coverage of the six classes of indicators by the existing range of available 
quantitative models. Aspects associated with cultural heritage and social 
capital/values are not included in any of the models and thus can only be 
estimated by ex-post qualitative (expert) assessments. In addition, domestic 
policies vary among countries owing to the increased subsidiarity in CAP 
decision-making, which now affects the scale and pattern of support under 
both pillars. These issues give rise to a problem in the extrapolation of 
results obtained for one country to any other member states. 
A final remark is also needed. It is clear that the time horizon of 
simulations matters because environmental and social effects arising from 
agricultural change frequently take some time to become fully apparent. 
Thus in general, our country case studies have been undertaken with a 
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6.2.2  Policy experiments 
The baseline: The June 2003–April 2004 CAP reform (S1) 
The June 2003–April 2004 CAP reform scenario is the baseline against 
which effects arising from the Doha round of negotiations can be assessed. 
It must be remembered that this scenario gives rise to different 
implementation rules in each member state. Such rules include single farm 
payments on a historical or regional basis, partial recoupling of some pillar 
I direct aids or the use of national envelopes in a number of member states, 
different requirements as regards cross-compliance and good agricultural 
and environmental practices, and the varying balance, focus and scale of 
pillar II schemes. For any single country where models exist, it is possible 
to examine the impact of the June 2003–April 2004 CAP reform on market 
prices, product supply and factor demand, intensification, land use, land 
abandonment, farm income and more rarely the number and the size of 
farms. Yet given that most models have primarily been developed to 
examine the effects of changes in pillar I market measures on the 
agricultural sector, there are important limits to the degree of policy detail 
that the models can incorporate. Cross-compliance and pillar II measures, 
as well as entry and exit from agriculture, are frequently not modelled.  
A fully decoupled June 2003–April 2004 CAP reform (S1bis) 
To draw a contrast with this baseline, it is desirable to consider a fully 
decoupled June 2003–April 2004 CAP reform with no partial recoupling 
and common cross-compliance requirements. By comparing this alternative 
implementation of the June 2003–April 2004 CAP reform with the baseline, 
it should be possible (at least in theory) to assess the impact of the partial 
recoupling of some pillar I direct aids – an option taken up by a number of 
member states. 
In the scenarios for both the baseline and the fully decoupled June 
2003–April 2004 CAP reform, trade instruments (export subsidies and 
import tariffs) are assumed to be unchanged at base period levels. 
A fully decoupled CAP – Decoupling extended to the dairy sector, export subsidy 
abolition and improved access to the EU market (S2) 
The third policy experiment corresponds to a fully decoupled CAP 
extended to the dairy sector. Export subsidies are abolished and market 
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scenario represents the impact of a fully decoupled CAP in the context of a 
Doha agreement entailing export subsidy suppression, assuming the 
URAA definition of coloured boxes is retained (meaning that there is no 
problem for the EU to respect its commitments on the domestic support 
dossier) and EU imports from third countries increases. 
A fully decoupled CAP with reduced, decoupled direct aids (S2bis) 
In an attempt to capture the possibility that either as a result of Doha round 
or talks beyond it the single farm payment is not accepted as a green box 
aid, it is interesting to examine a version of scenario S2 such that decoupled 
direct aids are reduced by 20%. This scenario assumes that the EU is forced 
to reduce decoupled direct aids because of WTO commitments, domestic 
pressure or notably budget constraints (enlargement to Bulgaria and 
Romania, with decoupling extended to nearly all supported sectors). 
A fully decoupled CAP with resources shifted from pillar I to pillar II (S3) 
If the driving force for the scenario S2bis change was the WTO, one could 
also consider a modification that would not reduce the overall support 
under the CAP but shift it between the pillars, i.e. a fully decoupled CAP 
with an increased share of resources devoted to pillar II measures. More 
specifically, this scenario S3 assumes that funds saved through a 20% 
decrease in pillar I measures are transferred to pillar II, in order to achieve 
environmental and social objectives. 
This range of scenarios will be quite helpful in assessing the potential 
effects of a Doha agreement on EU agriculture in different member states, 
even if not all the scenarios can be examined by all the models. In tracking 
Doha progress to date, the existing level of decoupling seems assured while 
increased market access will probably compel further reforms and thus 
probably more decoupling. Export subsidies will be phased out. Yet while 
there will not be a lot more EU funding for pillar II (following the last 
agreement on the EU financial perspectives), there could be some interest 
among member states in considering the scope for mitigating the effects of 
reform by using modulated money to target particular measures under 
pillar II, to increase the goods and minimise the bads. 
6.3  The models for our study 
Most of the existing models used for assessing the impact of multilateral 
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environmental outcomes. The multifunctional aspects of policy reforms are 
usually reduced to a relatively narrow set of indicators, mostly linked to 
environmental issues, but some social aspects, notably farm employment, 
can also be considered. Table 6.1 gives a summary of the characteristics of 
the models used for this ENARPRI examination of multifunctionality. 
Table 6.1 Main characteristics of the models used for examining multifunctionality 
Country, model name 
and type 
Scenarios modelled  Indicators of 
multifunctionality  
Ireland 
FAPRI-Ireland is a set of 
econometric, dynamic, 
multi-product, partial 
equilibrium commodity 
models 
 
CAP reform 2003 with full 
decoupling as the baseline, 
compared with a Doha scenario of 
increased market access (60% 
average tariff cut), 70% cuts in the 
amber- box domestic support 
(aggregated measurement of 
support) and elimination of export 
subsidies over 10 years 
 
Greenhouse gas 
emissions, ammonia 
emissions, fertiliser 
use and farm incomes 
 
Finland 
DREMFIA is a partial 
equilibrium recursive 
model with 17 
production regions, 
combining technology 
diffusion with optimising 
producer and consumer 
returns 
 
CAP reform 2003 with partial 
decoupling; full decoupling across 
the EU; new environmental cross-
compliance to create uncropped 
field margins on all arable land;  
pillar I cuts by 20% by 2013. 
 
Production levels, 
agricultural land use, 
nutrient balances, 
biodiversity, pesticide 
usage, farm income 
and farm labour 
Greece 
National and regional 
social accounting 
matrices 
 
All specified scenarios 
 
Production levels, 
farm/other 
employment, 
agricultural land use 
and pollution 
emissions 
Czech Republic 
FARMA–4 (linear 
programmes optimising 
production for given 
outcomes based on 
‘typical’ farms) 
 
Pre-CAP policy as in 2002, 
compared with full decoupling or 
100% uptake of an agri-
environment scheme 
 
Farm labour, farm 
types/systems, 
livestock numbers, 
grassland cover, 
fertiliser and energy 
use 
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In Finland, the team used the DREMFIA model, a dynamic, regional 
sector model of Finnish agriculture, in which a technology diffusion model 
is combined with an optimisation routine that stimulates annual 
production decisions (within the limits of fixed factors) and price changes. 
The scenarios examined included the actual CAP reform of 2003 as 
implemented in Finland with some sectors still partially coupled, along 
with full decoupling and the application of a simplified cross-compliance 
regime for compulsory arable field margins, as well as a scenario involving 
20% cuts in CAP pillar I payments. The list of indicators applied in the 
model is longer than in any of the other models described or used by other 
ENARPRI partners (see Table 6.1). It includes production levels, land use, 
nutrient balances, biodiversity index, pesticide use, farm incomes and 
employment; however, the model could not deal with a scenario involving 
the expansion of pillar II funding. 
In Ireland, the team used a FAPRI-Ireland model, or a set of dynamic, 
multi-product, partial equilibrium commodity models, built on a similar 
platform as the FAPRI models developed in the US. The Irish researchers 
examined  the scenario of  the CAP reform in 2003 implemented as full 
decoupling, versus an expected Doha outcome involving more market 
access and the phasing out of export subsidies. The indicators examined for 
multifunctionality included greenhouse gas emissions, forestry carbon 
sequestration, ammonia emissions and fertiliser usage. FAPRI is capable of 
dealing directly with the outcomes of international trade agreements rather 
than having to transform these into domestic policy changes. Yet the Irish 
model is less readily able to deal with the implications of some of the 
domestic policy scenarios outlined in this chapter, especially where they 
involve making assumptions about CAP pillar II spending and its effects. 
In Greece, the team investigated changes using national and regional 
social accounting matrices (SAMs) constructed to examine changes in the 
farm and non-farm sectors at these levels in response to policy changes. 
They also examined all four specified scenarios for this project, because the 
approach included consideration of the effects of CAP pillar II policies (in 
Greece, notably more than 70% of pillar II spending is allocated to 
improving farm competitiveness (European Commission, 2003)). The 
indicators analysed were farm output, farm/other employment, 
agricultural land use and levels of pollution emissions. 
In the Czech Republic, the team used a model called FARMA–4, 
which is a non-linear optimising model based on the optimising behaviour TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 201 
 
of three main farm types, linked to certain multifunctionality indicators. 
The scenarios examined were the CAP policy as in 2002, full decoupling 
and the expansion of a simple grassland-conserving agri-environment 
scheme across the country. The indicators tracked were employment, 
production types, stock numbers, grassland cover, fertiliser and energy use. 
In summary, the various models and approaches applied by the 
ENARPRI team can cover all the scenarios. The biggest modelling 
difficulties clearly apply to scenario S3, because few models have adequate 
methods to represent the range of pillar II measures deployed. Wherever 
the models have difficulties, additional ad-hoc information and 
qualitative/policy evaluative expertise can be used to examine the 
implications for multifunctionality. Thus it is indeed possible to seek to 
identify the links between trade policies and multifunctionality, albeit only 
at the level of individual EU member states. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has sought to provide the context for the work of the 
ENARPRI team on the relationships between multilateral trade agreements 
and multifunctionality – specifically, examining implications for the 
multifunctionality of agriculture in the EU. Framed in this context, the 
country case studies contribute a wealth of data and potential insights into 
these implications and their likely outcomes in terms of a range of 
environmental, social and economic indicators. A final section in this 
strand of ENARPRI work is presented in chapter 11, which synthesises 
these findings and analyses their relevance both to the understanding of 
trade and multifunctionality interrelations, and to the domestic and 
international policy process. 
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7.  Evaluating the impact of alternative 
agricultural policy scenarios 
on multifunctionality 
A case study of Finland 
  Heikki Lehtonen, Jussi Lankoski and Jyrki Niemi 
Introduction 
Evaluating changes in such a broad and often vaguely defined area as 
multifunctionality is by no means an easy task. It may be that the 
vagueness of concepts such as ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘multifunctionality’, which can be understood in many ways depending on 
the context, is in fact what makes them such popular policy goals. In this 
chapter we try to evaluate the effects of agricultural policies on different 
dimensions of multifunctionality in a consistent manner. Since we are 
agricultural economists, our tool is microeconomics-based economic 
modelling. This approach may be considered biased since certain 
dimensions of multifunctionality refer to biological and social relationships 
that may not be sufficiently taken into account in economic models. 
Nevertheless, in economic logic we find an approach that provides a 
sufficiently simple way of reasoning that facilitates a consistent analysis. 
Particular emphasis should be given to its different dimensions. For 
example, biological relationships, physical material flows and social 
phenomena require special efforts when analysing the effects of very 
different agricultural policies on some selected multifunctionality 
indicators, and we feel that a simple calculation of many indicators on the 
basis of existing economic models may provide misleading results. A 
specific research project may be required to clarify and set up the relevant 
production functions and relationships necessary for a credible assessment 
of the indicators of multifunctionality. 204 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 7.1 we 
clarify our concept of multifunctionality, as well as our principal approach 
and the main challenges to evaluating it. Section 7.2 presents the 
agricultural sector model employed by the study as well as the selected 
multifunctionality indicators used in the calculation. In section 7.3, 
alternative agricultural policy scenarios are listed and interpreted. Section 
7.4 lays out the indicator results from the sector model. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the results and a discussion of the 
applicability of the chosen approach. 
7.1  Definition of multifunctionality and our approach to its 
evaluation 
The notion of multifunctional agriculture refers to the fact that agricultural 
production provides not only food and fibre but also different non-market 
commodities. These non-commodity outputs include the impact of 
agriculture on environmental quality, such as rural landscape, biodiversity 
and water quality. Often this list also includes the socio-economic viability 
of the countryside, food safety, national food security and animal welfare 
together with cultural and historical heritage. There is no universally 
accepted definition of multifunctionality, and the emphasis given to 
various types of non-commodities differs. OECD (2001) provides a working 
definition of multifunctionality. This definition sets out the fundamentals 
of multifunctionality as: i) the existence of joint production of commodity 
and non-commodity outputs and ii) the characteristic that some non-
commodity outputs exhibit qualities of externalities or public goods 
(OECD, 2001, p. 13). Both theoretical and applied work has tried to push 
forward this working definition. 
Academic research on multifunctionality has mainly focused on the 
environmental dimension of multifunctionality. The reason for this is 
evident: Pareto optimality requires that all positive and negative 
externalities should be internalised, thus giving a firm theoretical basis to 
the environmental dimension multifunctionality. Boisvert (2001), Romstad 
et al. (2000), Guyomard & Levert (2001), Anderson (2002), Paarlberg et al. 
(2002), Vatn (2002), Peterson et al. (2002), Lankoski & Ollikainen (2003), 
Guyomard et al. (2004) and Lankoski et al. (2004) focus on the properties 
and policy design of multifunctional agriculture in either a closed economy 
or an international trade framework. All these studies approach 
multifunctionality with the help of the theory of joint production.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 205 
 
None of the previous papers has focused on the non-public good 
aspects (such as rural viability or food security) of multifunctional 
agriculture. The decision of whether features other than these public goods 
should be introduced to the social welfare function of agriculture is a 
complex question. As observed by OECD (2001) and argued by Anderson 
(2002) for instance, food security and rural viability cannot entirely be 
subsumed into the category of public goods. Very recently Ollikainen & 
Lankoski (2004) have enlarged the conventional public goods and bads 
framework to include non-public good qualities, more specifically that of 
rural viability. Following OECD (2001), they express rural viability through 
the employment effects of agricultural production. They demonstrate that 
rural viability moderates policy towards public goods (environmental non-
commodity outputs) because society trades-off public good qualities for 
those associated with rural viability. 
An important and so far nebulous issue in the literature on 
multifunctional agriculture is the fact that joint production of commodity 
and non-commodity outputs naturally differs among alternative 
production lines. For example, milk production can be considered as a truly 
multifunctional production activity (in terms of both environmental non-
commodity outputs and rural viability aspects), which nevertheless differs 
considerably from the multifunctionality associated with crop production. 
Previous literature has focused on policy packages mainly related to crop 
production (see e.g. Guyomard et al., 2004; Lankoski et al., 2004), but not on 
alternative production lines. Hence, an important research question arises: 
How does multifunctional agricultural policy affect the relative 
profitability, public goods and viability aspects across alternative 
production lines within agriculture? This chapter considers this question, 
focusing on relative profitability and changes in the supply of joint non-
commodity outputs as a result of changes in profitability. Moreover, we 
analyse the merits of environmental cross-compliance schemes to address 
multifunctionality.  
We examine this problem through a dynamic, regional sector model 
of Finnish agriculture (DREMFIA) (for a thorough description of the model, 
see Lehtonen, 2001). This model is employed to assess the effects of 
alternative policy scenarios on the multifunctional role of Finnish 
agriculture. In terms of environmental non-commodity outputs, we focus 
on nutrient runoffs, landscape diversity and biodiversity. We use regional 
nutrient surpluses (soil-surface balance method) for nitrogen and 206 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
phosphorus as a proxy for nutrient runoffs and resulting surface-water 
quality impairment. Physical input flows are particularly relevant in 
analysing environmental effects and adjustments to agricultural policies. 
Evaluation of nutrient balances in very different agricultural scenarios is a 
challenging task since drastic changes in policies may imply larger changes 
in the use of fertilisers, manure and feedstuffs and in the resulting crop and 
animal yields than historically observed. First, it is crucial that total 
quantities of inputs are validated to observed aggregate levels in the 
economic model and not just the total values of inputs and outputs. Second, 
more data should be used besides historical farm-level data on physical 
inputs and outputs. Experimental and research data may reveal important 
relationships between physical inputs and outputs. The available relevant 
crop and animal feeding research results have been used in setting the 
production functions in the model, while the level of physical inputs and 
outputs is validated to observed levels. These two aspects are not always 
easy to combine. Nevertheless, if the model is also consistent in terms of the 
physical flows of inputs and products, and in terms of yield responses to 
large changes in prices and supports, then the indicator changes may be 
credible as well, up to our current knowledge of the biological production 
process. The continuous updating of farm-level and biological research 
information is necessary. The calculation of many agri-environmental 
indicators should not be done as a careless routine. On the contrary, it 
requires conscientious assessment: Does the data used in the economic 
model tell us what will happen in the production process in very different 
policy scenarios? 
Once the crucial relationships of the bio-physical production process 
have been determined using the best available data and knowledge, the 
resulting changes in production facilitate a rather straightforward 
calculation of a number of indicators. For assessing landscape diversity, we 
employ Shannon’s diversity index (SHDI) to assess the richness (number of 
different land-cover classes, i.e. cultivated crops and bare and green fallow) 
and evenness (uniformity of distribution for types of land use) of 
agricultural land use under different policy scenarios. The area designated 
as providing different types of wildlife habitats is used as a proxy for 
biodiversity. 
As regards other non-commodity outputs, one of our interests is rural 
socio-economic viability. In line with Ollikainen & Lankoski (2004), we 
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agriculture and in the rural sectors serving agriculture. Our approach is to 
use an economic sector-level model that does not explicitly consider 
linkages between agriculture and other sectors of the national economy. 
Hence the approach cannot provide any final results concerning the 
employment effects of agricultural policies. The approach taken here, 
however, does consider in a detailed way the linkages among different 
production lines in agriculture. Especially the changes in the relative 
profitability of various agricultural activities affect production volumes and 
land use since land is a restricted, limited resource for agricultural 
activities. Agricultural land and production equipment (buildings and 
machinery), on the other hand, are of low value in alternative uses in 
Finland where the countryside is relatively sparsely populated. This 
characteristic makes even a partial equilibrium approach interesting in 
evaluating the socio-economic effects of agricultural policies. 
7.2  The model and multifunctionality indicators 
7.2.1  The sector model 
DREMFIA is a dynamic recursive model that includes 17 production 
regions. The model provides effects of various agricultural policies on land 
use, animal production, farm investments and farmers’ income. The model 
consists of two major parts: 1) a technology diffusion model that 
determines sector-level investments in different production technologies; 
and 2) an optimisation routine that simulates annual production decisions 
(within the limits of fixed factors) and price changes, i.e. supply and 
demand reactions, by maximising producer and consumer surpluses 
subject to the balance and resource (land and capital) constraints of 
regional products (Figure 7.1). 
In the DREMFIA model, annual land use and production decisions 
from 1995 to 2020 are simulated by an optimisation model that maximises 
producer and consumer surplus subject to regional product balance and 
resource (land) constraints. Final products and intermediate products may 
be transported between the regions. The optimisation model is a typical, 
spatial, price equilibrium model (see for example Cox & Chavas, 2001), 
except that no explicit supply functions are specified (i.e. supply is a primal 
specification). Furthermore, foreign trade activities are included in 
DREMFIA. The Armington assumption (Armington, 1969), which is a 
common feature in international agricultural trade models but less 
common in one-country sector models, is used. Imported and domestic 208 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
products are imperfect substitutes, i.e. endogenous prices of domestic and 
imported products are dependent. There are 18 different processed milk 
products and their associated regional processing activities in the model. 
Figure 7.1 Basic structure of the DREMFIA mode 
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Four main areas are included in the model: southern Finland, central 
Finland, Ostrobothnia (the western part of Finland) and northern Finland 
(Figure 7.2). Production in these areas is further divided into sub-regions 
on the basis of the support areas. In total, there are 17 different production 
regions. This allows a regionally disaggregated description of policy 
measures and production technology. The final and intermediate products 
move between the main areas at certain transportation costs. 
Technical change and investments, which imply the evolution of 
farm-size distribution, are modelled as a process of technology diffusion. 
Investments are dependent on economic conditions such as interest rates, 
prices, support, production quotas and other policy measures and TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 209 
 
regulations imposed on farmers. The model of technology diffusion used 
generally follows the main outlines of Soete & Turner (1984). 
 
Figure 7.2 Main regions in the dynamic regional sector model of Finnish 
agriculture (DREMFIA) 
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Two crucial aspects about diffusion and adaptation behaviour are 
included: first, the profitability of a new technique; and second, the risk 
and uncertainty involved in adopting a new technique. The information 
about and likelihood of adopting a new technique will increase as its use 
becomes widespread. 
To cover the first aspect, the likelihood of adopting a new technique 
(fβα) is made proportional to the fractional rate of profit increase in moving 
from technique α to technique β, i.e. fβα is proportional to (rβ-rα)/rα, where rα 
is the rate of return for technique α and rβ is the rate of return for technique 
β. The second aspect is modelled by letting fβα be proportional to the ratio 
of the capital stock in β technique (Kβ) to the total capital stock K (in a 
certain agricultural production line), i.e. Kβ/K. The total investments to α 
technique, after simplification, is 
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where σ is the savings rate (proportion of economic surplus re-invested in 
agriculture), η is the farmers’ propensity to invest in alternative techniques, 
Qα is the total production-linked revenue for technique α, w is a vector of 
input prices, Lα is a vector of variable production factors of technique α, 
and r is the average rate of return on all techniques. 
The interpretation of the investment function is as follows. If the 
value of η was zero, then (1) would show that the investment in α 
technique would come entirely from the investable surplus generated by α 
technique. For η ≠ 0, the investment in α technique will be greater or less 
than the first term on the right-hand side, depending on whether the rate of 
return on α technique is greater or less than the average rate of return on all 
techniques (r). This seems reasonable. If a technique is highly profitable it 
will tend to attract investments, and conversely, if it is relatively less 
profitable investments will decline. If there are no investments in α 
technique at some time period, the capital stock Kα decreases at the 
depreciation rate. To summarise, the investment function (1) is an attempt 
to model the behaviour of farmers whose motivation to invest is greater 
profitability, but who, nevertheless, will not adopt the most profitable 
technique immediately because of uncertainty and other constraining 
factors. 
The investment function (1) shows that the investment level is 
strongly dependent on the capital already invested in each technique. This 
assumption is consistent with the conclusions of Rantamäki-Lahtinen et al. 
(2002) and Heikkilä et al. (2004), i.e. that farm investments are strongly 
correlated with earlier investments, but poorly correlated with many other 
factors, such as liquidity or financial costs. Other common features, except 
for the level of previous investments by investing farms, were hard to find. 
Hence, the assumption made on cumulative gains from earlier investments 
seems to be supported by the findings of Rantamäki-Lahtinen et al. (2002) 
and Heikkilä et al. (2004). The investment function allows regional re-
location and concentration of production and technical change at the same 
time. 
Three dairy techniques (representing α techniques) and 
corresponding farm-size classes have been included in the DREMFIA 
model: farms with 1-19 cows (labour-intensive production), farms with 20-
49 cows (semi-labour intensive production) and farms with 50 cows or 
more (capital-intensive production). The parameter σ has been fixed to 
1.07, which means that the initial value 0.85 (i.e. farmers re-invest 85% of TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 211 
 
the economic surplus on fixed factors back into agriculture) has been scaled 
up by 26%, which is the average rate of investment support for dairy farms 
in Finland. The value of η ( f i x e d  t o  0 . 7 7 )  i s  t h e n  u s e d  a s  a  c a l i b r a t i o n  
parameter, which results in investments that facilitate the ex post 
development of dairy farm structure and milk production volume. The 
chosen combination of the parameters σ and η (1.07:0.77) is unique in the 
sense that it calibrates the farm-size distribution to the observed farm-size 
structure in 2002 (Farm Register, 2002). Choosing larger σ and smaller η 
exaggerates the investments on small farms, and choosing smaller σ and 
larger  η exaggerates the investments on large farms. Choosing smaller 
values for both σ and η results in investment and production levels that are 
too low, and choosing larger values for both σ  and  η results in 
overestimated investment and production levels compared with the ex post 
period. 
Use of variable inputs, such as fertilisers and feedstuffs, is dependent 
on agricultural product prices and fertiliser prices through production 
functions. The nutrients from animal manure are explicitly taken into 
account in the economic model. The feeding of animals may change 
provided that nutrition requirements, such as energy, protein, 
phosphorous and roughage needs, are fulfilled. In the feasible range of 
inputs per animal, production functions can be used to model the 
dependency between the average milk yield of dairy cows and the amount 
of concentrates and other grain-based feedstuffs. Since in historical farm-
level data there are relatively fewer instances of low or high levels of 
concentrates, the dataset is enriched by experimental data. A number of 
trials have been undertaken by agro-biological research on the yield-
response effects of significant changes in animal feeding and crop 
fertilisation (Sairanen et al., 1999 and 2003; Bäckman et al., 1997). In the case 
of dairy cows and field crops, the uniform pattern of the results of many 
similar trials facilitates the inclusion of the data material in the estimation 
of the production functions. Hence, the production functions in the model 
include not only the observed historical variation in the use of inputs but 
also responses to large changes in the use of inputs rarely observed in 
actual farms. This approach means that if agricultural policies imply 
significant changes in feed or fertiliser use, for example through relative 
input and output prices or restrictions on land use, the most relevant 
biological relationships are taken into account in calculating the 
economically-rational production adjustment. The new farm-level data on 212 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
animal feeding, however, is richer (there is more variation) than previous 
data as farmers have gradually increased the use of feed concentrates (Pro 
Agria, 2005), so we believe that the role of experimental data decreases over 
time. 
Milk quotas, which constrain milk production at the farm and 
country level, are traded within three separate areas in the model. Within 
each quota-trade area, the sum of quotas purchased must equal the sum of 
quotas sold. The price of the quota is the weighted sum of the shadow 
values of an explicit quota constraint in each sub-region. Milk quota trade 
has an important role in facilitating improvements in production efficiency. 
The observed milk quota prices have served as a valuable reference point in 
the model validation. 
The overall model replicates very closely the ex post production 
development in 1995-2003. Official agricultural production and price 
statistics1 have been used as the basis in validation. Calibrating the 
unobserved parameters of the investment model (discussed above) is a 
significant part of the overall validation of the model. Price changes in 
1995-2003 have been validated through calibrating the unobserved 
parameters in the Armington system and in export-cost specification (see 
Lehtonen, 2001, for details). The total value of each single input (calculated 
from the input specifications of many production activities in the model) 
has been checked and validated by using cross-sectional statistical data 
(Statistics Finland, 1995 and 2003). Furthermore, total quantities of inputs 
and not just the total values of inputs and outputs are validated to observed 
aggregate levels. Hence, the validation of the model is also consistent in 
terms of the physical flows of inputs, such as fertilisers and feedstuffs. 
Physical input flows are particularly relevant in analysing environmental 
effects and adjustments to large changes in agricultural policy. In the 
validation process, two individual years were excluded due to very 
unusual weather conditions and subsequent crop failures.  
The long- and medium-term changes in aggregate amounts and 
regional location of production are consistent in the economic sense as the 
model is built to reach a steady state of equilibrium in a 10-15 year period 
given no further policy changes. There is a built-in gradual adjustment in 
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the model as fixed production factors and animal biology make immediate 
adjustments costly. Non-linear production functions in the model are 
concave, i.e. the marginal productivity decreases with output. The steady-
state equilibria found at the whole country level are also the result of the 
limited domestic consumption of foodstuffs and expensive exports, owing 
to low EU prices against the production and transportation costs. Another 
reason for steady states in a 10-15 year period is the Armington assumption 
and the expectation that consumers have some preferences as to domestic 
products, i.e. the scarcity of domestic foodstuffs slightly increases producer 
prices, even though this increase is relatively small (only 1-10% on the 
producer price level) in the model, when validated to the observed price 
development.  A more detailed presentation of the model and its 
parameters can be found in Lehtonen (2001, partially updated in 2004). 
7.2.2  Multifunctionality indicators 
The available indicators derived from the DREMFIA model output are 
listed in Table 7.1. Not all the indicators are listed in this chapter, however. 
Most of the indicators presented in this study, such as production volumes, 
hectares of crops, nutrient balances and incomes, as well as direct 
agricultural employment, are calculated directly using the DREMFIA sector 
model. Indirect agricultural employment was calculated using regional 
input–output tables that take into account both upstream and downstream 
indirect employment (Knuuttila, 2004). 
Table 7.1 The applied indicators, derived from the DREMFIA model, in the 
agricultural policy scenario analysis 
Applied 
indicator 
Measured 
quantity 
Indicator 
reflecting  
Strategic goal of the indicator 
Total number 
of animal 
units up to 
2020 
Animal 
units 
The scale and long-
term economic 
viability of 
aggregate animal 
production 
To ascertain the relative 
economic viability of animal 
production in different policy 
scenarios  
Number of 
bovine animal 
units 
Animal 
units 
The scale and long-
term economic 
viability of dairy 
and beef 
production 
To ascertain the relative 
economic viability of dairy and 
beef production in different 
policy scenarios 214 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
Table 7.1 cont. 
Number of pig 
animal units 
Animal 
units 
The scale and long-
term economic 
viability of pig 
production 
To ascertain the relative 
economic viability of pig 
production in different policy 
scenarios 
Number of 
poultry animal 
units 
Animal 
units 
The scale and long-
term economic 
viability of poultry 
production 
 
 
To ascertain the relative 
economic viability of poultry 
production in different policy 
scenarios 
Total 
cultivated area 
(excluding set-
aside) up to 
2020 
Hectares Incentives  for 
active crop 
production 
Changes in incentives for active 
crop production 
Set-aside area  Hectares  Incentives for 
fulfilling cross-
compliance criteria 
and minimising 
costs 
Changes in incentives in 
fulfilling cross-compliance 
criteria and minimising costs in 
different policy scenarios 
Unused area  Hectares  Share of 
abandoned 
agricultural land 
owing to 
unprofitable 
production 
Changes in the share of 
abandoned land owing to 
unprofitable production  
Grass area  Hectares  The scale of grass 
feed production; 
incentives for grass 
feed use and 
bovine animal 
production 
Changes in the scale and 
incentives for grass feed 
production in different 
agricultural policy scenarios 
Grain area  Hectares  The scale and 
incentives for grain 
production 
Changes in the scale and 
incentives for grain production 
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Table 7.1 cont. 
Nitrogen 
balance on 
cultivated areaa)  
Kg/ha Nitrogen-leaching 
potential from 
cultivated land 
Changes in the nitrogen- 
leaching potential in different 
policy scenarios 
Phosphorous 
balance on 
cultivated areaa)  
Kg/ha Phosphorous-
leaching potential 
from cultivated 
land 
Changes in phosphorous-
leaching potential in different 
policy scenarios 
Habitat index  (Scale of 
0-100) 
Value of 
agricultural land 
for certain 
indicator species 
To ascertain the biodiversity 
effects of agricultural policies 
Agricultural 
income  
€ million  The level of 
economic activities 
in agriculture 
Changes in the level of 
economic activity in different 
policy scenarios 
Profitability 
coefficientb) 
– Profitability  of 
agricultural 
production 
Changes in profitability of 
agricultural production in 
different policy scenarios 
Labour hours in 
agriculture; 
indirect effects 
on employment 
Million 
hours or 
1,000 
employees 
Social 
sustainability of 
farmers, the 
working 
conditions of 
agricultural labour 
Changes in the number of 
people employed in agriculture 
and related professions in 
different policy scenarios 
Agricultural 
income per 
hour of labour 
€/hour Economic  and 
social welfare of 
farmers 
Changes in the economic and 
social viability of agriculture in 
different policy scenarios 
a)  The soil surface nitrogen and phosphorus balances are calculated as the difference between 
the total quantity of nitrogen or phosphorus inputs entering the soil and the quantity of 
nitrogen or phosphorus outputs leaving the soil annually, based on the nitrogen or 
phosphorus cycle. 
b)   The profitability coefficient is a ratio obtained when the agricultural surplus is divided by the 
sum of the entrepreneur family’s salary requirement and the interest requirement on the 
capital invested.  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Shannon’s diversity index (SHDI) was applied in the land-cover 
diversity calculations (McGarigal & Marks, 1995). The index is based on 
information theory (Shannon, 1948) and it is frequently used in diversity 216 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
quantifications (Di Falco & Perrings, 2003; Hietala-Koivu et al., 2004). The 
values of SHDI were calculated according to the formula: 
  () ,
1
ln ∑
=
× − =
m
i
i P i P SHDI  (2) 
where m is the number of land-cover classes,  i P  measures the proportion of 
area covered by land-cover type i and ln denotes natural logarithm. SHDI is 
equal to zero when the agricultural area contains only one land-cover class 
(i.e. no diversity). The value of Shannon’s diversity index increases as the 
number of different land-cover classes increases or the proportional 
distribution of the area among land-cover classes becomes more equitable 
(or both). Hence, for a given number of land-cover classes, SHDI reaches its 
maximum when the proportions of land-cover classes are uniform, i.e. P1 = 
P2 = … = Pm = 1/m (McGarigal & Marks, 1995). 
In addition to diversity in agricultural land use, we also consider the 
potential biodiversity effects of policy scenarios. According to Duelli (1997), 
biodiversity evaluation at the regional level can be based on landscape 
parameters. Even though landscape diversity indicators give an overview 
of biological diversity, there are no general models that relate overall 
species diversity to landscape diversity (Jeanneret et al., 2003). The 
relationship thus depends strongly on the organism examined. 
The aggregate soil surface balances (surplus/deficit) for nitrogen and 
phosphorus per cultivated area, excluding set-aside, were calculated by 
adding the nutrient content of fertilisers, organic manure and nitrogen 
deposits, and by subtracting the nutrient content of the harvest and losses 
to the atmosphere. The calculated net nutrient surplus (kg/ha) provides an 
indicator of the production intensity and of the potential nutrient losses 
and environmental damage to surface and ground waters. 
The size of the pesticide application area was also reported. Chemical 
pesticides enhance agricultural productivity but also pose potential risks to 
human health and the environment. For example, they may cause the 
contamination of surface water.  
The habitat index was calculated on the basis of a large-scale dataset 
of empirical observations concerning butterfly numbers on lands farmed by 
different crops (Kuussaari & Heliölä, 2004). The butterfly was selected as an 
indicator species by environmental scientists. It was observed that green 
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fields, whereas field edges provided more valuable habitats by more than 
seven times and natural meadows by more than ten times. These relative 
weights were used directly when calculating a habitat index as a linear 
vector, divided by overall hectares of agricultural lands. Hence, the 
resulting index represents an average biodiversity value of all agricultural 
land in comparison with natural meadows. In 1995-2004 the calculated 
habitat index was valued at between 20 and 25. The index would be 100 if 
all agricultural lands were changed to natural meadows. 
7.3  Alternative agricultural policy scenarios 
Based on the current multilateral trade negotiations and the most recent 
indications of negotiation positions from various World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) members, there are a number of interesting policy 
scenarios that could be analysed. In response to the WTO’s framework 
agreement approved in Geneva on July 2004 and the possible conclusion of 
the Doha round, the following scenarios are formulated as below. 
7.3.1  The baseline scenario (BASE) 
The baseline scenario (BASE) corresponds to the continuation of the 
Agenda 2000 agricultural policy (agreed in Berlin in 1999) over the medium 
term. The purpose of the baseline is not to forecast the future but to 
establish a yardstick against which policy simulations can be judged. The 
baseline simulation is a view of the world in which policies remain 
unchanged. The impact of EU enlargement has not been incorporated into 
the baseline. It is important, however, to remember that the baseline 
scenario includes the reductions in intervention support prices and future 
increases in quotas in the dairy sector that were politically agreed in Berlin 
in 1999. Therefore, it is assumed that the producer price of milk in the EU 
and in Finland would fall by 12% from the average producer price of 1999-
2001 by 2008.  
7.3.2  Common agricultural policy reform scenario (REF) 
The ongoing common agricultural policy (CAP) reform scenario (hereafter 
the ‘REF’ scenario) follows the CAP reform agreement made in June 2003, 
according to which most direct CAP subsidies will be decoupled from 
production and paid in a single, lump-sum farm payment based on 2000-02 
historical production levels (European Commission, 2003). On options 
given for the EU member states, the Finnish government has decided that 218 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
the implementation of the reform will start in 2006. From there on, all CAP 
arable-area payments will be decoupled from production and a 
regionalised flat-rate payment will be paid for all farms and all crops 
(including set-aside, but excluding some permanent crops). Also, 
decoupled CAP animal support, based on 2000–02 production, will be paid 
for individual farms; however, 69% of bull premia and 100% of suckler cow 
premia will remain coupled to production, i.e. paid per animal. The sum of 
coupled bull and suckler cow premia will not exceed 75% of the bull 
premia paid in the reference period 2000–02. Overall, 85% of CAP support 
will be decoupled. The farm-specific payments of decoupled animal 
support will later be included in the flat-rate payment. The timetable of the 
shift of farm-specific top-ups into the flat rate is still open (MAF, 2005). 
Receiving decoupled CAP support will not require any agricultural 
commodity production. Yet farmland has to be kept in good agricultural 
and environmental condition and this means in practice that land has to be 
either cultivated or kept as set-aside land. In the REF scenario, no change in 
the EU level of cereal prices is assumed. The reform of the milk sector will 
be more radical than that agreed in Berlin in 1999. The intervention price 
for butter is reduced by 25% (-7% in 2004, 2005 and 2006, and -4% in 2007), 
which is 10% more than that agreed in Agenda 2000. For skimmed milk 
powder (SMP), prices will be cut by 15% as agreed in Agenda 2000 (but this 
will occur in steps of 5% over three years from 2004–06). In 2007, it is 
assumed that the overall decrease in the average producer price of milk at 
the EU level will be 16% down from the 2003 price level, i.e. 4 percentage 
points more relative to the baseline. The price cuts will be compensated by 
a direct payment of €35.50 per tonne of milk quota. This payment becomes 
fully decoupled in 2007. Furthermore, 5% of all direct EU payments will be 
cut (modulated) from 2007. 
As regards multifunctionality issues and indicators, the question here 
is to evaluate to what extent the 2003 CAP reform, notably the decoupling 
of agricultural income-support direct aids (with the possibility for each 
member state to maintain some of these direct aids as coupled support) is 
likely to have positive or negative effects on multifunctionality indicators. 
7.3.3  Environmental cross-compliance (ECC) 
The environmental cross-compliance (ECC) scenario is identical to the REF 
scenario, except that one assumes that each member state chooses the full 
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from 0.5 to 2 metres wide. The idea of this scenario is to test the 
contribution of field edges to the habitat index and the possible effects on 
production. 
7.3.4  Attack on domestic support scenario (RED) 
The attack on domestic support (RED) scenario assumes, in addition to the 
ECC scenario that the EU (and Finland) is forced to agree a 20% cut in 
existing decoupled payments by 2013. By comparing the RED and ECC 
scenarios, one should be able to say something about the ‘relative’ 
efficiency of decoupling as regards multifunctionality. 
7.4  Indicator results from the model  
7.4.1   Continuation of Agenda 2000 
The baseline run of the agricultural sector model indicated (with certain 
exceptions) that if the Agenda 2000 policy continued, there would be no 
substantial changes in production volumes. For example, dairy production 
would remain almost unchanged in all regions. But the total amount of 
cultivated area, including fallow and cultivated grassland, would fall 
significantly. The most important change therefore concerns the amount of 
marginal farming land taken out of production, an area that would add 10-
15% to all agricultural land. Such a change results mainly from investments 
in larger dairy facilities, which in turn lead to a regional concentration of 
agricultural commodity production within each individual region studied. 
Thus, the demand for feed (grain and grass) decreases in many areas. This 
decline weakens endogenous market prices and the profitability of grain 
production. Because pork and poultry production also continue to become 
concentrated into large production units, some agricultural land is left idle 
in relatively less favourable agricultural areas. The relative increase in the 
uncultivated land area will be largest in northern Finland, but the absolute 
changes are largest in southern and central Finland. Soil quality is highly 
heterogeneous even in southern Finland. This heterogeneity is partly taken 
into account since there are 17 production regions in the DREMFIA model. 
Nevertheless, soil quality is considered homogenous in each region. 
7.4.2  Agenda 2000 vs. the ongoing reform of the CAP 
In the baseline scenario, milk production remains relatively stable in all 
regions since milk payments compensating the price reductions of butter 220 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
and skimmed milk powder are tied to milk quotas. In the CAP reform 
scenario, the linkage between milk payments and milk quotas is removed. 
According to the model results, CAP reform is not likely to result in any 
drastic decline of agricultural production in Finland, on the aggregate. Milk 
production may reduce substantially, however, in northern Finland, where 
dairy products dominate. Some decline of production may also take place 
in central Finland but the decline of production in these areas will be partly 
compensated by an increase in production in the Ostrobothnia region, 
which may benefit from the decreasing values of milk quotas under CAP 
reform. Hence, some milk quotas from central Finland shift to 
Ostrobothnia. Since milk quotas cannot be sold from southern Finland to 
Ostrobothnia (the movement of milk quotas has been restricted in three 
major quota-trading areas, where the number of sold quotas must equal the 
number of purchased quotas), the decreased value of milk quotas in 
southern Finland will facilitate a recovery of milk production from 2010. In 
northern Finland, which constitutes a third of the quota-trade area, 
however, not even the reduced milk quota values are sufficient to lead to 
later recovery in the milk production volume (Figure 7.3). 
Figure 7.3 Total milk production volumes in Finland (million litres) 
2000,00
2050,00
2100,00
2150,00
2200,00
2250,00
2300,00
2350,00
2400,00
2450,00
Y1995
Y1996
Y1997
Y1998
Y1999
Y2000
Y2001
Y2002
Y2003
Y2004
Y2005
Y2006
Y2007
Y2008
Y2009
Y2010
Y2011
Y2012
Y2013
Y2014
Y2015
Y2016
Y2017
Y2018
Y2019
Y2020
BASE
REF
ECC
RED
 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013. 
 TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 221 
 
This difference results from cuts in the milk price and decoupled CAP 
payments, which considerably reduce incentives to invest in milk 
production in the REF scenario. Since many farms are small and production 
costs are high, most dairy farmers who exit milk production make only the 
minimum effort to receive the CAP payments, i.e. they leave their land as 
set-aside. The reduction in overall production volume, on the other hand, 
provides opportunities for expanding dairy farms (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 Changes in milk production by 2015 in different scenarios compared with 
the baseline (in %) 
  REF ECC RED 
  2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
Southern 
Finland 
-11.1    -9.3 -0.9  -14.8 -9.2  +1.0  -14.4 -8.5  +0.5 
Ostrobothnia -4.0    +3.4 +3.7  -2.2 +3.6 +4.9  -3.3 +3.3 +6.1 
Central 
Finland 
-5.9    -11.3  -8.9  -9.1 -13.4 -11.8  -9.3 -14.7 -11.7 
Northern 
Finland 
-7.4 -18.6 -22.2  -6.5 -16.5 -17.5  -9.1 -20.5 -25.0 
Whole country  -7.1   -6.6  -3.4  -8.5 -6.9 -2.8 -9.3 -7.3 -3.9 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
A decreasing number of dairy cows and the partial or full de-
coupling of CAP headage payments will gradually result in decreasing beef 
production and grass area in all parts of Finland, but the effects of CAP 
reform on pork and poultry production will be minor. 
When comparing the agricultural land-use predictions of the ongoing 
CAP reform scenario to the corresponding results of the extended Agenda 
2000 scenario, we found that the REF scenario resulted in a larger green 
fallow area by almost four-times that of the BASE scenario. 
Correspondingly, the areas devoted to barley, oats and grass would be 
significantly smaller under the REF scenario (Table 7.3). Only the most 
feasible areas of earlier grasslands would be used for grain production. In 
relative terms, the difference in the green set-aside area between the two  
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scenarios was largest in northern and central Finland. In both regions, the 
green set-aside area would increase significantly as a result of the REF 
scenario. 
Table 7.3 Changes in land use by 2015 in different scenarios compared with the 
baseline scenario (per 1,000 ha) (in %) 
  Cereals area  Grass area  Green set-aside 
  REF ECC RED REF ECC RED REF ECC RED 
Southern 
Finland 
-12.8 -13.1 -11.9 -20.4 -23.2 -20.1 +350 +231 +341 
Ostrobothnia  -23.2 -25.6 -23.9  -5.2  -2.7  -0.0 +156  +78.7 +143 
Central 
Finland 
-45.5 -48.3 -46.8 -11.2 -12.8 -12.6 +440 +357 +450 
Northern 
Finland 
+150 +191 +166  -9.7 -13.3 -13.1  +1073 +705  +1,08
9 
Whole 
country 
-19.2 -20.2 -18.9 -11.8 -12.3 -11.1 +305 +206 +299 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Compared with the baseline scenario, the decoupling of CAP support 
from production2 slightly decreases the area under cereals production in 
southern Finland. The changes in the dairy sector are clearly seen in the 
proportion of grassland area, which would be approximately 20% smaller 
in 2015 as a result of the REF scenario. Instead, the fallow area may be over 
three times larger than that under Agenda 2000. These changes in grassland 
and fallow areas are also significant in absolute terms, since over a half of 
the total agricultural area is located in southern Finland. 
Ostrobothnia is the second largest agricultural area. If CAP supports 
were decoupled from production, the area under cereals in 2015 would be 
reduced by over 20% compared with the baseline scenario. Fallow area, in 
turn, would be almost 2.5 times larger. If CAP support were disconnected 
                                                      
2 In the REF scenario, 85% of CAP supports are decoupled, and in the ECC and 
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from production, the cereals area would decline (relatively) the most in 
central Finland. In 2015 it would shrink by nearly 50% as a result of the 
Agenda 2000 policy. The grassland area in turn would be reduced by over 
10%, but the fallow area may be almost 10 times larger. 
The share of agricultural land under grain was about 9% and the 
share of set-aside was around 4% in northern Finland in 2003. In the BASE 
scenario, the share of grain reduces further to 3% by 2015. As opposed to 
the other regions, the ongoing CAP reform would not reduce the cereals 
area of northern Finland. Instead the grain area would remain close to the 
2003 level, i.e. grasslands (but not grain areas) would be converted to set-
aside areas. When many northern dairy farmers exit unprofitable dairy 
production, this not only adds set-aside areas, but may also lead to an 
increase in grain areas on those former grasslands where the costs of feed-
grain cultivation can be covered. The greatest increase, however, would be 
in the fallow area, which would be over 10 times larger as a result of the 
REF scenario. The area under grass, which already covers close to 90% of 
agricultural land in northern Finland, would be cut by approximately 10% 
compared with the baseline scenario. While dairy production would fall by 
15-20%, this means that production would become relatively more 
extensive. 
The decreasing cereals area also means a decreasing area under 
pesticide application. With the exception of northern Finland, the chemical 
pesticide application area across Finland would be smaller under CAP 
reform scenarios than as a result of the baseline scenario, since cereal areas 
would decrease if direct aid payments were decoupled from production. If 
we examine the land-use results at the whole country level, the pesticide 
application areas would be the largest under the baseline scenario and the 
smallest under the RED scenario. This would benefit farmland birds for 
example, since the reduced use of pesticides may increase the amount of 
insect prey. 
The REF scenario would result in lower nitrogen and phosphorus 
surpluses only temporarily in all regions. Regional concentrations of dairy 
and beef production would be stronger in the REF scenario compared with 
the BASE scenario (Table 7.4). This effect would in turn drive up the 
nutrient balances again. Significant regional concentration of dairy 
production and larger farms imply more intensive grassland management, 
despite lower milk prices due to CAP reform. For this reason, the nutrient 
balance would increase even in central Finland, where dairy production 224 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
volume would decrease slightly. The high increases of the average nutrient 
balances in central Finland would partly stem from a drastically 
diminishing grain area and more intensive dairy production. In central 
Finland there would be some scarcity of land available for large dairy 
farms, which would drive up the nutrient balances. The nitrogen and 
phosphorous balances would remain below the baseline scenario levels in 
southern Finland and also in northern Finland, where the overall milk 
production volume would decrease considerably, and there would be less 
pressure for intensive dairy production (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4 Changes in the aggregate nitrogen and phosphorus balance (kg/ha) by 
2015 in different scenarios compared with the baseline (in %) 
  Aggregate 
nitrogen balance 
Aggregate 
phosphorus balance 
  REF ECC RED  REF ECC RED 
Southern  Finland    -17.8  -18.2  -18.5 -2.2 -3.5 -2.3 
Ostrobothnia -7.2  -2.5  -0.0 +5.8  +11.2 +8.1 
Central  Finland    +10.1 +10.2 +11.1 +19.7 +20.1 +18.7 
Northern Finland   -0.1  -6.0 -1.8 -6.9 -7.5 -6.5 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The above-mentioned changes in land allocation would lead to a 
slightly more uneven, aggregate land-cover class distribution in southern 
and central Finland and in Ostrobothnia (see Shannon’s diversity index in 
Table 7.5). In northern Finland, the value of SHDI would slightly increase 
in CAP reform scenarios along with the higher cereals and uncultivated 
agricultural areas. Increased uncultivated area results in increased SHDI 
values in the CAP support-reduction (RED) scenario. Expanded field edges 
in the ECC scenario provide a further increase of diversity in land use. On 
the other hand, a reduction of support from the common agricultural policy 
does not lead to a decrease in the SHDI in comparison with the REF 
scenario. 
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Table 7.5 Changes in Shannon’s diversity index and habitat index by 2015 in 
different scenarios compared with the baseline (in %) 
  SHDI Habitat  index 
  REF ECC RED  REF ECC RED 
Southern  Finland    -13.7  -6.0  -8.8 +53.7 +30.8 +52.2 
Ostrobothnia   -5.6  -2.1  -4.4 +30.0 +12.4 +29.6 
Central  Finland    -17.7  -7.5  -17.7 +69.5 +52.2 +70.3 
Northern Finland   +20.0  +36.4 +24.4 +46.6 +27.2 +43.3 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In order to evaluate changes in biodiversity, a habitat index has been 
calculated. While the baseline scenario shows gradually decreasing levels 
of the habitat index on agricultural lands (as the grass area declines), the 
rapid expansion of green set-aside in all other scenarios results in a 
significant increase in the habitat index. This effect occurs because green 
set-aside is considered a more valuable living environment than grain 
crops by almost five times for certain indicator species (in this case, 
butterflies). Nevertheless, if large areas are idled and gradually converted 
to forest, the biodiversity value of agricultural lands would diminish. The 
actual effect on biodiversity in the overall ecosystem (comprising 
agricultural land, forests, ponds, lakes, etc.) where farmlands are idled, 
however, is uncertain. Hence the habitat index calculated only shows the 
value of different uses of agricultural land. 
According to the model results, agricultural income, as well as 
agricultural income per labour hour, is higher in the CAP reform scenarios. 
In the case of partial or full de-coupling, a farmer may reduce relatively 
less-profitable activities without losing all support. This effect is a 
commonly perceived one of CAP reform and a motivation for it. Yet 
according to the model results, aggregate agricultural income would 
decrease in northern Finland owing to diminishing dairy production. This 
result is understandable since in the north there are few alternatives to 
dairy and beef production (Figure 7.4 and Table 7.6). 
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Figure 7.4 Agricultural incomes in Finland (€1000) 
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Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 7.6 Changes in total agricultural income and income per hour of labour by 
2015 in different scenarios compared with the baseline (in %) 
  Agricultural income 
 (€ million) 
Agricultural income per hour 
(€/hour) 
  REF ECC RED  REF ECC RED 
Southern Finland   +12.6  +7.9  +2.1 +16.8 +14.5  +5.4 
Ostrobothnia   +6.9 +3.0  -2.1  +10.4 +7.0 +0.6 
Central Finland   +5.3  +2.7  -4.6 +17.4 +18.2  +9.5 
Northern Finland   -3.1  -6.4  -6.6 +13.4 +11.8 +10.7 
Whole country   +8.5  +4.5  -0.1 +14.9 +12.3  +4.9 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In any scenario, including the BASE scenario, agricultural 
employment is set to fall in all the regions of Finland. This decline stems 
from the fact that traditionally, farm size has been relatively small in 
Finland for historical reasons. In spite of the relatively rapid decline of 
cattle farms over the last 10 years there is still substantial scope for growth 
in farm-size. Looking towards the future, the decline in agricultural TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 227 
 
employment is likely to be greatest in Finland’s northern region and least 
in the southern region and in Ostrobothnia (see Figure 7.5 and Table 7.7). 
Figure 7.5 Direct and indirect labour in agriculture in Finland in the BASE 
scenario (per 1,000 employees)  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 7.7 Changes in the direct and indirect labour of agriculture (per 1,000 
employees) in different scenarios compared with the baseline (in %) 
  REF ECC RED 
  2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
Southern  Finland  -3.5 -3.6  +3.8 -9.6 -5.7  +1.7 -5.1 -3.1  +4.5 
Ostrobothnia  -7.2 -3.1 -3.0 -6.4 -3.7 -2.8 -6.5 -2.7 -1.1 
Central  Finland  -3.5 -10.3  -8.4  -8.0 -13.1 -11.5  -7.2 -12.9 -12.2 
Northern  Finland  -3.1 -14.6 -20.1  -5.5 -14.7 -17.2  -5.7 -15.6 -21.1 
Whole  country  -4.6 -5.6 -2.4 -8.1 -7.3 -3.7 -6.0 -5.9 -2.4 
Notes: BASE = Agenda 2000; REF = Luxembourg 2003 reform with national adaptations; 
ECC = environmental cross-compliance; RED = reduction of CAP payments by 20% 
by 2013. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The food industry in Finland has also experienced major structural 
changes in the last 10 years. These changes are still going on. Hence it is 
assumed in this study that indirect employment in agriculture is 
considered to remain fixed for the agricultural labour force. For example, 228 | A CASE STUDY OF FINLAND 
 
the transportation of inputs and outputs will employ less labour as the 
number of farms decrease. Overall, the efficiency of labour will increase 
significantly and in the same magnitude in agriculture and in upstream 
and downstream industries. This means that the average reduction in 
agricultural employment (-18% in the baseline and -23% in the CAP reform 
scenarios by 2015) would be accompanied by the same change in indirect 
employment. This assumption will be relaxed as soon as new input–output 
data in each of the 20 provinces is obtained. 
Summary and conclusions 
The aim of this study is to predict and compare the multifunctionality 
effects of various agricultural policy reforms in Finland. Since the 
multifunctional value of agriculture lies in the joint production process of 
agricultural and public goods alongside other externalities, the impact of 
different agricultural policies on production, biological and employment 
factors have been analysed. The study has applied agricultural sector 
modelling as the research method, which takes into account changes in the 
profitability of different agricultural production lines and the resulting 
changes in land use and production intensity. Since the model does not 
explicitly consider the links between agriculture and the national economy, 
the effects on direct and indirect employment in agriculture are considered 
external to the model. 
CAP reform, possibly through the partial or full-decoupling of CAP 
payments, is not likely to result in any drastic decline of agricultural 
production in Finland on the whole. Yet according to the economic analysis 
here, milk production may reduce substantially in northern Finland where 
dairy farming is the dominant line of production. Some decline of 
production may also take place in central Finland, but decreasing 
production in these areas will be partly compensated by increasing 
production in the Ostrobothnia region, which may benefit from the falling 
values of milk quotas in CAP reform.  
A decreasing number of dairy cows and the partial or full de-
coupling of CAP headage payments would gradually result in reduced beef 
production and grasslands in all regions of Finland. Furthermore, the 
enlarging size and regional concentration of dairy production is likely to 
keep up the nutrient balances on agricultural land despite falling milk 
prices, which, ceteris paribus, would reduce the intensity of milk production.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 229 
 
The scarcity of land in the relatively most-competitive areas may even 
increase the phosphorous balance – which is a risk in terms of nutrient 
runoffs and water quality. 
In any scenario (including the baseline) agricultural employment is 
set to decline significantly throughout Finland. It is notable that the 
agricultural labour force is likely to shrink substantially irrespective of 
agricultural policy. According to our results, only a significant reduction in 
agricultural supports would speed up the decline in agricultural labour in 
southern Finland and Ostrobothnia, given that overall animal production 
will in any scenario stay at the present level or gradually rise in these 
relatively more competitive regions. But in northern Finland, CAP reform 
would reduce agricultural employment (and related indirect employment) 
significantly because of the substantial reduction of milk production, which 
is the dominant line of production in this part of the country. Interestingly, 
in the ECC scenario the reduction of agricultural employment would be 
less than that under the REF scenario. In addition to restrictions in milk-
quota trading among the regions, this result is partly owing to enlarged 
field edges, which slow down the concentration of production in other 
areas along with the outflow of milk quotas from northern Finland to some 
parts of central Finland. Hence the enlarged field edges would slightly 
mitigate the decline in dairy production and employment in northern 
Finland. From a multifunctionality viewpoint, this is an interesting result as 
environmental cross-compliance may also enhance socio-economic viability 
as measured by agricultural labour. 
On the effects of policies on agricultural land use, the main finding is 
that the amount of fallow land (especially green fallow) would increase 
considerably if agricultural support payments are decoupled from 
production. Although the expenses of establishing green fallows are higher 
than for bare fallows, the maintenance costs of green fallows are less. Based 
on the farm-level production cost calculations of the Union of Rural 
Advisory Centres (MKL, 1995), green fallows are more profitable than bare 
fallows over a five-year period, and thus the predicted rise in the area of 
green fallows is justified. Nevertheless, there is substantial uncertainty 
about the number of green fallow areas in the future, since at the farm level 
the choice of set-aside management also depends on the opportunity cost of 
labour and the age of production capital.  
In addition, it should be noted that the above results depend on the 
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agricultural condition. Without this requirement, the decoupling of support 
payments could in turn lead to land abandonment. 
A significant reduction of agricultural support is another factor that 
may also prompt land abandonment. This effect can be seen in the ‘attack 
on domestic support’ scenario where CAP payments are reduced by 20%. 
As a result, idled land grows to nearly 25% of the total agricultural land 
area. Since agricultural land comprises only 8% of all land in Finland, one 
could argue that any reduction in agricultural land would mean a loss in 
biodiversity or at least diversity at the landscape level.  
The habitat index calculated does not assign any value to idled or 
afforested agricultural land but solely considers agricultural land. Yet the 
calculated habitat index does show that in any policy scenario the 
remaining cultivated agricultural land would become biologically richer 
owing to an increase in green set-aside areas. Expanded field edges, 
required in the cross-compliance scenario, would provide significantly 
richer habitats for various species, such as butterflies. Since an increased 
set-aside area is a major expected outcome of CAP reform, providing 
sufficient incentives for green set-aside areas would make it possible to 
attain a higher level of biodiversity. On the other hand, our results show 
that changes in field edges (a change from 0.5 to 2 metre-wide edges were 
studied) do not imply any rise in the overall habitat value of agricultural 
lands. On the contrary, the enlarged field edges result in a higher intensity 
of grassland cultivation and larger grain areas in some places in which 
dairy and beef are dominant lines of production. In our calculations, the 
higher intensity effectively lowers the habitat value of grasslands.  
Consequently, wider field edges may even reduce the overall habitat 
index, especially if field parcels are small. This result, however, as well as 
the calculation procedure of the habitat index, needs to be discussed with 
environmental scientists. 
At the landscape level, these policy reforms, in which support is 
decoupled, change land use and decrease the diversity of agricultural land-
cover classes in almost all parts of the country, except in northern Finland. 
But the effect on biological diversity may not be equal to changes in 
Shannon’s diversity index, since at the species level, green fallows seem to 
have some positive effects, especially on the densities and abundance of 
farmland birds (Haukioja et al. 1985; Helenius et al. 1995; Tiainen & 
Pakkala 2000; Tiainen & Pakkala, 2001). Firbank et al. (2003) concluded that 
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birds, but the benefits of short-term set-aside for arable plants in England 
were small. Corbet (1995), on the other hand, considered long-term set-
aside a possibility for establishing patches of undisturbed perennial 
herbaceous vegetation and their associated fauna. Steffan-Dewenter & 
Tscharntke (1997), Critchley & Fowbert (2000) and Kuussaari & Heliölä 
(2004) remarked that green fallows are poorer habitats than meadows when 
considering the species diversity of vascular plants or butterflies and other 
insects. 
Further research work and new data are necessary to evaluate the 
employment effects. Closer cooperation with environmental scientists is 
needed in the development of the habitat index, especially as production 
techniques (such as no-till cultivation) are changing. In addition, different 
habitat indexes may be constructed in order to separately quantify the 
richness of animal and plant species. Interdisciplinary work is also 
important in terms of the overall credibility of the economic modelling 
approach in evaluating the multifunctionality issue: the material flows and 
production biological relationships in the sector model need to be regularly 
updated with new research and data at the farm level. Hence the 
assessment of different agricultural policies on many aspects of 
multifunctionality is a continuous research agenda rather than a single 
project providing fixed coefficients for future indicator calculations. The 
credibility of the production economics and biological relationships of the 
economic model determine the validity of the indicator results. The overall 
framework and economic logic of microeconomic simulation models 
provides a consistent assessment of the many aspects of multifunctionality 
in comparison with a number of different expert opinions. 
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8.  Modelling agricultural 
multifunctionality 
A case study of the Czech Republic 
  Tomáš Doucha and Ivan Foltýn 
Introduction 
The transformation of the Czech agricultural sector and its adjustment to 
new social and economic conditions has been ongoing since 1990, after the 
velvet revolution. The substance of the transformation consists of the 
restitution of ownership rights and titles for agricultural assets (property 
transformation) and of the restructuring of farms, their production and 
land use. Since the latter half of the 1990s, the restructuring has also been 
linked to the development of the multifunctionality of Czech agriculture. 
This orientation has gained importance since the accession of the Czech 
Republic to the EU in 2004, the entry of Czech farms into the EU Single 
Market under the conditions of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and 
the application of the European model of agriculture. 
In section 8.1, this chapter summarises the actual state of the Czech 
agricultural sector after 15 years of transformation, with the stress placed 
on its multifunctional characteristics and on the conditions influencing 
multifunctionality. Applying a non-linear optimising model and using data 
from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and other parameters 
(in section 8.2), the effects of defined policy scenarios are simulated up to 
2010 (in section 8.3) on the production structure and multifunctionality of 
Czech agriculture (in section 8.4). The effects on individual farm categories 
are projected, differentiated by regional aspects and their expected 
behavioural formulas and responses to policy stimuli. The most important 
policy issues arising from the simulations are presented in the conclusions. 
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The multifunctionality of agriculture – its positive externalities as 
public goods related to the environment and to rural development – is 
defined according to the methodology presented in Guyomard (2006) and 
in Dwyer et al. (2005). The indicators of multifunctionality are also derived 
from the referenced ENARPRI Working Papers, which can be adjusted to 
the possibilities of the applied mathematical model. The same point applies 
to the definitions of the policy scenarios.    
8.1  The multifunctionality of Czech agriculture – Current status 
8.1.1  Czech agricultural policy 
Multifunctionality in the Czech agricultural sector has been developing 
under the conditions determined by agricultural and other policies and the 
general institutional framework of society. Up to the mid-1990s, Czech 
agricultural policy was prevailingly oriented towards property 
transformation in the sector and income support for the emerging new 
farm structures. After 1994, the following stages of Czech agricultural 
policy can be observed, as outlined below (see also Table 8.1).  
1995–97: Restructuring 
Agricultural policy in the period 1995–97 was characterised by: 
•  continuing support for restructuring and stabilising the new 
emerging farm structure (41% of all budgetary support); 
•  introduction of new support for grassland in ‘less-favoured areas’ 
(LFAs) in order to maintain the landscape; 
•  support for the environment and multifunctionality was mainly 
through LFA payments, but new support was also given for non-food 
outputs of agricultural production (mainly for biofuel); 
•  a higher level of protection for domestic consumers through 
administrative barriers for exports (cereals, oilseeds, etc.); and 
•  protection for domestic producers at the general level agreed in the 
Uruguay round of the GATT (approximately 2-2.5 times lower than 
EU protection), which was only slightly eroded by bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements (e.g. the Central European Trade 
Agreement). 
 238 | A CASE STUDY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
1998–2003: CAP-like policy 
Agricultural policy in the period 1998–2003 was oriented towards a gradual 
adjustment to the CAP and future EU accession, and included these key 
aspects: 
•  a growing total level of support (by more than 60% in nominal terms 
compared with the previous period), particularly in the category of 
income support (38% of all budgetary support), based on CAP-like 
marketing frameworks and measures; 
•  a growing share of support for the environment and 
multifunctionality (31% of all budgetary support), with the 
implementation of (LFA) payments and the continuing high level of 
support for non-food outputs of agricultural production (biofuel); 
and 
•  a decrease in the actual tariff protection through the implementation 
of new trade agreements with the EU (‘double-profit’ and ‘double-
zero’ agreements), but with protection levels remaining on a higher 
level than in the EU. 
2004–05: The CAP 
Czech agricultural policy in the first years after EU accession (2004–05) has 
featured the following elements: 
•  a sharp increase in the total level of budgetary support (by 68% 
compared with the previous period); 
•  a prevailing share of income support in the total package of 
budgetary support (more than 55%). Income support in the form of 
direct payments has consisted of decoupled SAPS1 payments and 
coupled national, complementary, direct payments (the so-called 
‘top-up payments’). With a high share of coupled top-up payments, 
all the direct payments have thus functioned as coupled support 
during this start-up period;  
•  direct payments conditioned on ‘good farming practices’, but with 
reduced enforcement; 
                                                      
1 SAPS refers to the Simplified Administrative Payment Scheme.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 239 
 
•  an increase of support for the environment and multifunctionality, 
with a predominant share of LFA payments and a growing share of 
other support measures (for biodiversity and rural development), but 
with a sharp decrease of the budgetary support for biofuel (as a 
consequence of EU regulations in this sector). Owing to relatively 
weak payment conditions and other factors, however, in reality LFA 
payments and other forms of environmental support have been 
functioning as additional direct payments; and 
•  entry into the EU Single Market with ‘zero’ protection for the sector, 
but with a higher average level of protection against the rest of the 
world compared with the pre-accession period. 
Table 8.1 Annual budgetary supports for Czech agriculture from 1995 to 2005, 
by policy goals 
Goals  1995–97     1998–2003     2004–05    
  
CZK 
(mn)  % 
CZK  
(mn)  % 
CZK 
(mn)  % 
Restructuring 4,635  41.38  5,457  30.27  4,878  16.13 
Incomes 2,208  19.72  6,780  37.61  16,756  55.42 
Environment 2,469  22.04  5,518  30.61  7,993  26.44 
Consumers 1,888  16.86  271  1.50  609  2.01 
Total 11,199  100.00  18,025  100.00  30,235  100.00 
Of which 
  environment                   
Landscape, 
LFA 1,742  70.54  3,087  55.94  4,595  57.49 
Water, soil  20  0.82  137  2.48  714  8.93 
Biodiversity 232  9.40  337  6.10  1,057  13.22 
Ecological 
farming  0 0.00  141  2.55  240  3.01 
Forestry, 
rurala) 24  0.96  72  1.31  746  9.33 
Non-food 
use 451  18.28  1,745  31.62  642  8.03 
Total 2,469  100.00  5,518  100.00  7,993  100.00 
a) This is the only support available under the agricultural policy. 
Source: Database of agricultural policy, VUZE. 
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8.1.2  Farm structure – Land use and ownership 
During the entire transformation period, besides the legislation concerning 
property, the quality of the land market has been one of the most important 
factors shaping the Czech farm structure and multifunctionality. Owing to 
path dependencies from the Czech Republic’s ‘land history’ and to 
ineffective reform instruments (particularly the instruments and financial 
resources for land consolidation and re-parcelling in cadastres – the 
elementary official territorial unit in the Czech Republic), the land market 
has remained undeveloped. The privatisation of state land has proven to be 
the most significant driving force for its development. Nevertheless, those 
land users originating from the pre-reform period have retained real power 
and advantages in the land market. Thus, actual land use and ownership 
continues to strongly influence the present and future situation in Czech 
agriculture and its multifunctional roles (see Table 8.2).  
Table 8.2 Land users and owners of the Czech utilised agricultural area (2004) 
Farms/ 
owners 
State  Muni-
cipal 
PEa) 
farms 
LE 
farms 
PP-LE  Other 
PP 
Total 
(000 ha) 
Total 
(%) 
No.  Avg. 
size 
(ha) 
Subsistence –  –  40  –  –  –  40  1.11  19,189  0.2 
Family 30  5  205  –  –  185  425  11.81  30,231  14.1 
Ind. 320  10  65  60  –  1150  1605  44.58  3,704  433.3 
CF-M 125  5  –  40  75  395  640  17.78  668  958.1 
CF-O 110  5  –  20  180  540  855  23.75  667  1,281.9 
Other 35  –  –  –  –  –  35  0.97  180  194.4 
Total  
(000 ha) 
620  25  310  120  255  2,270  3,600  100.00  54,639  65.9 
Total (%)  17.22  0.69  8.61  3.33  7.08  63.06  100.00  –  –  – 
Number 1  6,000  2,000  28,000  50,000 3,000,000 3,086,001  –  –  – 
Average 
 size (ha) 
620,000  4.17  155.00  4.29  5.10  0.76  1.17  –  –  – 
a) Land leased by PE to other categories of farms is included in OPP (see definitions below). 
Notes: PE/LE = physical/legal entity; PP = physical persons; CF-M/O = coops and joint stock 
companies (M = with a power of management; O = with a power of owners); other companies 
included in the category of individual farms; PP-LE = PP as members/shareholders of farms 
Sources: Czech Statistical Office – Agrocensus 2000, the Czech Land Fund and authors’ estimations. 
The main conclusions that can be derived from Table 8.2 are as follows: 
•  There is an extreme concentration of land use (around 5% of the 
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UAA2). The dual structure of land use stands against an extreme 
fragmentation in the land ownership (millions of small owners). 
•  Czech farms own only about 12–13% of the land, with the remaining 
agricultural land being leased. 
•  Family farms only occupy around 13% of the UAA. 
•  Large individual farms (including partnership farms and limited 
liability companies) are the most dynamic farm category, occupying 
nearly half of the UAA at present. Their share in the UAA (also 
supported by the land privatisation efforts) has been growing. This 
trend has occurred through the enlargement of family farms and also 
through formal or informal changes to those collective farms (coops 
and joint stock companies) in which there has been a concentration of 
property or economic power in the hands of managers. 
•  From another point of view, about two-thirds of the UAA is occupied 
by ‘profit-oriented’ farms; the remaining one-third is utilised by 
‘income-oriented’ farms, with a stronger self-employment focus. 
•  Concerning land ownership and use, non-agricultural and foreign 
capital has been penetrating the sector at an increasing rate in the last 
few years (as an obvious consequence of the present and expected 
profitability of the Czech farming/land sector). 
Such land use and ownership structures have some implications for the 
development of multifunctionality in agriculture: 
•  In principle, there are high transaction costs accompanying any 
changes in land use or in land ownership. These costs result in 
passive behaviour on the part of landowners concerning the land 
market or in serious barriers for land users, e.g. in needed (and 
therefore supported) conversions of arable land into grassland 
(landowners block the conversion). 
•  There is a risk of an extremely high level of diversion of direct 
payments away from agriculture and from rural areas through land 
                                                      
2 UAA approximately represents the area of Czech agricultural land that is eligible 
for direct payments. The acreage of the UAA (about 3.5-3.6 million ha) differs from 
the total acreage of Czech agricultural land (4.3 million ha) based on the 
registration of ownership plots. Some of the difference (about 300,000 ha) can be 
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ownership and leased land (today a reasonable number of 
landowners live in towns). At present, in the Czech Republic the 
diversion of support is hampered by the low degree of flexibility in 
the land market, so this is more of a future risk. 
•  The prevailing profit orientation of farms represents another risk for 
multifunctionality. The continuing investment support for farm 
modernisation will clearly lead to a further reduction of labour, 
without a proper incentive for the establishment of new job 
opportunities on those farms if new non-agricultural activities are not 
sufficiently profitable. 
8.1.3  Farm categories and their characteristics  
The effects of different policy scenarios on multifunctionality are modelled 
below for individual farm categories. The farm categories are defined 
through the application of two main criteria: 
•  the regional location of farms, reflecting also the local share of LFA. 
Each Czech farm can be identified by its location in the so-called 
‘production regions’, reflecting soil productivity, i.e. in 
-  the hilly region (H), which simulates 100% of the LFAs in the area 
of a farm; 
-  the potato region (P), which simulates 50% of the LFAs in the area 
of a farm; 
-  the maize and sugar beet regions (M), which simulate 0% of the 
LFAs in the area of a farm; 
•  the behaviour of farms and their expected reflection of policy 
measures/stimuli, more specifically, 
-  profit-oriented farms (P), optimising the rate of profit from 
inputs/assets;3 and 
-  income-oriented farms (I), optimising the level of gross margin or 
the maximum profit generated by farming.4 
                                                      
3 For modelling, this farm category is represented by large individual farms with 
more than 300 ha of agricultural land. 
4 For modelling, this farm category is represented by family farms with 50–100 ha 
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Combining these two criteria, six categories of farms are recognised for 
modelling: HP, HI, PP, PI, MP and MI. Based on FADN data and with the 
conversion of land use and production structures for farms with 100 ha of 
agricultural land, the main indicators for all selected farm categories are 
presented in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Economic and structural indicators for selected farm categories 2004* 
Indicator Unit 
 
Hilly (H) 
 
 
Potato (P) 
 
 
Maize & sugar 
beet (M) 
 
        Profit  Income    Profit  Income  Profit  Income 
Arable  land  ha  12.4 19.6  54.6 71.3  96.7 94.0 
  –  cereals  ha  3.0 14.5  36.9 50.0  66.2 61.9 
  –  oilseeds  ha  1.7 0.0  9.0 7.2  8.9 8.3 
 – forage  ha  7.6  4.4  4.6  10.9  1.6  5.7 
 – other  ha  0.1  0.7  4.1  3.2  20.0  18.1 
Permanent 
crops  ha  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.2  0.2 2.9 
Grassland  ha  87.6 80.4  45.4 28.5  3.1  3.1 
Total  UAA  ha  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
Dairy cows  heads  10.4  8.9 7.0  14.6 1.0  3.8 
Suckler cows  heads  7.5 7.2  5.1 5.4  0.3 0.5 
Ewes/goats  heads  5.9 0.0  1.6 1.5  0.1 0.9 
Pigs  000  CZK  4  8 26  206 74  132 
Poultry  000  CZK  0 0  0 3  0 0 
Eggs  000  CZK  0 0  0 0  0  1799 
Livestock units  LU  32.1 48.7  21.5 43.7  6.1 15.0 
Labour  AWU  1.40 2.26  1.40 2.97  1.85 3.02 
Production 000  CZK 753  1,247 1,497  2,399 2,362  2,982 
 – crops  000 CZK  363  484  980  1,202  2,138  2,533 
 – livestock  000 CZK  375  717  487  1,126  155  381 
 – other  000 CZK  15  46  30  71  69  68 
Interim  
   consumption  000 CZK  691  1164  1077  1644  1549  1915 
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Table 8.3 cont. 
Operational 
   subsidiesa)  000  CZK  529 657  406 388  329 365 
Net value 
added 
   (NVA)  000 CZK  507  548  826  701  912  1047 
Labour costs 
   (hired)  000 CZK  251  40  190  40  294  109 
Capital  costs  000  CZK  7 35  10 15  22 28 
Rents for land  000 CZK  25  38  55  48  122  104 
Operational 
surplus  000  CZK  224 442  446 756  475 838 
NVA/AWU 000  CZK  362 242  590 236  493 347 
Profitability b)  CZK/CZK 1.16 1.07  1.24 1.12  1.15 1.20 
Production 
   intensity 
000 
CZK/ha  7.38 12.01  14.67 23.28  22.93 29.14 
Production/  
AWU  000  CZK  538 552 1,069 808 1,277 987 
Share of non- 
   agri. Prod.   %  2.0 3.7  2.0 3.0  2.9 2.3 
Interim 
consumption/ 
   production  %  91.8 93.3  71.9 68.5  65.6 64.2 
Depreciation/ 
   production  %  11.2 15.4  8.4 13.2  11.3 11.7 
* Calculated for 100 ha. 
a) Without production taxes 
b)  (Production+operational subsidies)/(interim consumption + depreciation+labour costs 
including FWU+capital costs+rents for land). 
Source: FADN CZ (2004), VUZE. 
 
8.1.4  The multifunctionality of Czech agriculture 
The development of multifunctionality in the Czech agricultural sector 
during the reform, applying selected proxy indicators, is shown in Table 
8.4. 
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Table 8.4 Indicators of multifunctionality – Czech agriculture 
Indicator 
Unit  1989 1995 2004  Index 
2004/1989 
Land abandonment  000 ha  300  300  300  100.00 
Share of arable land in agricultural land  %  75.00  73.00  71.70  95.60 
Share of land threatened by erosion   %  35.00  33.00  33.00  94.29 
Share of ecological farming on agricultural  land  %  0.00 1.00 5.97  – 
Of which on arable land and permanent  crops  %  0.00 0.50 7.70  – 
Number of cows (dairy and suckler)  000 heads  1248  768  574  45.99 
Number of sheep  000 heads  399  80  140  35.09 
Number of workers in agriculture  000 pers.  533  222  141  26.45 
Share of non-agricultural incomes 
in total farm incomes 
%  30.00 20.00 16.00  53.33 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Czech agriculture under the socialist regime was characterised by 
extremely large collective and state farms and by industrial methods of 
farming, with heavy negative consequences for the environment and 
landscape. The share of arable land in the total area reached about 75%, 
although about two-thirds of the Czech agricultural area now finds itself in 
regions with worse soil and climatic conditions. This side effect has been 
observed as typical of the socialist policy of full food self-sufficiency at any 
cost. The approach towards water in the countryside, however, was the 
most seriously damaging aspect.  
During the last 15 years of the transformation of the Czech 
agricultural sector, its relations to the environment and landscape have not 
changed in principle, despite the large financial resources spent on this 
purpose. Any improvements that have occurred have been enforced by the 
poor economic conditions affecting farms, leading to a reduction in the 
consumption of fertilisers, pesticides, etc. The main causes of this situation 
are 
•  inappropriate agricultural policies (with opportunity costs fostering 
the continuation of industrial farming and overweighing the stimuli 
for change); 
•  ineffective environmental legislation accompanied by weak 
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•  the above-mentioned relations between land users and landowners, 
generating high transaction costs for needed changes; and 
•  very slow progress in land consolidation/re-parcelling. 
Meanwhile, major changes have occurred in the social functions of 
farms and in their relations to rural areas. Since 1989, nearly 75% of 
workers have left farms, being largely absorbed by other sectors. 
Furthermore, the quality of human capital in the agricultural sector has 
deteriorated, because mainly younger and more educated workers have 
exited. Agriculture has stopped representing the main source of rural 
employment and now the risk of growth in rural unemployment – in view 
of a further inevitable reduction of labour in primary agricultural 
production – has been increasing. The risk is all the more serious today, 
because of a relatively low willingness of farms to create new job 
opportunities in non-agricultural activities for the released workers. 
Likewise, other social functions previously provided by farms (nursery 
schools, canteens, health centres, etc.) have been abolished (with some 
exceptions). Above all, Czech agriculture, with its prevailing industrial 
character, still has a tendency to reduce the recreational potential in rural 
areas, functioning against the needed development of rural tourism.  
8.2  Methodology 
8.2.1  The FARMA-4 model 
Optimal farm behaviour in a system of sustainable development 
Definition 1 
Farm behaviour under the given natural conditions is economically optimal if 
the farm maximises its profit in the framework of all its possible avenues of 
production. Indeed, economically-optimal farm behaviour can negatively 
impact the sustainable development of agriculture (e.g. soil fertility) and 
the environment. 
For modelling the influences of farming on the environment, some 
indicators that can be quantified and used for measuring the effects on the 
environment have been selected, as set out below. 
•  Ratio of grassland. This indicator generally characterises exposure to 
soil erosion and the capacity for water retention. 
•  Risk to plants. Broadly-seeded crops in crop rotation pose a risk of 
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•  Ratio of organic fertilisers. This indicator is able to predict the losses 
of soil diversity in ecosystems and soil erosion, and the washing-off 
of nitrogen and phosphorus from the surface and underground 
waters, etc. If there is not a proper circulation of organic mass, then 
an increased share of industrial fertilisers can be supposed, which 
causes negative ecological effects. 
•  Number of breeding cattle (per head) and other farm animals. This 
indicator gives basic information about the production of greenhouse 
gasses in agriculture. 
•  Inputs of energy. This indicator calculates the consumption of fossil 
energy by the agricultural sector, compared with the production of 
renewable energy. 
Definition 2 
Farm behaviour in the given natural conditions is ecologically optimal, if the 
farm maximises its profit while respecting one or more sustainability 
indicators. 
Mathematical model of farm ecological behaviour  
To simulate the sustainability of Czech agriculture, a mathematical 
optimisation model of farm economic behaviour (FARMA-4) is applied, 
with the implementation of the above-mentioned ecological criteria in the 
sense of definition 2. 
The adjusted mathematical model FARMA-4 includes the following 
segments: 
•  marketed and feeding commodities of the crop production on the 
arable land and on grassland; 
•  commodities of the livestock production connected with meat and 
milk outputs; 
•  feeding balance on the basis of self-supply in feedstuffs; 
•  calculations of production and income activities with respect to 
agricultural producer prices (farm-gate prices); 
•  cost calculations for all commodities on the basis of unit costs; 
•  calculations of commodity support (per hectare, per head or per 
production unit) on the basis of CAP rules or other defined policy 
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•  calculations of two optimisation criteria: 1) farm profit = total sales + 
total subsidies – total cost; and 2) farm profitability = (total sales + 
total subsidies ) / total cost;   
•  calculations of the production of organic fertilisers (e.g. manure); 
•  calculations of the nutrient balance of NPK based on the circulation of 
fertilisers on the farm (industrial, organic (crop or animal in origin) 
and air-deposition) measured in the pure nutrients N, P and K;  
•  calculations of the total heads of animals measured by livestock units 
(LU) and LU/ha; 
•  yield calculations depending on the applied level of industrial 
fertilisers; and 
•  calculations of labour inputs depending on the production structure, 
measured by the total number of working hours or AWU (AWU = 
2,200 hours/year). 
According to the optimisation criterion (1 or 2) it is possible to compute 
farm profit maximisation in relation to additional conditions: 
•  positive nutrient balances of N, P, K; 
•  maximum or minimum LU on the agricultural land/forage 
land/grassland; and  
•  implementation of some agro-environmental programmes such as the 
maintenance of grassland. 
For simulations of farm behaviour under the different production 
conditions of the Czech Republic, three farm categories were constructed 
for three regions (M is the area fully located in a non-LFA, P is the area 
located in a combination of non-LFA and LFA, and H is the area fully 
located in an LFA) and the two orientations/behaviours (P is the profit 
with the criterion 2 and I is the income with the criterion 1). All farm 
categories are represented as 100 ha farms where the structure of 
agricultural commodities and intensity parameters (hectare yields or milk 
yields) and cost parameters (unit costs per hectare or ‘feeding days’) are 
derived from the Czech farm surveys (FADN, CZ). 
8.2.2  The multifunctionality indicators used 
For modelling multifunctionality with the application of the model 
FARMA-4, the following indicators are used for the selected farm 
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•  the structure of land use, including arable land, grassland and land 
that has been set-aside (unused); 
•  the number of dairy/suckler cows; 
•  the livestock (ruminants) density (livestock units/ha); 
•  labour (employment); and 
•  the balance of elements (N, P, K). 
8.2.3  Data 
To simulate the impact of various policy scenarios, the following 
exogenous variables/parameters are applied:  
•  For the situation in 2004,  
-  structure of production (using FADN data from 2004); 
-  production costs for individual commodities (using the VUZE 
survey from 2004); 
-  farm-gate prices for individual commodities (based on the report 
on the situation in Czech agriculture, 1994-2004); and 
-  direct payments and LFA payments (using the database of policy 
measures for 2004, VUZE). 
•  For simulations of predictions related to the horizon of 2010, 
-  direct payments (decoupled Single Payment Scheme) and LFA 
payments according to the Accession Treaty between the EU and 
the Czech Republic and according to the last known policy 
decisions/expectations; 
-  farm-gate prices in the EU (OECD, 2005), reflecting reform in the 
sugar sector; 
-  exchange rates CZK/EUR (VUZE predictions) and EUR/USD 
(OECD, 2005);  
-  input prices, i.e. labour, land and other inputs (VUZE 
predictions); and 
-  yields (VUZE predictions, based on AG-MEMOD simulations). 
8.3  Policy scenarios 
The policy scenarios below are applied for modelling the effects of policy 
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•  S1 represents the status quo for 2004–06, with decoupled SAPS 
payments, coupled top-up payments and LFA payments as in the 
period 2004–06. 
•  S2 incorporates full decoupling. It features the decoupled Single 
Payment Scheme at the maximum possible level and LFA payments 
based on the suppositions/conditions from the last draft of the Czech 
EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development) 
programmes,5 sugar beet, milk and permanent crop productions ≤ the 
reference period 2004–06, and sugar beet production without 
compensation payments resulting from the reform. 
•  S3 models a reduced version of full decoupling, i.e. the same as the S2 
scenario, but with a 20% reduction in direct payments. 
•  S4 also incorporates a reduced version of full decoupling, with 
increased agro-environmental support (the transfer of the financial 
sources from the first pillar to the second), i.e. the same as the S3 
scenario, but with a 20% increase in payments for the agro-
environmental scheme ‘maintenance of pastures’.6  
                                                      
5 For 2010 this is held to be a maximum of 24% of arable land on a farm in the H 
category, or 64% of arable land on a farm in the P category, and the ruminant 
density 0.36–1.8 LU/ha of forage land. The level of LFA payments is set at CZK 
4,650/ha of grassland on a farm in the H category and CZK 3,410/ha of grassland 
on a farm in the P category. Investment support for the establishment of grassland 
is CZK 8,000 for all farm categories.  
6 In 2010 this is held to be a maximum of 23% of arable land on a farm in the H 
category, or 58% of arable land on a farm in the P category, and the ruminant 
density 0.36–1.0 LU/ha of forage land; a maximum of 170 kg N/ha on arable land 
and 40 kg N/ha of grassland. Compensation is set at CZK 3,100/ha of grassland 
for farms in the H category and CZK 2,800/ha for farms in the P and M categories.  
The same conditions apply for investment support for the establishment of 
grassland and for the livestock density in the LFA payments, but the maximum 
share of arable land in farm acreage is 0.23% for the H farm category and 0.58% for 
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8.4  Results of modelling multifunctionality 
The results of the simulations related to 2005 (S1) and to 2010 (S2–4) for the 
selected farm categories and the defined policy scenarios are presented in 
Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5 Simulation results 
Indicator/farm category Unit MI MP  PI  PP  HI  HP 
S1 (2005)                      
Arable  land  ha  99.5  84.0  71.4 12.9 52.6 8.2 
 – cereals & oilseeds  ha  76.7  63.6  64.9 6.0  47.0 3.1 
  –  fodder  ha  2.7  2.3  4.5 6.8 5.6 5.0 
 – other arable land  ha  20.1  18.1 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Grassland  ha  0.5  16.0  28.6 87.1 47.4 91.8 
Unused land  ha  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dairy cows  heads  1.0  3.8  7.0  14.6 10.4 8.9 
Suckler cows  heads  3.0  3.0  16.9 8.2  13.2 14.8 
Livestock units/ha  
  of fodder land  LU  2.55  0.81  1.50 0.53 0.94 0.52 
Labour  AWU  1.47  1.50  1.78 1.55 1.70 1.34 
Balance  of  N  kg  -11,580 -8,918 7,259 8,980 8,095 8,473 
Balance of P  kg  -2,738  -2,478  73  200  -145  -56 
Balance of K  kg  -4,165  -3,385  1,717  571  1,382  160 
Operational surplus  
   (profit)  000  CZK 1,239  1,281  1,220 1,122 1,236 1,036 
S2 (2010)                      
Arable  land  ha  95.5  4.2  65.1 12.8 8.7  8.3 
 – cereals & oilseeds  ha  73.4  1.9  58.5  6.1 3.2 3.2 
  –  fodder  ha  2.0  2.2  4.4 6.6 5.4 5.0 
 – other arable land  ha  20.1  0.1  2.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Grassland  ha  4.5  31.0  34.9 87.2 91.3 91.7 
Unused land  ha  0.0  64.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dairy cows  heads  1.0  3.8  7.0  14.6 10.4 8.9 
Suckler cows  heads  3.0  3.0  16.9 8.2  13.2 14.8 
Livestock units/ha  
of fodder land  LU  1.29  0.45  1.27 0.53 0.52 0.52 
Labour  AWU  1.44  0.67  1.63 1.55 1.39 1.34 
Balance  of  N  kg  -11,780 3,193  6,401 8,855 8,231 8,348 252 | A CASE STUDY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
Table 8.5 cont. 
Balance of P  kg  -2,817  92  -233  177  -70  -79 
Balance of K  kg  -4,206  195  1,358  486  17  72 
Operational surplus  
   (profit)  000  CZK 751  436  1,219 1,424 1,410 1,352 
S3 (2010)                      
Arable  land  ha  95.5  69.0  65.1 12.8 8.7  8.3 
 – cereals & oilseeds  ha  73.4  66.7 58.5  6.1 3.2 3.2 
–  fodder  ha  2.0  2.2  4.4 6.6 5.4 5.0 
 – other arable land  ha  20.1  0.1  2.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Grassland  ha  4.5  31.0  34.9 87.2 91.3 91.7 
Unused land  ha  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dairy cows  heads  1.0  3.8  7.0  14.6 10.4 8.9 
Suckler cows  heads  3.0  3.0  16.9 8.2  13.2 14.8 
Livestock units/ha  
of fodder land  LU  1.29  0.45  1.27 0.53 0.52 0.52 
Labour  AWU  1.44  1.13  1.63 1.55 1.39 1.34 
Balance  of  N  kg  -11,780 5,295  6,401 8,855 8,231 8,348 
Balance of P  kg  -2,817  149  -233  177  -70  -79 
Balance of K  kg  -4,206  -196  1358  486  17  72 
Operational surplus  
   (profit)  000  CZK 611  604  1,079 1,284 1,270 1,212 
S4 (2010)+B23                      
Arable  land  ha  86.9  4.2  9.1 12.6  8.6 8.2 
 – cereals & oilseeds  ha  65.9  1.8  2.6 5.9 3.0 3.1 
  –  fodder  ha  0.9  2.2  4.4 6.6 5.5 5.0 
 – other arable land  ha  20.1  0.2  2.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Grassland  ha  13.1  31.0  90.9 87.4 91.4 91.8 
Unused land  ha  0.0  64.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dairy cows  heads  1.0  3.8  7.0  14.6 10.4 8.9 
Suckler cows  heads  3.0  3.0  16.9 8.2  13.2 14.8 
Livestock units/ha 
of fodder land  LU  0.60  1.45  0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 
Labour  AWU  1.38  0.67  1.31 0.25 1.39 1.33 
Balance  of  N  kg  -11,680 2,406  4,476 6,704 5,983 6,088 
Balance  of  P  kg  -2,921 -64  -896 -267 -532 -540 
Balance of K  kg  -4,180  115  -439  302  -171  -117 
Operational surplus  
   (profit)  000  CZK 640  382  1,276 1,522 1,555 1,499 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 253 
 
The interpretation of the results for the 2005 (S1) and to 2010 (S2–4) 
scenarios can be summarised as below.  
•  S1 (status quo 2005) represents the optimisation of the current 
production structures under the 2004–06 policy conditions (not 
considering permanent crops). The optimum structures compared 
with the current ones show an increase in the acreage of arable land 
in all income-oriented farms and vice versa in all profit-oriented 
farms. Grassland can generate higher profitability; arable land can 
generate a higher amount of profit. Leaving the land unused is not an 
optimum solution for any of the farm categories. 
•  The results of S2–4 related to 2010 are very similar, substantiating the 
hypotheses on land use, labour inputs and so forth. 
-  Profit-oriented farms could be more attracted by the conversion of 
arable land into grassland (even in non-LFA regions) and by the 
introduction of (relatively) very extensive cattle breeding, 
resulting in a reduction of labour inputs. Only in non-LFA regions 
could it be profitable to enlarge (to an extreme extent) the area of 
unused land. 
-  Income-oriented farms could retain a higher share of arable land 
combined with relatively extensive cattle breeding, resulting in 
higher labour inputs. Gains in unused land may be very limited. 
-  The decrease of direct payments by 20% (S3) would only impact 
the level of profitability and profits, without affecting land use or 
production structures. 
•  The implementation of higher payments for the maintenance of 
grassland (S4) could compensate the decrease of direct payments in 
the profitability and profits in all farm categories, but would be 
especially attractive for income-oriented farms in the potato regions. 
Conclusions – Policy issues and recommendations 
Around 75% of the utilised agricultural area in the Czech Republic is 
occupied by profit-oriented farms. Because of a combination of 
expectations about the slow progress in land consolidation (re-parcelling), a 
zero-level of degressivity by the size of farm in direct payments until 2010, 
a low level of degressivity by the size of farm in LFA payments and other 
factors, the share of profit-oriented farms in the Czech Republic may even 
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W i t h  t h i s  k i n d  o f  f a r m  s t r u c t u r e in mind, the total decoupling of 
direct payments combined with the possibility that land will not have to be 
used for the production of a commodity 7 can lead to an extreme level of 
extensive farming and a large share of unused land in the most productive 
regions.  
These trends, however, could be counter-balanced by the conditions 
for LFA payments, which contribute significantly to the finances of farms in 
the LFAs. On the one hand, the maximum limits for the share of arable land 
and on the other hand the minimum limits for livestock density could lead 
to an enlargement of the grassland acreage accompanied by a shift of cattle 
breeding on the LFA land. 
Under these conditions, the tendency towards the intensity of 
production along with a reduction in labour costs and in employment by 
farms could be smoothed. This point applies to all regions and farm 
categories. Nevertheless, there may be a perpetual risk that the expected 
positive externalities from farming related to the environment (water, soil) 
may be eliminated by the negative externalities connected with rural 
employment or to rural social and human capital. 
Taking into account all aspects of multifunctionality, the main policy 
issues and recommendations deduced from the model simulations to be 
addressed by policy-makers are 
•  Implementation of a graduated scale for degressivity in the direct 
payments and particularly in the LFA payments could create stimuli 
for the development of small and medium-sized farms, generating 
better conditions for job opportunities and an increase in the quality 
of human and social capital in (marginal) rural areas. 
•  Greater support is needed for the development of non-agricultural 
activities on farms or for the development of micro-firms in rural 
areas. 
•  Agro-environmental schemes need to be implemented, based on 
more stringent conditions for compensation payments or on schemes 
to compensate non-commodity outputs in accordance with real 
environmental effects (to reduce the risk that agro-environmental 
                                                      
7 The land will however, have to be maintained according to good farming 
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payments, owing to low transaction costs in the required changes to 
farm practices, are considered a prolongation of direct payments). 
•  In any case, decoupling can lead to a fall in the volume of production 
by the Czech agricultural sector and contribute to a reduction of 
surpluses under the EU-25 framework. 
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9.  The impact of potential WTO trade 
reform on greenhouse gas and 
ammonia emissions from agriculture 
A case study of Ireland 
  Trevor Donnellan and Kevin Hanrahan 
Introduction 
This study combines an economic, partial-equilibrium, agricultural 
commodity and inputs model (the FAPRI-Ireland model) 1 with a model for 
the estimation of greenhouse gases and ammonia emissions from 
agriculture. It considers a potential reform of agricultural trade policy 
under a possible World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement, to reveal the 
extent to which there are environmental effects associated with such a 
reform that need to be considered in addition to the conventional economic 
ones. 
Since the industrial revolution the use of fossil fuels (oil, coal and 
natural gas) has provided power for industry and facilitated the lifestyle of 
Western societies. Owing to the use of fossil fuels, levels of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide have risen, which may augment the greenhouse effect to the 
point where a change in the climate may result. Higher levels of other trace 
gases such as nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) may also contribute to a change in climatic conditions.  
                                                      
1 The FAPRI-Ireland Partnership is a research affiliation between Teagasc – The 
Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority and the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) based at the University of Missouri (for further 
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Collectively these gases are referred to as greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
In Ireland agricultural production is a leading contributor of GHG 
emissions to the atmosphere in the form of methane and nitrous oxide. 
While some remain sceptical about the evidence of global warming, 
the body of scientific opinion contends that a significant alteration of our 
climate is possible within this century. Continuing global warming may 
affect, among other things, crop yields and water supply. Furthermore, it 
may generate the potential for altering the range and number of pests that 
affect plants as well as diseases that threaten the health of both humans and 
animals. An increase in global temperatures may cause the melting of polar 
icecaps, which would raise sea levels and inundate low-lying land areas 
around the world. 
Reflecting growing international concern about global warming, the 
Kyoto Protocol2 was signed in Japan in 1997. It resulted in specific 
limitations for GHG emission levels to be achieved by the first commitment 
period 2008–12 in countries that are signatories to the agreement. These 
targets were set with reference to GHG levels in 1990. Most developed 
countries must reduce their GHG emissions below the 1990 level to comply 
with the Protocol. Within the EU, Ireland received a concession that allows 
an increase in its GHG emissions by no more than 13% above the 1990 
levels by the first commitment period. 
In 2000 the National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS) for Ireland was 
published. It projected that without policies to contain the level of 
emissions, Ireland would in fact exceed its target of 60.74 million tonnes 
(Mt) of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent by up to 22% by the first 
commitment period.3 In the NCCS, the Department of the Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government in Ireland set out specific measures to 
control GHG emissions.  
Relative to other EU member states and most other developed 
countries, Ireland is unusual in terms of the percentage contribution made 
by agriculture to national GHG emissions. Of the 68 Mt of GHG CO2 
equivalent produced in Ireland in 2004, it is estimated that 28% was 
                                                      
2 S e e  t h e  U S  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e ,  B u r e a u  o f  O c e a n s  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Environmental and Scientific Affairs (1998) for more details. 
3 See the NCCS, Department of the Environment (2000), p. 12. 258 | A CASE STUDY OF IRELAND 
 
contributed by Irish agriculture (Environmental Protection Agency, 2005). 
This figure reflects both the high degree of agricultural activity and 
relatively lower levels of other GHG sources (such as heavy industry) in 
Ireland. The emission of GHGs from Irish agriculture principally comes 
from animals but is also the result of agricultural practices such as the use 
of fertiliser and manure management. It is likely that policy-makers will 
seek to reduce GHG emissions below the levels projected in the NCCS 
report. In this regard they may consider the cost of reducing emissions 
from each sector in order to minimise the effect on the overall economy. 
There is thus a need to estimate GHG emissions from the various sectors of 
the economy, including agriculture. 
This study projects the future level of GHG emissions under existing 
agricultural policies prevailing in the EU and then contrasts that outcome 
with projections made under an assumed WTO agreement, thereby 
capturing the potential impact of such a trade reform for GHG emissions 
from Irish agriculture. 
In addition to concerns relating to GHG emissions, since the 1970s 
there has been growing international concern about air pollution. In the EU 
an objective of policy-makers is to formulate and implement strategies to 
improve air and water quality. To meet this objective, the control of 
emissions from a variety of industrial, commercial and agricultural sources 
is a key aim. With this in mind the European Council issued a Directive 
(No. 2001/81/EC) in 2001 that sets limits for each EU member state in 
terms of total emissions of specific gases. These limits are to be met by 2010. 
Four categories of pollutants – sulphur (SO2), nitrous oxides (NOx), 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and ammonia (NH3) – have been 
identified as being responsible for acidification and eutrophication of 
ground water and ground-level ozone pollution. The Directive allows EU 
member states to provide their own mechanisms to ensure that reduction 
targets are achieved. As part of the Directive member states will be 
required to report each year on their actual and projected future levels of 
emissions of these substances. National programmes are required to specify 
how national ceilings will be met. The Directive contained provisions for 
reviews in 2004 and 2008 to identify the progress being made and whether 
further actions are required. 
Some of the pollutants mentioned above can be transported 
considerable distances through the air or in water, which means that 
pollution arising in one country may have an impact in another. Thus a TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 259 
 
coordinated international approach, which extends beyond the EU, is 
required to address the issue. Accordingly, in November 1999 EU member 
states together with Central and Eastern European countries, the US and 
Canada negotiated the UNECE Gothenburg Protocol to the 1979 
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate 
Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground Level Ozone (UNECE, 1999). 
The Gothenburg Protocol contains emission ceilings that are not as 
stringent as are those agreed by the European Council. Under the 
Gothenburg Protocol, Ireland agreed to reduce its NH3 emission levels by 
9% from those estimated for 1990. With regard to Irish agriculture’s 
contribution to these forms of pollution, a number of consequences can be 
identified as below. 
Eutrophication refers to the gradual increase in the concentration of 
phosphorus, nitrogen, ammonia and other plant nutrients in water 
ecosystems such as lakes. As the amount of organic material that can be 
broken down into nutrients rises, the productivity or fertility of such an 
ecosystem increases. Runoff from land may enter water systems containing, 
among other things, fertiliser and decomposing plant matter. This spillover 
can cause algal blooms (highly concentrated amounts of micro-organisms) 
to develop on the water surface, which then prevents the light penetration 
and oxygen absorption that is necessary for aquatic life. This process can be 
intensified when excessive amounts of fertilisers (as well as sewage and 
detergents) are prevalent. Ammonia is a major constituent of agricultural 
fertilisers, which contributes to the process of eutrophication.  
Acidification can result from emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides and ammonia. Although sulphur is the biggest contributor to 
acidification, nitrogen compounds are also a significant source. When soil 
becomes acidified it can cause nutrients to leach, which then reduces soil 
fertility. Metals can also be released from the process, which can affect the 
micro-organisms that facilitate the decomposition of organic matter in the 
soil and in turn affect birds, animals and humans. Tree damage such as leaf 
and needle losses has been linked to acidification and high concentrations 
of ground ozone. 
We examine the level of ammonia produced by the various sub-
sectors of Irish agriculture. We use economic projections for future levels of 
agricultural activity in conjunction with per unit estimates of ammonia 
emissions to calculate future levels of ammonia emissions from Irish 
agriculture.  260 | A CASE STUDY OF IRELAND 
 
In this study we do not consider the issue of whether or not GHG or 
ammonia emissions from agriculture should be considered as a 
multifunctional output of the agricultural sector. The OECD has produced 
an analytical framework wherein the nature and definition of 
multifunctionality is discussed at length (OECD, 2001).  
The rest of this chapter is divided into four further sections. Section 
9.1 examines the methodology for the estimation of the impact of trade 
policy on the level of agricultural activity and in turn the effects of GHG 
and ammonia production. Section 9.2 outlines two states of the world for 
examination. The first, referred to as a baseline, examines agricultural 
activity and emissions generation under a continuation of existing 
(Uruguay round) WTO trade policies and the current (Luxembourg 
Agreement) EU common agricultural policy (CAP). The second state of the 
world, a WTO reform scenario, alters trade policies (as a result of a 
hypothetical WTO agreement) to assess the impact on agricultural activity 
and emissions generation. The policy change considered under the WTO 
reform is also detailed in this section. The difference between emission 
levels under the two scenarios is an estimate of the environmental effects of 
the WTO reform. Section 9.3 presents the results for agricultural 
production, GHG and ammonia emissions under both the baseline and the 
WTO reform scenarios. The results are followed by some conclusions and 
areas for further work. 
9.1  Method of analysis 
The approach used here involves the use of two distinct modelling 
frameworks, which interact with each other to produce projections of the 
impact of trade policy reform on GHG and ammonia emissions. The first 
component is an econometric, partial-equilibrium commodity model and 
the second component is the satellite emissions projection models for both 
GHG and ammonia. 
9.1.1  Partial-equilibrium commodity model 
The FAPRI-Ireland model is a set of econometric, dynamic, multi-product, 
partial-equilibrium commodity models. In its current version, the model 
has an agricultural commodity coverage that extends to markets for grains 
(wheat, barley and oats), other field crops (potatoes, sugar beet and 
vegetables), livestock (cattle, pigs, poultry and sheep) and milk and dairy 
products (cheese, butter, whole milk powder and skim milk powder). TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 261 
 
Many of the equations in the model are estimated using annual data from 
the period 1973–2005 or over shorter periods in cases where data are not 
available or where, for policy reasons, longer estimation periods would not 
be meaningful. 
The FAPRI-Ireland model is structured as a component of the 
FAPRI EU GOLD model, which is a commodity model of EU agriculture. 
The GOLD model in turn can form a component of the FAPRI world 
modelling system for world agriculture. In this way the model for Ireland 
can incorporate the consequences of changes in international trade policy 
as they relate to agriculture. 
The primary purpose of the FAPRI-Ireland model is to analyse the 
effect of policy changes on economic indicators such as the supply and use 
of agricultural products, agricultural input expenditure and sector income. 
In so doing the model produces future projections of animal numbers, 
input usage volumes (e.g. fertiliser, feed, fuel and energy) and other 
indicators. These data can be incorporated into the satellite GHG models to 
enable the provision of base data and projections relating to 
multifunctionality indicators, such as GHG emissions, fertiliser usage and 
ammonia emissions. Key components of the structure of the partial-
equilibrium model are set out below. 
The equation for the total agricultural area farmed is modelled as: 
  ⎟
⎠
⎞ ⎜
⎝
⎛ =
−
−
1
1
t
t
t gdp
agout f taf   (1) 
where  t taf is the total agricultural area in year t and  1 − t agout is the value of 
agricultural output in year  1 − t  and  1 − t gdp  is a measure of national income 
in year  1 − t . The equations used to determine the share of the total 
agricultural area farmed within each agricultural culture group can be 
expressed as: 
  ( ) t t t i t t i t i Z V ash agout ret f ash , , , , 1 , 1 1 , , − − − =       5 , , 1K = i  (2) 
where  t i ash , is the share of the total agricultural area to be allocated to i-th 
culture group in year t,  1 , − t i ret  is the value of the output from the i-th 
culture group and  1 − t agout is the value of total agricultural output in year 
1 − t , while V  and Z are vectors of exogenous and endogenous variables 
that could have an impact on the area allocated to agriculture culture group 
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modelled (pasture, hay and silage, potatoes, sugar beet and cereals) is 
derived as the residual land use so as to ensure land-use balance.  
The total area allocated to the i-th agricultural culture group is then 
derived as the product of the i-th area share times the total agricultural 
area: 
  t t i t i taf ash af ∗ ≡ , ,  (3) 
Within each of the i agricultural culture groups, land may be further 
allocated among competing cultures, for example within the land area 
allocated to the cereals culture group soft wheat ‘competes’ with barley and 
oats for land. Within the culture group allocation of land this is modelled 
using area allocation equations of a similar form to (2): 
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where 
j
t i asf ,  is the share of the j-th culture within the culture group i, 
j
t i ret 1 , −  is the return to the  j -th culture in year  1 − t , and  t S  and  t W  are 
other endogenous and exogenous variables that may affect the allocation of 
land among the  j  competing cultures within any given culture group i. 
The land (in hectares) allocated to the  j -th culture is then derived as the 
product of the total land allocated to the i-th culture group ( t i af , ) times the 
area share ( t j i asf , , ): 
  t i
j
t i
j
t i af asf aha , , , ∗ ≡
. (5) 
The yield equations of culture k  in culture group i can be written as:  
  ( ) V r p f r
k
t i
j
t i
k
t i , , 1 , 1 , , − − =
     n k j ,..., 1 , =  (6) 
where 
k
t i r ,  is the yield per hectare of culture k  belonging to the culture 
group i, and V is a vector of variables, which could influence the yield per 
hectare of the culture being modelled. 
On the demand side, crush and feed demand and non-feed use per 
capita are modelled using the following general functional forms: 
  ( ) Z p f Fu
j
t i
k
t i , , , =
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where 
k
t i Fu ,  is the feed demand for culture k  belonging to the culture 
group  i and Z is a vector of endogenous variables (such as the level of 
meat production), which could affect the feed demand; 
  ( )
k
t i
j
t i
k
t i NFu p f NFu 1 , , , , − =
     n k j ,..., 1 , =  (8) 
where 
k
t i NFu ,  is the non-feed demand for culture k  belonging to the 
culture group i and V is a vector of exogenous variables (such as income) 
that could have an impact on non feed demand; 
  ( )
h
t i
l
t i
h
t i
h
t i
k
t i CR p p p f CR 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , , , − − − − =
     n l h ,..., 1 , =  (9) 
where 
k
t i CR ,  is the crush demand for oilseed culture k  and 
h
t i p 1 , −  is the real 
price of considered seed oil and 
l
t i p 1 , −  is the real price of the seed meal 
produced as a product of the crushing process. 
While the structure of individual livestock sub-models varies, their 
general structure is similar and is presented below. Ending numbers of 
breeding animals can be written as: 
  ( ) V p cct f cct t i t i t i , , 1 , , − =
     n i ,..., 1 =  (10) 
where  t i cct ,  is the ending number in year t for the breeding animal type i, 
1 , − t i p  is the real price in year  1 − t  of the animal culture i considered, and 
V is a vector of exogenous variables that could have an impact on the 
ending inventory concerned (such as the direct payment linked to the 
animals concerned or specific national policy instruments). 
Numbers of animals produced by the breeding herd inventory can be 
written as: 
  ( ) t i t i t i ypa cct f spr , 1 , , , − =
     n i ,..., 1 =  (11) 
where  t i spr ,  is the number of animals produced from breeding herd  t i cct ,  
in year t and  t i ypa ,  is the exogenous yield per breeding animal concerned. 
Within each animal culture i there may be m categories of slaughter 
j . The number of animals in animal culture i that are slaughtered in 
slaughter category  j  can be written as:  
  ( ) V z p cct f ktt
j
t i t i
j
t i
j
t i , , , , , , , =
     n i ,..., 1 =      m j ,..., 1 =  (12) 264 | A CASE STUDY OF IRELAND 
 
where 
j
t i ktt ,  is the number of animals slaughtered in category  j  of animal 
culture i in year t, 
j
t i z ,  is an endogenous variable that represents the share 
of different categories of animals slaughtered in the total number of 
animals slaughtered for the animal culture concerned, and V is a vector of 
exogenous variables. 
Ending stocks of animals (breeding and non-breeding) are derived 
using identities involving initial inventories of animals, animal production 
(births), slaughter, and live exports and imports. 
The number of dairy cows can be written as: 
  ( ) V p f cct t t , =    (13) 
where  t cct  is the ending number of dairy cows in year t,  t p  is the real 
price of milk in year t, and V is a vector of exogenous variables that could 
have an impact on the ending inventory concerned (including policy 
instruments such as the milk quota). 
Milk yields per cow can be written as:  
  ( ) V p f r t t , =       (14) 
where  t r  is the milk yield per cow,  t p  is the real price of milk in year t, 
and V is a vector of variables that could influence the yield per cow. 
9.1.2  GHG emissions model 
The projections of commodity outputs and input usage from the FAPRI-
Ireland model can be converted into projections of GHG emissions using 
the default conversion coefficients outlined by Houghton et al. (1996) in 
their contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), modified, where possible, with specific coefficients for Ireland.  
The methodology for the establishment of the GHG inventories was 
proposed by Houghton et al. (1996). It was subsequently adopted and 
adjusted to allow for conditions specific to Ireland by the Department of 
the Environment (1997). The approach essentially involves applying 
conversion coefficients to agricultural data and calculating the associated 
emissions of GHGs from enteric fermentation, manure management 
practices and agricultural soil management as defined by Houghton et al. 
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Data on Irish livestock numbers, enterprise areas and input 
applications have been obtained from the FAPRI-Ireland model. Livestock 
emission factors are expressed in terms of the annual amount of methane 
produced by the animal. These emission factors vary by animal type, not 
only because of their differing size and feed consumption, but also because 
of the manner in which food is digested and the animal manure is 
subsequently treated.  
Concerning manure management, the nature of production systems 
tends to favour the management of cattle and pig manure in liquid 
systems, which facilitate anaerobic respiration and the emission of 
methane. By contrast, sheep are rarely housed and consequently methane 
emissions from their manure are negligible.  
The emission of GHGs from agricultural soils varies in accordance 
with the manner in which the land is managed, which in turn depends on 
the type of crop production system in place. For the purposes of emissions 
calculations, the IPCC categorises farmland under three uses. Crop land 
and more intensively farmed grassland have quantities of fertiliser applied 
to them, whereas less intensively farmed grassland may have no fertiliser 
applied to it. Consequently, the levels of methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions from cropland and more intensively farmed grassland are 
considerably higher than grassland maintained without fertiliser.  
GHGs in the form of methane and nitrous oxide emissions from each 
agricultural sub-sector i are thus a function of the number of animals, crop 
areas harvested and nitrogen application. Since the global warming 
potential of CH4 and N2O differ, for the purpose of their addition these are 
brought to a common base of CO2 equivalents using standard weighting 
systems. CH4  produced in each agricultural sector can be represented as: 
  ( ) i t i t i q f CH α , , , , 4 =
 (13) 
where  t i CH , , 4  is the total amount of CH4 produced by sector i in year t, q is 
the quantity of animal or crop category i in year t and α  is the methane 
conversion coefficient associated with the animal or crop category i. 
Similarly, N2O produced in each agricultural sector can be 
represented as: 
  ( ) j t j t j q f O N β , , , 2 =
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where  t j O N , 2  is the total amount of  O N2 produced by sector j in year t, q is 
the quantity of animal or crop category j in year t andβ  is the nitrous oxide 
conversion coefficient associated with the animal or crop category j. 
Finally, total GHG emissions in the common base of CO2 equivalents 
can be expressed as: 
  ∑ ∑ = = + =
m
j t j
n
i t i t O N CH GHG
1 , 2 1 , , 4 γ δ
 (15) 
where EquivCO2 is CO2 equivalent, while  21 = δ and  310 = γ  are the 
global warming potentials of methane and nitrous oxide respectively.  
The next section provides a brief review of the results for the 
agricultural variables used in the generation of GHG emissions. Then the 
consequent baseline and alternative scenario projections of GHG emissions 
from Irish agriculture are presented.  
9.1.3  Ammonia emissions model 
The projections of commodity outputs and input usage from the FAPRI-
Ireland model can be converted into projections of ammonia emissions 
using conversion coefficients. Estimates are based on the quantities of 
synthetic fertiliser applied (e.g. urea and calcium ammonium nitrate) per 
hectare. From 2000 onwards projections are calculated to allow for lower 
nitrogen (N) application rates on the land areas that participate in the Rural 
Environment Protection Scheme. This scheme is an income-support 
measure for farmers in Ireland, which promotes farming practices that 
allow environmentally-friendly food production and the conservation of 
wildlife habitats. 
9.2  Descriptions of the baseline and WTO reform scenarios 
The method of reporting the effect of trade policy on GHG and ammonia 
emissions relies upon a comparison of two states of the world, one 
including, and the other excluding, the trade policy change under 
examination. 
Baseline scenario. This scenario calculates the level of activity that 
would arise in the future under a base case set of agricultural policies. 
Projections of activity levels under the base case of agricultural policy are 
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The baseline projections of agricultural activity used in this section 
are drawn from the baseline outlined in Binfield et al. (2006), i.e. the CAP 
mid-term review and the GATT4 Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA).5 Projections of GHG emissions stemming from these 
agricultural projections are presented below.  
Alternative scenario. This scenario calculates the level of activity that 
would arise in the future under alternative agricultural policies. Projections 
of activity levels under alternative policies are referred to as the alternate 
policy outcomes.  
At the time of writing (December 2005), the outcome of the WTO 
Doha round negotiations is unknown. The WTO reform scenario 
formulated and analysed here is close to the current position of the EU 
within the Doha round (EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s offer 
of 28 October 2005). Under the WTO scenario, as defined in Table 9.1, the 
aggregate measure of support (AMS) is cut by 70% from the bound URAA 
levels. Under the export competition heading, the EU phases out its export 
subsidies over the course of 10 years. Also, in this WTO scenario, 50% of 
the cut in export subsidies is front-loaded on the first year (2007) with the 
remaining 50% phased out in equal instalments over the following nine 
years. Under the market access headings a cut in average tariffs of 60% is 
implemented with lower cuts in tariffs applying to sensitive products set at 
25%. Beef and butter are designated as sensitive products for the EU and 
are subject to these lower tariff reductions. No other market access 
provisions (e.g. tariff-rate quotas or TRQs) are altered.  
Under the WTO reform scenario analysed, the green and blue box 
classifications of current government support to agriculture are retained 
and unaffected by the changes proposed. 
 
 
 
                                                      
4 GATT refers to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – the precursor to the 
World Trade Organisation. 
5 Note that the more recent reform of the EU sugar regime (Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 318/2006) is not reflected in this analysis. 268 | A CASE STUDY OF IRELAND 
 
Table 9.1 WTO reform scenario 
  Domestic support  Export subsidies Market  access 
WTO 
scenario 
70% reduction in the 
total AMS based on 
Uruguay round final 
bound levels with 
retention of green 
and blue boxes 
Phased out over 10 
years, with a 50% 
down payment in 
year 1 and 9 years of 
equal instalments 
thereafter 
60% average cut in 
tariff lines, with a 
25% minimum cut (to 
apply to products 
designated as 
sensitive) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
The effect of the change in policy can be measured by the difference 
between the projections for the baseline and the WTO reform scenarios. 
9.3  Results 
Here the results for GHG emissions are presented under both the baseline 
policy and the WTO reform scenario. The results include a summary of the 
impact on agricultural production levels as well as details on GHG 
emissions. 
9.3.1  Irish agricultural production: Baseline policy 
Under baseline policies, livestock numbers in Ireland are projected to fall 
over time. The number of dairy cows would fall as a result of the quota 
limits on total milk production and genetic improvements that lead to dairy 
cows becoming more productive over time – thus the number of cows 
required to fill the quota would decrease. Dairy cows are by far the largest 
source of agricultural GHG emissions, on a per head basis, so this reduction 
would have a sizable effect on total Irish agricultural GHG emissions.  
Under the baseline projection, the decoupling of agricultural policy as 
recently introduced in the EU will lead to a decrease in beef cattle and 
sheep numbers over the period to 2015, since the policy will make it 
unprofitable for some producers to raise these animals. In Ireland, the 
baseline number of pigs and other animal categories is projected to remain 
relatively static over the projection period. 
The total land area in agricultural use in Ireland will have declined 
slightly by about 1% under baseline policies by 2015 relative to the level in 
2004. Some changes in land use are projected over the period, as there is a 
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as pasture. Although animal numbers are expected to decline, the move 
towards more extensive livestock production will mean that the proportion 
of land devoted to pasture, hay and silage will not change markedly. 
Conditions attached to the receipt of the decoupled payments limits the 
extent to which land will move between these use categories. 
9.3.2  GHG emissions from Irish agriculture: Baseline policy 
The baseline projections for total emissions from agriculture are presented 
in Figure 9.1. Overall, the baseline projections suggest that, with the 
introduction of decoupling as an agricultural policy, there will be a 
reduction in overall agricultural activity. Consequently, Irish agricultural 
GHG emissions are also set to decline. The reduction comes mainly 
through a decrease in the projected future numbers of cattle (both dairy 
and beef) and sheep. Total GHG emissions from Irish agriculture are 
projected to fall by approximately 14% by 2015 relative to 2004. Measured 
against a 1990 base, the decline by 2015 is projected to be over 16%. 
Emissions must be reduced by 8% for the EU-15 as a whole, by the 
first commitment period. Yet under the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement, 
Ireland is committed to minimising its rate of increase in GHG emissions to 
13% above the 1990 level agreed under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Strong economic growth has prompted a significant rise in emissions in the 
non-agricultural sectors of the Irish economy since 1990, so the projected 
fall in agricultural GHG emissions would represent an important 
contribution towards the attainment of Ireland’s GHG emissions target. 
Projected emissions under the baseline scenario are shown in Table 9.2. 
Figure 9.1 Projections of GHG emissions from Irish agriculture – Baseline policy 
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Note: Totals represent CH4 and N2O (in C02 equivalents) from enteric fermentation, manure 
management and agricultural soils. 
Source: FAPRI-Ireland Partnership Model (2006). 270 | A CASE STUDY OF IRELAND 
 
Table 9.2 GHG emissions by Irish agriculture from 1990 to 2015 – Baseline policy 
Source category  Unita)  1990  Baseline 2015  Change (%) 
Methane (CH4)   Gg 551.6  469.8  -14.83 
Nitrous oxide (N2O)  Gg   23.9   21.3  -10.88 
Total (CO2 equivalent)   Mt   18.97   15.8  -16.71 
a) Gg = gigagram (thousand tonnes); Mt = million tonnes 
Note:  The C02 equivalent measure represents the change in the global warming potential of 
methane and nitrous oxide. 
Source: FAPRI-Ireland Partnership Model (2006). 
The next section outlines the results of the WTO reform scenario 
using the FAPRI-Ireland model. The consequent effects on GHG emissions 
under these alternate policy scenarios are presented. 
9.3.3  Projections of agricultural activity: WTO reform scenario 
It is projected that under the WTO reform scenario, milk quotas will 
continue to be filled in Ireland. Dairy cow numbers will decline at a slightly 
lower rate than indicated in the baseline, because the WTO reform scenario 
will lead to a reduction in milk prices that is greater than in the baseline. 
This outcome slightly impedes the growth in milk yields; as a corollary, it 
also slows the fall in cattle numbers.  
Under the WTO scenario, there is also a further contraction in Irish 
beef cattle numbers as reduced exports (due to the elimination of export 
refunds) and increased imports (due to reduced import tariffs) lead to 
lower beef prices across EU member states including Ireland. Overall, cattle 
numbers under the WTO scenario are lower than in the baseline. 
In the case of sheep, Irish prices and production also decline as 
imports from outside the EU increase (due to lower import tariffs). The 
number of pigs and other animal categories is projected to remain 
relatively static over the projection period under the WTO reform scenario. 
Relative to the baseline, the WTO reform scenario leads to only minor 
changes in the allocation of Irish farmland to pasture, hay and silage, 
cereals and root crops. As indicated under the baseline projections, the 
conditions attached to the receipt of the decoupled payments will limit the 
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9.3.4  Projections for GHG emissions: WTO reform scenario 
Since the WTO reform scenario suggests that cattle and sheep numbers fall 
appreciably relative to the baseline levels, methane emissions from both 
enteric fermentation and manure management are expected to decline by a 
greater extent in this scenario than under the baseline.  
Emissions levels under the WTO reform scenario for methane, nitrous 
oxide and GHG equivalent emissions of CO2 are illustrated in Table 9.3. 
Under the WTO reform scenario, by 2015 the total GHG emissions from 
agriculture are expected to decrease by 3.5 Mt of CO2 equivalent (a 
decrease of almost 20%) relative to the position in 1990.  
Table 9.3 GHG emissions by Irish agriculture from 1990 to 2015 – Luxembourg 
Agreement/EU WTO scenario  
Source category  Unita) 1990 
Actual 
2015 WTO reform 
scenario 
Change (%) 
Methane (CH4)   Gg 551.6  456.9  -17.17 
Nitrous oxide (N2O)   Gg  23.9  20.9  -12.55 
Total (CO2 equivalent)*   Mt  18.97  15.3  -19.35 
a)  Gg = gigagram (thousand tonnes); Mt = million tonnes 
Note: The CO2 equivalent measure represents the change in the global warming potential of 
Methane and Nitrous Oxide. 
Source: FAPRI-Ireland Partnership Model (2006). 
By contrast, the baseline analysis presented earlier projected a 
reduction of 3.2 Mt of CO2 equivalent relative to the 1990 level (a decrease 
of over 16%). Under the WTO reform scenario the 2015 outcome represents 
a reduction in emissions relative to 1990 levels that is almost 3 percentage 
points below the reduction projected to occur in the baseline. This result 
suggests that the WTO reform examined here would deliver additional 
environmental benefits to those already anticipated under the baseline 
agricultural reforms taking place in the EU. 
Figure 9.2 presents the projections for GHG emissions from Irish 
agriculture under the baseline and the WTO reform scenarios in CO2 
equivalent terms.  
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Figure 9.2 Projections of GHG emissions from Irish agriculture – Baseline and 
WTO scenarios 
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Note: Totals represent CH4 and N2O (in CO2 equivalent) from enteric fermentation, manure 
management and agricultural soils. 
Source: FAPRI-Ireland Partnership Model (2006). 
9.3.5  Projections of ammonia emissions: Baseline and WTO reform 
scenarios 
Apart from any environmental restrictions that might come into place, the 
t y p e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c y  p u r s u e d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
agricultural activity and in turn the total level of ammonia emissions. The 
level of ammonia emissions can be projected under the baseline and WTO 
scenarios. The approach builds on earlier work (Behan & Hyde, 2003). 
It is found that under both the baseline and the WTO scenarios 
emissions of ammonia are likely to decline relative to current levels. By 
2015 it is projected that ammonia emissions from agriculture will have 
declined by 13% relative to the 2004 level. Despite the decrease this would 
still mean that the level of ammonia emissions from agriculture would be 
very close to the 1990 base year for the Gothenburg Protocol. Ireland’s 
commitment under this Protocol is for a 9% reduction on the 1990 level of 
emissions of ammonia (a target level of 116,000 tonnes) in aggregate 
economy-wide terms by 2010. Projections of ammonia emissions are shown 
in Figure 9.3. 
The reduction in emissions in the baseline stems from the decoupling 
of payments, which results in fewer beef cattle and sheep numbers. With 
milk production fixed by a quota, the continuing increase in milk yields per 
cow means that dairy cattle numbers are also reduced in the baseline.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 273 
 
Figure 9.3 Projected ammonia emissions from agriculture – Baseline and WTO 
scenarios 
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Source: FAPRI-Ireland Partnership Model (2006). 
Under the WTO reform scenario it is projected that there will be 
further reductions in beef cattle and sheep numbers relative to the levels 
projected in the baseline but the decline in dairy cattle numbers is in line 
with that of the baseline. Relative to 2004 the reduction achieved by 2015 
represents a decline of 14%. The extent of the decline is only slightly (1%) 
greater under the WTO scenario compared with the baseline.  
The analysis here suggests that the effects on non-dairy sectors of EU 
and Irish agriculture of the WTO elements of the scenario analysed would 
be somewhat modest. The changes that arise under the scenario relative to 
the baseline in these sectors largely stem from policy changes in the 
Luxembourg Agreement. Nevertheless, more extensive trade reforms 
might have a more widespread impact on agriculture in the EU and 
Ireland. Results will also be sensitive to the future exchange rate between 
the euro and the US dollar. 
9.3.6  Comments on the overall results 
The overall results projected for both GHG and ammonia emissions 
suggest that the reductions in emissions foreseen over time will largely 
arise from CAP reforms rather from international trade policy (WTO) 
reforms. Although this is the most obvious conclusion to make, it may also 
be slightly misleading. The motivations for reform of the CAP relate, to 
some degree, to pressures external to the EU – principally the need to make 
the CAP more compatible with a future WTO agreement. It is unlikely that 274 | A CASE STUDY OF IRELAND 
 
the 2003 CAP reform would have taken the shape it did, had it not been for 
these WTO-related pressures. Therefore one could argue that the 
reductions in emissions projected under the baseline are also motivated by 
trade policy reform and not merely by changes to domestic policies.  
Conclusions 
This study projects some of the effects of recent reforms to EU agricultural 
policy (as a baseline) on the environmental/multifunctionality aspects of 
Irish agriculture. The analysis also provides projections of the potential 
effects of a WTO agreement on such measures in Ireland.  
Under baseline policies (the Luxembourg CAP Reform Agreement), 
GHG emissions from Irish agriculture are projected to decline over the next 
10 years relative to existing levels. Potential WTO trade reforms that might 
arise from a future WTO agreement would lead to only modest additional 
reductions in GHG emissions by 2015. 
In Ireland, increasing milk yields in the presence of a milk quota and 
the introduction of decoupled payments will reduce the number of dairy 
cows, other cattle and sheep. These kinds of livestock are the three leading 
contributors to GHG emissions from Irish agriculture. As a result of EU 
CAP reform (the decoupling of direct payments) and ongoing productivity 
improvements in agriculture, substantial reductions in methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions are possible, even in the absence of trade reform.  
The dairy sector will remain the main source of agricultural GHG 
emissions in Ireland. This sector is projected to continue to produce at the 
maximum level allowed under the milk quota system. It is likely that it 
would require a greater degree of WTO reform than that examined in this 
WTO scenario to significantly reduce emissions from the dairy sector below 
the level projected in the baseline. 
Estimates for 2004 indicate that agriculture was responsible for over 
one-quarter of all Irish GHG emissions. Consequently, the reduction in 
emissions from Irish agriculture stemming from both the CAP reform of 
2003 and any future WTO trade reform should represent a significant 
contribution from the agricultural sector towards meeting the Irish national 
Kyoto target for the first commitment period of a maximum 13% increase 
in GHG emissions over the 1990 emissions levels. 
Emissions of ammonia from Irish agriculture are projected to decline 
under both the baseline and the WTO reform scenarios. Yet much of the TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 275 
 
decline projected under the WTO scenario is estimated to occur in any 
event under the baseline scenario. The impact of the WTO scenario on 
ammonia emissions from agriculture only represents an additional 1% 
reduction by 2015, relative to the 2015 baseline position. 
I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  h a v e  b e e n  
generated at a national level only. While this national focus does present an 
issue in the case of GHG emissions, in the case of ammonia emissions there 
may be additional regional or local considerations that fall outside the 
scope of this model. For example, while it is anticipated that trade reform 
will lead to an overall lowering of agricultural output in Ireland, it could 
lead to local-level intensification or extensification of production, which the 
national model is unable to capture. Local-level changes of these kinds 
could have local-level environmental implications concerning ammonia 
emissions that cannot be measured by a non-local level study such as this. 
The projections in this chapter have been produced under the IPCC 
Tier I basis, since this is the level of detail allowed by the FAPRI-Ireland 
commodity model as currently structured. Future work will aim at 
redesigning aspects of the FAPRI-Ireland commodity model to allow a 
greater disaggregation of agricultural activity and enable emissions 
projections to be made on an IPCC Tier II basis. 
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10. Modelling the effects of trade policy 
on the multifunctionality 
of agriculture 
A social accounting matrix approach for Greece 
  Demetrios Psaltopoulos and Eudokia Balamou 
Introduction 
During the last two decades, there have been major changes in the 
economic structure of European rural areas, mainly induced by agricultural 
policy reforms, international trade liberalisation and globalisation, and the 
strengthened role of rural development policies. The part played by 
agriculture and farmers in the European economy and society has been 
changing accordingly. Agricultural activity has suffered a setback in 
economic and social terms and especially with regard to employment, 
while manufacturing and service employment have spread.  
At the same time, and especially in Europe, a number of concerns 
such as food over-production (which has led to major trade disputes and 
the negative and positive environmental consequences of modern farming) 
have prompted a rethinking of the position of agriculture within society. 
This trend has been accompanied by a reconsideration of the institutional 
system surrounding agriculture (van Huylenbroeck & Durand, 2004) and 
consequently, a greater emphasis on the non-production functions of 
farming. Against this background and (particularly) in view of the Doha 
round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks, increased attention has 
been given to the concept of ‘multifunctionality’, which is based on the 
notion that agriculture produces multiple outputs that include both public 
goods and privately traded commodities (OECD, 1997; Peterson, Boisvert & 
de Gorter, 2002). Furthermore, in the EU, this concept has been utilised by 
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several European Commission statements defending the right of the EU to 
use common agricultural policy (CAP) support in order to uphold a 
multifunctional ‘European model of agriculture’ (European Commission, 
1998; Thomson, 2004).  
Nowadays, over half of the population in the EU-25 live in rural 
areas, which cover 90% of the EU’s territory. Despite the fact that rural 
areas have increasingly become an environment for living and leisure, 
farming and forestry are still of overriding importance for land use and the 
management of natural resources, and consequently, a major platform for 
economic development in rural communities. Thus any changes in 
agricultural support induced by international trade negotiations would 
surely influence farm activities and the joint production of both public and 
private goods by agriculture. Taking into account that most of these 
commodity and non-commodity outputs are directly and indirectly 
‘traded’ (Bryden, 2005), it is interesting to explore the multifunctionality 
implications of alternative trade-policy scenarios. 
The objective of this chapter is to utilise the social accounting matrix 
(SAM) analytical framework for conducting an assessment of the potential 
effects of trade agreements on several multifunctionality indicators in 
Greek agriculture. More specifically, two SAM models are constructed, one 
for Greece and one for the local rural economy of Archanes (Crete), an 
agriculturally dependent NUTS IV area that has demonstrated a noticeable 
record in terms of the implementation of pillar II policies. The alternative 
scenarios considered here were specified by Dwyer et al. (2005). Based on 
this specification and pertinent decisions about CAP reform and pillar II 
policies (Council of the EU, 2003; European Commission, 2004a and 2004b), 
a national/regional specification of these scenarios is followed by SAM-
based impact analyses. Scenario-specific effects include estimates of annual 
average changes in agricultural output, employment and land use, 
economy-wide output and employment, factor incomes (labour and 
capital), household and firm income and finally, pollution emissions.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.1 presents the applied 
methodology and the model construction process. Section 10.2 presents the 
methodological procedures of the policy impact assessment, while section 
10.3 presents the specification of the alternative policy scenarios and the 
estimation of effects. The chapter ends with relevant conclusions.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 279 
 
10.1  Modelling framework 
10.1.1  Methods 
The repercussions of rural and agricultural policies have been evaluated by 
different tools and approaches, as regards targeted groups in various rural 
areas (Bossard, Daucé & Léon, 2000). Quantitative evaluations range from 
descriptive techniques, rational checking procedures and local growth 
indicators, to more sophisticated macro- and micro- models, input–output 
(IO) models, cost-benefit and multi-criteria analyses (for a review, see 
Psaltopoulos, 2004). Several studies, however, have used some form of 
qualitative analysis to evaluate rural policy action. Evaluation of CAP 
effects has also taken a number of directions, such as emphasising 
environmental or competitive aspects, and has become part of the overall 
regional analysis in the Cohesion Reports of the European Commission 
(1996, 2001 and 2004c).  
The selection of an ‘appropriate’ evaluation technique mainly 
depends on the policy actions to be evaluated and on the focus of the 
evaluation. As policy interventions are made at distinct levels and as policy 
is usually defined as “a set of activities which may differ and may have 
different direct beneficiaries at different domains, and which are directed 
towards common general objectives or goals” (European Commission, 
1997), a general equilibrium approach seems more appropriate for 
assessing policy impacts. Such models, based on the SAM technique, allow 
the identification of the effects of both pillar I and II funding (i.e. 
investment and direct income transfers) in a national or local economy (or 
both). Other possible advantages of this modelling framework can be 
described as follows:  
a)  The multi-sectoral dimension of a SAM approach accommodates the 
analysis of the effects induced by current rural development policies, 
which have shifted attention from traditional, product-/sector-
oriented support towards more broadly based (multi-sectoral) 
assistance.  
b)  Several evaluation approaches only estimate the direct effects of 
policy action. As a general equilibrium approach, however, the SAM 
technique allows for the estimation of the ‘global’ economic effects of 
these injections.  280 | A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX APPROACH FOR GREECE 
 
c)  The SAM technique (in comparison with the more traditional 
Leontief IO approach) has the ability to capture the distributional 
effects of exogenous injections (investment funding and transfers) in 
an economy. More specifically, the important presence of the CAP 
subsidy payments to farmers further substantiates the use of the SAM 
method since analysis that focuses solely on production linkages (IO) 
may ignore the implications (particularly the distributional effects) 
arising from other types of links between rural sectors (especially 
agriculture) and the macroeconomy. 
On the other hand, it has to be noted that the use of this technique for 
impact assessment also involves some simplistic assumptions regarding the 
economic behaviour of sectors, households, etc., which are all assumed to 
maintain their recorded pattern of expenditure in the base period (the 
linearity assumption). Also, the ‘snapshot’ nature of the technique does not 
allow the exploration of changes in technology, relative prices, incomes and 
expenditures over time. Most of the above weaknesses could have been 
dealt with here through the use of computable, general equilibrium 
analysis (and a considerable number of additional and often speculative 
assumptions), but this is clearly beyond the resources of this effort. 
The SAM technique has not often been used for policy-impact 
analysis, mainly because of (usually) severe data demands, especially at the 
regional level. But in recent years some indicative studies have applied this 
technique. Psaltopoulos (2001) estimated the economy-wide effects of 
alternative policy scenarios related to the tobacco sector on the national 
economy of Greece. Roberts (2003) built a 1997 SAM for the Western Isles in 
Scotland and estimated the economic impact of both central government 
funding of public services and exogenous transfers of income to local 
households. Psaltopoulos et al. (2004) built regional SAMs for six remote 
rural areas of Scotland, Finland and Greece, in an attempt to discover how 
EU structural policies have affected their economies. Finally, Psaltopoulos 
& Balamou (2005) built an interregional SAM for Crete to assess the effects 
of CAP pillar I and II measures on a rural–urban interregional economy. 
10.1.2  Application 
The objective of this section is to present the analytical procedure applied 
to the generation of a national SAM for the Greek economy and a regional 
SAM for the local rural economy of Archanes, in both cases for the year 
1998.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 281 
 
The national SAM for Greece 
The basis of the national SAM is the national accounts and a detailed IO 
table for 1998. Building on this foundation and by using the statistical 
tables of the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) we have been 
able to add the accounts of various economic agents. These accounts were 
drawn from a national household income and expenditure survey, the 
financial accounts of enterprises, the rest of the world and non-profit 
institutions, the principal aggregates of the Eurostat national accounts, 
transactions table, data on taxes, subsidies, government transfers, etc.  
The initial product of the above process was a preliminary 17-sector 
SAM for Greece for 1998. The matrix contained aggregated structural 
information for agriculture and forestry. Therefore, in order to generate 
detailed information on the structure of sectors relevant to this study we 
disaggregated agriculture and forestry into the cultivation of arable crops, 
vegetables, fruit, tobacco, livestock and forestry. As a result, the final form 
of the national SAM consists of twenty-two sectors, two production factors 
(labour and capital), three institutions (households, firms and government), 
the rest of the world and a capital account. 
The regional SAM for Archanes 
The regional IO table for Archanes has been generated by using the hybrid 
GRIT technique developed by Jensen et al. (1979). The GRIT technique 
creates a preliminary, regional transactions matrix through the mechanical 
adjustment of the national direct-requirements matrix by using 
employment-based simple location quotients and cross-industry location 
quotients. Subsequently, an analyst can ‘interfere’ with the mechanically-
produced table through the insertion of ‘ s u p e r i o r ’  d a t a  f ro m  s u r v e y s o r  
other sources at various stages in the development of the table. Thus, GRIT 
incorporates the advantages of both the ‘survey’ and ‘non-survey’ IO 
regionalisation approaches.   
After regionalising the available national IO table (first, to the level of 
the prefecture and then to that of the study area) with the use of the 
mechanical GRIT procedure, information from a sectoral business survey in 
Archanes was utilised. The selection of target sectors for the business 
survey was primarily based on the importance of particular sectors in the 
structure of the local economy and in the implementation of pillar I and II 
policies. Businesses were primarily chosen through random sampling of 
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firms were deliberately selected owing to their significant economic impact 
on the study area (which mostly consists of small enterprises). Surveys 
were conducted face-to-face with business owners, using a structured 
questionnaire. The sample accounted for 40% of local units. The second 
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  s u p e r i o r  d a t a  w a s  a n  e x t e n d e d  s u r v e y  o f  h o u s e h o l d s  i n  
Archanes. Around 10% of local households provided information on the 
sources of their income and their consumption patterns. In order to 
develop the non-IO components of the regional SAM, regional and national 
data from a wide range of sources were used (the 1998 Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey, the NSSG regional accounts, interviews with local 
policy-makers and local government data). 
As a result, the final form of the Archanes SAM consists of thirteen 
sectors (with three agricultural sub-sectors – vine-growing, olive-growing 
and other agriculture), three production factors (labour, capital and land), 
three institutions (households, firms and government), the rest of the world 
and a capital account. 
With regard to the identification of multifunctionality indicators, 
these models estimate changes in farm output levels, agricultural 
employment, total employment, agricultural land use and pollution 
emissions. Finally, estimated results are presented in an average annual 
form for the period 2007–13, with the exception of tobacco, where estimates 
relate to the post–2010 period. 
10.2  Impact analysis methodology 
10.2.1  Conceptual issues 
In accordance with the SAM analytical framework (general equilibrium, 
comparative static), impact analysis deals with the comparison of levels of 
study-area output, employment and so forth, calculated by applying 
multiplier and coefficient values to the injections of expenditure (treated as 
additional final demand) associated with policy. Implicitly, this compares 
two alternative equilibrium positions of the national/regional economy (i.e. 
mutually balanced levels of production, firm and household incomes, and 
trade flows), which are consistent respectively with and without these 
expenditure patterns. No account is taken of the time pattern of adjustment 
to the additions to final demand, while calculations seek to isolate the 
effects of policy expenditures from those of other influences. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 283 
 
In this particular exercise scenario-specific domestic policy changes 
have been fed into the SAM models as injections to final demand. More 
specifically, 
•  A decrease in subsidies (owing to modulation and other revisions to 
CAP market support) constitutes a negative injection to the 
agricultural subsidies cell (government column).  
•  Any increase in pillar II funds is converted into projections of rural 
development action (programmes and measures) and constitutes an 
increase in the relevant capital account column (for investment 
action) or agricultural subsidies cell (for agri-environment measures). 
In terms of the sectoral distribution of these changes to exogenous 
final demand, the 2000–06 pattern is observed in both study areas. 
•  Possible adjustments to production volumes and their effects (e.g. an 
increase in the milk quota) can be modelled through the use of the 
mixed endogenous/exogenous version of the Leontief model, 
extended to a SAM framework. 
•  In the case of a decline in prices, supply is linearly adjusted through 
the use of the relevant product-specific price elasticities (obtained 
from Mergos, 2003) and the effects are modelled through the use of 
the mixed endogenous/exogenous version of the Leontief model, 
extended to a SAM framework. 
•  The effects of possible substitution (e.g. moving from cotton to 
cereals) or abandonment of agricultural activity in several sub-sectors 
(or both) owing to decoupling are modelled through the use of the 
mixed endogenous/exogenous version of the Leontief model, 
extended to a SAM framework. Exogenous estimates of these 
developments are obtained from Tsiboukas (2003). 
•  Finally, the impact on land use is projected through the utilisation of 
the applicable input elasticities estimated in Sarris (2003).  
10.2.2  Analytical procedures 
Conventional Leontief procedure 
In a SAM framework, the conventional Leontief procedure can be used to 
estimate the economy-wide effects of changes in exogenous demand. More 
analytically, the identification of the shocks whose effects are investigated 
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in pillar I subsidies) is followed by the specification of the model’s 
exogenous accounts (in this case the government, the rest of the world and 
capital). The available SAM multipliers and coefficients are then utilised in 
order to produce economy-wide effects in terms of output, labour income, 
firm income, household income and employment. 
Economic effects of fixed supply 
In parallel, in a SAM context, exogenous changes to sectoral gross output(s) 
as a result of forces outside the model can have a profound impact on the 
accounts of the other aspects of the economy under study, through the 
interdependence relationships portrayed by this general equilibrium data 
system.  Such changes include a decline in prices (which causes an 
adjustment in supply), the abandonment or shift in cultivation as a result of 
decoupling, an increase of production quotas and targets, and natural 
disasters.  
This method is based on the mixed exogenous/endogenous variable 
version of the IO model devised by Miller & Blair (1985) for IO analysis. It 
was extended to a SAM context by Roberts (1992), who estimated the (UK) 
economy-wide effects of milk quotas, which represent a ceiling on the level 
of gross output of a particular sector. It was further extended by 
Psaltopoulos & Thomson (1998) to estimate the capacity-adjustment effects 
of structural policy implementation in remote rural areas of the EU. 
Through these methods, changes in activity levels lead to the execution of 
comparative analysis and the estimation of the relevant economic effects (of 
changes in supply) on output, labour income, capital income, land rent (for 
the regional model), firm income, household income and employment. 
Impact on pollution emissions 
In order to estimate the scenario-specific levels of pollution emissions, we 
have drawn from the methodology developed by Leontief & Ford (1972) 
and utilised the national pollution matrix produced by the NSSG (Mylonas, 
2000). 
This particular matrix was transformed by Loizou (2001) to reflect the 
disaggregation of agriculture into several sub-sectors. As a next step, a 
matrix of total pollution coefficients was estimated for both the national 
(Greece) and regional (Archanes) economies, after carrying out the 
appropriate sectoral classification adjustments. Elements in this matrix 
indicate the total (i.e. direct and indirect) pollution of pollutant k, which TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 285 
 
occurs from increased economic activity in sector j, caused (in turn) by a 
unitary increase of final demand within this particular sector. The 
emissions estimated concerned nine pollutants (CO2, CH4, N2O, NOx, CO, 
NMVOC, SO2, BOD5 and nitrates). 
10.3  Scenario analysis  
During the period in which this study was undertaken, an important issue 
concerned the determination by the Greek Ministry of Agriculture of the 
degree of decoupling in various regimes such as arable crops and sheep 
farming, along with the distribution of the national envelope in the case of 
(e.g.) olive oil. In order to proceed with the specification of the scenarios, 
we utilised information provided by the Ministry of Agriculture (2004). 
This information was derived from a committee of experts established by 
the ministry in order to provide an opinion on the implementation of new 
CAP reforms in Greece. According to the committee, the main 
characteristics of the implementation of the CAP reforms in Greece would 
be as follows: 
•  A single payment scheme would be implemented for all products 
covered by the reform (which in fact commenced on 1.1.2006). 
•  Full decoupling would occur in the sectors covering arable crops 
(including durum wheat), sheep and goat farming, and olive oil. 
•  In the bovine sector, Greece would opt for keeping 100% of the 
suckler cow premium and 40% of the slaughter premium coupled. 
•  Greece would not utilise the regional application options. 
•  Greece would not utilise the option to grant up to 10% of the national 
ceiling as sector-specific payments for improving the quality and 
marketing of agricultural products. 
•  The single payment scheme would fully apply to the Aegean Islands. 
In most instances these forecasts turned out to be accurate. 
10.3.1  Specification of scenarios 
Based on the decisions concerning the 2003–04 reforms to the CAP and 
pillar II policies (Council of the EU, 2003; European Commission, 2004a and 
2004b), we carried out the national and regional specification of the 
alternative scenario elements.  286 | A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX APPROACH FOR GREECE 
 
For Greece, scenario 1bis consists of five scenario elements. The first 
element is subsidies.1 This element will feature a decline in subsidies for 
durum wheat (by €12.4 mn per annum) and for cotton (by €12 mn), along 
with a fall of the reference period levels for rice (by 6.8%) and for tobacco 
(by 50%, post–2010). It will also involve a rise in subsidies for other cereals 
(by €9 mn) and for dairy products (by €29 mn).  
The second scenario element is prices. In the case of rice, a 15% 
reduction in prices is projected, owing to assumptions about market 
liberalisation. Multiplied by the relevant supply elasticity, this results in a 
decrease of 18.6% in the gross production of rice. In dairy products a 10% 
decrease in gross output is projected.  
In the third scenario element, modulation, there is a 2.4% decrease in 
subsidies for the products covered by the CAP reform. The fourth scenario 
element involves decoupling, which projects that 30% of cotton production 
is abandoned and converted to cereals. In this scenario, 40% of tobacco 
production is also abandoned, of which 11% is converted to sugar beet. 
Declines in gross output as a result of decoupling are anticipated for cereals 
(-14%), olive oil (-10%), sheep and goat farming (-15%) and beef farming (-
5%). Finally, in the case of pillar II policies, the annual average expenditure 
for the period 2000–06 (which includes all European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee funding for this purpose) is projected to increase by €88.6 
mn of Community contributions, related to modulation and sectoral 
transfers. 
For Archanes, scenario 1 consists of three scenario elements. The first 
one is modulation.  For this element, when account is taken that 30% of 
olive oil farms (and 55% of specific subsidies for this product) relate to 
farmers over the €5,000 threshold, a cut in subsidies (2.8%) is expected for 
this particular product. For the second scenario element, decoupling, 20% 
of olive oil production is assumed to be abandoned. In the third scenario 
element, which considers pillar II policies, an increase of average 2000–06 
annual expenditures by 25% is projected. 
Scenario 2 consists of the above three elements plus the element of 
prices. More specifically, in olive oil a 10% decrease in prices is projected as 
a result of market liberalisation. Taking into account the relevant supply 
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elasticity, this decline leads to a 2.56% reduction in gross output. Similarly, 
declines in gross output are anticipated for raisins (by 1.46%), grapes for 
wine (by 4.2%) and table grapes (by 3.17%). 
Scenario 2b consists of all the scenario 2 elements plus the element of 
subsidies, wherein olive oil is assumed to suffer a cut of 20% in subsidies 
(in reference period levels). 
Scenario 3 consists of all the scenario 2b elements, plus the element of 
pillar II policies. This element expects an increase in policy expenditures 
that is equivalent to the decline in olive oil subsidies. 
10.3.2  Results of the scenario effects 
Tables 10.1-10.2 and 10.3-10.6 present the estimated effects of the above 
scenarios for Greece and Archanes, respectively. The tables include results 
for several variables, some of which may not be linked to 
multifunctionality. Comments in this section, however, do highlight 
projected changes to indicators that are related to the multifunctionality 
concept. 
In the case of Greece, it seems that if scenario 1bis is realised, the 
impact on the national economy will be marginally positive, with the 
exception of agricultural employment, for which a decline of 10.11% is 
forecasted (Table 10.1).  
Agricultural output is expected to decline mainly in the case of 
tobacco (-38.99%), as well as in livestock (-5.49%) and fruit (-3.22%). Output 
in the vegetables sector is forecasted to increase by 1.15%, while the output 
of arable crops remains more or less constant. Farm employment is 
projected to fall by a significant 10.11%, mainly owing to developments in 
the tobacco sector. In terms of land use, a 10.3% reduction of tobacco land is 
projected, while the livestock figure is expected to decline by 1.73%. At the 
economy-wide level, output effects seem to be positive (+0.66%) through 
the increase of pillar II spending and the declining importance of 
agriculture in the Greek economy, while (for the same reasons) a moderate 
increase in total employment is projected (+0.10%). Finally, pollution 
emissions are expected to increase by 1.97%, a figure attributed to a 
projected rise of 5.45% as a result of pillar II policies and a decline of 3.48% 
through the contraction of farm activity.  
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Table 10.1 Effects of scenario 1bis for Greece (annual average changes from 1998 levels, 1998 prices) 
Scenario 
elements 
Output effects 
(mn of GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Labour 
income effects 
(mn of GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Capital 
income effects 
 (mn of GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Firm income 
effects 
(mn of GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Α. Decline in 
      subsidies  
-46,972.54 -0.07  -7,329.99 -0.06  -64,367.51 -0.32  -61,571.41 -0.32 
Β. Decline in  
    prices 
-65,549.41 -0.10  -5,914.43 -0.05  -33,200.80 -0.16  -31,758.57 -0.16 
C. Modulation   -15,730.18  -0.02  -2,454.67 -0.02  -21,555.42 -0.11  -20,619.06 -0.11 
D. Decoupling   -325,627.10  -0.52  -46,553.68 -0.39  -104,178.69 -0.52  -99,653.20 -0.51 
Ε. Pillar II  868,512.04  1.38  13,340.20 1.16  397,586.45 1.97  380,315.39 1.96 
Total  414,632.81 0.66  77,087.42 0.64 174,284.02  0.87 166,713.17  0.86 
 
Scenario 
elements 
Household 
income effects 
(mn of GRD)  
Change 
(%) 
Agricultural  
emp. effects 
 (no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Employment 
effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Pollution 
effects 
(tonnes) 
Change 
(%) 
Α. Decline in  
     subsidies   
-46,020.65 -0.14  -551 -0.08  -10,624 -0.17  -248,708.99 -0.30 
Β. Decline in 
    prices 
-25,888.48 -0.08  -4,229 -0.61  -20,401 -0.34  -409,075.75 -0.49 
C. Modulation   -15,411.42  -0.05  -184 -0.03  -3,588 -0.06  -83,287.77 -0.10 
D. Decoupling   -109,457.08  -0.34  -74,640  -10.84  -144,759 -2.38  -2,179,302.14 -2.60 
Ε. Pillar II  379,071.78  1.17  9,988  1.45  185,588 3.05  4,570,732.83 5.45 
Total 182,314.15  0.56  -69,616  -10.11  6,246 0.10  1,650,335.18 1.97 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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In terms of the elements of scenario 1bis, it should be noted that falls 
in agricultural output (-5.3%), employment (-10.84%) and total employment 
(-2.38%) mostly occur from decoupling, which also contributes to a 2.6% 
reduction of pollution. The effects of the remaining elements of the scenario 
(declines in subsidies and prices, and modulation) seem to be rather 
marginal, while developments in pillar II policies generate positive 
outcomes even in terms of farm output (+1.64%) and farm employment 
(+1.45%), but more importantly, for total employment (+3.05%). 
The forecasts show that pollution emissions may increase in total, but 
there are projections (in Table 10.2) of reductions in the cases of BOD5 (-
7.56%), N2O (-7.54%), CH4 (-4%) and nitrates (-2.30%). On the other hand, 
these positive projections are rather ‘eliminated’ by an estimated 2.08% 
increase in CO2 emissions, the particular pollutant that is by far the most 
important in Greece.  
Table 10.2 Effects of scenario 1bis for Greece on pollution (annual average changes 
from 1998 levels) 
Pollutants   Changes in pollution (tonnes)  Change (%) 
CO2 1,680,069.28  2.08 
CH4 -13,517.87  -4.00 
N2O -2,125.88  -7.54 
Nox 2,991.64  0.99 
CO 2,645.42  0.30 
NMVOC 763.74  0.29 
SO2 11,502.17  2.19 
BOD5 -22,925.86  -7.56 
Nitrates   -9,047.48  -2.30 
Total  1,650,355.18 1.97 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
For the agriculturally-dependent local economy of Archanes, scenario 
projections are rather negative. Not surprisingly, scenario 2b (a reduction 
of income support aids) generates the most negative results, followed by 
scenario 2 (full decoupling and the elimination of export subsidies) and 
scenario 3. The fact that the status quo-specific scenario 1 seems to be 
associated with (comparatively) less-pessimistic prospects is possibly a 
welcomed consolation. 290 | A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX APPROACH FOR GREECE 
 
As in the case of national projections, the estimated negative effects 
are quite significant for farm output and employment, being around the -
11% mark for scenarios 2, 2b and 3. Furthermore, economy-wide job losses 
are notable for these three scenarios (ranging from -3.8% to -6.6%), as are 
reductions in agricultural land use (around -8%). Projections on the 
reduction of pollution are also quite significant for these three scenarios, 
ranging from -2.14% for scenario 3 to more than -5% for scenarios 2 and 2b. 
In more detail, in the case of the status quo scenario 1 (Table 10.3), 
agricultural output is expected to fall by 5.9%, mainly owing to the decline 
in olive oil production (-18.6%). For the same reason, farm employment is 
projected to fall by 5.22%. In terms of land use, a 5.44% reduction of land 
dedicated to olive trees is anticipated, while land dedicated to vineyards 
could increase by 0.5%. At the local economy-wide level, output effects 
seem to be marginally positive (+0.03%) as a result of the increase in pillar 
II spending, while (for the same reasons) a rather moderate decline in total 
employment is projected (-1.88%). A cut of 0.35% in pollution emissions is 
expected, based on an estimated 3.55% increase arising from pillar II 
policies and a fall of 3.90% through the contraction of farm activity. 
Examining the elements of scenario 1, it should be noted that declines 
in agricultural output (-6.6%) employment (-6.55%) and total employment 
(-4.74%) are related to decoupling, which also contributes to a 3.86% fall in 
pollution. The impact of modulation seems to be marginal. Changes in 
pillar II policies, however, generate positive results even in the cases of 
farm employment (+1.33%) and total employment (+2.91%). Finally, 
pollution forecasts show a decline in total emissions, but this projection is 
almost solely attributable to a projected reduction of nitrates (-6.05%).  
The results associated with scenario 2 (the elimination of export 
subsidies) are even more negative, owing to the repercussions of the 
projected decline in prices. Agricultural output is expected to decline (Table 
10.4) by a significant 11.3%, as olive oil production is reduced by 21.17% 
and vine production by 8.33%. For the same reasons, farm employment is 
projected to fall by a significant 11.4%. With regard to land use, a 6.18% 
reduction of land dedicated to olive trees is anticipated, while land 
dedicated to vineyards could decline by 1.86%.  
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Table 10.3 Effects of scenario 1 for Archanes (annual average changes from 1998 levels, 1998 prices) 
Scenario 
elements 
Output 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Labour 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Capital 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Land 
rent 
effects  
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Firm 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Α. Modulation   -5.50  -0.03  -0.74  -0.02 -11.82 -0.17 -0.50 -0.03  -11.88 -0.14 
B.  Decoupling   -450.62  -1.91  -36.19  -0.86 -110.47  -1.62  -106.89  -5.60 -209.50 -2.43 
C.  Pillar II  463.80  1.96  65.03  1.55  587.06 8.61  31.68 1.66 596.35 6.91 
Total  7.68 0.03  28.10 0.67  464.74  6.81 -75.71  -3.96  374.97  4.34 
 
Scenario 
elements 
Househol
d income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Agricultural 
emp. effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Employment 
effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Pollution 
effects 
(tonnes) 
Change 
(%) 
Α.  Modulation    -9.03  -0.07  0  0  -1 -0.05 -3.32 -0.04 
B. Decoupling   -181.00  -1.32  -56  -6.55  -93 -4.74  -335.98 -3.86 
C. Pillar II  479.51  3.49  11  1.33  57 2.91  308.79 3.55 
Total 289.49  2.11  -45  -5.22  -37 -1.88  -30.51 -0.35 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10.4 Effects of scenario 2 for Archanes (annual average changes from 1998 levels, 1998 prices) 
Scenario 
elements 
Output 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Labour 
income 
effects  
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Capital 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Land rent 
effects  
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Firm 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Α. Modulation   -5.50  -0.03  -0.74  -0.02  -11.82 -0.17  -0.50 -0.03  -11.88 -0.14 
B.  Decoupling   -450.62  -1.91  -36.19  -0.86 -110.47  -1.62  -106.89  -5.60 -209.50  -2.43 
C. Pillar II  463.80  1.96  65.03  1.55 587.06  8.61  31.68  1.66  596.35  6.91 
D. Decline in 
     prices 
-419.59 -1.77  -32.74 -0.78  -107.99 -1.58  -93.27 -4.88  -193.99 -2.25 
Total   -411.91  -1.74  -4.64  -0.11 356.78  5.24  -168.98  -8.85  180.98  2.09 
 
Scenario 
elements 
Household 
income 
effects 
(mn of GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Agricultural 
emp. effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Employment 
effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Pollution 
effects 
(tonnes) 
Change 
(%) 
Α.  Modulation    -9.03 -0.07  0  0  -1 -0.05  -3.32 -0.04 
B. Decoupling   -181.00  -1.32  -56 -6.55  -93 -4.74 -335.98 -3.86 
C. Pillar II  479.51  3.49  11 1.33  57 2.91 308.79 3.55 
D. Decline in 
     prices 
-166.88 -1.22  -53 -6.18  -86 -4.39 -429.51 -4.93 
Total   122.60  0.88  -98  -11.40  -123 -6.27 -460.01 -5.29 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
   
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
A
G
R
E
E
M
E
N
T
S
,
 
M
U
L
T
I
F
U
N
C
T
I
O
N
A
L
I
T
Y
 
&
 
E
U
 
A
G
R
I
C
U
L
T
U
R
E
 
|
 
2
9
3
Table 10.5 Effects of scenario 2b for Archanes (annual average changes from 1998 levels, 1998 prices) 
Scenario elements  Output 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Labour 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Capital 
income 
effects  
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Land 
rent 
effects  
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Firm 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Α.  Modulation    -5.50 -0.03 -0.74 -0.02  -11.82 -0.17 -0.50 -0.03  -11.88 -0.14 
B. Decoupling    -450.62  -1.91  -36.19  -0.86 -110.47  -1.62 -106.89  -5.60 -209.50 -2.43 
C. Pillar II  463.80  1.96  65.03  1.55  587.06 8.61  31.68 1.66 596.35 6.91 
D. Decline in  prices  -419.59  -1.77  -32.74  -0.78 -107.99  -1.58  -93.27 -4.88 -193.99 -2.25 
Ε. Decline in  
subsidies  
-39.26 -0.17 -5.27 -0.13  -84.46 -1.24 -3.57 -0.19  -84.84 -0.98 
Total  -451.17 -1.91 -9.91 -0.24  272.32 4.00  -172.55  -9.04  96.14 1.11 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Scenario elements  Household 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Agricultural 
emp. effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Employment 
effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Pollution 
effects 
(tonnes) 
Change 
(%) 
Α. Modulation   -9.03  -0.07  0  0  -1  -0.05  -3.32  -0.04 
B. Decoupling   -181.00  -1.32  -56 -6.55  -93 -4.74 -335.98  -3.86 
C. Pillar II  479.51  3.49  11 1.33  57 2.91 308.79  3.55 
D. Decline in prices  -166.88  -1.22 -53  -6.18 -86  -4.39  -429.51  -4.93 
Ε. Decline in subsidies   -64.47  -0.47 -2  -0.18 -6  -0.31  -23.69  -0.27 
Total 58.13  0.41  -100  -11.58  -129 -6.58 -483.71  -5.55  
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Table 10.6 Effects of scenario 3 for Archanes (annual average changes from 1998 levels, 1998 prices) 
Scenario elements  Output 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Labour 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Capital 
income 
effects 
 (mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Land 
rent 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Firm 
income 
effects 
(mn of 
GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Α. Modulation   -5.50  -0.03  -0.74  -0.02  -11.82 -0.17 -0.50 -0.03  -11.88  -0.14 
B. Decoupling   -450.62  -1.91  -36.19  -0.86 -110.47  -1.62 -106.89  -5.60 -209.50  -2.43 
C. Pillar II  463.80  1.96  65.03  1.55  587.06 8.61  31.68 1.66  596.35  6.91 
D. Decline in  prices  -419.59  -1.77  -32.74  -0.78 -107.99  -1.58  -93.27 -4.88  -193.99  -2.25 
Ε. Decline in subsidies   -39.26  -0.17  -5.27  -0.13  -84.46 -1.24 -3.57 -0.19  -84.84  -0.98 
F. Increase in pillar II funds  445.25  1.88 62.43 1.49  563.58 8.26 30.41  1.59  572.49 6.63 
Total -5.91  -0.03  52.53  1.25  835.89 12.25  -142.13 -7.44  668.63 7.74 
 
Scenario elements  Household 
income effects 
(mn of GRD) 
Change 
(%) 
Agricultural 
emp. effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Employment 
effects 
(no. of jobs) 
Change 
(%) 
Pollution 
effects 
(tonnes) 
Change 
(%) 
Α Modulation   -9.03  -0.07  0  0  -1  -0.05  -3.32  -0.04 
B. Decoupling   -181.00  -1.32  -56 -6.55  -93 -4.74 -335.98 -3.86 
C. Pillar II  479.51  3.49  11 1.33  57 2.91 308.79 3.55 
D. Decline in prices  -166.88  -1.22 -53  -6.18  -86  -4.39  -429.51  -4.93 
Ε. Decline in subsidies   -64.47  -0.47 -2  -0.18  -6  -0.31  -23.69  -0.27 
F. Increase in pillar II funds 460.33  3.35  11  1.27  54  2.75  296.44  3.41 
Total 518.47  3.78  -89  -10.31  -75 -3.83 -187.27 -2.14 
Source: Authors’ calculations. TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 295 
 
At the economy-wide level, output effects seem to be negative   
(-1.74%), because of the negative effects of both modulation and the 
expected decline in prices, while (for the same reasons) projections are also 
negative for total employment (-6.27%). Pollution emissions are expected to 
fall by an important 5.29%, as the reduction in prices under this scenario 
could contribute to a decline of 4.93%. 
In scenario 2 the contributions of decoupling and the expected 
decline in prices to the forecasted negative trends seem to be rather 
balanced. Yet it appears that decoupling negatively affects the olive oil sub-
sector the most, while a possible decline in prices seems to mostly hit vine-
growers. The effects of modulation and pillar II policies are similar to those 
of scenario 1. Estimates of pollution emissions show a decline in almost all 
categories of emissions and especially in nitrates (-14.4%), CH4 (-12.91%), 
N2O (-12.46%) and even CO2 (-4.51%).  
The results for scenario 2b (further reductions in support) are more 
pessimistic than for scenario 2, owing to the marginally negative effects of a 
further decline in support (Table 10.5). Nevertheless, in terms of ‘structural 
characteristics’, the relevant projections are somewhat similar to those in 
scenario 2, as the negative contribution of a further cut in subsidies is rather 
marginal in all categories of estimates. 
Finally, the increase in pillar II funds associated with scenario 3 
improves the projections, especially for economy-wide output and 
employment (Table 10.6). On the other hand, estimates for agricultural 
output, agricultural employment and land abandonment differ only 
marginally from those of scenarios 2 and 2b. The anticipated decline of 
pollution emissions is cut by half (compared with the levels of scenarios 2 
and 2b), as pillar II action seems to be associated with an increase in 
emissions (of all types). 
Conclusions 
Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that under the scenarios 
examined, the effects of policy reform upon multifunctionality indicators 
are rather mixed and perhaps not extremely worrying. The effects of the 
status quo scenarios seem to be optimistic in terms of projected economy-
wide output and employment at both the national and regional levels. On 
the other hand, scenario 1(bis) generates negative results for farm output 
and employment (especially for the agriculturally-dependent Archanes 
economy), while projections of land-use abandonment are marginal at the 296 | A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX APPROACH FOR GREECE 
 
national and rather moderate at the regional level, and environmental 
repercussions are negative at the national level. The regional analysis has 
also shown that (at least in this case study) the results from scenarios 2, 2b 
and (even) 3 are rather worrying in terms of all categories of projections, 
with the notable exception of the important one of economy-wide output. 
Taking into account the specification of scenario 3, this finding generates 
rather justified reservations about the ability of pillar II policies to 
ameliorate the contraction of economic activity caused by a decrease in 
pillar I support in such an agriculturally-dependent local economy. 
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11. Multifunctionality and the 
implications for EU policies 
  Yiorgos Alexopoulos, David Baldock, Dimitris Damianos and Janet Dwyer 
Introduction 
This chapter offers an overview of the final results of our quantitative 
analyses of different agricultural policy scenarios and their potential impact 
upon multifunctionality in EU agriculture. Our aim here is to review and 
discuss these results, to outline some implications for EU policies of the 
findings of ENARPRI partners’ research work and, finally, to propose 
issues that call for further consideration and analysis. 
11.1  Results of quantitative analysis: The multifunctionality 
perspective 
11.1.1  Ireland 
The Irish team used a FAPRI-Ireland model, i.e. a set of dynamic, multi-
product, partial equilibrium commodity models, in order to estimate 
indicators such as animal numbers and input usage volumes. The model’s 
estimates were incorporated into satellite greenhouse gas (GHG) models to 
make projections for multifunctionality indicators such as GHG and 
ammonia emissions. The researchers examined the 2003 reform of the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) with full decoupling as the baseline 
scenario and a ‘most likely reform’ scenario of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The latter scenario involved the elimination of export 
subsidies over 10 years, an easing of market access by a 60% average tariff 
cut and an additional 70% cut in amber box domestic support (total 
aggregate measure of support). 
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The Irish study suggested that the number of dairy cows would 
decline under both scenarios with a slightly greater reduction occurring 
under the WTO reform (a 14% decline under the baseline and only 1% 
greater under the WTO reform scenario). Both scenarios also project 
decreases in beef cattle and sheep numbers up to 2015. Lower beef prices 
across Europe and Ireland, resulting from the expected fall in exports and 
rise in imports, are considered to cause the greater reduction in Irish cattle 
numbers projected under the WTO reform scenario. Livestock production 
is expected to become more extensive. The baseline scenario indicates shifts 
from areas cultivated with cereals and root crops into pasture. The 
relatively modest effects of the WTO reform scenario on sectors other than 
dairy are explained by reference to the more significant policy changes 
within the Luxembourg agreement that preceded the 2003 reform.  
The reduction in overall agricultural activity, mainly in the dairy 
sector (which is the main source of agricultural GHG emissions in Ireland), 
will lead to a 14% cut in GHG emissions by 2015 relative to 2004 under the 
baseline scenario. Although WTO reform would deliver additional 
environmental benefits, further reductions in comparison with the baseline 
scenario appear to be only modest (only an additional 1% decline in 
ammonia emissions and 3.35% in total CO2 equivalent by 2015 relative to 
2004). Thus, a more radical WTO reform would be required in order to 
further reduce emissions from the dairy sector (Donnelan & Hanrahan, 
2006). 
11.1.2  Finland 
The Finnish research team utilised the DREMFIA model –  a dynamic, 
regional sector model that enables an analysis of Finnish agriculture. A 
technology diffusion model is combined with an optimisation routine that 
stimulates annual production decisions and price changes. The scenarios 
examined included the 2003 CAP reform as implemented in Finland, which 
means certain sectors remain partially coupled. The scenario of full 
decoupling was also investigated, along with the application of a simplified 
cross-compliance regime. The Finnish team also tested a scenario involving 
20% cuts in CAP pillar I payments. The indicators that the model was able 
to examine included production levels, land use, nutrient balances, two 
types of biodiversity indexes, the use of pesticides, farm incomes and 
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The Finnish study indicated that under the 2003 CAP reform, milk 
production in northern Finland would be reduced substantially and 
extensification in the sector would be expected. Beef production and 
grassland area would decline across the whole country. At the same time, 
the cropped area is predicted to decrease significantly as more land is put 
into ‘green set-aside’ (i.e. fallow) areas, particularly in the centre of the 
country. Crop area is expected to increase slightly in the north but shrink to 
some extent in the south. Pesticide use is expected to reduce in the short 
run as well as nitrogen and phosphorous surpluses. Beef and dairy 
production is expected to become more concentrated regionally, leading to 
notable rises in nutrient loading in some locations by 2015. The growth in 
fallow land will encourage improvement in habitat biodiversity in northern 
Finland. Nevertheless, the general national outlook for biodiversity as 
measured by the Shannon index is unfavourable, with the exception of 
northern Finland, because land-use diversity in most regions is expected to 
be reduced by the reforms. Cross compliance is predicted to enhance 
biodiversity conditions relative to the 2003 reform scenario, while reducing 
decoupled support by 20% apparently has little impact. Total farm incomes 
per farm are predicted to rise under all the scenarios, but total farm income 
will fall in the north as agriculture declines in this region. Farm 
employment will also fall slightly, under all the scenarios (Lehtonen, 
Lankoski & Niemi, 2005). 
11.1.3  Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, the research team used a non-linear optimising 
model (FARMA-4), which is designed to optimise the behaviour of three 
prevailing farm types, linked to certain multifunctionality indicators. The 
scenarios examined were the specific model of the CAP implemented in the 
country in 2002, full decoupling, full decoupling with decoupled direct 
payments reduced by 20% and, finally, the expansion of an agri-
environment scheme across the country designed for grassland 
conservation. The indicators investigated were agricultural employment, 
production types, stock numbers, land use and fertiliser inputs. 
The model suggested that full decoupling could lead to an extreme 
level of extensive farming with increased set-aside levels in the most 
productive regions. Reduced decoupled payments were expected to have a 
negative impact on the level of farm profitability. Increased less-favoured 
area payments counterbalance these trends in the regions. In any case 302 | MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EU POLICIES 
 
agricultural output decreases and, in total, employment is expected to fall. 
The authors conclude that the appropriate implementation of pillar II 
measures may preserve the projected environmental benefits and 
counterbalance, to an extent, the negative consequences of reduced 
decoupled payments on rural employment (Doucha & Foltyn, 2006). 
11.1.4  Greece 
In Greece, the team examined policy effects by means of social accounting 
matrices at the national and regional levels. The region investigated was 
Archanes in the prefecture of Iraklion, Crete, a NUTS IV area that depends 
heavily on agriculture and specialises in the production of olive oil, table 
grapes and wine. At the same time, the region has a notable record for the 
implementation of pillar II policy measures. The models were constructed 
to assess changes in farm and non-farm sectors, in response to all four 
specified scenarios. The indicators analysed were farm output, farm and 
other employment, agricultural land use and levels of pollution emissions. 
The study incorporated an examination of the effects of CAP pillar II 
measures, which in Greece place most emphasis on the improvement of 
agricultural holdings’ competitiveness. The models allow analysis of the 
effects of both pillar I and pillar II measures and policy instruments. The 
approach is static, however, and does not allow the dynamic assessment of 
changes in technology and innovation or the variables associated with 
structural adjustment.  
Under a status quo scenario, at the national level the study suggested 
a significant decline in agricultural employment, the full impact of which 
was expected to exceed 10%. This result was related to the anticipated 
effect of decoupling on certain sectors in the agricultural economy, such as 
tobacco.  Decoupling seems to be responsible for a projected reduction in 
total agricultural output by over 5%. In the case of tobacco, the fall in 
output was expected to approach 40%, whereas the respective reduction for 
the livestock sector was estimated to be slightly less than 2%. In general, 
the contraction of farm activity leads to environmental benefits. Yet, in 
contrast to what might be expected in most member states, these benefits 
are more than outweighed by rises in pollution emissions, which stem from 
the implementation of specific pillar II policy instruments associated with 
investment incentives for improving the sectors’ competitive position. 
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farm employment (1.5%) and farm output (1.6%), which counterbalance the 
effects of decoupling in the agricultural sector. 
At the regional level, under the status quo scenario a predominantly 
rural area such as Archanes sees agricultural output decline by almost 6% 
and rural employment by over 5%, mainly owing to a significant projected 
reduction of olive oil production by over 18%. When considerations of 
pillar II measures are incorporated, the effects on agricultural output and 
rural employment are subdued and become rather modest but still point in 
the same direction. As with the national-level analysis, pillar II measures 
are expected to cause an increase in pollution emissions at levels sufficient 
to minimise the environmental benefits of the contraction of farming 
activity.  
Results for the scenarios reflecting further reductions in support have 
the same implications and the effects are intensified. Thus, the elimination 
of export subsidies leads to significant cuts in agricultural output and farm 
employment (both greater than 10%), whereas the impact of a further 
reduction in subsidies is rather marginal relative to the previous scenario. 
In these cases the increase in pillar II funds seems to have only marginal 
effects on agricultural output, agricultural employment and land 
abandonment. 
In assessing the effects of pillar II measures as implemented in Greece 
to date, whatever scenario is used, one concludes that increased pollution 
emissions are generated. In certain cases such rises in pollution overwhelm 
the environmental benefits deriving from the contraction in farming 
activity. As pointed out by the authors, the question of whether pillar II 
measures as currently designed and implemented in Greece are best suited 
to agriculturally-dependent local economies that suffer from a severe 
reduction in pillar I-types of support, is pertinent (Psaltopoulos & Balamou, 
2005). 
11.2  Review and discussion of the results 
11.2.1  Environmental indicators 
Considering first the environmental indicators and their responses to the 
different policy scenarios, the predictions of the models indicate some 
positive and some negative repercussions of decoupling. Lower market 
prices,  ceteris paribus, will tend to lead to extensification (especially in 
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terms of water, GHG emissions, biodiversity and landscapes in intensively 
farmed situations and regions. The same trend, however, would indicate 
greater environmental risks in extensive (marginal) habitats where the loss 
of stock could threaten the viability of traditional management systems and 
thus the implications for biodiversity and landscapes could be negative. 
Nevertheless, the models also suggest marked inter-regional shifts and that 
some effects are only temporary (e.g. with regard to input-use levels in 
Finland). In sum, the models point to a highly complex set of 
environmental outcomes in relation to the effects of decoupling – which is 
also the view of other experts in this area (e.g. GFA–RACE & IEEP, 2004). 
11.2.2  Socio-economic indicators 
On the socio-economic side, the models indicate some trends towards 
reduced levels of farm employment and lower farm incomes following a 
change in policy, although not in all cases. There are different implications 
of these changes depending on the capacity of other sectors to absorb 
labour. For example, in an otherwise buoyant rural economy shrinkage in 
farm employment can be positive because it signifies a redeployment of 
labour into sectors with higher productivity, whereas in an otherwise 
stagnant rural economy it can be a problem because labour lost from 
farming may simply increase unemployment. The story is different for the 
Czech Republic and probably other new member states as well because the 
phasing-in of pillar I support in these countries may stimulate an expansion 
in the farm sector, leading to both positive and negative consequences for 
sector employment, contingent on the precise nature of this expansion. This 
effect is likely to dwarf the impact of decoupling, given that in most of 
these countries governments have been operating a simplified pillar I 
payment system rather than the sector-specific direct payments under the 
main regimes. Furthermore, in those few countries that had implemented a 
more sector-specific system (including the Czech Republic), this experience 
will have been relatively short-lived. 
11.2.3  Rural development indicators 
When considering the multifunctionality effects of scenarios that include 
the expansion of pillar II-type supports alongside decoupling, the 
indicators suggest potentially positive results, but only if these measures 
are effectively targeted. It should be noted that relatively few teams were 
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schemes were modelled. An expansion in agri-environment schemes (as 
modelled in Finland and the Czech Republic) generally implies positive 
environmental benefits, but in the case of Greece, where most of the current 
pillar II aid is devoted to enhancing agricultural competitiveness, an 
expanded pillar II suggests negative environmental outcomes. In both 
cases, where farm employment was examined, the results of expanded 
pillar II expenditure were negative for this indicator. Still, it is known that 
this outcome is highly conditional upon the precise design of pillar II 
measures and that some schemes, including agri-environment ones, have 
been shown to have positive effects upon farm employment (Dwyer & 
Kambites, 2005). 
The findings of the modelling work in relation to pillar II policies are 
inconclusive, largely because these policies vary considerably among 
different areas. In addition, many are difficult to model in a precise way 
because the causal relationships between measures and outcomes are only 
partially understood and generally cannot be reduced to basic production, 
price and input responses, as with pillar I measures. Yet from the limited 
results of the relevant modelling exercises and from a wider literature 
review, the implications of the Doha round indicate that there is a need for 
policy-makers to seek to use the resources available for pillar II actions in a 
clearly targeted way in future. Pillar II activities could be more explicitly 
designed to promote the positive and minimise the negative repercussions 
predicted as a result of pillar I decoupling. Nevertheless, these findings 
have to be viewed in the context of current and perhaps more significant 
domestic issues as regards the future scale and direction of pillar II support 
in Europe. Of particular significance is the agreement on the EU budget for 
2007–13 arrived at in December 2005. The agreement has severely reduced 
the budgeted funds available to this pillar for the next seven-year 
programming period in the EU-15 with a more positive result in the new 
member states. 
11.2.4  Impact of the Doha round on multifunctionality 
An increase in market access combined with lower market prices in the EU 
for many agricultural commodities would tend to suggest a contraction in 
the domestic farm sector – i.e. fewer farmers in the EU producing lower 
levels of agricultural output. At the same time, there are likely to be both 
gains and losses for the quality and diversity of the rural environment, the 
pattern of which will be highly dependent upon the farming systems 306 | MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EU POLICIES 
 
currently in place in different regions and sub-regions of Europe. Changes 
in the rural environment will also depend on several broader factors such 
as rural demography and non-farming economic opportunities. In respect 
of the wider social implications of the trade round, it seems clear that there 
will be adjustments as a result of Doha that could lead to negative and 
positive effects at the local level. The balance of these will again be highly 
contingent upon the nature of the local economy in each particular region 
or sub-region. It also seems likely that the trade round will take place 
against a background of continuing and accelerating structural change in 
the new member states, which is largely the result of their accession to the 
EU and is much less related to overarching international factors.  
The results of the modelling research carried out in each case study 
contribute to these observations, and indicate that the effects on several 
multifunctionality indicators are regionally dependent and differentiated 
among sectors and product mixes. Thus, the Irish case study demonstrates 
that the effects on agricultural activity, other than dairy, stem mainly from 
the CAP reform associated with the Luxembourg agreement while the 
impact of the hypothetical Doha reform would be rather modest. Along the 
same lines the full-decoupling scenario is likely to have a greater impact on 
atmospheric emissions than the projected Doha reform – although 
assumptions about market access are important here. In the Greek regional 
case study, following a quite different methodology, the estimated negative 
trends are attributed equally to decoupling and the expected decline in 
prices. In-depth analysis, however, suggests that specific sectors are not 
equally affected by policy measures of a similar kind. More specifically, in 
the case of the two products of most importance for the local agricultural 
economy in the Crete case study, namely olives and vines, it is argued that 
while decoupling affects primarily the olive oil sub-sector it is the reduction 
in prices that mostly impacts the returns and viability of the table- and 
wine-grape producers. Yet, price reductions also generate a greater amount 
of environmental benefit than decoupling.  
11.3  Implications of model findings 
Heterogeneity of the models, scenarios and situations 
In an effort to capture, explore and assess the key effects of the 2003 reform 
from the point of view of multifunctionality, a group of institutes managed 
to specify and test several models. These models, briefly outlined and 
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relevant to the member states and regions of application. Additionally, by 
means of the same models, researchers attempted to investigate some 
further reform possibilities as indicated by a range of scenarios, each one of 
which represented a different, alternative reform outcome. Owing to 
practical difficulties stemming from a lack of homogeneity among different 
country situations, the national models were set up in a way that did not 
allow the testing of an identical set of scenarios for all the member states 
involved. Significant variations, even in the baseline scenario, were 
unavoidable as the 2003 agreement and the subsequent decoupling 
adjustments triggered by the WTO were implemented in a variety of ways 
in the member states in advance of Doha.  
Doha’s ‘modest impact’ 
An interesting point about the models’ results is that, generally, trade-
driven policy changes in the EU and the member states of the kind 
assumed here appear to have a limited impact upon agriculture as well as 
selected multifunctionality indicators. This general observation has to be 
treated with caution, however, as the following specific factors need to be 
considered: 
•  As the 2003 CAP reform is often justified on the basis that it was 
designed to assist negotiations under the Doha round, it would be 
possible to recognise it as being an important consequence of the 
WTO process even though the CAP reform was decided upon prior to 
the round’s conclusion. In this context, the network’s policy scenarios 
for Doha outcomes were seen and designed as incremental 
adjustments to the direction imposed by the basic model 
implemented in 2003. Thus, they correspond to only mild incremental 
changes in respect of some of the multifunctionality effects that the 
reform is predicted to have. In general, the implementation of the 
2003 CAP reform was forecasted by several models to have quite 
significant effects upon agriculture and thus upon various aspects of 
multifunctionality. These effects were largely attributable to the 
combined consequences of decoupling and continued decreases of 
guaranteed prices with only limited compensation in the major 
supported sectors.  
•  The modelling exercises for Finland and Greece in particular showed 
that, as expected, the effects of similar Doha scenarios at the EU or 
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effects at the regional and local levels. At these latter two levels, the 
results may be more significant for specific multifunctionality 
indicators (e.g. biodiversity, concentration of production, nutrient 
loadings, land taken out of production, extensification and 
agricultural employment). The findings indicate that because of the 
spatial heterogeneity of the socio-structural characteristics of 
agriculture and rural areas throughout Europe, the examination of 
likely sub-regional and regional outcomes of future policy changes 
(although challenging) will be important. 
•  The results of the dynamic modelling of outcomes in the Finnish case 
study suggest that some effects can change substantially over time. 
This factor should be taken into account when studying policy effects, 
such as those under the Doha scenarios, on certain multifunctionality 
indicators. The examples of fertiliser surpluses and pesticide use, 
which were predicted by the model applied in Finland to decrease in 
the short run but increase again at a later point in time as farms adjust 
and restructure in response to policy changes, are important here. 
•  In the new member states, the 2003 reform scenarios are set against an 
underlying trend in policy that is quite different to that which 
operates in the EU-15. Levels of domestic support have been 
significantly increasing over time as common pillar I supports are 
phased in. Farmers are in essence being offered much larger 
payments, which, even when decoupled are likely to give rise to a 
greater capacity to produce and raise profits. This result is attained by 
means of the phasing-in of pillar I support over the period for which 
the network’s models were run. The results of the research work 
carried out for Czech agriculture demonstrate that an increased pillar 
I-type of support favours larger and more commercial farm 
enterprises at the expense of the rest. When combined with full 
decoupling, commercial farms are expected to only utilise land of 
better quality whereas other farms with semi-subsistence production 
will probably keep all their land in production, irrespective of quality.   
•  It can be seen that some variables, such as farm labour, farm size and 
concentration are somewhat ‘insulated’ with regard to the external 
policy environment, owing to their structural nature. Thus they 
usually display distinctive long-term trends and show significant 
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•  Some variables are particularly influenced by local or regional 
conditions and peculiarities, such as the prevailing political choices 
and preferences; hence, they are not necessarily reflective of wider 
policy changes and become very difficult to model. Member states’ 
rural development programmes, which are characterised by a highly 
variable mix of measures, or the different approaches that 
governments adopt in order to cope with the problems in their less-
favoured areas, are good examples that explain important differences 
in environmental outcomes among countries. 
•  Institutional factors such as the national or regional government’s role 
as regulators in the agricultural sector or the rural economy as a 
whole are very decisive in determining the final outcome. For 
instance, governments at different levels intervene in the sphere of 
land-use policy; they also design and implement land tax systems as 
well as monitor, supervise and control CAP pillar I and pillar II 
measures, thus influencing farmers’ decisions to abandon or reclaim 
land. Such issues can have a great impact on most multifunctionality 
indicators at the ground level. 
Pillar II rural development measures 
A limited number of models can take into account pillar II rural 
development policies and their impact. Examples include the social 
accounting matrices used in the case of Greece, the Finnish model and the 
optimisation (FARMA-4) model applied in the Czech Republic. For this 
type of modelling a considerable range of assumptions is unavoidable, 
especially when looking ahead at prospective programmes that have not 
yet been agreed. Such assumptions include estimates of the measures that 
member states will adopt in 2007–13, the levels of take-up by farmers and 
others, the likely outcomes and the ramifications they will have. The case 
studies summarised here have demonstrated (as expected) that member 
states vary greatly in the approaches they have adopted and, consequently, 
multifunctional variables and indicators cannot be expected to follow a 
uniform pattern.  
The Greece case study is extreme since the model depicts the 
potential consequences of rural development measures that are 
substantially focused in budgeting terms on the improvement of 
agricultural competitiveness. It comes as no surprise that a switch to this 
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impact on multifunctionality indicators. In the very different case of the 
Czech Republic, where pillar II measures place clear emphasis on agri-
environment issues (namely, the expansion of a scheme designed for 
grassland conservation), the respective model concludes that the effects of 
these rural policy instruments are distinctly positive for the environment. 
There will be many examples of programmes within this range with 
varying outcomes. Although there are ceilings on the percentage of funds 
that can be allocated to the main categories (cuts to measures under the 
new rural development regulations for 2007–13), major differences will 
persist, creating a considerable challenge for both forecasting measures and 
modelling policy scenarios. Rural development measures per se are not 
invariably associated with the enhanced provision of goods, as illustrated 
in Greece.   
Cross compliance 
If implemented according to guidelines and obligations commonly agreed 
upon by the member states and the European Commission, cross 
compliance should be expected to have positive repercussions on a number 
of multifunctionality indicators such as the levels of agricultural pollution, 
nature management and the control of land abandonment. These benefits 
could help to address some of the negative effects of decoupling, such as 
marginalisation and scrub invasions, which might otherwise occur 
according to theory and literature (see above). Although cross compliance 
has not been treated by the models in quantitative terms, certain interesting 
issues are being raised. A number of the research teams responsible for the 
implementation of case studies have pointed out that ‘good farming 
practices’ associated with eligibility for pillar II payments are not 
effectively enforced in the respective member states. In general the level 
and manner of implementation throughout the EU is uncertain at this point 
in time. In a few years, however, empirical evidence of how cross 
compliance has worked will be available and could well be employed in 
quantitative and qualitative policy-impact analyses. 
Some considerations about model effectiveness 
Models, in general, are not equally convincing and forceful when 
addressing different parameters. Models are better suited to the treatment 
of simple, quantifiable parameters such as employment, farm structures, 
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relationship to policy variables is quite complex. Models are less effective 
when they are called upon to handle less straightforward 
multifunctionality indicators such as landscape, cultural factors and 
biodiversity. Furthermore, in assessing the multifunctionality impact of 
agricultural policy reform in a holistic way, models should be designed and 
constructed to investigate links in the food supply chain. It is also 
important that the models assess how the impact of policy changes in 
Europe could affect certain countries outside the EU (e.g. the effects of the 
Doha round on environments and employment in developing countries).  
The discussion in this section leads us to another conclusion, namely 
that the assessment of policies and their consequences in relation to 
multifunctionality cannot be undertaken entirely through simple economic 
welfare analyses and models solely tailored to suit this perspective. 
Additional information on diversified socio-structural characteristics 
among member states and regions, farmers’ and consumers’ attitudes and 
preferences along with the role of institutions needs to be captured and 
incorporated into the analyses as far as possible.   
11.4  Issues that call for consideration and analysis 
We draw a number of conclusions from this exercise so far, as follows. 
•  Current models that seek to predict the response of agriculture in 
particular countries to likely changes in policy as a result of the Doha 
round can examine the ramifications on a broad range of potential 
indicators of multifunctionality. 
•  In general, the majority of predicted results in relation to 
multifunctionality indicators are plausible from the point of view of 
informed expert understanding, as measured by the forecasted 
direction and scale of change. Yet in some instances there can be 
unexpected anomalies that appear to stem from shortfalls in the 
modelling process rather than real-life challenges to the expert views. 
The models tend to adopt rather simplistic, standardised relations 
between farm sector change and the variety of multifunctionality 
indicators and, as with most modelling of this kind, the predicted 
outcomes are very dependent on the assumptions made in defining 
these relations.  
•  The models tend to pick up simple functional relationships – for 
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negative externalities such that more farming usually means less 
environment in a simple trade-off relationship – but they do less well 
where the effects are more complex. They are also more able to deal 
with linear relationships that can be objectively defined than with 
context-sensitive relationships where the perception of the effects can 
be contested. Also, national-level modelling approaches have limited 
ability to pick up spatially differentiated responses, whereas the 
regional ones have a tendency to suggest that regional and even sub-
regional variability of responses will be highly significant for 
multifunctionality. 
•  Because the models that we have examined here are for the most part 
nationally or regionally defined and are based on different 
approaches and methodologies, their results are not strictly 
comparable across member states or regions. Nevertheless, some 
comparisons may be valid in the context of expert interpretation of 
their overall findings. 
•  Some of the proposed multifunctionality indicators are potentially 
ambiguous. For example, a contraction of the farm workforce that 
comes as a result of policy reform can be seen as a positive 
development in cases where former farmers and their families 
diversify their income sources by spending more outside 
conventional farming. On the other hand, in a less buoyant economy, 
a reduction of employment in agriculture may lead to unemployment 
owing to a real or perceived lack of alternative sources of jobs or 
income. In particular areas this could result in outward migration and 
damage to traditional rural culture. 
Standing back from our modelling studies, it is possible to consider 
several important issues in relation to the multifunctionality/trade debate. 
There are strong arguments for incorporating multifunctionality 
objectives more explicitly in agricultural policy, not least in relation to 
changes in trade policy. The 2003 reform of the CAP was intended as a step 
in this direction, whatever the eventual outcome. In general, conservation 
and environmental quality provide a transparent and publicly acceptable 
basis for rural household support, which is also consistent with policy 
reforms that are acceptable in the framework of the WTO. Yet the efficient 
implementation of environmental policy in agriculture presupposes that 
support is addressed to agricultural activities that provide particular 
benefits to the natural environment. A policy favouring the adoption of a TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 313 
 
clear environmental basis for support would probably imply a 
redistribution of payments that is significantly different from that which 
currently prevails under the CAP. If farm payments are to be justified on 
the basis of a wide spectrum of environmental goals and multifunctionality 
indicators (biodiversity, landscape, historical features, water, soil and air 
quality), then a significant proportion of agricultural holdings might 
qualify for assistance at some level (Smith, 2001). In this respect, the critical 
issue is perhaps where the ‘reference level’ of responsible farming practice 
lies, below which no payment is justified whereas above it farmers should 
be rewarded for providing these public services. 
CAP decoupled transfers, along with a host of other income sources 
contribute to total household income. On the basis of a number of socio-
economic factors (age, preferences, wealth, family characteristics, location, 
the role of institutions, etc.) every farm household decides how to allocate 
income between consumption and savings/investment. In principle, 
households compare possible alternative rates of return in order to decide 
about how to invest. They keep on investing in the farm until expected 
returns cease to exceed returns associated with off-farm opportunities. In 
theory, decoupling alone should have practically no effect on farm 
investment; neither should it affect production levels. Nevertheless, 
decoupling will in practice influence production decisions when market 
failures exist, such as credit constraints that prevent farmers from profiting 
from farm investments. In such cases, decoupling might make it possible 
for the household to proceed with an investment that, in turn, might lead to 
a small increase of production (Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004). In practical 
terms, no agricultural policy tool designed to support producers’ incomes 
appears to be entirely production-neutral (OECD, 2001). 
A multifunctionality-oriented policy promoting environmental 
benefits from extensive agriculture needs to be related to the risk-averse 
behaviour of farmers. As variability in the market for agricultural goods 
and thus the level of market risk increases, as could be anticipated after the 
abolition of coupled support and adoption of the single farm payment 
(SFP) scheme, farmers can be expected to be less inclined to adopt more 
intensive practices (Oglethorpe, 1995). This consequence could bring about 
some ‘environmental dividend’ in certain intensively farmed areas of the 
EU. At the same time, however, decoupling could decrease the incentive to 
farm in marginal areas including some of high nature value that are 
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case negative environmental benefits could result. Hence decoupling, as a 
policy option, is clearly insufficient on its own to provide a socially optimal 
level of environmental benefit from agriculture. 
From the strict perspective of economic theory, there should be a 
clear distinction between policies designed to enhance farmers’ incomes 
and welfare and policies intended to promote multifunctionality in 
agriculture. Policies aiming at income enhancement have a focus on the 
farmers’ consumption abilities, whereas policies where multifunctionality 
is the primary goal are focused on farmers as producers of private and 
public goods (Prestegard, 2003). Yet in reality, it is often the case that 
instruments designed for the former purpose have been reinterpreted in 
the latter context; thus conversely, agri-environment and other pillar II 
payments have been perceived as providing an element of income support 
in many areas of Europe. 
It is possible that decoupled SFPs will allow marginally viable, small 
agricultural holdings to remain in operation for a longer period than would 
otherwise be the case. This category of farm might be able to cover variable 
expenses and thus remain in business in the short run. It is highly unlikely 
however, that large numbers of scarcely viable farms will remain in 
production in the long run because of rising land values and increasing 
competition. SFPs could offer a financial cushion enabling them to maintain 
their low-yield production and thus prevent structural change. By contrast, 
SFPs could be used by larger producers to buy production rights along 
with the land that is required, thus triggering greater structural change 
than might otherwise have occurred. The more efficient producers are 
likely to adopt newer technologies and exercise better management 
techniques, potentially raising yields and production levels. Therefore, the 
direction of the net effect of SFPs on restriction and consolidation is 
uncertain (Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004). 
The long-term decline in the farm labour force is driven by the ‘pull’ 
process of work off the farm and the ‘push’ process attributed to the 
adoption of labour-saving technology and declining returns to domestic 
producers as a result of increased market competition. It seems very likely 
that decoupled support, in the form of SFPs, will reinforce existing trends 
in this respect, thus leading to a further reduction of total work hours in 
agriculture. The introduction of decoupled support will probably leave use 
of labour by larger commercial farms fairly unaffected. Similarly, the 
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income is now a minor share of total household income, seem unlikely to 
shed significantly more labour as a result of SFPs. It seems most probable 
that labour losses will be concentrated in those middle-sized holdings 
where there is still scope to make cost savings through the adoption of less 
labour-intensive farming systems or through economies of scale gained 
through farm enlargement (Linares, 2003), 
11.5  Final recommendations 
Notwithstanding these points, it would be useful to develop more 
sensitivity to these issues in future trade modelling/policy analysis work, 
so that the EU’s international negotiators can draw upon these resources in 
considering options and negotiating details of agreements.  
This view suggests a need to improve multifunctionality models at 
the country or regional level so that their predictions can more fully inform 
wider debates. At least three areas of improvement would seem 
particularly worthwhile:  
1.  the introduction of spatial variation into the national models so that 
the differential effects on regions and sub-regions can be explored;  
2.  an attempt to include dynamic representations of effects upon other 
sectors beyond the farm gate, in examining the wider socio-economic 
aspects of multifunctionality; and 
3.  the identification of better means to incorporate the effects of CAP 
pillar II policies (as these become a more significant feature in EU 
countries) on sectoral and wider social and environmental para-
meters, if multifunctionality issues are to be adequately examined. 
At this stage, the models raise questions about the effects of trade-
driven policy changes including both the political benefits and downsides 
of decoupling. They provide a useful complement to more qualitative 
judgements. Yet they also point to the need for more effective use of a 
range of analytical tools and data sources in examining and explaining 
complex phenomena in the rural economy and society, including the 
results of policy evolution. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the modelling work that has been 
undertaken through the ENARPRI network has added to our 
understanding of the potential indications of multilateral trade agreements 
on the multifunctional character and qualities of agriculture across the EU, 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
ACP  African Caribbean and Pacific countries 
AMAD  Agricultural Market Access Database 
AMS  Aggregate measure of support 
AoA  Agreement on Agriculture 
AVE  Ad valorem tariff equivalent 
CAP  Common agricultural policy 
CCPs   Counter-cyclical payments 
CEECs   Central and Eastern European countries 
CGE   Computable, general equilibrium 
DDA   Doha Development Agenda 
DREMFIA  A partial equilibrium recursive model used in the case 
study of Finland 
EAGGF European  Agricultural  Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
EBA   Everything but Arms 
EEC   European Economic Community 
EPAs   Economic Partnership Agreements 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FADN  Farm Accountancy Data Network 
FAPRI  An economic, partial-equilibrium, agricultural commodity 
and inputs model used for the case study of Ireland 
FARMA-4    A non-linear optimising model used in the case study of 
the Czech Republic 
FTA   Free trade agreement 
GAFTA   Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
GATS   General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade TRADE AGREEMENTS, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY & EU AGRICULTURE | 319 
 
GHGs   Greenhouse gases 
GRIT   Generation of regional input–output tables 
GSP   Generalised System of Preferences 
GTAP   Global Trade Analysis Project 
IO   Input–output 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LDCs   Least-developed countries 
LFAs   Less-favoured areas 
MAcMap   Market Access Map, a database of customs tariffs or 
import duties of 178 countries  
MEDA   Financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership 
MERCOSUR  Customs union among Central and South American 
countries 
MFN   Most-favoured nation 
MPS   Market price support 
MTR   Mid-term review of the EU's common agricultural policy 
NCCS   National Climate Change Strategy for Ireland 
NSSG   National Statistical Service of Greece 
NUTS   NUTS is the EU nomenclature for territorial units for 
statistical purposes  
OCTs   Overseas countries and territories 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PSEs   Producer support estimates 
PTAs   Preferential trade agreements 
ROW   Rest of the world 
SAM  Social accounting matrix 
SAPS   Simplified Administrative Payment Scheme 320 | GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
SDT   Special and differential treatment 
SHDI   Shannon’s diversity index 
SPS   Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
SSG   Special safeguard mechanism 
STEs   State trading enterprises 
TAs   Trade agreements 
TBTs   Technical barriers to trade 
TRAINS   Trade Analysis and Information System,  an UNCTAD 
database 
TRIPS   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
TRQs   Tariff-rate quotas 
UAA   Utilised agricultural area 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
URAA   Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
VERs   Voluntary export restrictions 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
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